reliability inquiry (Arizona) · Go Syfert
← Arizona issues

reliability inquiry in Arizona

14 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2024 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

CaseFollowedCited
Neil v. Biggersgreen
scotus · 1972 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2016–2022
2 sentences

2022See id. ¶ 10 (Reliability factors “include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, . . . the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.” (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 199–200 (1972)).

2016After considering the reliability factors set forth in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S.Ct. 375 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), the trial court concluded that Any’s identification was sufficiently reliable and denied Goudeau’s motion to preclude.

12
State v. Spearsgreen
ariz · 1996 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024The State “need not disprove ‘every remote possibility of tampering’” to show the continuity of possession necessary to establish a chain of custody, State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 287 (1996) (citation omitted), and the precautions described support the superior court’s assessment of admissibility. ¶12 Fredericks further asserts that lack of evidence about policies and procedures of the out-of-state laboratory performing the drug screens, and the fact that his urine samples were unrefrigerated for some period before being tested, undermine the reliability of the test results.

11
State v. Carrgreen
arizctapp · 2007 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Urinalysis reports, however, are generally deemed reliable and admissible (provided there is evidence of how the sample was collected) so long as there is “nothing to indicate that [the] report [is] inaccurate, or that the hospital testing procedures were generally unreliable.” State v. Carr, 216 Ariz. 444, 446, ¶ 5 (App. 2007) (alterations in original and citations omitted).

11
United States v. Adrian Paul Martinezgreen
ca8 · 1993 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015In the Eighth Circuit, “[a]n alleged error in the application of a reliable methodology should provide the basis for exclusion of the opinion only if that error negates the basis for the reliability of the principle itself.” United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1198 (8th Cir.1993); see also United States v. Gipson, 383 F.3d 689, 697 (8th Cir.2004) (“[O]utright exclusion of the evidence in question is warranted only if the methodology was so altered by a deficient application as to skew the methodology itself.”).

11
United States v. George Edward Gipsongreen
ca8 · 2004 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015In the Eighth Circuit, “[a]n alleged error in the application of a reliable methodology should provide the basis for exclusion of the opinion only if that error negates the basis for the reliability of the principle itself.” United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1198 (8th Cir.1993); see also United States v. Gipson, 383 F.3d 689, 697 (8th Cir.2004) (“[O]utright exclusion of the evidence in question is warranted only if the methodology was so altered by a deficient application as to skew the methodology itself.”).

11
State v. Prasertphonggreen
ariz · 2003 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005E.g., State v. Prasertphong, 206 Ariz. 70, 81, ¶ 35 , 75 P.3d 675, 686 (2003), vacated *25 by 541 U.S. 1039 , 124 S.Ct. 2165 , 158 L.Ed.2d 727 (2004). ¶26 The reliability analysis adopted in Roberts was recently jettisoned by the Supreme Court in Crawford .

2005E.g., State v. Prasertphong, 206 Ariz. 70, 81, ¶ 35 , 75 P.3d 675, 686 (2003), vacated *25 by 541 U.S. 1039 , 124 S.Ct. 2165 , 158 L.Ed.2d 727 (2004). ¶26 The reliability analysis adopted in Roberts was recently jettisoned by the Supreme Court in Crawford .

11
State v. Sloangreen
moctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
1 sentence

2004Testimony intended to demonstrate that an interview of a child victim was suggestive or otherwise inappropriate and the risks created by such questioning “represents evidence only an expert could give on matters not within the knowledge of a juror ... [and] would assist the jury directly in evaluating the weight given to the testimony.” State v. Sloan, 912 S.W.2d 592, 597 (Mo.App.1995). ¶ 25 Because Dr. Underwager’s proposed expert testimony is not the type subject to a reliability inquiry under Frye and “involves an area of expertise beyond the ken of the average layman,” Barlow, 507 S.E.2d a

11
State v. Hungerfordgreen
nh · 1997 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000See Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F.Supp. 286, 287 (D.Mass.1996) (finding that the theory of repressed memory is reliable under Daubert ); Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child and Family Services, Inc., 718 N.E.2d 738, 748-49 (Ind.1999) (concluding that, before the testimony is admitted into evidence, the court must be satisfied that the expert scientific testimony is based on reliable scientific principles); State v. Hungerford, 142 N.H. 110 , 697 A.2d 916, 920 (1997) (concluding that repressed memories must satisfy a threshold reliability inquiry before being admitted at trial); State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.

