arrest violation in Maryland

1987It is not the belief of the officer that determines the validity of the arrest; it is whether, in the situation in which he found himself, he had probable cause to believe a felony had been committed and that the person arrested committed it.” Id. at 532, 252 A.2d 290 (emphasis added).

1969It is not the belief of the officer that determines the validity of the arrest; it is whether, in the situation in which he found himself, he had probable cause to believe a felony had been committed and that the person arrested committed it.” And see Boddie and Brooks v. State, 6 Md.

2018App. at 221 , 906 A.2d 1089 (stating that at the time of a canine alert there was "unquestionable probable cause for the warrantless arrest of" a vehicle's driver); and (2) that "the 'search incident to an arrest' exception to the warrant requirement is applicable as long as the search is 'essentially contemporaneous' with the arrest," Barrett v. State , 234 Md.

2018App. 653 , 672, 174 A.3d 441 (2017) (quoting Wilson v. State , 150 Md.

2018App. 653 , 672, 174 A.3d 441 (2017) (quoting Wilson v. State , 150 Md.

2018App. at 221 , 906 A.2d 1089 (stating that at the time of a canine alert there was "unquestionable probable cause for the warrantless arrest of" a vehicle's driver); and (2) that "the 'search incident to an arrest' exception to the warrant requirement is applicable as long as the search is 'essentially contemporaneous' with the arrest," Barrett v. State , 234 Md.

2016The Court of Special Appeals agreed on that point and concluded that there was a factual dispute as to whether the regulation had been posted prior to the arrest, thereby precluding the award of summary judgment. 219 Md.App. at 179 , 100 A.3d 499 .

2016The Court of Special Appeals agreed on that point and concluded that there was a factual dispute as to whether the regulation had been posted prior to the arrest, thereby precluding the award of summary judgment. 219 Md.App. at 179 , 100 A.3d 499 .

2011Our discussion of the alleged arrest requirement was relevant because the Shepard driver argued that, at his suspension hearing, the "ALJ applied the wrong legal standard in construing the meaning of 'reasonable grounds’ " and that " 'reasonable grounds' [meant] ‘a preponderance of the evidence standard' or at the very least, probable cause.” Id. at 254 , 923 A.2d at 107 .

2011Our discussion of the alleged arrest requirement was relevant because the Shepard driver argued that, at his suspension hearing, the "ALJ applied the wrong legal standard in construing the meaning of 'reasonable grounds’ " and that " 'reasonable grounds' [meant] ‘a preponderance of the evidence standard' or at the very least, probable cause.” Id. at 254 , 923 A.2d at 107 .

2007See e.g., State v. Collier, 279 Ga. 316 , 612 S.E.2d 281, 284 (Ga.2005) (holding that the Georgia implied consent law contemplates arrest, and therefore requires probable cause to conduct an alcohol concentration test); Verdoorn v. Director of Revenue, 119 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Mo.2003) (en banc) (noting that Missouri law requires an arrest supported by probable cause before an officer may conduct an alcohol concentration test); Pooler v. MVD, 306 Or. 47 , 755 P.2d 701, 702 (1988) (en banc) (noting that Oregon law requires an arrest supported by probable cause before an officer may request an alcoh

2007See e.g., State v. Collier, 279 Ga. 316 , 612 S.E.2d 281, 284 (Ga.2005) (holding that the Georgia implied consent law contemplates arrest, and therefore requires probable cause to conduct an alcohol concentration test); Verdoorn v. Director of Revenue, 119 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Mo.2003) (en banc) (noting that Missouri law requires an arrest supported by probable cause before an officer may conduct an alcohol concentration test); Pooler v. MVD, 306 Or. 47 , 755 P.2d 701, 702 (1988) (en banc) (noting that Oregon law requires an arrest supported by probable cause before an officer may request an alcoh

2007See e.g., State v. Collier, 279 Ga. 316 , 612 S.E.2d 281, 284 (Ga.2005) (holding that the Georgia implied consent law contemplates arrest, and therefore requires probable cause to conduct an alcohol concentration test); Verdoorn v. Director of Revenue, 119 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Mo.2003) (en banc) (noting that Missouri law requires an arrest supported by probable cause before an officer may conduct an alcohol concentration test); Pooler v. MVD, 306 Or. 47 , 755 P.2d 701, 702 (1988) (en banc) (noting that Oregon law requires an arrest supported by probable cause before an officer may request an alcoh

2007See e.g., State v. Collier, 279 Ga. 316 , 612 S.E.2d 281, 284 (Ga.2005) (holding that the Georgia implied consent law contemplates arrest, and therefore requires probable cause to conduct an alcohol concentration test); Verdoorn v. Director of Revenue, 119 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Mo.2003) (en banc) (noting that Missouri law requires an arrest supported by probable cause before an officer may conduct an alcohol concentration test); Pooler v. MVD, 306 Or. 47 , 755 P.2d 701, 702 (1988) (en banc) (noting that Oregon law requires an arrest supported by probable cause before an officer may request an alcoh

2006Johnson, 352 Md. 374 , 722 A.2d 873 (holding that the trial judge exerted improper influence by, in the presence of the jury, ordering the arrest of defense counsel, interrupting counsel frequently, holding counsel in contempt); Vandegrift v. State, 237 Md. 305, 311 , 206 A.2d 250, 254 (1965) (“The questioning by the trial judge showing his disbelief of the witness’ testimony was beyond the line of impartiality over which a judge must not step.”).

2006Johnson, 352 Md. 374 , 722 A.2d 873 (holding that the trial judge exerted improper influence by, in the presence of the jury, ordering the arrest of defense counsel, interrupting counsel frequently, holding counsel in contempt); Vandegrift v. State, 237 Md. 305, 311 , 206 A.2d 250, 254 (1965) (“The questioning by the trial judge showing his disbelief of the witness’ testimony was beyond the line of impartiality over which a judge must not step.”).

