23 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dowling v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023To the extent that the majority opinion can be interpreted as an argument that Biggers should be broadened to first-time-in-court identifications because of their suggestive nature, the caselaw does not support such an expansion. “[T]he jury, not the judge, traditionally determines the reliability of evidence,” Perry, 565 US at 245 , and only that evidence whose admission “is so extremely unfair that its admission violates ‘fundamental conceptions of justice,’ ” Dowling, 493 US at 352 (citation omitted), is subject to a judicial reliability assessment. 2023See Dowling, 493 US at 352-353 . | 3 | 3 |
People v. Graygreen2 sentences2023See Gray, 457 Mich at 115 -116 & n 10. 15 The distinction is that the reliability inquiry focuses on the admissibility of the pretrial identification, while the independent-basis inquiry focuses on whether a witness who was subject to an unnecessarily suggestive pretrial procedure may nonetheless identify the defendant at trial. 2023See Gray, 457 Mich at 115 -116 & n 10. 15 The distinction is that the reliability inquiry focuses on the admissibility of the pretrial identification, while the independent-basis inquiry focuses on whether a witness who was subject to an unnecessarily suggestive pretrial procedure may nonetheless identify the defendant at trial. | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Becky Lynn Barrettgreen2 sentences2000This Court noted that MRE 803(24) had not been interpreted in Michigan and that it needed to look at analogous cases discussing the federal catchall exceptions, FRE 803(24) and 804(b)(5): In United States v Barrett, 8 F3d 1296, 1300 (CA 8, 1993), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the issue whether hearsay evidence of a child’s statements concerning her mother’s abuse were sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible under FRE 803(24): “In order to comply with the Sixth Amendment, hearsay statements offered into evidence must bear ‘adequate “indicia of reliability.” ” ’ This reliabili 1998See FRE 803(24); FRE 804(b)(5). *467 In United States v Barrett, 8 F3d 1296, 1300 (CA 8, 1993), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the issue whether hearsay evidence of a child’s statements concerning her mother’s abuse were sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible under FRE 803(24): In order to comply with the Sixth Amendment, hearsay statements offered into evidence must bear “adequate ‘indi-cia of reliability.’ ” This reliability requirement is fulfilled when the hearsay statement either “ ‘falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception’ ” or occurs under circumstances with “ ‘ | 2 | 2 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green2 sentences2020The reliability standard “entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid.” Id. 592-593 . 2016Brown’s stepfather, Major Chapman, testified that while Brown was dragged to the trunk of a 5 Although Cain states in his question presented that Jaehnig’s testimony was not based on scientific analysis and did not meet the reliability standard in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc, 509 US 579, 590 ; 113 S Ct 2786 ; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993), the Daubert standard applies to expert testimony and Jaehnig did not testify as an expert. | 1 | 4 |
Prado Navarette v. Californiagreen1 sentence2026And it follows that, “an informant who is proved to tell the truth about some things is more likely to tell the truth about other things, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in -3- criminal activity.” Navarette, 572 US at 398 (cleaned up). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kurylczykgreen2 sentences2020Kurylczyk, 443 Mich at 306 (opinion by GRIFFIN, J.); id. at 318 (BOYLE, J., concurring in part). 2020Kurylczyk, 443 Mich at 306 (opinion by GRIFFIN, J.); id. at 318 (BOYLE, J., concurring in part). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2020See State v Harris, 330 Conn 91, 115; 191 A3d 119 (2018) (holding that the Biggers factors do not provide a sufficient measure for reliability and that state due-process protections require a different reliability analysis); Young, 374 P3d at 426-427 (holding that the Biggers factors do not provide a sufficient measure for reliability and that state due-process protections require a different reliability analysis); Lawson, 352 Or at 739-751 (refining an existing parallel state reliability analysis based on scientific and legal developments); State v Henderson, 208 NJ 208, 285; 27 A3d 872 (2011 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lawson/Jamesgreen1 sentence2020See State v Harris, 330 Conn 91, 115; 191 A3d 119 (2018) (holding that the Biggers factors do not provide a sufficient measure for reliability and that state due-process protections require a different reliability