2000See Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F.Supp. 286, 287 (D.Mass.1996) (finding that the theory of repressed memory is reliable under Daubert ); Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child and Family Services, Inc., 718 N.E.2d 738, 748-49 (Ind.1999) (concluding that, before the testimony is admitted into evidence, the court must be satisfied that the expert scientific testimony is based on reliable scientific principles); State v. Hungerford, 142 N.H. 110 , 697 A.2d 916, 920 (1997) (concluding that repressed memories must satisfy a threshold reliability inquiry before being admitted at trial); State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.

11
State v. Quattrocchigreen
ri · 1996 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000See Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F.Supp. 286, 287 (D.Mass.1996) (finding that the theory of repressed memory is reliable under Daubert ); Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child and Family Services, Inc., 718 N.E.2d 738, 748-49 (Ind.1999) (concluding that, before the testimony is admitted into evidence, the court must be satisfied that the expert scientific testimony is based on reliable scientific principles); State v. Hungerford, 142 N.H. 110 , 697 A.2d 916, 920 (1997) (concluding that repressed memories must satisfy a threshold reliability inquiry before being admitted at trial); State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.

2000See Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F.Supp. 286, 287 (D.Mass.1996) (finding that the theory of repressed memory is reliable under Daubert); Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child and Family Services, Inc., 718 N.E.2d 738, 748-49 (Ind.1999) (concluding that, before the testimony is admitted into evidence, the court must be satisfied that the expert scientific testimony is based on reliable scientific principles); State v. Hungerford, 142 N.H. 110 , 697 A.2d 916, 920 (1997) (concluding that repressed memories must satisfy a threshold reliability inquiry before being admitted at trial); State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2

11
Shahzade v. Gregorygreen
mad · 1996 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000See Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F.Supp. 286, 287 (D.Mass.1996) (finding that the theory of repressed memory is reliable under Daubert ); Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child and Family Services, Inc., 718 N.E.2d 738, 748-49 (Ind.1999) (concluding that, before the testimony is admitted into evidence, the court must be satisfied that the expert scientific testimony is based on reliable scientific principles); State v. Hungerford, 142 N.H. 110 , 697 A.2d 916, 920 (1997) (concluding that repressed memories must satisfy a threshold reliability inquiry before being admitted at trial); State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.

2000See Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F.Supp. 286, 287 (D.Mass.1996) (finding that the theory of repressed memory is reliable under Daubert); Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child and Family Services, Inc., 718 N.E.2d 738, 748-49 (Ind.1999) (concluding that, before the testimony is admitted into evidence, the court must be satisfied that the expert scientific testimony is based on reliable scientific principles); State v. Hungerford, 142 N.H. 110 , 697 A.2d 916, 920 (1997) (concluding that repressed memories must satisfy a threshold reliability inquiry before being admitted at trial); State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2

11
Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child & Family Services, Inc.green
ind · 1999 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000See Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F.Supp. 286, 287 (D.Mass.1996) (finding that the theory of repressed memory is reliable under Daubert ); Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child and Family Services, Inc., 718 N.E.2d 738, 748-49 (Ind.1999) (concluding that, before the testimony is admitted into evidence, the court must be satisfied that the expert scientific testimony is based on reliable scientific principles); State v. Hungerford, 142 N.H. 110 , 697 A.2d 916, 920 (1997) (concluding that repressed memories must satisfy a threshold reliability inquiry before being admitted at trial); State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.

