reliability test in Delaware

2021ID 65976880, at ¶ 6. 25 Norman v. All About Women, P.A., 193 A.3d 726 , 730-31 (Del. 2018). 26 Timblin v. Kent General Hospital, 640 A.2d 1021 1024-26 (Del. 1994); cf. Crowhorn v. Boyle, 793 A.2d 422, 433 (Del. Super. Ct. 2002) (noting that the doctor’s general “proposition that seventy-five percent of chronic back pain sufferers ‘get better’ in six weeks . . . would have no application to” the plaintiff because the doctor “offer[ed] no basis for placing [the plaintiff] among the seventy-five percent.”) 27 Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 81 A.3d 1264, 1269 (Del. 2013) (quoting Daube

2021ID 65976880, at J 6. 25 Norman v. All About Women, P.A., 193 A.3d 726, 730-31 (Del. 2018). 26 Timblin v. Kent General Hospital, 640 A.2d 1021 1024-26 (Del. 1994); cf Crowhorn v. Boyle, 793 A.2d 422, 433 (Del. Super. Ct. 2002) (noting that the doctor’s general “proposition that seventy-five percent of chronic back pain sufferers ‘get better’ in six weeks... would have no application to” the plaintiff because the doctor “offer[ed] no basis for placing [the plaintiff] among the seventy-five percent.”) 27 Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 81 A.3d 1264, 1269 (Del. 2013) (quoting Daubert y.

2008See also, e.g., Norwood v. State, 2003 WL 29969 , at *2 (Del.Supr.) (finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court in allowing a detective to testify as the investigating officer and as an expert witness with respect to the factors distinguishing possession with intent to distribute from possession for consumption, where the requirements of D.R.E. 702 were satisfied by the detective's testimony that the factors listed were relied upon by all the members of her unit statewide, even if the reliability test of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d

2008See also, e.g., Norwood v. State, 2003 WL 29969 , at *2 (Del.Supr.) (finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court in allowing a detective to testify as the investigating officer and as an expert witness with respect to the factors distinguishing possession with intent to distribute from possession for consumption, where the requirements of D.R.E. 702 were satisfied by the detective's testimony that the factors listed were relied upon by all the members of her unit statewide, even if the reliability test of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d

2021ID 65976880, at ¶ 6. 25 Norman v. All About Women, P.A., 193 A.3d 726 , 730-31 (Del. 2018). 26 Timblin v. Kent General Hospital, 640 A.2d 1021 1024-26 (Del. 1994); cf. Crowhorn v. Boyle, 793 A.2d 422, 433 (Del. Super. Ct. 2002) (noting that the doctor’s general “proposition that seventy-five percent of chronic back pain sufferers ‘get better’ in six weeks . . . would have no application to” the plaintiff because the doctor “offer[ed] no basis for placing [the plaintiff] among the seventy-five percent.”) 27 Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 81 A.3d 1264, 1269 (Del. 2013) (quoting Daube

2021ID 65976880, at J 6. 25 Norman v. All About Women, P.A., 193 A.3d 726, 730-31 (Del. 2018). 26 Timblin v. Kent General Hospital, 640 A.2d 1021 1024-26 (Del. 1994); cf Crowhorn v. Boyle, 793 A.2d 422, 433 (Del. Super. Ct. 2002) (noting that the doctor’s general “proposition that seventy-five percent of chronic back pain sufferers ‘get better’ in six weeks... would have no application to” the plaintiff because the doctor “offer[ed] no basis for placing [the plaintiff] among the seventy-five percent.”) 27 Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 81 A.3d 1264, 1269 (Del. 2013) (quoting Daubert y.