analysis); Young, 374 P3d at 426-427 (holding that the Biggers factors do not provide a sufficient measure for reliability and that state due-process protections require a different reliability analysis); Lawson, 352 Or at 739-751 (refining an existing parallel state reliability analysis based on scientific and legal developments); State v Henderson, 208 NJ 208, 285; 27 A3d 872 (2011 | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Stategreen1 sentence2020See State v Harris, 330 Conn 91, 115; 191 A3d 119 (2018) (holding that the Biggers factors do not provide a sufficient measure for reliability and that state due-process protections require a different reliability analysis); Young, 374 P3d at 426-427 (holding that the Biggers factors do not provide a sufficient measure for reliability and that state due-process protections require a different reliability analysis); Lawson, 352 Or at 739-751 (refining an existing parallel state reliability analysis based on scientific and legal developments); State v Henderson, 208 NJ 208, 285; 27 A3d 872 (2011 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. McKeevegreen2 sentences1998To determine the admissibility of the courier’s prior testimony in this case, we will thus look at whether MRE 804(b)(1) is a firmly rooted exception. 13 This Court has not previously found MRE 804(b)(1) to be firmly rooted, but the federal courts have so characterized FRE 804(b)(1), 14 which is worded nearly identically. 15 Indeed, the exception has been described as “deeply embedded in American jurisprudence.” United States v McKeeve, 131 F3d 1, 9 (CA 1, 1997). 1998To determine the admissibility of the courier's prior testimony in this case, we will thus look at whether MRE 804(b)(1) is a firmly rooted exception. [13] This Court has not previously found MRE 804(b)(1) to be firmly rooted, but the federal courts have so characterized FRE 804(b)(1), [14] which is worded nearly identically. [15] Indeed, *542 the exception has been described as "deeply embedded in American jurisprudence." United States v. McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1, 9 (C.A.1, 1997). | 1 | 1 |
| Hopkins v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lipscombgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Prater v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Castrogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Wimberlygreen | 1 | 1 |
Kelly v. Stategreen2 sentences1992Axell, p 856; Castro , p 973 (although the procedure is reliable, the evidence was inadmissible because the testing laboratory failed to use generally accepted scientific techniques); United States v Jakobetz, 955 F2d 786 (CA 2, 1992); Prater v State, 307 Ark 180 ; 820 SW2d 429, 436 (1991); Commonwealth v Curnin, 409 Mass 218; 565 NE2d 440 (1991); People v Lipscomb, 215 Ill App 3d 413; 574 NE2d 1345, 1357 (1991); Hopkins v State, 579 NE2d 1297, 1302 (Ind, 1991); State v Brown, 470 NW2d 30, 32-33 (Iowa, 1991); Smith v Deppish, 248 Kan 217, 238; 807 P2d 144 *276 (1991); State v Davis, 814 SW2d 5 1992Axell, p 856; Castro , p 973 (although the procedure is reliable, the evidence was inadmissible because the testing laboratory failed to use generally accepted scientific techniques); United States v Jakobetz, 955 F2d 786 (CA 2, 1992); Prater v State, 307 Ark 180 ; 820 SW2d 429, 436 (1991); Commonwealth v Curnin, 409 Mass 218; 565 NE2d 440 (1991); People v Lipscomb, 215 Ill App 3d 413; 574 NE2d 1345, 1357 (1991); Hopkins v State, 579 NE2d 1297, 1302 (Ind, 1991); State v Brown, 470 NW2d 30, 32-33 (Iowa, 1991); Smith v Deppish, 248 Kan 217, 238; 807 P2d 144 (1991); State v Davis, 814 SW2d 593 (M | 1 | 1 |
| Glover v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Deppishgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Lee
green
2 sentences2004Therefore, we conclude, at least with respect to nontestimonial evidence such as the child's statement in this case, that the reliability factors of People v. Lee, 243 Mich.App. 163, 178 , 622 N.W.2d 71 (2000), are an appropriate means of determining admissibility. 2004Therefore, we conclude, at least with respect to nontestimonial evidence such as the child's statement in this case, that the reliability factors of People v. Lee, 243 Mich.App. 163, 178 , 622 N.W.2d 71 (2000), are an appropriate means of determining admissibility. | 3 | 2004–2018 |
Perry v. New Hampshire
green
1 sentence2020We have not been asked to reach that question in this case. 14 Perry, 565 US at 232 , quoting Simmons, 390 US at 384. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Commonwealth v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2020But if the indicia of reliability are strong enough to outweigh the corrupting effect of the police-arranged suggestive circumstances, the identification evidence ordinarily will be admitted, and the jury will ultimately determine its worth.[14] evaluate eyewitness testimony and that state due-process protections require a different reliability analysis); People v Adams, 53 NY2d 241, 250-252 ; 423 NE2d 379 (2005) (holding that the state’s due-process requirements require per se exclusion of unnecessarily suggestive showups); Commonwealth v Johnson, 420 Mass 458, 465; 650 NE2d 1257 (1995) (hold | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Adams