2000See Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F.Supp. 286, 287 (D.Mass.1996) (finding that the theory of repressed memory is reliable under Daubert); Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child and Family Services, Inc., 718 N.E.2d 738, 748-49 (Ind.1999) (concluding that, before the testimony is admitted into evidence, the court must be satisfied that the expert scientific testimony is based on reliable scientific principles); State v. Hungerford, 142 N.H. 110 , 697 A.2d 916, 920 (1997) (concluding that repressed memories must satisfy a threshold reliability inquiry before being admitted at trial); State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2

11
State v. Morenogreen
arizctapp · 1992 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994State v. Moreno, 173 Ariz. 471, 472 , 844 P.2d 638, 639 (App.1992).

1994State v. Moreno, 173 Ariz. 471, 472 , 844 P.2d 638, 639 (App.1992).

11
State v. Roblesgreen
ariz · 1983 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
2 sentences

1987In State v. Robles, 135 Ariz. 92, 94-95 , 659 P.2d 645, 647-48 (1983), we noted that some courts have approached this reliability inquiry by comparing the evidence under scrutiny with each of the specific exceptions set out in Rules 803 and 804.

1987In State v. Robles, 135 Ariz. 92, 94-95 , 659 P.2d 645, 647-48 (1983), we noted that some courts have approached this reliability inquiry by comparing the evidence under scrutiny with each of the specific exceptions set out in Rules 803 and 804.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Dessureault green
ariz · 1969
2 sentences

2015Thus, we do not address the court of appeals’ reliability analysis or conclusion. ¶ 7 In Dessureault , we set forth the procedure for Arizona courts to follow when a defendant challenges a pretrial identification. 104 Ariz. at 383-84 , 453 P.2d at 954-55 .

2015Thus, we do not address the court of appeals’ reliability analysis or conclusion. ¶ 7 In Dessureault , we set forth the procedure for Arizona courts to follow when a defendant challenges a pretrial identification. 104 Ariz. at 383-84 , 453 P.2d at 954-55 .

12015–2015
State v. Anderson green
ariz · 2005
2 sentences

2006All of these arguments were rejected in Anderson II, 210 Ariz. at 347 ¶¶ 79-80 & 82, 111 P.3d at 389 . ¶ 79 Moreover, Ellison has not shown any prejudice from the timing of the State’s formal notice.

2006All of these arguments were rejected in Anderson II, 210 Ariz. at 347 ¶¶ 79-80 & 82, 111 P.3d at 389 . ¶ 79 Moreover, Ellison has not shown any prejudice from the timing of the State’s formal notice.

12006–2006
Crawford v. Washington green
scotus · 2004
1 sentence

2005In Crawford , the Court analyzed the historical background of the Confrontation Clause to determine the meaning of an accused’s right to confront the “witnesses against him.” 541 U.S. at 47-50 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 .

12005–2005
Perry v. United States green
scotus · 2004
1 sentence

2005E.g., State v. Prasertphong, 206 Ariz. 70, 81, ¶ 35 , 75 P.3d 675, 686 (2003), vacated *25 by 541 U.S. 1039 , 124 S.Ct. 2165 , 158 L.Ed.2d 727 (2004). ¶26 The reliability analysis adopted in Roberts was recently jettisoned by the Supreme Court in Crawford .

12005–2005
Parisi v. Illinois green
scotus · 2004
1 sentence

2005E.g., State v. Prasertphong, 206 Ariz. 70, 81, ¶ 35 , 75 P.3d 675, 686 (2003), vacated *25 by 541 U.S. 1039 , 124 S.Ct. 2165 , 158 L.Ed.2d 727 (2004). ¶26 The reliability analysis adopted in Roberts was recently jettisoned by the Supreme Court in Crawford .

