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13 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Devenpeck v. Alfordgreen2 sentences2024See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 , 153–54, 125 S. Ct. 588 , 160 L. 2024See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 , 153–54, 125 S. Ct. 588 , 160 L. | 1 | 1 |
Petrucelli v. City of Meridengreen1 sentence2020See Conn. Code Evid. § 6-10 (c). 10 Protective orders are also authorized upon an arrest for a violation of General Statutes § 53a-182b or 53a-183 provided that the court also finds that ‘‘such violation caused the victim to reasonably fear for his or her physical safety.’’ General Statutes § 54-1k (a). 11 Although not applicable here, § 46b-16a does expressly limit its applica- tion to those persons who have not obtained any other type of protective order arising out of the same alleged abuse, assault or stalking and who do not qualify to seek relief under § 46b-15. 12 We note that, ‘‘[t]o th | 1 | 1 |
Heisinger v. Dillongreen1 sentence2020See Conn. Code Evid. § 6-10 (c). 10 Protective orders are also authorized upon an arrest for a violation of General Statutes § 53a-182b or 53a-183 provided that the court also finds that ‘‘such violation caused the victim to reasonably fear for his or her physical safety.’’ General Statutes § 54-1k (a). 11 Although not applicable here, § 46b-16a does expressly limit its applica- tion to those persons who have not obtained any other type of protective order arising out of the same alleged abuse, assault or stalking and who do not qualify to seek relief under § 46b-15. 12 We note that, ‘‘[t]o th | 1 | 1 |
Glik v. Cunniffegreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011) (‘‘we have previously recognized that the videotaping of public officials is an exercise of [f]irst [a]mendment liberties’’). | 1 | 1 |
Washington Mutual Bank v. Coughlingreen2 sentences2020See Conn. Code Evid. § 6-10 (c). 10 Protective orders are also authorized upon an arrest for a violation of General Statutes § 53a-182b or 53a-183 provided that the court also finds that ‘‘such violation caused the victim to reasonably fear for his or her physical safety.’’ General Statutes § 54-1k (a). 11 Although not applicable here, § 46b-16a does expressly limit its applica- tion to those persons who have not obtained any other type of protective order arising out of the same alleged abuse, assault or stalking and who do not qualify to seek relief under § 46b-15. 12 We note that, ‘‘[t]o th 2020See Conn. Code Evid. § 6-10 (c). 10 Protective orders are also authorized upon an arrest for a violation of General Statutes § 53a-182b or 53a-183 provided that the court also finds that ‘‘such violation caused the victim to reasonably fear for his or her physical safety.’’ General Statutes § 54-1k (a). 11 Although not applicable here, § 46b-16a does expressly limit its applica- tion to those persons who have not obtained any other type of protective order arising out of the same alleged abuse, assault or stalking and who do not qualify to seek relief under § 46b-15. 12 We note that, ‘‘[t]o th | 1 | 1 |
Fishbein v. Commissioner of Motor Vehiclesgreen1 sentence1999Compare Fishbein v. Kozlowski , 48 Conn. App. 552 , 555 , 719 A.2d 902 (1998) (defendant challenged his arrest for violating General Statutes § 14-227a on the ground that a police officer lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop his vehicle). | 1 | 1 |
Fishbein v. Kozlowskigreen1 sentence1999Compare Fishbein v. Kozlowski , 48 Conn. App. 552 , 555 , 719 A.2d 902 (1998) (defendant challenged his arrest for violating General Statutes § 14-227a on the ground that a police officer lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop his vehicle). | 1 | 1 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1993A “[T]he principles of fundamental fairness that are the hallmark of due process permit a brief investigatory detention, even in the absence of probable cause, if the police have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184 , 579 A.2d 484 (1990); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. 1993A “[T]he principles of fundamental fairness that are the hallmark of due process permit a brief investigatory detention, even in the absence of probable cause, if the police have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184 , 579 A.2d 484 (1990); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Carey
green
2 sentences2020The trial court found that the defendant violated §§ 53a-48 and 21a-277 (a), and §§ 21a-277 (a) and 21a-267 (a), which were not included in the application for the arrest warrant.19 ‘‘[A] defendant cannot be found in violation of probation on grounds other than those with which he is charged . . . .’’ State v. Carey, 30 Conn. App. 346, 349 , 620 A.2d 201 (1993), rev’d on other grounds, 228 Conn. 487 , 636 A.2d 840 (1994). 2020The trial court found that the defendant violated §§ 53a-48 and 21a-277 (a), and §§ 21a-277 (a) and 21a-267 (a), which were not included in the application for the arrest warrant.19 ‘‘[A] defendant cannot be found in violation of probation on grounds other than those with which he is charged . . . .’’ State v. Carey, 30 Conn. App. 346, 349 , 620 A.2d 201 (1993), rev’d on other grounds, 228 Conn. 487 , 636 A.2d 840 (1994). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Carey
green
