questions inquiry in Ohio

2006"On appeal, the only questions for inquiry are whether the factual conclusions upon which the trial court based the exercise of its discretion were against the manifest weight of the evidence, or whether there was an abuse of discretion." McCoy v. McCoy (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 570 , 583 . {¶ 6} The issue of attorney's fees has been thoroughly addressed in this matter.

1999"On appeal, the only questions for inquiry are whether the factual conclusions upon which the trial court based the exercise of its discretion were against the manifest weight of evidence, or whether there was an abuse of discretion." McCoy v. McCoy (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 570 , 583 .

1997Id; Oatey v. Oatey (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 251, 263 , 614 N.E.2d 1054, 1061 ; Birath v. Birath (1988), 53 Ohio App.3d 31, 39 , 558 N.E.2d 63, 71 .” Further, the Swanson court cautioned: “[T]he initial overriding consideration is the financial ability of the individual in question to meet the demands of any award.

1997Id; Oatey v. Oatey (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 251, 263 , 614 N.E.2d 1054, 1061 ; Birath v. Birath (1988), 53 Ohio App.3d 31, 39 , 558 N.E.2d 63, 71 .” Further, the Swanson court cautioned: “[T]he initial overriding consideration is the financial ability of the individual in question to meet the demands of any award.

2024The trial court can then, at hearing, determine if in fact privileged matters may be disclosed.”). {¶ 9} We note that although the parties debate the applicability of Dublin v. State, 138 Ohio App.3d 753 (10th Dist.2000), Dublin is consistent with, but does not control, the outcome here.

2023See State v. Walters, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-693, 2007-Ohio-5554, ¶ 81 (noting that "counsel's words in posing a question are not 'evidence' "); State v. Bailey, 2d Dist. No. 27177, 2017-Ohio-2679, ¶ 26 ; Corporate Exchange Bldgs.

2008Hall , 2002-Ohio-4953 , at ¶ 16, citing Cohen v. Cohen (1983), 8 Ohio App.3d 109 , 111 . {¶ 30} "Upon appeal, the only questions for inquiry are whether the factual conclusions upon which the trial court based the exercise of its discretion were against the manifest weight of the evidence; or, whether there was an abuse of discretion." Swanson v. Swanson (1976), 48 Ohio App.2d 85 , 90 (citation omitted). {¶ 31} With regard to attorney fees, the court's judgment entry stated as follows: {¶ 32} "The court * * * heard the testimony of the parties relative to attorney fees.

2007The potential compromise of reliability caused by the lack of strict compliance can be shown by the defense on cross-examination." State v. Boczar , 113 Ohio St.3d 148 , 2007-Ohio-1251 , at ¶ 23 . {¶ 40} In the case sub judice, the prosecutor, on numerous occasions, objected to the questions defense counsel asked Sergeant Beaver on cross-examination relating to his training of current NHTSA standards and whether an officer should ask any questions before performing the field sobriety tests.

2003We have reaffirmed our position on this issue in State v. Grimmett, Franklin App. No. 01AP-1287, 2002-Ohio-3354 , certification of conflict granted (2002), 96 Ohio St.3d 1510 , and State v. Crowley (2002), 151 Ohio App.3d 249 . {¶ 7} Defense counsel did not object to any of the questions actually asked by the jury, and, as we have already noted, the trial court, exercising its discretion, eliminated the questions to which defense counsel objected.

2002Id. {¶ 48} In the instant case, the previous questions which defense counsel asked of the officers regarding whether it was possible that Braxton had been dropped off in the area where they found him, led the court to conclude that defense counsel was not truly surprised by McDonald's alibi testimony.

1994“Upon appeal the only questions for inquiry are whether the factual conclusions upon which the trial court based the exercise of its discretion were against the manifest weight of the evidence; or, whether there was an abuse of discretion.” Swanson v. Swanson (1976), 48 Ohio App.2d 85, 90 , 2 O.O.3d 65, 68 , 355 N.E.2d 894, 898 ; Linehan v. Linehan (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 124, 128 , 517 N.E.2d 967, 971-972 ; Oatey v. Oatey (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 251, 263 , 614 N.E.2d 1054, 1061-1062 ; McCoy v. McCoy (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 570, 583 , 632 N.E.2d 1358, 1366-1367 .

1994“Upon appeal the only questions for inquiry are whether the factual conclusions upon which the trial court based the exercise of its discretion were against the manifest weight of the evidence; or, whether there was an abuse of discretion.” Swanson v. Swanson (1976), 48 Ohio App.2d 85, 90 , 2 O.O.3d 65, 68 , 355 N.E.2d 894, 898 ; Linehan v. Linehan (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 124, 128 , 517 N.E.2d 967, 971-972 ; Oatey v. Oatey (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 251, 263 , 614 N.E.2d 1054, 1061-1062 ; McCoy v. McCoy (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 570, 583 , 632 N.E.2d 1358, 1366-1367 .

1994An “ ‘abuse of discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 , 5 OBR 481, 482, 450 N.E.2d 1140, 1142 ; Oatey, 83 Ohio App.3d at 263, 614 N.E.2d at 1061-062 .

1994An “ ‘abuse of discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 , 5 OBR 481, 482, 450 N.E.2d 1140, 1142 ; Oatey, 83 Ohio App.3d at 263, 614 N.E.2d at 1061-062 .

1930Summarizing, under the case of Painesville Utopia Theatre Co. v. Lautermilch, 118 Ohio St., 167 , 160 N. E., 683 , we cannot, in the state of the record, reverse the judgment without invading the province of the jury; and upon the other questions of error we fail to find any prejudicial error which would warrant a reversal by this reviewing court.

1930Summarizing, under the case of Painesville Utopia Theatre Co. v. Lautermilch, 118 Ohio St., 167 , 160 N. E., 683 , we cannot, in the state of the record, reverse the judgment without invading the province of the jury; and upon the other questions of error we fail to find any prejudicial error which would warrant a reversal by this reviewing court.

1927The special charge requested by plaintiffs, and which was refused by the trial court, is: “I charge you that it is the duty of the common carrier to supply cars that are suitable and safe for the particular kind of commodity undertaken to be conveyed, which implies not only that it must be of a type so constructed as to be able to encounter the ordinary risks of transportation, but also must be perfect in all its parts.” Plaintiffs in error argue that they were entitled to have this special charge given and cite as authority the case of Wilson & Co. v. Hines, 123 Wash., 643 , 213 P., 5 .

1927The special charge requested by plaintiffs, and which was refused by the trial court, is: “I charge you that it is the duty of the common carrier to supply cars that are suitable and safe for the particular kind of commodity undertaken to be conveyed, which implies not only that it must be of a type so constructed as to be able to encounter the ordinary risks of transportation, but also must be perfect in all its parts.” Plaintiffs in error argue that they were entitled to have this special charge given and cite as authority the case of Wilson & Co. v. Hines, 123 Wash., 643 , 213 P., 5 .

1927Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich., 165 .” It is plain, from a reading of the above, that *117 the questions at bar here, to-wit, health and fire measures, did not appear, there as predominant issues, determining the difference between a governmental and a proprietary function.