2001To be sure, both cases mentioned a search incident to an arrest as an exception to the prohibition against war-rantless searches of dwelling houses, Agnello, 269 U.S. at 31 , 46 S.Ct. at 6 , 70 L.Ed. at 148 ; Johnson, 333 U.S. at 16-17 , 68 S.Ct. at 370 , 92 L.Ed. at 442 .

2001To be sure, both cases mentioned a search incident to an arrest as an exception to the prohibition against war-rantless searches of dwelling houses, Agnello, 269 U.S. at 31 , 46 S.Ct. at 6 , 70 L.Ed. at 148 ; Johnson, 333 U.S. at 16-17 , 68 S.Ct. at 370 , 92 L.Ed. at 442 .

2001To be sure, both cases mentioned a search incident to an arrest as an exception to the prohibition against war-rantless searches of dwelling houses, Agnello, 269 U.S. at 31 , 46 S.Ct. at 6 , 70 L.Ed. at 148 ; Johnson, 333 U.S. at 16-17 , 68 S.Ct. at 370 , 92 L.Ed. at 442 .

2001To be sure, both cases mentioned a search incident to an arrest as an exception to the prohibition against war-rantless searches of dwelling houses, Agnello, 269 U.S. at 31 , 46 S.Ct. at 6 , 70 L.Ed. at 148 ; Johnson, 333 U.S. at 16-17 , 68 S.Ct. at 370 , 92 L.Ed. at 442 .

2000In our opinion, this was proper under the circumstances of the arrest for the violation of the motor vehicle law and the check of the serial number was not a “mere pretext” to discover what was contained in the rear portion of the Sedacca vehicle. 252 Md. at 221-22 , 249 A.2d 456 (underlining supplied; italics in original).

2000In our opinion, this was proper under the circumstances of the arrest for the violation of the motor vehicle law and the check of the serial number was not a “mere pretext” to discover what was contained in the rear portion of the Sedacca vehicle. 252 Md. at 221-22 , 249 A.2d 456 (underlining supplied; italics in original).

2000Fourteen years later, in Foster v. State, 297 Md. 191 , 464 A.2d 986 (1983), the Court of Appeals recognized that an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence.

2000Fourteen years later, in Foster v. State, 297 Md. 191 , 464 A.2d 986 (1983), the Court of Appeals recognized that an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence.

1999The majority concluded instead that a “degree of intrusiveness ‘beyond Terry ’ ... does not necessarily mean that the State has satisfied the arrest requirement when it seeks to justify [a search] on the basis of an arrest.” Id. at 357 , 688 A.2d at 33 (quoting 3 Wayne R.

1999The majority concluded instead that a “degree of intrusiveness ‘beyond Terry ’ ... does not necessarily mean that the State has satisfied the arrest requirement when it seeks to justify [a search] on the basis of an arrest.” Id. at 357 , 688 A.2d at 33 (quoting 3 Wayne R.

1996See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 , 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1632 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726, 740 (1963); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 , 48 S.Ct. 137 , 72 L.Ed. 293 (1927).

1996See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 , 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1632 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726, 740 (1963); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 , 48 S.Ct. 137 , 72 L.Ed. 293 (1927).

1996See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 305 , 78 S.Ct. 1190, 1193-1194 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1332, 1336 (1958) (arrest for federal offense by municipal police officer, and the Court stated that, in the “circumstance of an arrest for violation of federal law by state peace officers, ... the lawfulness of the arrest without warrant is to be determined by reference to state law”); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 , 68 S.Ct. 222, 226 , 92 L.Ed. 210 , 217 (1948) (a municipal police department detective arrested the defendant for possessing counterfeit gasoline ration coupons in violation o

1996See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 305 , 78 S.Ct. 1190, 1193-1194 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1332, 1336 (1958) (arrest for federal offense by municipal police officer, and the Court stated that, in the “circumstance of an arrest for violation of federal law by state peace officers, ... the lawfulness of the arrest without warrant is to be determined by reference to state law”); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 , 68 S.Ct. 222, 226 , 92 L.Ed. 210 , 217 (1948) (a municipal police department detective arrested the defendant for possessing counterfeit gasoline ration coupons in violation o

1987In Simms v. State, 4 Md.App. 160 [ 242 A.2d 185 (1968) ], we noted at page 167: “In assessing the validity of an arrest under the rule the essential ingredient is that probable cause existed within the knowledge of the arresting officer and not that he necessarily construed that knowledge correctly.

1987In Simms v. State, 4 Md.App. 160 [ 242 A.2d 185 (1968) ], we noted at page 167: “In assessing the validity of an arrest under the rule the essential ingredient is that probable cause existed within the knowledge of the arresting officer and not that he necessarily construed that knowledge correctly.

1973We likewise noted in Paul , citing with approval Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610 , 56 A. 2d 813 (1948), that the question of whether an arrest is motivated by malice or whether there exists wantonness is generally a question for the jury. 2 In addition to those facts we have recited, there was the additional testimony that, in effect, after having been forced to empty his pockets to establish his innocence, appellee was momentarily prevented from leaving the security office unless he agreed to sign a civil release, to which appellant was neither in fact nor in law entitled.

1973We likewise noted in Paul , citing with approval Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610 , 56 A. 2d 813 (1948), that the question of whether an arrest is motivated by malice or whether there exists wantonness is generally a question for the jury. 2 In addition to those facts we have recited, there was the additional testimony that, in effect, after having been forced to empty his pockets to establish his innocence, appellee was momentarily prevented from leaving the security office unless he agreed to sign a civil release, to which appellant was neither in fact nor in law entitled.