reliability test in Florida

2025Risk Servs., 166 So. 3d 189, 194 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“The Daubert[1] test as codified in section 90.702 requires (1) that the testimony be based on ‘sufficient facts or data’; (2) that it be a ‘product of reliable principles and methods’; and (3) that the expert ‘applied the principles and methods reliable to the facts of the case.’”); Kemp v. State, 280 So. 3d 81 , 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (“The Supreme Court in Daubert outlined a list of factors that bear on the reliability inquiry: (1) whether the theory can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to pee

2021Although there is no definitive list of factors for the court to consider in making this determination, the Daubert court laid out several observations it deemed appropriate for consideration of the reliability inquiry, including: (1) “whether [the] theory or technique . . . can be (and has been) tested”; (2) “whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication”; (3) “in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error”; and (4) “general acceptance.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.

2002Stevens v. State, 419 So.2d 1058 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228 , 103 S.Ct. 1236 , 75 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983).

1996Stevens v. State, 419 So.2d 1058 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228 , 103 S.Ct. 1236 , 75 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983).

2002Stevens v. State, 419 So.2d 1058 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228 , 103 S.Ct. 1236 , 75 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983).

1996Stevens v. State, 419 So.2d 1058 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228 , 103 S.Ct. 1236 , 75 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983).

2002Stevens v. State, 419 So.2d 1058 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228 , 103 S.Ct. 1236 , 75 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983).

1996Stevens v. State, 419 So.2d 1058 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228 , 103 S.Ct. 1236 , 75 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983).

2018In the present case, by contrast, the trial court conducted a reliability analysis by comparing the child’s statement with statements made by other children, concluding that “they do corroborate each other.” This is not permitted under Townsend, which plainly 19 holds that “a court should not consider other corroborating evidence to determine the reliability of the child's statement.” Id. at 957-58 .

2018In the present case, by contrast, the trial court conducted a reliability analysis by comparing the child’s statement with statements made by other children, concluding that “they do corroborate each other.” This is not permitted under Townsend, which plainly holds that “a court should not consider other corroborating evidence to determine the reliability of the child's statement.” Id. at 957-58 .

2006In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court overruled the reliability test previously established in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), for determining the admissibility of testimonial hearsay.

2006In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court overruled the reliability test previously established in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), for determining the admissibility of testimonial hearsay.

1987See Dorman v. State, 492 So.2d 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (blood-alcohol test results not admissible for lack of substantial compliance with statutory requirements where trooper’s observation that defendant’s eyes were red insufficient to establish probable cause to take sample); State v. Roose, 450 So.2d 861, 862 (Fla. 3d DCA) (test results inadmissible where person who withdrew defendant’s blood not statutorily authorized to do so; lack of authorization “fatally infects the reliability of the test results and renders them inadmissible into evidence”), rev. denied, 451 So.2d 850 (Fla.1984); Bea

1984In Grala v. State, 414 So.2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), we squarely held, as we do here, that the fact that the person who has drawn the defendant's blood is not statutorily authorized to do so fatally infects the reliability of the test results and renders them inadmissible into evidence.

2006In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court overruled the reliability test previously established in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), for determining the admissibility of testimonial hearsay.

2006In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court overruled the reliability test previously established in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), for determining the admissibility of testimonial hearsay.

1994When such reliable evidence is offered, “any inquiry into its reliability for purposes of admissibility is only necessary when the opposing party makes a timely request for such an inquiry supported by authorities indicating that there may not be general scientific acceptance of the technique employed.” Robinson v. State, 610 So.2d 1288, 1291 (Fla.1992) (quoting Correll v. State, 523 So.2d 562, 567 (Fla.1988)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 1205 , 127 L.Ed.2d 553 (1994) (citations omitted).

1994When such reliable evidence is offered, "any inquiry into its reliability for purposes of admissibility is only necessary when the opposing party makes a timely request for such an inquiry supported by authorities indicating that there may not be general scientific acceptance of the technique employed." Robinson v. State, 610 So.2d 1288, 1291 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Correll v. State, 523 So.2d 562, 567 (Fla. 1988)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1205 , 127 L.Ed.2d 553 (1994) (citations omitted).

1991Coppolino v State, 223 So.2d 68, 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied. 399 U.S. 927 (1970).

1987Coppolino v. State, 223 So.2d 68, 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), app. dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).

1991Coppolino v State, 223 So.2d 68, 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied. 399 U.S. 927 (1970).

1987Coppolino v. State, 223 So.2d 68, 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), app. dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).

1989The Bender opinion, supra, indicates otherwise, for the Supreme Court stated that where the State has failed to comply with the administrative rules, the results may nevertheless be admissible “if the traditional predicate is laid which establishes the reliability of the test, the qualifications of the operator, and the meaning of the test results by expert testimony.” 382 So.2d at 700 .

1985The Florida supreme court in State v. Bender, 382 So.2d 697 (Fla.1980), stated that where motor vehicle driver intoxication is not involved the implied consent provision is inapplicable and, consequently, the results of blood tests are admissible into evidence without compliance with the administrative rules if the traditional predicate is laid which establishes the reliability of the test, the qualifications of the operator, and the meaning of the test results by expert testimony.

2018Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980). - 34 - juror would not join a death recommendation if a resentencing were now conducted are likely given that proper Caldwell instructions would be required”; thus, the unanimous recommendation does not meet the Eighth Amendment’s reliability requirement.

2012The court added that “[t]he mere fact that a tip, if true, would describe illegal activity does not mean that the police may make a Terry stop without meeting the reliability requirement.” Id. at 273 n. *, 120 S.Ct. 1375 .

2012The court added that “[t]he mere fact that a tip, if true, would describe illegal activity does not mean that the police may make a Terry stop without meeting the reliability requirement.” Id. at 273 n. *, 120 S.Ct. 1375 .

2008The Florida Supreme Court stated that, in addition to factors set out in the statute, in determining whether to admit hearsay statements of a mentally disabled declarant, the courts should consider: (1) the spontaneity of the statement; (2) how the statement was elicited; (3) the mental state of the declarant when the abuse was reported; (4) how the declarant described the act; (5) whether the declarant used terminology unexpected of a similarly situated mentally disabled adult; (6) the motive or lack thereof to fabricate the statement; (7) the ability of the declarant to distinguish between r

2006In Conner , we explicitly held that "unlike the child hearsay context, we are unable to formulate a list of permissible considerations that would ensure the reliability of a hearsay statement made by an elderly adult to the extent that `adversarial testing would add little to its reliability.'" 748 So.2d at 958 -59 (quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 818 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 ).

2006In Conner , we explicitly held that "unlike the child hearsay context, we are unable to formulate a list of permissible considerations that would ensure the reliability of a hearsay statement made by an elderly adult to the extent that `adversarial testing would add little to its reliability.'" 748 So.2d at 958 -59 (quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 818 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 ).

2006In Conner , we explicitly held that "unlike the child hearsay context, we are unable to formulate a list of permissible considerations that would ensure the reliability of a hearsay statement made by an elderly adult to the extent that `adversarial testing would add little to its reliability.'" 748 So.2d at 958 -59 (quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 818 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 ).