2 sentences2020The trial court found that the defendant violated §§ 53a-48 and 21a-277 (a), and §§ 21a-277 (a) and 21a-267 (a), which were not included in the application for the arrest warrant.19 ‘‘[A] defendant cannot be found in violation of probation on grounds other than those with which he is charged . . . .’’ State v. Carey, 30 Conn. App. 346, 349 , 620 A.2d 201 (1993), rev’d on other grounds, 228 Conn. 487 , 636 A.2d 840 (1994). 2020The trial court found that the defendant violated §§ 53a-48 and 21a-277 (a), and §§ 21a-277 (a) and 21a-267 (a), which were not included in the application for the arrest warrant.19 ‘‘[A] defendant cannot be found in violation of probation on grounds other than those with which he is charged . . . .’’ State v. Carey, 30 Conn. App. 346, 349 , 620 A.2d 201 (1993), rev’d on other grounds, 228 Conn. 487 , 636 A.2d 840 (1994). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Arline
green
1 sentence2015We accord plenary review, however, to the determination that the facts as found amount to probable cause.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Robinson, 105 Conn. App. 179, 191 , 937 A.2d 717 (2008), aff’d, 290 Conn. 381 , 963 A.2d 59 (2009). ‘‘However, [w]e [will] give great deference to the findings of the trial court because of its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arline, 74 Conn. App. 693 , 699–700, 813 A.2d 153 , cert. denied, 263 Conn. 907 , 819 A.2d 841 (2003). ‘‘A police office | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Weihing v. Silbert
green
1 sentence2015We accord plenary review, however, to the determination that the facts as found amount to probable cause.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Robinson, 105 Conn. App. 179, 191 , 937 A.2d 717 (2008), aff’d, 290 Conn. 381 , 963 A.2d 59 (2009). ‘‘However, [w]e [will] give great deference to the findings of the trial court because of its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arline, 74 Conn. App. 693 , 699–700, 813 A.2d 153 , cert. denied, 263 Conn. 907 , 819 A.2d 841 (2003). ‘‘A police office | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Arline
green
2 sentences2015We accord plenary review, however, to the determination that the facts as found amount to probable cause.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Robinson, 105 Conn. App. 179, 191 , 937 A.2d 717 (2008), aff’d, 290 Conn. 381 , 963 A.2d 59 (2009). ‘‘However, [w]e [will] give great deference to the findings of the trial court because of its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arline, 74 Conn. App. 693 , 699–700, 813 A.2d 153 , cert. denied, 263 Conn. 907 , 819 A.2d 841 (2003). ‘‘A police office 2015We accord plenary review, however, to the determination that the facts as found amount to probable cause.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Robinson, 105 Conn. App. 179, 191 , 937 A.2d 717 (2008), aff’d, 290 Conn. 381 , 963 A.2d 59 (2009). ‘‘However, [w]e [will] give great deference to the findings of the trial court because of its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arline, 74 Conn. App. 693 , 699–700, 813 A.2d 153 , cert. denied, 263 Conn. 907 , 819 A.2d 841 (2003). ‘‘A police office | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2015We accord plenary review, however, to the determination that the facts as found amount to probable cause.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Robinson, 105 Conn. App. 179, 191 , 937 A.2d 717 (2008), aff’d, 290 Conn. 381 , 963 A.2d 59 (2009). ‘‘However, [w]e [will] give great deference to the findings of the trial court because of its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arline, 74 Conn. App. 693 , 699–700, 813 A.2d 153 , cert. denied, 263 Conn. 907 , 819 A.2d 841 (2003). ‘‘A police office 2015We accord plenary review, however, to the determination that the facts as found amount to probable cause.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Robinson, 105 Conn. App. 179, 191 , 937 A.2d 717 (2008), aff’d, 290 Conn. 381 , 963 A.2d 59 (2009). ‘‘However, [w]e [will] give great deference to the findings of the trial court because of its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arline, 74 Conn. App. 693 , 699–700, 813 A.2d 153 , cert. denied, 263 Conn. 907 , 819 A.2d 841 (2003). ‘‘A police office | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2015We accord plenary review, however, to the determination that the facts as found amount to probable cause.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Robinson, 105 Conn. App. 179, 191 , 937 A.2d 717 (2008), aff’d, 290 Conn. 381 , 963 A.2d 59 (2009). ‘‘However, [w]e [will] give great deference to the findings of the trial court because of its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arline, 74 Conn. App. 693 , 699–700, 813 A.2d 153 , cert. denied, 263 Conn. 907 , 819 A.2d 841 (2003). ‘‘A police office 2015We accord plenary review, however, to the determination that the facts as found amount to probable cause.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Robinson, 105 Conn. App. 179, 191 , 937 A.2d 717 (2008), aff’d, 290 Conn. 381 , 963 A.2d 59 (2009). ‘‘However, [w]e [will] give great deference to the findings of the trial court because of its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arline, 74 Conn. App. 693 , 699–700, 813 A.2d 153 , cert. denied, 263 Conn. 907 , 819 A.2d 841 (2003). ‘‘A police office | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences2013State v. Davis, 261 Conn. 553, 567 , 804 A.2d 781 (2002). “[A] defendant charged with violating § 53a-167a (a) . . . is not entitled to a self-defense instruction. 2013State v. Davis, 261 Conn. 553, 567 , 804 A.2d 781 (2002). “[A] defendant charged with violating § 53a-167a (a) . . . is not entitled to a self-defense instruction. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Dukes
