reliability test in Delaware

2021ID 65976880, at J 6. 25 Norman v. All About Women, P.A., 193 A.3d 726, 730-31 (Del. 2018). 26 Timblin v. Kent General Hospital, 640 A.2d 1021 1024-26 (Del. 1994); cf Crowhorn v. Boyle, 793 A.2d 422, 433 (Del.

2021ID 65976880, at ¶ 6. 25 Norman v. All About Women, P.A., 193 A.3d 726 , 730–31 (Del. 2018). 26 Timblin v. Kent General Hospital, 640 A.2d 1021 1024–26 (Del. 1994); cf. Crowhorn v. Boyle, 793 A.2d 422, 433 (Del.

2016Under Section 262, “fair value” means “the value to a stockholder of the firm as a going concern, as opposed to the firm’s value in the context of an 91 Hopkins Report ¶¶ 95-99. 23 acquisition or other transaction.” 92 This Court relatedly has recognized that ‘[i]n an arm’s-length, synergistic transaction, the deal price generally will exceed fair value because target fiduciaries bargain for a premium that includes . . . a share of the anticipated synergies.”93 Indeed, “the ability of target fiduciaries to obtain a premium to market implies that they successfully extracted a portion of the val

2016Under Section 262, “fair value” means “the value to a stockholder of the firm as a going concern, as opposed to the firm’s value in the context of an 91 Hopkins Report ¶¶ 95-99. 23 acquisition or other transaction.” 92 This Court relatedly has recognized that ‘[i]n an arm’s-length, synergistic transaction, the deal price generally will exceed fair value because target fiduciaries bargain for a premium that includes . . . a share of the anticipated synergies.”93 Indeed, “the ability of target fiduciaries to obtain a premium to market implies that they successfully extracted a portion of the val

2021ID 65976880, at J 6. 25 Norman v. All About Women, P.A., 193 A.3d 726, 730-31 (Del. 2018). 26 Timblin v. Kent General Hospital, 640 A.2d 1021 1024-26 (Del. 1994); cf Crowhorn v. Boyle, 793 A.2d 422, 433 (Del.

2021CCHS’s counsel did not rebut this interpretation of the study. 23 Id. 6 Finally, it is true, as CCHS argues, that supporting literature is not a prerequisite under Daubert.24 Nor is supporting literature listed among the reliability factors that the Supreme Court of Delaware identified in response to Daubert: (1) the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education; (2) the evidence is relevant; (3) the expert’s opinion is based upon information reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field; (4) the expert will assist the trier of fact to und

2021ID 65976880, at J 6. 25 Norman v. All About Women, P.A., 193 A.3d 726, 730-31 (Del. 2018). 26 Timblin v. Kent General Hospital, 640 A.2d 1021 1024-26 (Del. 1994); cf Crowhorn v. Boyle, 793 A.2d 422, 433 (Del.

2021ID 65976880, at ¶ 6. 25 Norman v. All About Women, P.A., 193 A.3d 726 , 730–31 (Del. 2018). 26 Timblin v. Kent General Hospital, 640 A.2d 1021 1024–26 (Del. 1994); cf. Crowhorn v. Boyle, 793 A.2d 422, 433 (Del.

2025And in the event, after an extensive colloquy with Cooke that tested the reliability of his waiver of his right to counsel and his ability to represent himself, the court granted Cooke’s request, and the second trial began with 1 Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 842 (Del. 2009). 2 Cooke at the helm.

2008See also, e.g., Norwood v. State, 2003 WL 29969 , at *2 (Del.Supr.) (finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court in allowing a detective to testify as the investigating officer and as an expert witness with respect to the factors distinguishing possession with intent to distribute from possession for consumption, where the requirements of D.R.E. 702 were satisfied by the detective's testimony that the factors listed were relied upon by all the members of her unit statewide, even if the reliability test of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d

2008See also, e.g., Norwood v. State, 2003 WL 29969 , at *2 (Del.Supr.) (finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court in allowing a detective to testify as the investigating officer and as an expert witness with respect to the factors distinguishing possession with intent to distribute from possession for consumption, where the requirements of D.R.E. 702 were satisfied by the detective's testimony that the factors listed were relied upon by all the members of her unit statewide, even if the reliability test of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d

2001This fear is misplaced for three reasons: (1) to be admissible, the testimony must be relevant and not unfairly prejudicial under D.R.E. 401, 402, and 403; (2) the testimony must relate to the psychological treatment and must satisfy the two-part reliability test; and (3) opposing counsel may cross-examine the psychotherapists on the purpose of the diagnosis (that is, whether the goal of the diagnosis was treatment or preparation for litigation). [211] See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical p

2001This fear is misplaced for three reasons: (1) to be admissible, the testimony must be relevant and not unfairly prejudicial under D.R.E. 401, 402, and 403; (2) the testimony must relate to the psychological treatment and must satisfy the two-part reliability test; and (3) opposing counsel may cross-examine the psychotherapists on the purpose of the diagnosis (that is, whether the goal of the diagnosis was treatment or preparation for litigation). [211] See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical p

2001See McLean, 482 A.2d at 104 ("It is the habit and continuity of keeping records germane to the business activity which lends reliability to the business records.”); see also 3 Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, supra, at 1670-71 (noting that the “organization’s reliance on the records is a basis for the reliability for the exception”). 21 .

