reliability test in Georgia

2025Of course, when engaging in a reliability analysis, courts “must be careful to focus on the expert’s principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”15 Critically, as in this case, when a witness “relies solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.”16 Indeed, if admissibility could be “established merely by the ipse dixit of an admittedly qualified expert, the reliability prong would

2023Nor has he reliably applied any standard to the facts of this case.12 When engaging in a reliability analysis, courts must be careful to focus on the expert’s “principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” See Daubert, 509 U. S. at 595 (II) (B); see also Webster v. Desai, 305 Ga. App. 234, 235 (1) ( 699 SE2d 419 ) (2010) (referencing the four non-inclusive Daubert factors for assessing reliability, which include an 12 We do not decide, in this opinion, what standard of care applies in situations such as the one presented here; we find only that McCans failed to articu

2007See Cheatwood, supra, 248 Ga. App. at 620 (1) (admitting OnTrack TesTstik results when expert testimony about the reliability of the test was presented).

2007See Cheatwood, supra, 248 Ga. App. at 620 (1) (admitting OnTrack TesTstik results when expert testimony about the reliability of the test was presented).

1990“The state laid a proper foundation for the introduction of the test results. . . . [Cits.] The defendant’s challenge to the reliability of the test results . . . [did not demand that judgment be entered in his favor] but went merely to the weight to be placed on them by the jury.” Sanders v. State, 176 Ga. App. 869, 869-870 (1) ( 338 SE2d 5 ) (1985).

1990“The state laid a proper foundation for the introduction of the test results. . . . [Cits.] The defendant’s challenge to the reliability of the test results . . . [did not demand that judgment be entered in his favor] but went merely to the weight to be placed on them by the jury.” Sanders v. State, 176 Ga. App. 869, 869-870 (1) ( 338 SE2d 5 ) (1985).

2026As Kumho Tire recognized, “the relevant reliability inquiry should be flexible, [] its overarching subject should be validity and reliability, and [] Daubert was intended neither to be exhaustive nor to apply in every case.” 526 US at 158 (III)(B) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2025See Miller, 317 Ga. at 26 (1) (a); Almanza, 304 Ga. at 558 (2); Wright, 374 Ga. App. at 31; Willcox, 355 Ga. App. at 542 (1).

2025See generally General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (III) ( 118 SCt 512 , 139 LE2d 508) (1997) (discussing how “ipse dixit” means, in essence, testimony untethered to data; that is, an assertion made but not proven). 12 Keough’s experience was insufficient to permit him to offer reliable opinions on the standard of care required of TICO’s maintenance mechanics.18 Additionally, when an expert’s opinion is based partially on speculation, this “goes to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility.”19 And it is likewise true that the appropriate standard for assessing the

2025See Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 1; Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 590 (2) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015).

2025See Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 1; Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 590 (2) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015).

2025Of course, when engaging in a reliability analysis, courts “must be careful to focus on the expert’s principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”15 Critically, as in this case, when a witness “relies solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.”16 Indeed, if admissibility could be “established merely by the ipse dixit of an admittedly qualified expert, the reliability prong would

2025Of course, when engaging in a reliability analysis, courts “must be careful to focus on the expert’s principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”15 Critically, as in this case, when a witness “relies solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.”16 Indeed, if admissibility could be “established merely by the ipse dixit of an admittedly qualified expert, the reliability prong would

2025See generally General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (III) ( 118 SCt 512 , 139 LE2d 508) (1997) (discussing how “ipse dixit” means, in essence, testimony untethered to data; that is, an assertion made but not proven). 12 Keough’s experience was insufficient to permit him to offer reliable opinions on the standard of care required of TICO’s maintenance mechanics.18 Additionally, when an expert’s opinion is based partially on speculation, this “goes to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility.”19 And it is likewise true that the appropriate standard for assessing the

2025See generally General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (III) ( 118 SCt 512 , 139 LE2d 508) (1997) (discussing how “ipse dixit” means, in essence, testimony untethered to data; that is, an assertion made but not proven). 12 Keough’s experience was insufficient to permit him to offer reliable opinions on the standard of care required of TICO’s maintenance mechanics.18 Additionally, when an expert’s opinion is based partially on speculation, this “goes to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility.”19 And it is likewise true that the appropriate standard for assessing the

2025See Miller, 317 Ga. at 26 (1) (a); Almanza, 304 Ga. at 558 (2); Wright, 374 Ga. App. at 31; Willcox, 355 Ga. App. at 542 (1).