12005–2005
Barlow v. State green
ga · 1998
1 sentence

2004Testimony intended to demonstrate that an interview of a child victim was suggestive or otherwise inappropriate and the risks created by such questioning “represents evidence only an expert could give on matters not within the knowledge of a juror ... [and] would assist the jury directly in evaluating the weight given to the testimony.” State v. Sloan, 912 S.W.2d 592, 597 (Mo.App.1995). ¶ 25 Because Dr. Underwager’s proposed expert testimony is not the type subject to a reliability inquiry under Frye and “involves an area of expertise beyond the ken of the average layman,” Barlow, 507 S.E.2d a

12004–2004
State v. Bible green
ariz · 1993
2 sentences

2000Given the rule's text and cases such as Hummert, 188 Ariz. 119 , 933 P.2d 1187 ; Johnson, 186 Ariz. 329 , 922 P.2d 294 ; and Bible, 175 Ariz. 549 , 858 P.2d 1152—all decided after we adopted Ariz.R.Evid. 702—we could not now discover such a standard implicit in the language of the rule, phrased as it is in terms of "specialized knowledge" that will assist the jury "to understand the evidence or to determine" the facts and permitting expert testimony when a witness is "qualified ... by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." Nor do we believe we should interpret the rule to inclu

2000Given the rule's text and cases such as Hummert, 188 Ariz. 119 , 933 P.2d 1187 ; Johnson, 186 Ariz. 329 , 922 P.2d 294 ; and Bible, 175 Ariz. 549 , 858 P.2d 1152—all decided after we adopted Ariz.R.Evid. 702—we could not now discover such a standard implicit in the language of the rule, phrased as it is in terms of "specialized knowledge" that will assist the jury "to understand the evidence or to determine" the facts and permitting expert testimony when a witness is "qualified ... by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." Nor do we believe we should interpret the rule to inclu

12000–2000
State v. Hummert green
ariz · 1997
2 sentences

2000Given the rule's text and cases such as Hummert, 188 Ariz. 119 , 933 P.2d 1187 ; Johnson, 186 Ariz. 329 , 922 P.2d 294 ; and Bible, 175 Ariz. 549 , 858 P.2d 1152—all decided after we adopted Ariz.R.Evid. 702—we could not now discover such a standard implicit in the language of the rule, phrased as it is in terms of "specialized knowledge" that will assist the jury "to understand the evidence or to determine" the facts and permitting expert testimony when a witness is "qualified ... by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." Nor do we believe we should interpret the rule to inclu

2000Given the rule's text and cases such as Hummert, 188 Ariz. 119 , 933 P.2d 1187 ; Johnson, 186 Ariz. 329 , 922 P.2d 294 ; and Bible, 175 Ariz. 549 , 858 P.2d 1152—all decided after we adopted Ariz.R.Evid. 702—we could not now discover such a standard implicit in the language of the rule, phrased as it is in terms of "specialized knowledge" that will assist the jury "to understand the evidence or to determine" the facts and permitting expert testimony when a witness is "qualified ... by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." Nor do we believe we should interpret the rule to inclu

12000–2000
Wilson v. Phillips green
calctapp · 1999
2 sentences

2000See Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F.Supp. 286, 287 (D.Mass.1996) (finding that the theory of repressed memory is reliable under Daubert ); Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child and Family Services, Inc., 718 N.E.2d 738, 748-49 (Ind.1999) (concluding that, before the testimony is admitted into evidence, the court must be satisfied that the expert scientific testimony is based on reliable scientific principles); State v. Hungerford, 142 N.H. 110 , 697 A.2d 916, 920 (1997) (concluding that repressed memories must satisfy a threshold reliability inquiry before being admitted at trial); State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.

2000See Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F.Supp. 286, 287 (D.Mass.1996) (finding that the theory of repressed memory is reliable under Daubert ); Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child and Family Services, Inc., 718 N.E.2d 738, 748-49 (Ind.1999) (concluding that, before the testimony is admitted into evidence, the court must be satisfied that the expert scientific testimony is based on reliable scientific principles); State v. Hungerford, 142 N.H. 110 , 697 A.2d 916, 920 (1997) (concluding that repressed memories must satisfy a threshold reliability inquiry before being admitted at trial); State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.

