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5 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1914–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Swain v. Monona Countygreen1 sentence2021See Swain v. Monona Cty., 163 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Iowa 1969). | 1 | 1 |
Boger v. Kellnergreen2 sentences1986See Clark v. Umbarger, 247 Iowa 938, 942 , 75 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1956) (“There are many decisions of this court that the questions of violation and exception thereto, if any, under [sections 321.354-355] are questions for the jury.”); Tuhn v. Clark, 241 Iowa 441, 442-44 , 41 N.W.2d 13, 14-15 (1950) (jury question whether car, stopped so driver could remove ice from windshield, was “disabled” under section 321.355); Boger v. Kellner, 239 Iowa 1189, 1192 , 33 N.W.2d 369, 371 (1948) (jury question whether car with stopped motor disabled under section 321.-355); Hayungs v. Falk, 238 Iowa 285, 295-96 1986See Clark v. Umbarger, 247 Iowa 938, 942 , 75 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1956) (“There are many decisions of this court that the questions of violation and exception thereto, if any, under [sections 321.354-355] are questions for the jury.”); Tuhn v. Clark, 241 Iowa 441, 442-44 , 41 N.W.2d 13, 14-15 (1950) (jury question whether car, stopped so driver could remove ice from windshield, was “disabled” under section 321.355); Boger v. Kellner, 239 Iowa 1189, 1192 , 33 N.W.2d 369, 371 (1948) (jury question whether car with stopped motor disabled under section 321.-355); Hayungs v. Falk, 238 Iowa 285, 295-96 | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Pustgreen2 sentences1986See Clark v. Umbarger, 247 Iowa 938, 942 , 75 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1956) (“There are many decisions of this court that the questions of violation and exception thereto, if any, under [sections 321.354-355] are questions for the jury.”); Tuhn v. Clark, 241 Iowa 441, 442-44 , 41 N.W.2d 13, 14-15 (1950) (jury question whether car, stopped so driver could remove ice from windshield, was “disabled” under section 321.355); Boger v. Kellner, 239 Iowa 1189, 1192 , 33 N.W.2d 369, 371 (1948) (jury question whether car with stopped motor disabled under section 321.-355); Hayungs v. Falk, 238 Iowa 285, 295-96 1986See Clark v. Umbarger, 247 Iowa 938, 942 , 75 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1956) (“There are many decisions of this court that the questions of violation and exception thereto, if any, under [sections 321.354-355] are questions for the jury.”); Tuhn v. Clark, 241 Iowa 441, 442-44 , 41 N.W.2d 13, 14-15 (1950) (jury question whether car, stopped so driver could remove ice from windshield, was “disabled” under section 321.355); Boger v. Kellner, 239 Iowa 1189, 1192 , 33 N.W.2d 369, 371 (1948) (jury question whether car with stopped motor disabled under section 321.-355); Hayungs v. Falk, 238 Iowa 285, 295-96 | 1 | 1 |
Hayungs v. Falkgreen2 sentences1986See Clark v. Umbarger, 247 Iowa 938, 942 , 75 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1956) (“There are many decisions of this court that the questions of violation and exception thereto, if any, under [sections 321.354-355] are questions for the jury.”); Tuhn v. Clark, 241 Iowa 441, 442-44 , 41 N.W.2d 13, 14-15 (1950) (jury question whether car, stopped so driver could remove ice from windshield, was “disabled” under section 321.355); Boger v. Kellner, 239 Iowa 1189, 1192 , 33 N.W.2d 369, 371 (1948) (jury question whether car with stopped motor disabled under section 321.-355); Hayungs v. Falk, 238 Iowa 285, 295-96 1986See Clark v. Umbarger, 247 Iowa 938, 942 , 75 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1956) (“There are many decisions of this court that the questions of violation and exception thereto, if any, under [sections 321.354-355] are questions for the jury.”); Tuhn v. Clark, 241 Iowa 441, 442-44 , 41 N.W.2d 13, 14-15 (1950) (jury question whether car, stopped so driver could remove ice from windshield, was “disabled” under section 321.355); Boger v. Kellner, 239 Iowa 1189, 1192 , 33 N.W.2d 369, 371 (1948) (jury question whether car with stopped motor disabled under section 321.-355); Hayungs v. Falk, 238 Iowa 285, 295-96 | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Umbargergreen2 sentences1986See Clark v. Umbarger, 247 Iowa 938, 942 , 75 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1956) (“There are many decisions of this court that the questions of violation and exception thereto, if any, under [sections 321.354-355] are questions for the jury.”); Tuhn v. Clark, 241 Iowa 441, 442-44 , 41 N.W.2d 13, 14-15 (1950) (jury question whether car, stopped so driver could remove ice from windshield, was “disabled” under section 321.355); Boger v. Kellner, 239 Iowa 1189, 1192 , 33 N.W.2d 369, 371 (1948) (jury question whether car with stopped motor disabled under section 321.-355); Hayungs v. Falk, 238 Iowa 285, 295-96 1986See Clark v. Umbarger, 247 Iowa 938, 942 , 75 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1956) (“There are many decisions of this court that the questions of violation and exception thereto, if any, under [sections 321.354-355] are questions for the jury.”); Tuhn v. Clark, 241 Iowa 441, 442-44 , 41 N.W.2d 13, 14-15 (1950) (jury question whether car, stopped so driver could remove ice from windshield, was “disabled” under section 321.355); Boger v. Kellner, 239 Iowa 1189, 1192 , 33 N.W.2d 369, 371 (1948) (jury question whether car with stopped motor disabled under section 321.-355); Hayungs v. Falk, 238 Iowa 285, 295-96 | 1 | 1 |
