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5 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1951–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alcantar v. Stategreen1 sentence2010Although a trial court has wide discretion over the admissibility of evidence, this discretion is “obviously limited by the rales of evidence.” Alcantar v. State, 987 So.2d 822, 825 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Prietogreen1 sentence1984See also State v. Prieto, 439 So.2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) [8 FLW 2387] (Ferguson, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Richardson v. State
green
1 sentence1986Richardson, 246 So.2d at 775 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Mungin v. State
green
2 sentences1982However, since Smith's sole objection to the prosecutor's "didn't-you-say-to-me-in-a-pre-trial-interview" line of questioning was that the witness could not be impeached by an unrecorded oral statement not witnessed by a third party, an objection devoid of merit, see Mungin v. State, 109 Fla. 310 , 147 So. 577 (1933); Stewart v. State, 42 Fla. 591 , 28 So. 815 (1900); Mahone v. State, 222 So.2d 769 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); and since, more importantly, Smith failed to later move for a mistrial, or register any complaint, when no impeaching testimony by the prosecutor was forthcoming, [1] the error w 1982However, since Smith's sole objection to the prosecutor's "didn't-you-say-to-me-in-a-pre-trial-interview" line of questioning was that the witness could not be impeached by an unrecorded oral statement not witnessed by a third party, an objection devoid of merit, see Mungin v. State, 109 Fla. 310 , 147 So. 577 (1933); Stewart v. State, 42 Fla. 591 , 28 So. 815 (1900); Mahone v. State, 222 So.2d 769 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); and since, more importantly, Smith failed to later move for a mistrial, or register any complaint, when no impeaching testimony by the prosecutor was forthcoming, [1] the error w | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Dukes v. State
green
1 sentence1982The difference between a prosecutor's questions to a defense witness which insinuate impeaching facts, the proof of which is nonexistent, so clearly impermissible, see Dukes v. State, 356 So.2d 873 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Thorpe v. State, 350 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Marsh v. State, 202 So.2d 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967), and questions, such as those asked below, insinuating impeaching facts which, although said to exist, are not later proved, is one of degree only, and either interrogation, because not followed by actual impeachment, is condemnable. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Thorpe v. State
neutral
1 sentence1982The difference between a prosecutor's questions to a defense witness which insinuate impeaching facts, the proof of which is nonexistent, so clearly impermissible, see Dukes v. State, 356 So.2d 873 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Thorpe v. State, 350 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Marsh v. State, 202 So.2d 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967), and questions, such as those asked below, insinuating impeaching facts which, although said to exist, are not later proved, is one of degree only, and either interrogation, because not followed by actual impeachment, is condemnable. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Mahone v. State
green
1 sentence1982However, since Smith's sole objection to the prosecutor's "didn't-you-say-to-me-in-a-pre-trial-interview" line of questioning was that the witness could not be impeached by an unrecorded oral statement not witnessed by a third party, an objection devoid of merit, see Mungin v. State, 109 Fla. 310 , 147 So. 577 (1933); Stewart v. State, 42 Fla. 591 , 28 So. 815 (1900); Mahone v. State, 222 So.2d 769 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); and since, more importantly, Smith failed to later move for a mistrial, or register any complaint, when no impeaching testimony by the prosecutor was forthcoming, [1] the error w | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Stewart v. State
green
1 sentence1982However, since Smith's sole objection to the prosecutor's "didn't-you-say-to-me-in-a-pre-trial-interview" line of questioning was that the witness could not be impeached by an unrecorded oral statement not witnessed by a third party, an objection devoid of merit, see Mungin v. State, 109 Fla. 310 , 147 So. 577 (1933); Stewart v. State, 42 Fla. 591 , 28 So. 815 (1900); Mahone v. State, 222 So.2d 769 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); and since, more importantly, Smith failed to later move for a mistrial, or register any complaint, when no impeaching testimony by the prosecutor was forthcoming, [1] the error w | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Marsh v. State
green
1 sentence1982The difference between a prosecutor's questions to a defense witness which insinuate impeaching facts, the proof of which is nonexistent, so clearly impermissible, see Dukes v. State, 356 So.2d 873 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Thorpe v. State, 350 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Marsh v. State, 202 So.2d 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967), and questions, such as those asked below, insinuating impeaching facts which, although said to exist, are not later proved, is one of degree only, and either interrogation, because not followed by actual impeachment, is condemnable. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Stewart v. Stewart
green
2 sentences1951The other questions challenge the sufficiency of the complainant's Florida residence to support his suit for divorce, whether or not correct procedural requirements were followed and whether or not there was condonation, reconciliation or basis for application of the doctrine of comparative rectitude as promulgated in Stewart v. Stewart, 158 Fla. 326 , 29 So.2d 247 , 170 A.L.R. 1073 . 1951The other questions challenge the sufficiency of the complainant's Florida residence to support his suit for divorce, whether or not correct procedural requirements were followed and whether or not there was condonation, reconciliation or basis for application of the doctrine of comparative rectitude as promulgated in Stewart v. Stewart, 158 Fla. 326 , 29 So.2d 247 , 170 A.L.R. 1073 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.