arrest exception in Texas

1990In Brown the Supreme Court held, however, that Miranda warnings are insufficient standing alone to attenuate the taint of an arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, though are an important factor, in- determining whether the confession or statement was obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. 422 U.S. at 603 , 95 S.Ct. at 2261 .

1990In Brown the Supreme Court held, however, that Miranda warnings are insufficient standing alone to attenuate the taint of an arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, though are an important factor, in- determining whether the confession or statement was obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. 422 U.S. at 603 , 95 S.Ct. at 2261 .

2013McGee, 105 S.W.3d at 615 ; see Miller v. State, 393 S.W.3d 255, 263 (Tex. Crim.

2013McGee, 105 S.W.3d at 615 ; see Miller v. State, 393 S.W.3d 255, 263 (Tex. Crim.

2003See Peacock, 77 S.W.3d at 287-88 (holding that the trial court's jurisdiction continues after the probationary period has expired "[a]s long as both a motion alleging a violation of probationary terms is filed and a capias or arrest warrant is issued prior to the expiration of the term, followed by due diligence to apprehend the probationer and to hear and determine the allegations in the motion").

2003See Peacock, 77 S.W.3d at 287-88 (holding that the trial court’s jurisdiction continues after the probationary period has expired “[a]s long as both a motion alleging a violation of probationary terms is filed and a capias or arrest warrant is issued prior to the expiration of the term, followed by due diligence to apprehend the probationer and to hear and determine the allegations in the motion").

1990See also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 , 102 S.Ct. 2664 , 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982); Barber v. State, 737 S.W.2d 824, 832 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).

1990See also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 , 102 S.Ct. 2664 , 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982); Barber v. State, 737 S.W.2d 824, 832 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).

2024Nevertheless, the evidence against Hinojosa’s self- 4 See Alexander v. State, 88 S.W.3d 772, 781 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, pet. ref’d). - 18 - 04-22-00401-CR defense argument outweighed the prejudicial effect of the mug shot, and Hinojosa’s substantial rights were not affected.

2018The search of the tin can was justified by virtue of the lawful arrest “[T]he search incident to an arrest exception is premised upon promoting officer safety and preventing the destruction of evidence relating to the crime for which the person was arrested.” State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399, 413 (Tex. Crim.

2016Search Incident to Arrest Exception The exception for a warrantless search incident to arrest “derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 338 , 129 S.Ct. at 1716 ; see State v. Elias, 339 S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex.Crim.App.2011).

2016Search Incident to Arrest Exception The exception for a warrantless search incident to arrest “derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 338 , 129 S. Ct. at 1716 ; see State v. Elias, 339 S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex. Crim.

2015Bassin v. Towber, 894 S.W.2d 25, 31 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied].

2014As the Supreme Court recently explained in Arizona v. Gant,52 the search incident to an arrest exception to the warrant requirement is premised upon promoting officer safety and preventing the destruction of evidence relating to the crime for which the person was arrested.53 Although Gant involved the search of a car, courts have discussed its application to other situations in which “the item searched is removed from the suspect’s control between 50 Id. at 3-4. 51 See, e.g., Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354-55 (2001) (officers could arrest and jail mother who, along with her children,

2010Attorney v. Lacafta, 965 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (finding petitioner not entitled to expunction when she was never arrested or detained by the police); Carson v. State, 65 S.W.3d 774, 780-84 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (holding that although petitioner was never physically arrested, he submitted to authority by appearing in court in response to a citation, and therefore, he met the arrest requirement under the ex-punction statute); Ex parte S.C., 305 S.W.3d 258, 263-65 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (determining that petitioner was n

2010Attorney v. Lacafta, 965 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (finding petitioner not entitled to expunction when she was never arrested or detained by the police); Carson v. State, 65 S.W.3d 774, 780-84 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (holding that although petitioner was never physically arrested, he submitted to authority by appearing in court in response to a citation, and therefore, he met the arrest requirement under the ex-punction statute); Ex parte S.C., 305 S.W.3d 258, 263-65 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (determining that petitioner was n

2010Attorney v. Lacafta, 965 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (finding petitioner not entitled to expunction when she was never arrested or detained by the police); Carson v. State, 65 S.W.3d 774, 780-84 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (holding that although petitioner was never physically arrested, he submitted to authority by appearing in court in response to a citation, and therefore, he met the arrest requirement under the ex-punction statute); Ex parte S.C., 305 S.W.3d 258, 263-65 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (determining that petitioner was n

2007See Devenpeck v. Alford , 543 U.S. 146, 154-55 (2004).

2004Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 617 , 124 S.Ct. 2127, 2129 , 158 L.Ed.2d 905, 910-11 (2004); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 , 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); Satterwhite v. State, 726 S.W.2d 81, 87 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), rev’d on other grounds, 486 U.S. 249 , 108 S.Ct. 1792 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284 . 486 U.S. 249 , 108 S.Ct. 1792 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988).

2004Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 617 , 124 S.Ct. 2127, 2129 , 158 L.Ed.2d 905, 910-11 (2004); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 , 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); Satterwhite v. State, 726 S.W.2d 81, 87 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), rev’d on other grounds, 486 U.S. 249 , 108 S.Ct. 1792 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284 . 486 U.S. 249 , 108 S.Ct. 1792 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988).

2004Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 617 , 124 S.Ct. 2127, 2129 , 158 L.Ed.2d 905, 910-11 (2004); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 , 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); Satterwhite v. State, 726 S.W.2d 81, 87 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), rev’d on other grounds, 486 U.S. 249 , 108 S.Ct. 1792 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284 . 486 U.S. 249 , 108 S.Ct. 1792 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988).

1999See id. at 95 .

1990See also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 , 102 S.Ct. 2664 , 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982); Barber v. State, 737 S.W.2d 824, 832 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).

1988In that case, the Court considered a statute which forbade an officer to make an arrest for violation of automobile speed laws “unless he wear a diamond-shaped badge and a cap, coat, and trousers of blue or dark gray.” Id. at 592.

1983Nevertheless, before considering the applicability of the res gestae of the arrest exception to this cause, we first point out the following: there was positive proof by the State of the allegations in the indictment; appellant did not inject into the case any issue that would have authorized the admission into evidence of the spontaneous declaration, compare Ex parte Carter, 621 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Bell v. State, 620 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); the cross examination of the complainant did not exceed the bounds of proper cross examination, see Caldwell v. State, 477 S.W.2d 877, 879

1983Nevertheless, before considering the applicability of the res gestae of the arrest exception to this cause, we first point out the following: there was positive proof by the State of the allegations in the indictment; appellant did not inject into the case any issue that would have authorized the admission into evidence of the spontaneous declaration, compare Ex parte Carter, 621 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Bell v. State, 620 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); the cross examination of the complainant did not exceed the bounds of proper cross examination, see Caldwell v. State, 477 S.W.2d 877, 879

1983In a parallel situation, the Court of Criminal Appeals, in Green v. State, 594 S.W.2d 72, 73-74 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), reversed a conviction founded upon evidence resulting from an arrest for violation of the Waco Municipal Innkeepers Ordinance, where the ordinance in question was not properly introduced into evidence.