2025See generally General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (III) ( 118 SCt 512 , 139 LE2d 508) (1997) (discussing how “ipse dixit” means, in essence, testimony untethered to data; that is, an assertion made but not proven). 12 Keough’s experience was insufficient to permit him to offer reliable opinions on the standard of care required of TICO’s maintenance mechanics.18 Additionally, when an expert’s opinion is based partially on speculation, this “goes to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility.”19 And it is likewise true that the appropriate standard for assessing the

2025See generally General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (III) ( 118 SCt 512 , 139 LE2d 508) (1997) (discussing how “ipse dixit” means, in essence, testimony untethered to data; that is, an assertion made but not proven). 12 Keough’s experience was insufficient to permit him to offer reliable opinions on the standard of care required of TICO’s maintenance mechanics.18 Additionally, when an expert’s opinion is based partially on speculation, this “goes to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility.”19 And it is likewise true that the appropriate standard for assessing the

2025See generally General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (III) ( 118 SCt 512 , 139 LE2d 508) (1997) (discussing how “ipse dixit” means, in essence, testimony untethered to data; that is, an assertion made but not proven). 12 Keough’s experience was insufficient to permit him to offer reliable opinions on the standard of care required of TICO’s maintenance mechanics.18 Additionally, when an expert’s opinion is based partially on speculation, this “goes to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility.”19 And it is likewise true that the appropriate standard for assessing the

2025See generally General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (III) ( 118 SCt 512 , 139 LE2d 508) (1997) (discussing how “ipse dixit” means, in essence, testimony untethered to data; that is, an assertion made but not proven). 12 Keough’s experience was insufficient to permit him to offer reliable opinions on the standard of care required of TICO’s maintenance mechanics.18 Additionally, when an expert’s opinion is based partially on speculation, this “goes to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility.”19 And it is likewise true that the appropriate standard for assessing the

2025See Miller, 317 Ga. at 26 (1) (a); Almanza, 304 Ga. at 558 (2); Wright, 374 Ga. App. at 31; Willcox, 355 Ga. App. at 542 (1).

2025See generally General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (III) ( 118 SCt 512 , 139 LE2d 508) (1997) (discussing how “ipse dixit” means, in essence, testimony untethered to data; that is, an assertion made but not proven). 12 Keough’s experience was insufficient to permit him to offer reliable opinions on the standard of care required of TICO’s maintenance mechanics.18 Additionally, when an expert’s opinion is based partially on speculation, this “goes to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility.”19 And it is likewise true that the appropriate standard for assessing the

2025See generally General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (III) ( 118 SCt 512 , 139 LE2d 508) (1997) (discussing how “ipse dixit” means, in essence, testimony untethered to data; that is, an assertion made but not proven). 12 Keough’s experience was insufficient to permit him to offer reliable opinions on the standard of care required of TICO’s maintenance mechanics.18 Additionally, when an expert’s opinion is based partially on speculation, this “goes to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility.”19 And it is likewise true that the appropriate standard for assessing the

2023Nor has he reliably applied any standard to the facts of this case.12 When engaging in a reliability analysis, courts must be careful to focus on the expert’s “principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” See Daubert, 509 U. S. at 595 (II) (B); see also Webster v. Desai, 305 Ga. App. 234, 235 (1) ( 699 SE2d 419 ) (2010) (referencing the four non-inclusive Daubert factors for assessing reliability, which include an 12 We do not decide, in this opinion, what standard of care applies in situations such as the one presented here; we find only that McCans failed to articu

2023Nor has he reliably applied any standard to the facts of this case.12 When engaging in a reliability analysis, courts must be careful to focus on the expert’s “principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” See Daubert, 509 U. S. at 595 (II) (B); see also Webster v. Desai, 305 Ga. App. 234, 235 (1) ( 699 SE2d 419 ) (2010) (referencing the four non-inclusive Daubert factors for assessing reliability, which include an 12 We do not decide, in this opinion, what standard of care applies in situations such as the one presented here; we find only that McCans failed to articu

2015Finally, completing the argument, appellant asserts that, in considering his motion for new trial upon the general grounds, the trial court failed to weigh the evidence as a “thirteenth juror,” see White v. State, 293 Ga. 523, 524 ( 753 SE2d 115 ) (2013) (even when evidence is legally sufficient to sustain conviction, trial judge must assess motion for new trial as a thirteenth juror using OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21); Walker v. State, 292 Ga. 262, 264 ( 737 SE2d 311 ) (2013) (trial court does not exercise its discretion properly when it evaluates general grounds using Jackson v. Virginia standa

2015Finally, completing the argument, appellant asserts that, in considering his motion for new trial upon the general grounds, the trial court failed to weigh the evidence as a “thirteenth juror,” see White v. State, 293 Ga. 523, 524 ( 753 SE2d 115 ) (2013) (even when evidence is legally sufficient to sustain conviction, trial judge must assess motion for new trial as a thirteenth juror using OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21); Walker v. State, 292 Ga. 262, 264 ( 737 SE2d 311 ) (2013) (trial court does not exercise its discretion properly when it evaluates general grounds using Jackson v. Virginia standa