2021ID 65976880, at ¶ 6. 25 Norman v. All About Women, P.A., 193 A.3d 726 , 730-31 (Del. 2018). 26 Timblin v. Kent General Hospital, 640 A.2d 1021 1024-26 (Del. 1994); cf. Crowhorn v. Boyle, 793 A.2d 422, 433 (Del. Super. Ct. 2002) (noting that the doctor’s general “proposition that seventy-five percent of chronic back pain sufferers ‘get better’ in six weeks . . . would have no application to” the plaintiff because the doctor “offer[ed] no basis for placing [the plaintiff] among the seventy-five percent.”) 27 Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 81 A.3d 1264, 1269 (Del. 2013) (quoting Daube

2021ID 65976880, at J 6. 25 Norman v. All About Women, P.A., 193 A.3d 726, 730-31 (Del. 2018). 26 Timblin v. Kent General Hospital, 640 A.2d 1021 1024-26 (Del. 1994); cf Crowhorn v. Boyle, 793 A.2d 422, 433 (Del. Super. Ct. 2002) (noting that the doctor’s general “proposition that seventy-five percent of chronic back pain sufferers ‘get better’ in six weeks... would have no application to” the plaintiff because the doctor “offer[ed] no basis for placing [the plaintiff] among the seventy-five percent.”) 27 Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 81 A.3d 1264, 1269 (Del. 2013) (quoting Daubert y.

2016Under Section 262, “fair value” means “the value to a stockholder of the firm as a going concern, as opposed to the firm’s value in the context of an 91 Hopkins Report ¶¶ 95-99. 23 acquisition or other transaction.” 92 This Court relatedly has recognized that ‘[i]n an arm’s-length, synergistic transaction, the deal price generally will exceed fair value because target fiduciaries bargain for a premium that includes . . . a share of the anticipated synergies.”93 Indeed, “the ability of target fiduciaries to obtain a premium to market implies that they successfully extracted a portion of the val

2016Under Section 262, “fair value” means “the value to a stockholder of the firm as a going concern, as opposed to the firm’s value in the context of an 91 Hopkins Report ¶¶ 95-99. 23 acquisition or other transaction.” 92 This Court relatedly has recognized that ‘[i]n an arm’s-length, synergistic transaction, the deal price generally will exceed fair value because target fiduciaries bargain for a premium that includes . . . a share of the anticipated synergies.”93 Indeed, “the ability of target fiduciaries to obtain a premium to market implies that they successfully extracted a portion of the val

2021ID 65976880, at ¶ 6. 25 Norman v. All About Women, P.A., 193 A.3d 726 , 730-31 (Del. 2018). 26 Timblin v. Kent General Hospital, 640 A.2d 1021 1024-26 (Del. 1994); cf. Crowhorn v. Boyle, 793 A.2d 422, 433 (Del. Super. Ct. 2002) (noting that the doctor’s general “proposition that seventy-five percent of chronic back pain sufferers ‘get better’ in six weeks . . . would have no application to” the plaintiff because the doctor “offer[ed] no basis for placing [the plaintiff] among the seventy-five percent.”) 27 Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 81 A.3d 1264, 1269 (Del. 2013) (quoting Daube

2021ID 65976880, at J 6. 25 Norman v. All About Women, P.A., 193 A.3d 726, 730-31 (Del. 2018). 26 Timblin v. Kent General Hospital, 640 A.2d 1021 1024-26 (Del. 1994); cf Crowhorn v. Boyle, 793 A.2d 422, 433 (Del. Super. Ct. 2002) (noting that the doctor’s general “proposition that seventy-five percent of chronic back pain sufferers ‘get better’ in six weeks... would have no application to” the plaintiff because the doctor “offer[ed] no basis for placing [the plaintiff] among the seventy-five percent.”) 27 Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 81 A.3d 1264, 1269 (Del. 2013) (quoting Daubert y.

2025And in the event, after an extensive colloquy with Cooke that tested the reliability of his waiver of his right to counsel and his ability to represent himself, the court granted Cooke’s request, and the second trial began with 1 Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 842 (Del. 2009). 2 Cooke at the helm.

