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6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Alaskagreen2 sentences2012Without providing an exhaustive list of the questions the defense should have been permitted to pose, we conclude that this inquiry was necessary “to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’ ” Lewis, 10 A.3d at 654 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 ). 2012Without providing an exhaustive list of the questions the defense should have been permitted to pose, we conclude that this inquiry was necessary “to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’ ” Lewis, 10 A.3d at 654 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 ). | 1 | 2 |
Jackson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1991Jackson v. United States, 490 A.2d 192, 195 (D.C.1985). 2 *763 A. Appellant contends first, that the questions that defense counsel would have asked Hopkins would merely have established that Hopkins was on the scene when appellant was arrested, a fact already established by the police officers’ testimony, and would only have concerned Hopkins’ observations of appellant, such as where appellant was standing, whether Hopkins had noticed a weapon on appellant, and whether he had observed appellant throw anything. | 1 | 1 |
Young v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1987See, e.g., Young v. United States, 478 A.2d 287, 289 (D.C.1984) (jurors asked about their involvement in the field of law enforcement and the criminal justice system). 1987See, e.g., Young v. United States, 478 A.2d 287, 289 (D.C.1984) (jurors asked about their involvement in the field of law enforcement and the criminal justice system). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lewis v. United States
green
1 sentence2012Without providing an exhaustive list of the questions the defense should have been permitted to pose, we conclude that this inquiry was necessary “to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’ ” Lewis, 10 A.3d at 654 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 ). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
McCurley v. National Savings & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences2000While failure of counsel to make a proffer may be excused if the thrust of the excluded testimony had been made apparent by what had gone before, see id., in this case there was no indication of the questions defense counsel would have presented to Harris, much less the answers those questions would have produced. 2000While failure of counsel to make a proffer may be excused if the thrust of the excluded testimony had been made apparent by what had gone before, see id., in this case there was no indication of the questions defense counsel would have presented to Harris, much less the answers those questions would have produced. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Rieser v. District of Columbia
green
1 sentence1979As was pointed out by the federal appellate court in Rieser v. District of Columbia, supra, 183 U.S.App.D.C. at 391 , 563 F.2d at 478 , the questions of immunity and duty owed require separate analysis in this jurisdiction due to the “ministerial-discretionary” test for immunity. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
cluster 349523
green
1 sentence1979As was pointed out by the federal appellate court in Rieser v. District of Columbia, supra, 183 U.S.App.D.C. at 391 , 563 F.2d at 478 , the questions of immunity and duty owed require separate analysis in this jurisdiction due to the “ministerial-discretionary” test for immunity. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.