Hamilton v. Luckeygreen2 sentences1986See Clark v. Umbarger, 247 Iowa 938, 942 , 75 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1956) (“There are many decisions of this court that the questions of violation and exception thereto, if any, under [sections 321.354-355] are questions for the jury.”); Tuhn v. Clark, 241 Iowa 441, 442-44 , 41 N.W.2d 13, 14-15 (1950) (jury question whether car, stopped so driver could remove ice from windshield, was “disabled” under section 321.355); Boger v. Kellner, 239 Iowa 1189, 1192 , 33 N.W.2d 369, 371 (1948) (jury question whether car with stopped motor disabled under section 321.-355); Hayungs v. Falk, 238 Iowa 285, 295-96 1986See Clark v. Umbarger, 247 Iowa 938, 942 , 75 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1956) ("There are many decisions of this court that the questions of violation and exception thereto, if any, under [sections 321.354-355] are questions for the jury."); Tuhn v. Clark, 241 Iowa 441, 442-44 , 41 N.W.2d 13, 14-15 (1950) (jury question whether car, stopped so driver could remove ice from windshield, was "disabled" under section 321.355); Boger v. Kellner, 239 Iowa 1189, 1192 , 33 N.W.2d 369, 371 (1948) (jury question whether car with stopped motor disabled under section 321.355); Hayungs v. Falk, 238 Iowa 285, 295-96 | 1 | 1 |
Tuhn v. Clarkgreen2 sentences1986See Clark v. Umbarger, 247 Iowa 938, 942 , 75 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1956) (“There are many decisions of this court that the questions of violation and exception thereto, if any, under [sections 321.354-355] are questions for the jury.”); Tuhn v. Clark, 241 Iowa 441, 442-44 , 41 N.W.2d 13, 14-15 (1950) (jury question whether car, stopped so driver could remove ice from windshield, was “disabled” under section 321.355); Boger v. Kellner, 239 Iowa 1189, 1192 , 33 N.W.2d 369, 371 (1948) (jury question whether car with stopped motor disabled under section 321.-355); Hayungs v. Falk, 238 Iowa 285, 295-96 1986See Clark v. Umbarger, 247 Iowa 938, 942 , 75 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1956) (“There are many decisions of this court that the questions of violation and exception thereto, if any, under [sections 321.354-355] are questions for the jury.”); Tuhn v. Clark, 241 Iowa 441, 442-44 , 41 N.W.2d 13, 14-15 (1950) (jury question whether car, stopped so driver could remove ice from windshield, was “disabled” under section 321.355); Boger v. Kellner, 239 Iowa 1189, 1192 , 33 N.W.2d 369, 371 (1948) (jury question whether car with stopped motor disabled under section 321.-355); Hayungs v. Falk, 238 Iowa 285, 295-96 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bossenberger v. Bossenberger
neutral
2 sentences1936Bossenberger v. Bossenberger, 210 Iowa 825 , 229 N. W. 833 ; Belknap v. Belknap, supra. Chapter 552 of the Code gave the appellants a special procedure to vacate the judgment. 1936Bossenberger v. Bossenberger, 210 Iowa 825 , 229 N. W. 833 ; Belknap v. Belknap, supra. Chapter 552 of the Code gave the appellants a special procedure to vacate the judgment. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Vogt v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.
neutral
2 sentences1936Co., 164 Iowa 158 , 145 N. W. 463 , the court states: “The right of this court in considering appeals in actions at law is to pass upon the questions of error only; and it has been held under the statute in many cases, and never to the contrary, that it will not consider as allegations of error matters upon which the trial court had not first had the opportunity to rule.” The judgment of the trial court was a verity until vacated. 1936Co., 164 Iowa 158 , 145 N. W. 463 , the court states: “The right of this court in considering appeals in actions at law is to pass upon the questions of error only; and it has been held under the statute in many cases, and never to the contrary, that it will not consider as allegations of error matters upon which the trial court had not first had the opportunity to rule.” The judgment of the trial court was a verity until vacated. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Richards v. W. H. Hellen & Son
green
1 sentence1919We think that Richards v. Hellen, 153 Iowa 66 , determines» (whatever else it leaves unsettled) that taking possession! on default in payment, and under a contract authorizing thef taking of such possession, is not a rescission of the contract, but proceeding under and in-afBrmance of the contract ; that the decision goes beyond mere intimation; and that it was not a pronouncement which could not competently be made in a replevin suit. 2-b 6‘ fitionai Csaies • session^ seller mentsemaae.pay’ As is not unusual, the way to the vitals of the decision is filled with some unnecessary obstructions. | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Smith v. Warren County
neutral
1 sentence1914Code, section 4105; Smith v. Warren Co., 49 Iowa, 336 ; Ash v. Scott, 76 Iowa, 27; Reynolds v. Insurance Co., 80 Iowa, 563 . | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Ash & Co. v. Scott
neutral
1 sentence1914Code, section 4105; Smith v. Warren Co., 49 Iowa, 336 ; Ash v. Scott, 76 Iowa, 27; Reynolds v. Insurance Co., 80 Iowa, 563 . | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Reynolds v. Iowa & Nebraska Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1914Code, section 4105; Smith v. Warren Co., 49 Iowa, 336 ; Ash v. Scott, 76 Iowa, 27; Reynolds v. Insurance Co., 80 Iowa, 563 . | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.