arrest exception in Indiana

1992Rabadi v. State (1989), Ind., 541 N.E.2d 271 ; Fyock v. State (1982), Ind., 436 N.E.2d 1089 ; Murrell v. State (1981), Ind., 421 N.E.2d 638 .

1992Rabadi v. State (1989), Ind., 541 N.E.2d 271 ; Fyock v. State (1982), Ind., 436 N.E.2d 1089 ; Murrell v. State (1981), Ind., 421 N.E.2d 638 .

1992Rabadi v. State (1989), Ind., 541 N.E.2d 271 ; Fyock v. State (1982), Ind., 436 N.E.2d 1089 ; Murrell v. State (1981), Ind., 421 N.E.2d 638 .

1982Our Supreme Court in Fyock v. State (1982) Ind., 436 N.E.2d 1089 , stated: “We do not regard the Belton case as enunciating a ‘new’ constitutional principle- [T]he Court only sought to explain and elaborate on the ‘search incident to an arrest’ exception .... ...

2016But failing to inform the trial court of a defendant’s arrest is error, and the State’s attempt to use this error as justification for the delay .would preclude Arion from availing himself of the protections of Rule 4 through no fault of his own. [14] It is true we have occasionally found a trial court’s lack of knowledge of a defendant’s whereabouts to be relevant for Rule 4(C) purposes. 5 Feuston v. State, 953 N.E.2d 545 (Ind.Ct.App.2011); Werner v. State, 818 N.E.2d 26 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).

2016But failing to inform the trial court of a defendant’s arrest is error, and the State’s attempt to use this error as justification for the delay .would preclude Arion from availing himself of the protections of Rule 4 through no fault of his own. [14] It is true we have occasionally found a trial court’s lack of knowledge of a defendant’s whereabouts to be relevant for Rule 4(C) purposes. 5 Feuston v. State, 953 N.E.2d 545 (Ind.Ct.App.2011); Werner v. State, 818 N.E.2d 26 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).

2015The State asserts there was probable cause to make an arrest and that the factors of degree of suspicion and law enforcement needs to preserve evidence weigh in favor of a search incident to arrest. [22] We consider “the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred.” Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361 .

2011Row, 864 N.E.2d at 1016 .

2002The State petitions for rehearing 1 of our opinion in Edwards v. State, 762 N.E.2d 128 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). 2 We grant the State's petition for the limited purpose of addressing the State's arguments that we improperly considered the absence of "exigent cireumstances" to justify the State's warrantless search of a vehicle and that we misapplied the search incident to an arrest exception to the warrant requirement.

2000As an exception to the exclusionary rule, our courts have held that “if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means ... then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.” Banks v. State, 681 N.E.2d 235, 240 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)).

2000As an exception to the exclusionary rule, our courts have held that “if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means ... then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.” Banks v. State, 681 N.E.2d 235, 240 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)).

1995Id. at 1378 .

1994Woods appeals the denial of that motion. “[A] warrantless search of an automobile may be conducted during the course of an arrest under the exception which permits a search of the immediate area that is within the arrestee’s control.” Jackson v. State (1992), Ind.App., 588 N.E.2d 588, 590 .

1994Woods appeals the denial of that motion. "[A] warrantless search of an automobile may be conducted during the course of an arrest under the exception which permits a search of the immediate area that is within the arrestee's control." Jackson v. State (1992), Ind. App., 588 N.E.2d 588, 590 .

1993The plain view doctrine was established by Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 , and modified by Horton v. California (1990), 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 LEd.2d 112, and requires that a police officer must lawfully be in a place where he or she can view the item seized, the item must in fact be in plain view at the time it is discovered, and it must be immediately apparent to the officer upon discovery that the item is evidence of a crime.

1993The plain view doctrine was established by Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 , and modified by Horton v. California (1990), 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 LEd.2d 112, and requires that a police officer must lawfully be in a place where he or she can view the item seized, the item must in fact be in plain view at the time it is discovered, and it must be immediately apparent to the officer upon discovery that the item is evidence of a crime.

1992Rabadi v. State (1989), Ind., 541 N.E.2d 271 ; Fyock v. State (1982), Ind., 436 N.E.2d 1089 ; Murrell v. State (1981), Ind., 421 N.E.2d 638 .

1992Rabadi v. State (1989), Ind., 541 N.E.2d 271 ; Fyock v. State (1982), Ind., 436 N.E.2d 1089 ; Murrell v. State (1981), Ind., 421 N.E.2d 638 .

1989Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); Murrell v. State (1981), Ind., 421 N.E.2d 638 .

1989Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); Murrell v. State (1981), Ind., 421 N.E.2d 638 .

1973See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray (1967), 386 U.S. 547 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 ; McCray v. City of Lake Louisvilla (Ky. 1960), 332 S.W.2d 837 .

1973Throop v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 342 , 259 N.E.2d 875 .

1973Throop v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 342 , 259 N.E.2d 875 .

1926State v. Madison (1909), 23 S. D. 584, 122 N. W. 647 . *185 But it was held that such right could be exercised only at the time of making the arrest, and not by returning, after the party arrested' had been taken away, and reentering the house to seize the liquor without a search warrant.