green
2 sentences2020But if the indicia of reliability are strong enough to outweigh the corrupting effect of the police-arranged suggestive circumstances, the identification evidence ordinarily will be admitted, and the jury will ultimately determine its worth.[14] evaluate eyewitness testimony and that state due-process protections require a different reliability analysis); People v Adams, 53 NY2d 241, 250-252 ; 423 NE2d 379 (2005) (holding that the state’s due-process requirements require per se exclusion of unnecessarily suggestive showups); Commonwealth v Johnson, 420 Mass 458, 465; 650 NE2d 1257 (1995) (hold 2020But if the indicia of reliability are strong enough to outweigh the corrupting effect of the police-arranged suggestive circumstances, the identification evidence ordinarily will be admitted, and the jury will ultimately determine its worth.[14] evaluate eyewitness testimony and that state due-process protections require a different reliability analysis); People v Adams, 53 NY2d 241, 250-252 ; 423 NE2d 379 (2005) (holding that the state’s due-process requirements require per se exclusion of unnecessarily suggestive showups); Commonwealth v Johnson, 420 Mass 458, 465; 650 NE2d 1257 (1995) (hold | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Manson v. Brathwaite
green
1 sentence2020The choice of the United States Supreme Court to incorporate the reliability analysis in Brathwaite rather than apply a per se rule of excluding unnecessarily suggestive identifications relied on a prediction: “The police will guard against unnecessarily suggestive procedures under the totality rule, as well as the per se one, for fear that their actions will lead to the exclusion of identifications as unreliable.” Brathwaite, 432 US at 112 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
green
2 sentences2018Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael, 526 US 137, 150 ; 119 S Ct 1167 ; 143 L Ed 2d 238 (1999); Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc, 509 US 579, 591 ; 113 S Ct 2786 ; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993); Kowalski, 492 Mich at 120 . 2018Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael, 526 US 137, 150 ; 119 S Ct 1167 ; 143 L Ed 2d 238 (1999); Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc, 509 US 579, 591 ; 113 S Ct 2786 ; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993); Kowalski, 492 Mich at 120 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Geno
green
1 sentence2018Further, in determining whether a statement has “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” several factors can be evaluated, including: (1) the spontaneity of the statements, (2) the consistency of the statements, (3) lack of motive to fabricate or lack of bias, (4) the reason the declarant cannot testify, (5) the voluntariness of the statements, i.e., whether they were made in response to leading questions or made under undue influence, (6) personal knowledge of the declarant about the matter on which he spoke, (7) to whom the statements were made . . . , and (8) the time frame within wh | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Kowalski
green
1 sentence2018Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael, 526 US 137, 150 ; 119 S Ct 1167 ; 143 L Ed 2d 238 (1999); Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc, 509 US 579, 591 ; 113 S Ct 2786 ; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993); Kowalski, 492 Mich at 120 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Geno
green
1 sentence2018Further, in determining whether a statement has “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” several factors can be evaluated, including: (1) the spontaneity of the statements, (2) the consistency of the statements, (3) lack of motive to fabricate or lack of bias, (4) the reason the declarant cannot testify, (5) the voluntariness of the statements, i.e., whether they were made in response to leading questions or made under undue influence, (6) personal knowledge of the declarant about the matter on which he spoke, (7) to whom the statements were made . . . , and (8) the time frame within wh | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Elher v. Misra
green
1 sentence2016See Daubert, 509 US at 593-594 ; Elher v Misra, 499 Mich 11 , ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2015). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Moore v. Prestige Painting
neutral