green
2 sentences2008Custodial arrests not only serve to protect the police themselves, but also serve ... to assist in the investigation of crime.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 121 , 547 A.2d 10 (1988). 2008Custodial arrests not only serve to protect the police themselves, but also serve ... to assist in the investigation of crime.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 121 , 547 A.2d 10 (1988). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Santiago
green
2 sentences2008“The search incident to an arrest exception . . . has traditionally been justified by the reasonableness of searching for weapons, instruments of escape and evidence of crime when a person is taken into custody and lawfully detained.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santiago, 17 Conn. App. 273, 276-77 , 552 A.2d 438 (1989). “[W]e have recognized that the police may make a search without a warrant incidental to a lawful custodial arrest. . . . 2008“The search incident to an arrest exception . . . has traditionally been justified by the reasonableness of searching for weapons, instruments of escape and evidence of crime when a person is taken into custody and lawfully detained.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santiago, 17 Conn. App. 273, 276-77 , 552 A.2d 438 (1989). “[W]e have recognized that the police may make a search without a warrant incidental to a lawful custodial arrest. . . . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Toler
neutral
2 sentences2005Section 53a-32(a) provides, in relevant part, that upon a defendant's arrest for a violation of probation, "the court shall cause the defendant to be brought before *553 it without unnecessary delay for a hearing on the violation charges...." In State v. Toler, 192 Conn. 321 , 471 A.2d 643 (1984), our Supreme Court set forth enumerated factors to be considered in determining whether a delay between arraignment for a violation of probation and hearing constituted an unnecessary delay. 2005Section 53a-32(a) provides, in relevant part, that upon a defendant's arrest for a violation of probation, "the court shall cause the defendant to be brought before *553 it without unnecessary delay for a hearing on the violation charges...." In State v. Toler, 192 Conn. 321 , 471 A.2d 643 (1984), our Supreme Court set forth enumerated factors to be considered in determining whether a delay between arraignment for a violation of probation and hearing constituted an unnecessary delay. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Magnotti
green
2 sentences1998In addition, our case law establishes that “ ‘searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detention.’ ” State v. Magnotti, 198 Conn. 209, 214-15 , 502 A.2d 404 (1985), quoting United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803 , 94 S. Ct. 1234 , 39 L. 1998In addition, our case law establishes that “ ‘searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detention.’ ” State v. Magnotti, 198 Conn. 209, 214-15 , 502 A.2d 404 (1985), quoting United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803 , 94 S. Ct. 1234 , 39 L. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
United States v. Edwards
green
2 sentences1998In addition, our case law establishes that “ ‘searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detention.’ ” State v. Magnotti, 198 Conn. 209, 214-15 , 502 A.2d 404 (1985), quoting United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803 , 94 S. Ct. 1234 , 39 L. 1998In addition, our case law establishes that “ ‘searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detention.’ ” State v. Magnotti, 198 Conn. 209, 214-15 , 502 A.2d 404 (1985), quoting United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803 , 94 S. Ct. 1234 , 39 L. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Lampasona v. Jacobs
green
2 sentences1993Lampasona v. Jacobs, 209 Conn. 724 , 728 553 A.2d 175 (1989). 1993Lampasona v. Jacobs, 209 Conn. 724 , 728 553 A.2d 175 (1989). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Lamme
green
2 sentences1993A “[T]he principles of fundamental fairness that are the hallmark of due process permit a brief investigatory detention, even in the absence of probable cause, if the police have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184 , 579 A.2d 484 (1990); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. 1993A “[T]he principles of fundamental fairness that are the hallmark of due process permit a brief investigatory detention, even in the absence of probable cause, if the police have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184 , 579 A.2d 484 (1990); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Krueger
green
1 sentence1991In interpreting the Illinois statute, which provides that the person must have been “placed under arrest,” *318 the court in People v. Krueger, 208 Ill. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
United States v. Robinson
green
2 sentences1989United States v. Robinson, [ 414 U.S. 218, 234 , 94 S. Ct. 467 , 38 L. 1989United States v. Robinson, [ 414 U.S. 218, 234 , 94 S. Ct. 467 , 38 L. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.