2001This fear is misplaced for three reasons: (1) to be admissible, the testimony must be relevant and not unfairly prejudicial under D.R.E. 401, 402, and 403; (2) the testimony must relate to the psychological treatment and must satisfy the two-part reliability test; and (3) opposing counsel may cross-examine the psychotherapists on the purpose of the diagnosis (that is, whether the goal of the diagnosis was treatment or preparation for litigation). [211] See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical p

2001See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical psychologist as to a physician, and warrants us in reading ‘medical’ broadly.”); Morgan v. Foretich, 4th Cir., 846 F.2d 941 , 949 n. 17 (1988) (same); State v. Nelson, 138 Wis.2d 418 , 406 N.W.2d 385, 390 (1987) (same); United States v. Balfany, 8th Cir., 965 F.2d 575 , (1992) ("[Statements about abuse ... made by a child to a trained social worker or psychologist pursuant to diagnosis or treatment for emotional or psychological injuries are admissible u

2001This fear is misplaced for three reasons: (1) to be admissible, the testimony must be relevant and not unfairly prejudicial under D.R.E. 401, 402, and 403; (2) the testimony must relate to the psychological treatment and must satisfy the two-part reliability test; and (3) opposing counsel may cross-examine the psychotherapists on the purpose of the diagnosis (that is, whether the goal of the diagnosis was treatment or preparation for litigation). [211] See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical p

2001See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical psychologist as to a physician, and warrants us in reading ‘medical’ broadly.”); Morgan v. Foretich, 4th Cir., 846 F.2d 941 , 949 n. 17 (1988) (same); State v. Nelson, 138 Wis.2d 418 , 406 N.W.2d 385, 390 (1987) (same); United States v. Balfany, 8th Cir., 965 F.2d 575 , (1992) ("[Statements about abuse ... made by a child to a trained social worker or psychologist pursuant to diagnosis or treatment for emotional or psychological injuries are admissible u

2001This fear is misplaced for three reasons: (1) to be admissible, the testimony must be relevant and not unfairly prejudicial under D.R.E. 401, 402, and 403; (2) the testimony must relate to the psychological treatment and must satisfy the two-part reliability test; and (3) opposing counsel may cross-examine the psychotherapists on the purpose of the diagnosis (that is, whether the goal of the diagnosis was treatment or preparation for litigation). [211] See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical p

2001See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 7th Cir., 965 F.2d 206, 210 (1992) ("The rationale [of F.R.E. 803(4)] applies as forcefully to a clinical psychologist as to a physician, and warrants us in reading ‘medical’ broadly.”); Morgan v. Foretich, 4th Cir., 846 F.2d 941 , 949 n. 17 (1988) (same); State v. Nelson, 138 Wis.2d 418 , 406 N.W.2d 385, 390 (1987) (same); United States v. Balfany, 8th Cir., 965 F.2d 575 , (1992) ("[Statements about abuse ... made by a child to a trained social worker or psychologist pursuant to diagnosis or treatment for emotional or psychological injuries are admissible u

2001Supr., 637 A.2d 20, 25 (1994) (holding that job-related mental injuries are equally compensable as physical injuries under the Delaware Workmens' Compensation Act; stating, "[a]lthough the cause and existence of a mental infirmity may be more difficult to establish than its physical counterpart, a clearly proven mental injury should be accorded equal treatment under the Act"). [212] Tr. of 10/27/98, at 29. [213] In some cases, a patient's lies are as helpful to her treatment as her truthful statements.

2000Litig., 3d Cir., 35 F.3d 717, 747-750 (1994).

2000Litig., 3d Cir., 35 F.3d 717, 747-750 (1994).

1998See Gannon v. State, Del.Supr., 704 A.2d 272, 274-75 (1998). 22 .

1998Hearsay that falls within a "firmly rooted” exception also has "sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the reliability requirement posed by the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 356 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. at 743 n. 8, 116 L.Ed.2d at 859 n. 8 (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817, 820-21 , 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3147, 3149-50 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-84 , 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2782-83 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987)). 21 .

1998Hearsay that falls within a "firmly rooted” exception also has "sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the reliability requirement posed by the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 356 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. at 743 n. 8, 116 L.Ed.2d at 859 n. 8 (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817, 820-21 , 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3147, 3149-50 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-84 , 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2782-83 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987)). 21 .