2015Finally, completing the argument, appellant asserts that, in considering his motion for new trial upon the general grounds, the trial court failed to weigh the evidence as a “thirteenth juror,” see White v. State, 293 Ga. 523, 524 ( 753 SE2d 115 ) (2013) (even when evidence is legally sufficient to sustain conviction, trial judge must assess motion for new trial as a thirteenth juror using OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21); Walker v. State, 292 Ga. 262, 264 ( 737 SE2d 311 ) (2013) (trial court does not exercise its discretion properly when it evaluates general grounds using Jackson v. Virginia standa

2015Finally, completing the argument, appellant asserts that, in considering his motion for new trial upon the general grounds, the trial court failed to weigh the evidence as a “thirteenth juror,” see White v. State, 293 Ga. 523, 524 ( 753 SE2d 115 ) (2013) (even when evidence is legally sufficient to sustain conviction, trial judge must assess motion for new trial as a thirteenth juror using OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21); Walker v. State, 292 Ga. 262, 264 ( 737 SE2d 311 ) (2013) (trial court does not exercise its discretion properly when it evaluates general grounds using Jackson v. Virginia standa

2002See note 1, supra. See Ruffin v. Shaw Indus., 149 F3d 294 (4th Cir. 1998); Summers v. Missouri Pacific R.

2002To a degree, the reliability of challenge testing rests upon rules of logic, which are akin to common sense. [7] See note 1, supra. [8] See Ruffin v. Shaw Indus., 149 F.3d 294 (4th Cir.1998); Summers v. Missouri Pacific R.

2001Because the conspiracy involved the concealment phase of the crime, we must apply the reliability factors 2 set forth by the U. S. Supreme Court in its plurality opinion in *264 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 88-89 (91 SC 210, 27 LE2d 213) (1970), to determine whether appellant’s right to confront the non-testifying declarant was abridged.

1999Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the victim’s out-of-court statement concerning the acts which constitute the crimes charged, arguing that this statement was not admissible under the child hearsay statute, OCGA § 24-3-16, because the trial court did not consider the statement’s reliability under the test set out in Gregg v. State, 201 Ga. App. 238, 240 (3) (b) ( 411 SE2d 65 ).

1999Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the victim’s out-of-court statement concerning the acts which constitute the crimes charged, arguing that this statement was not admissible under the child hearsay statute, OCGA § 24-3-16, because the trial court did not consider the statement’s reliability under the test set out in Gregg v. State, 201 Ga. App. 238, 240 (3) (b) ( 411 SE2d 65 ).

1992These issues were raised in Harris v. State, 199 Ga. App. 457, 458-459 (4) ( 405 SE2d 501 ) (1991), in which it was held “the defendant’s challenge to the reliability of the test results did not affect their admissibility under these circumstances, but went merely to the weight to be placed on them. . . .” (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Id. at 459 .

1992These issues were raised in Harris v. State, 199 Ga. App. 457, 458-459 (4) ( 405 SE2d 501 ) (1991), in which it was held “the defendant’s challenge to the reliability of the test results did not affect their admissibility under these circumstances, but went merely to the weight to be placed on them. . . .” (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Id. at 459 .

1991Accord Burks v. State, 195 Ga. App. 516 (2) (a) ( 394 SE2d 136 ) (1990). 5.

1991Accord Burks v. State, 195 Ga. App. 516 (2) (a) ( 394 SE2d 136 ) (1990). 5.

1991Accord Broski v. State, 196 Ga. App. 116 ( 395 SE2d 317 ) (1990). "`The defendant's challenge to the reliability of the test results did not affect their admissibility under these circumstances, but went merely to the weight to be placed on them by the jury.' [Cit.]" Dotson, supra, 233 .

1991Accord Broski v. State, 196 Ga. App. 116 ( 395 SE2d 317 ) (1990). "`The defendant's challenge to the reliability of the test results did not affect their admissibility under these circumstances, but went merely to the weight to be placed on them by the jury.' [Cit.]" Dotson, supra, 233 .

1982Analyzed in the light of Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 638 ( 277 SE2d 729 ), the hearsay information was based on the personal *798 observation of these young males and in each case the reliability was established by the statement in the affidavit showing that they were either victims of the crime or that the statement was against their penal interest.

1982Analyzed in the light of Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 638 ( 277 SE2d 729 ), the hearsay information was based on the personal *798 observation of these young males and in each case the reliability was established by the statement in the affidavit showing that they were either victims of the crime or that the statement was against their penal interest.