2024In Finocchiaro, the Court refused to exclude a BAC blood test based on the lack of a live witness to establish chain of custody where there was other evidence regarding the overall reliability of the test.83 The purpose was to eliminate 79 Id. at *3 (citing 21 Del. C. § 4177(h)) (emphasis in original). 80 Id. (quoting the Board’s decision). 81 Id. (citing 21 Del. C. § 4177(g)) (omissions in original). 82 D.I. 14 at 17 (emphasis in original). 83 See Milligan v. State, 116 A.3d 1232, 1239 (Del. 2015) (citing Demby v. State, 913 A.2d 1127 , 1131 (Del. 2005) (“We have never interpreted [Delaware’s

2001This fear is misplaced for three reasons: (1) to be admissible, the testimony must be relevant and not unfairly prejudicial under D.R.E. 401, 402, and 403; (2) the testimony must relate to the psychological treatment and must satisfy the two-part reliability test; and (3) opposing counsel may cross-examine the psychotherapists on the purpose of the diagnosis (that is, whether the goal of the diagnosis was treatment or preparation for litigation). [211] See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical p

2001This fear is misplaced for three reasons: (1) to be admissible, the testimony must be relevant and not unfairly prejudicial under D.R.E. 401, 402, and 403; (2) the testimony must relate to the psychological treatment and must satisfy the two-part reliability test; and (3) opposing counsel may cross-examine the psychotherapists on the purpose of the diagnosis (that is, whether the goal of the diagnosis was treatment or preparation for litigation). [211] See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical p

2001See McLean, 482 A.2d at 104 ("It is the habit and continuity of keeping records germane to the business activity which lends reliability to the business records.”); see also 3 Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, supra, at 1670-71 (noting that the “organization’s reliance on the records is a basis for the reliability for the exception”). 21 .

2001See People v. LaLone, 432 Mich. 103 , 437 N.W.2d 611, 612-13 (1989); 3 Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, supra, at 1666 ("But while a doctor relies only on reliable information to treat a patient for physical ailments, a psychiatrist relies on all information, truthful and untruthful, to treat the patient.").

2001See People v. LaLone, 432 Mich. 103 , 437 N.W.2d 611, 612-13 (1989); 3 Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, supra, at 1666 ("But while a doctor relies only on reliable information to treat a patient for physical ailments, a psychiatrist relies on all information, truthful and untruthful, to treat the patient.").

2001See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical psychologist as to a physician, and warrants us in reading ‘medical’ broadly.”); Morgan v. Foretich, 4th Cir., 846 F.2d 941 , 949 n. 17 (1988) (same); State v. Nelson, 138 Wis.2d 418 , 406 N.W.2d 385, 390 (1987) (same); United States v. Balfany, 8th Cir., 965 F.2d 575 , (1992) ("[Statements about abuse ... made by a child to a trained social worker or psychologist pursuant to diagnosis or treatment for emotional or psychological injuries are admissible u

2001This fear is misplaced for three reasons: (1) to be admissible, the testimony must be relevant and not unfairly prejudicial under D.R.E. 401, 402, and 403; (2) the testimony must relate to the psychological treatment and must satisfy the two-part reliability test; and (3) opposing counsel may cross-examine the psychotherapists on the purpose of the diagnosis (that is, whether the goal of the diagnosis was treatment or preparation for litigation). [211] See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical p

2001See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical psychologist as to a physician, and warrants us in reading ‘medical’ broadly.”); Morgan v. Foretich, 4th Cir., 846 F.2d 941 , 949 n. 17 (1988) (same); State v. Nelson, 138 Wis.2d 418 , 406 N.W.2d 385, 390 (1987) (same); United States v. Balfany, 8th Cir., 965 F.2d 575 , (1992) ("[Statements about abuse ... made by a child to a trained social worker or psychologist pursuant to diagnosis or treatment for emotional or psychological injuries are admissible u

2001This fear is misplaced for three reasons: (1) to be admissible, the testimony must be relevant and not unfairly prejudicial under D.R.E. 401, 402, and 403; (2) the testimony must relate to the psychological treatment and must satisfy the two-part reliability test; and (3) opposing counsel may cross-examine the psychotherapists on the purpose of the diagnosis (that is, whether the goal of the diagnosis was treatment or preparation for litigation). [211] See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical p

