questions defense in Illinois

2015By the State’s questions and defense counsel’s responses, they ‘effectively argued against defendant at a proceeding when he appeared pro se,’ which ‘is contrary to the intent of a preliminary Krankel inquiry.’ [People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 40 ].

2015By the State's questions and defense counsel's responses, they 'effectively argued against defendant at a proceeding when he appeared pro se,' which 'is contrary to the intent of a preliminary Krankel inquiry.' [People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 40 ].

2004In People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89 (2002), the supreme court affirmed our decision in McCain and Johnson with respect to the issue of timeliness.

2004In People v. Boclair , 202 Ill. 2d 89 (2002), the supreme court affirmed our decision in McCain and Johnson with respect to the issue of timeliness.

1998People v. Bey, 42 Ill. 2d 139, 147 , 246 N.E.2d 287 (1969).

1998People v. Bey, 42 Ill. 2d 139, 147 , 246 N.E.2d 287 (1969).

2014Because Richardson does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence, we remand for a new trial. ¶ 42 Reversed and remanded. ¶ 43 JUSTICE MASON, dissenting. ¶ 44 I agree with the majority that under People v. Wilmington, 2013 IL 112938 , the trial court’s questioning of the venire in this case failed to conform to the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) and that in the absence of an objection to the admonishments to the jury, a plain error analysis is warranted.

2009The court noted that the trial court itself asked the questions that defense counsel wished to ask and, when those questions revealed any potential for bias, the trial court questioned those prospective jurors further. 2 Thus, the court concluded that the error was not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. 382 Ill.

1992People v. Rivera (1986), 145 Ill.

1991(See, e.g., People v. Gendron (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 518, 520 .) Since the defendant could not show that he was prejudiced in any way by his post-conviction attorney’s conduct, his ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim fails.

1990(Loss, 119 Ill. 2d at 215 (Ryan, J., specially concurring, joined by Clark, C.J., and Moran and Miller, JJ.); In re Mitan (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 118, 127 .) Thus, in providing truthful and accurate answers to the questions on the bar application, petitioner simply did what was expected of him, and in that way avoided the potentially serious consequences of later disclosure and discipline.

1985The questions defense counsel sought to be asked suggest that the defendant was “seeking particular kinds of jurors, rather than simply fair and impartial jurors, the latter of which were all defendant was entitled to have serve.” (People v. Phillips (1981), 99 Ill.

1985App. 3d 362, 368 , 425 N.E.2d 1040 .) In this respect, the questions were inappropriate and violative of Supreme Court Rule 234 (87 Ill. 2d R. 234), and it would have been error for the trial court to permit defendant to ask them.

1983To the extent that the appellate court opinion decides the questions whether the immunity conferred by section 1 of "An Act to revise the law in relation to husband and wife" is personal and may be waived, and whether the insurance carrier can invoke the defendant's immunity in defense of plaintiff's action, the judgment of the appellate court is vacated without comment as to its merits. ( Madison Park Bank v. Zagel (1982), 91 Ill.2d 231 .) As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

1983(See People v. Bryant (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 514 ; People v. Hopkins (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 452 .) The questions which defense counsel was precluded from asking were simply not relevant to the issue of whether the identification procedure had been unnecessarily suggestive, and the trial judge did not deny defendant a fair hearing by sustaining objections to those inquiries.

1983(See People v. Bryant (1983), 94 Ill.2d 514 ; People v. Hopkins (1973), 53 Ill.2d 452 .) The questions which defense counsel was precluded from asking were simply not relevant to the issue of whether the identification procedure had been unnecessarily suggestive, and the trial judge did not deny defendant a fair hearing by sustaining objections to those inquiries.

1983(See People v. Bryant (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 514 ; People v. Hopkins (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 452 .) The questions which defense counsel was precluded from asking were simply not relevant to the issue of whether the identification procedure had been unnecessarily suggestive, and the trial judge did not deny defendant a fair hearing by sustaining objections to those inquiries.

1983(See People v. Bryant (1983), 94 Ill.2d 514 ; People v. Hopkins (1973), 53 Ill.2d 452 .) The questions which defense counsel was precluded from asking were simply not relevant to the issue of whether the identification procedure had been unnecessarily suggestive, and the trial judge did not deny defendant a fair hearing by sustaining objections to those inquiries.

1980(Accord People v. Bracey (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 514 , 283 N.E.2d 685 (in the context of a post-conviction petition).) Further, at trial, no effort was made by defense counsel to clarify his query, to pursue his line of questioning, or to introduce evidence proving that Real and Blanch were the same man.

1980(Accord People v. Bracey (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 514 , 283 N.E.2d 685 (in the context of a post-conviction petition).) Further, at trial, no effort was made by defense counsel to clarify his query, to pursue his line of questioning, or to introduce evidence proving that Real and Blanch were the same man.

1977Ed. 2d 694 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 ) when the nature of the inquiry changed from a polygraph examination to an interrogation for evidentiary purposes, his choosing to answer the questions was not a waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel.

1973In Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 353 , 19 L.

1973In Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 353 , 19 L.

1972No reason for any of the objections was stated and, except in one instance, there was no motion to strike the testimony. ( People v. Carson (1930), 341 Ill. 11 , 16-7 ; People v. Nakutin (1936), 364 Ill. 563 , 571 ; 1 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 18 at p. 325; Cleary, Handbook of Illinois Evidence, sec. 7.4 at pp. 102-3.) After each of defense counsel's objections the prosecutor asked another question, apparently in order to keep the witness from volunteering improper testimony.

1972No reason for any of the objections was stated and, except in one instance, there was no motion to strike the testimony. ( People v. Carson (1930), 341 Ill. 11 , 16-7 ; People v. Nakutin (1936), 364 Ill. 563 , 571 ; 1 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 18 at p. 325; Cleary, Handbook of Illinois Evidence, sec. 7.4 at pp. 102-3.) After each of defense counsel's objections the prosecutor asked another question, apparently in order to keep the witness from volunteering improper testimony.