12000–2000
State v. Johnson green
ariz · 1996
2 sentences

2000Given the rule's text and cases such as Hummert, 188 Ariz. 119 , 933 P.2d 1187 ; Johnson, 186 Ariz. 329 , 922 P.2d 294 ; and Bible, 175 Ariz. 549 , 858 P.2d 1152—all decided after we adopted Ariz.R.Evid. 702—we could not now discover such a standard implicit in the language of the rule, phrased as it is in terms of "specialized knowledge" that will assist the jury "to understand the evidence or to determine" the facts and permitting expert testimony when a witness is "qualified ... by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." Nor do we believe we should interpret the rule to inclu

2000Given the rule's text and cases such as Hummert, 188 Ariz. 119 , 933 P.2d 1187 ; Johnson, 186 Ariz. 329 , 922 P.2d 294 ; and Bible, 175 Ariz. 549 , 858 P.2d 1152—all decided after we adopted Ariz.R.Evid. 702—we could not now discover such a standard implicit in the language of the rule, phrased as it is in terms of "specialized knowledge" that will assist the jury "to understand the evidence or to determine" the facts and permitting expert testimony when a witness is "qualified ... by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." Nor do we believe we should interpret the rule to inclu

12000–2000
Chambers v. Mississippi green
scotus · 1973
1 sentence

1996Id.

11996–1996
State v. Jeffers green
ariz · 1983
2 sentences

1990Yslas, 139 Ariz. at 65, 676 P.2d at 1123; Jeffers, 135 Ariz. at 422 , 661 P.2d at 1123 .

1990Yslas, 139 Ariz. at 65, 676 P.2d at 1123; Jeffers, 135 Ariz. at 422 , 661 P.2d at 1123 .

11990–1990
Aguilar v. Texas red
scotus · 1964
2 sentences

1975First, appellant contends that the act of “making” the informant reliable through one buy which leads neither to arrest nor conviction does not meet the reliability test enunciated in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

1975First, appellant contends that the act of “making” the informant reliable through one buy which leads neither to arrest nor conviction does not meet the reliability test enunciated in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

11975–1975
Spinelli v. United States red
scotus · 1969
2 sentences

1975First, appellant contends that the act of “making” the informant reliable through one buy which leads neither to arrest nor conviction does not meet the reliability test enunciated in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

1975First, appellant contends that the act of “making” the informant reliable through one buy which leads neither to arrest nor conviction does not meet the reliability test enunciated in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

11975–1975

Statutes the citing opinions construe

AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4031 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 398 (1993–2026) OH 82 (1981–2026) IL 82 (1972–2025) CA 64 (1958–2026) NC 60 (1985–2025) NY 54 (1977–2025) WA 54 (1987–2025) MA 41 (1975–2023) FL 40 (1983–2026) TN 37 (1983–2026) CO 37 (1990–2026) VA 34 (1970–2025) MD 32 (1971–2025) NJ 31 (1987–2024) IN 30 (1969–2020) MN 30 (1977–2019) CT 29 (1977–2025) KS 27 (1978–2025) NM 26 (1975–2025) AL 24 (1980–2016) MI 23 (1980–2026) WI 22 (1980–2025) UT 22 (1994–2025) MS 22 (2001–2020) ID 18 (1984–2026) SC 18 (1993–2024) MO 17 (1978–2021) GA 16 (1982–2025) HI 16 (1996–2021) LA 15 (1979–2026) AZ 14 (1975–2024) DC 13 (1977–2025) IA 13 (1979–2022) PA 12 (1981–2025) WV 12 (1990–2024) NH 11 (1967–2024) DE 11 (1996–2025) MT 10 (1994–2019) OR 8 (1982–2022) AK 6 (1979–1996) OK 6 (1991–2019) NE 6 (1994–2022) ME 6 (1979–2026) WY 6 (1993–2025) SD 6 (1936–2022) AR 4 (1981–2026) VT 4 (2000–2024) KY 4 (2006–2019) VI 4 (1999–2016) RI 3 (1989–1999) NV 2 (2005–2013)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check