2 sentences2008Given that the magistrate was not bound by the rules of evidence, and given Scarpetta's testimony establishing the reliability of the test results, the WCAC, to the extent it found Scarpetta's testimony inadmissible or unreliable, did not review the magistrate's decision to admit this evidence for an abuse of discretion, but instead made its own, erroneous determination of admissibility. [ Id. at 132, 689 N.W.2d 758 .] Defendants sought leave to appeal this Court's decision before the Supreme Court. 2008Given that the magistrate was not bound by the rules of evidence, and given Scarpetta's testimony establishing the reliability of the test results, the WCAC, to the extent it found Scarpetta's testimony inadmissible or unreliable, did not review the magistrate's decision to admit this evidence for an abuse of discretion, but instead made its own, erroneous determination of admissibility. [ Id. at 132, 689 N.W.2d 758 .] Defendants sought leave to appeal this Court's decision before the Supreme Court. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2006Defendant relies on Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 ; 124 S Ct 1354 ; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004), which rejected the reliability test established in Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56, 66 ; 100 S Ct 2531 ; 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980), with respect to the admissibility of “testimonial” evidence. 2006Defendant relies on Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 ; 124 S Ct 1354 ; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004), which rejected the reliability test established in Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56, 66 ; 100 S Ct 2531 ; 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980), with respect to the admissibility of “testimonial” evidence. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Ohio v. Roberts
red
2 sentences2006Defendant relies on Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 ; 124 S Ct 1354 ; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004), which rejected the reliability test established in Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56, 66 ; 100 S Ct 2531 ; 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980), with respect to the admissibility of “testimonial” evidence. 2006Defendant relies on Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 ; 124 S Ct 1354 ; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004), which rejected the reliability test established in Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56, 66 ; 100 S Ct 2531 ; 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980), with respect to the admissibility of “testimonial” evidence. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Welch
green
2 sentences2000This reliability requirement is fulfilled when the hearsay statement either “ ‘ “falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” ’ ” or occurs under circumstances with “ ‘ “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” ’ ” People v Welch, 226 Mich App 461, 467 ; 574 NW2d 682 (1997) (citations omitted). 2000This reliability requirement is fulfilled when the hearsay statement either “ ‘ “falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” ’ ” or occurs under circumstances with “ ‘ “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” ’ ” People v Welch, 226 Mich App 461, 467 ; 574 NW2d 682 (1997) (citations omitted). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Dye
green
2 sentences1998Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” In the specific context of MRE 804(b)(1), we earlier held in People v Dye, 431 Mich 58, 93 ; 427 NW2d 501 (1988), that the preliminary examination testimony of an unavailable witness may be used at trial upon a showing that the testimony bears satisfactory indicia of reliability. 11 The reliability requirement was also noted in People v Bean, 457 Mich 677, 682-683 ; 580 NW2d 390 (1998). 1998Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” In the specific context of MRE 804(b)(1), we earlier held in People v Dye, 431 Mich 58, 93 ; 427 NW2d 501 (1988), that the preliminary examination testimony of an unavailable witness may be used at trial upon a showing that the testimony bears satisfactory indicia of reliability. 11 The reliability requirement was also noted in People v Bean, 457 Mich 677, 682-683 ; 580 NW2d 390 (1998). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Poole
green
2 sentences1998With equal plausibility, the prosecutor infers from the courier's brief testimony that she is concerned about committing perjury by giving exculpatory testimony at trial. [12] Second, and more importantly, Poole and Roberts teach that the reliability requirement is satisfied "without more" if the proposed testimony falls within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. 444 Mich. at 162 , 506 N.W.2d 505 . 1998With equal plausibility, the prosecutor infers from the courier's brief testimony that she is concerned about committing perjury by giving exculpatory testimony at trial. [12] Second, and more importantly, Poole and Roberts teach that the reliability requirement is satisfied "without more" if the proposed testimony falls within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. 444 Mich. at 162 , 506 N.W.2d 505 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Bean