2001See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical psychologist as to a physician, and warrants us in reading ‘medical’ broadly.”); Morgan v. Foretich, 4th Cir., 846 F.2d 941 , 949 n. 17 (1988) (same); State v. Nelson, 138 Wis.2d 418 , 406 N.W.2d 385, 390 (1987) (same); United States v. Balfany, 8th Cir., 965 F.2d 575 , (1992) ("[Statements about abuse ... made by a child to a trained social worker or psychologist pursuant to diagnosis or treatment for emotional or psychological injuries are admissible u

2001This fear is misplaced for three reasons: (1) to be admissible, the testimony must be relevant and not unfairly prejudicial under D.R.E. 401, 402, and 403; (2) the testimony must relate to the psychological treatment and must satisfy the two-part reliability test; and (3) opposing counsel may cross-examine the psychotherapists on the purpose of the diagnosis (that is, whether the goal of the diagnosis was treatment or preparation for litigation). [211] See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical p

2001See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical psychologist as to a physician, and warrants us in reading ‘medical’ broadly.”); Morgan v. Foretich, 4th Cir., 846 F.2d 941 , 949 n. 17 (1988) (same); State v. Nelson, 138 Wis.2d 418 , 406 N.W.2d 385, 390 (1987) (same); United States v. Balfany, 8th Cir., 965 F.2d 575 , (1992) ("[Statements about abuse ... made by a child to a trained social worker or psychologist pursuant to diagnosis or treatment for emotional or psychological injuries are admissible u

2001This fear is misplaced for three reasons: (1) to be admissible, the testimony must be relevant and not unfairly prejudicial under D.R.E. 401, 402, and 403; (2) the testimony must relate to the psychological treatment and must satisfy the two-part reliability test; and (3) opposing counsel may cross-examine the psychotherapists on the purpose of the diagnosis (that is, whether the goal of the diagnosis was treatment or preparation for litigation). [211] See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical p

2001See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical psychologist as to a physician, and warrants us in reading ‘medical’ broadly.”); Morgan v. Foretich, 4th Cir., 846 F.2d 941 , 949 n. 17 (1988) (same); State v. Nelson, 138 Wis.2d 418 , 406 N.W.2d 385, 390 (1987) (same); United States v. Balfany, 8th Cir., 965 F.2d 575 , (1992) ("[Statements about abuse ... made by a child to a trained social worker or psychologist pursuant to diagnosis or treatment for emotional or psychological injuries are admissible u

2001This fear is misplaced for three reasons: (1) to be admissible, the testimony must be relevant and not unfairly prejudicial under D.R.E. 401, 402, and 403; (2) the testimony must relate to the psychological treatment and must satisfy the two-part reliability test; and (3) opposing counsel may cross-examine the psychotherapists on the purpose of the diagnosis (that is, whether the goal of the diagnosis was treatment or preparation for litigation). [211] See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical p

2000Litig., 3d Cir., 35 F.3d 717, 747-750 (1994).

2000Litig., 3d Cir., 35 F.3d 717, 747-750 (1994).

1998Hearsay that falls within a "firmly rooted” exception also has "sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the reliability requirement posed by the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 356 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. at 743 n. 8, 116 L.Ed.2d at 859 n. 8 (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817, 820-21 , 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3147, 3149-50 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-84 , 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2782-83 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987)). 21 .

1998Hearsay that falls within a "firmly rooted” exception also has "sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the reliability requirement posed by the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 356 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. at 743 n. 8, 116 L.Ed.2d at 859 n. 8 (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817, 820-21 , 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3147, 3149-50 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-84 , 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2782-83 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987)). 21 .

1998See Gannon v. State, Del.Supr., 704 A.2d 272, 274-75 (1998). 22 .