green
2 sentences1998Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” In the specific context of MRE 804(b)(1), we earlier held in People v Dye, 431 Mich 58, 93 ; 427 NW2d 501 (1988), that the preliminary examination testimony of an unavailable witness may be used at trial upon a showing that the testimony bears satisfactory indicia of reliability. 11 The reliability requirement was also noted in People v Bean, 457 Mich 677, 682-683 ; 580 NW2d 390 (1998). 1998Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” In the specific context of MRE 804(b)(1), we earlier held in People v Dye, 431 Mich 58, 93 ; 427 NW2d 501 (1988), that the preliminary examination testimony of an unavailable witness may be used at trial upon a showing that the testimony bears satisfactory indicia of reliability. 11 The reliability requirement was also noted in People v Bean, 457 Mich 677, 682-683 ; 580 NW2d 390 (1998). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Commonwealth v. Curnin green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences1992Axell, p 856; Castro , p 973 (although the procedure is reliable, the evidence was inadmissible because the testing laboratory failed to use generally accepted scientific techniques); United States v Jakobetz, 955 F2d 786 (CA 2, 1992); Prater v State, 307 Ark 180 ; 820 SW2d 429, 436 (1991); Commonwealth v Curnin, 409 Mass 218; 565 NE2d 440 (1991); People v Lipscomb, 215 Ill App 3d 413; 574 NE2d 1345, 1357 (1991); Hopkins v State, 579 NE2d 1297, 1302 (Ind, 1991); State v Brown, 470 NW2d 30, 32-33 (Iowa, 1991); Smith v Deppish, 248 Kan 217, 238; 807 P2d 144 *276 (1991); State v Davis, 814 SW2d 5 1992Axell, p 856; Castro , p 973 (although the procedure is reliable, the evidence was inadmissible because the testing laboratory failed to use generally accepted scientific techniques); United States v Jakobetz, 955 F2d 786 (CA 2, 1992); Prater v State, 307 Ark 180 ; 820 SW2d 429, 436 (1991); Commonwealth v Curnin, 409 Mass 218; 565 NE2d 440 (1991); People v Lipscomb, 215 Ill App 3d 413; 574 NE2d 1345, 1357 (1991); Hopkins v State, 579 NE2d 1297, 1302 (Ind, 1991); State v Brown, 470 NW2d 30, 32-33 (Iowa, 1991); Smith v Deppish, 248 Kan 217, 238; 807 P2d 144 (1991); State v Davis, 814 SW2d 593 (M | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Caldwell v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Pennington green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Schwartz
green
2 sentences1992Axell, p 856; Castro , p 973 (although the procedure is reliable, the evidence was inadmissible because the testing laboratory failed to use generally accepted scientific techniques); United States v Jakobetz, 955 F2d 786 (CA 2, 1992); Prater v State, 307 Ark 180 ; 820 SW2d 429, 436 (1991); Commonwealth v Curnin, 409 Mass 218; 565 NE2d 440 (1991); People v Lipscomb, 215 Ill App 3d 413; 574 NE2d 1345, 1357 (1991); Hopkins v State, 579 NE2d 1297, 1302 (Ind, 1991); State v Brown, 470 NW2d 30, 32-33 (Iowa, 1991); Smith v Deppish, 248 Kan 217, 238; 807 P2d 144 *276 (1991); State v Davis, 814 SW2d 5 1992Axell, p 856; Castro , p 973 (although the procedure is reliable, the evidence was inadmissible because the testing laboratory failed to use generally accepted scientific techniques); United States v Jakobetz, 955 F2d 786 (CA 2, 1992); Prater v State, 307 Ark 180 ; 820 SW2d 429, 436 (1991); Commonwealth v Curnin, 409 Mass 218; 565 NE2d 440 (1991); People v Lipscomb, 215 Ill App 3d 413; 574 NE2d 1345, 1357 (1991); Hopkins v State, 579 NE2d 1297, 1302 (Ind, 1991); State v Brown, 470 NW2d 30, 32-33 (Iowa, 1991); Smith v Deppish, 248 Kan 217, 238; 807 P2d 144 (1991); State v Davis, 814 SW2d 593 (M | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Cobey v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Woodall green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Ford green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| James v. United States green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Jackson v. United States green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Perrine v. Mossinghoff green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Ibn-Tamas v. United States green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State v. Souel green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Hicks v. Virginia green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Adams v. Illinois green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Allweiss green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. LaSumba green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Commonwealth v. Lykus green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Barbara green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.