reliability requirement in California

2023(Davenport, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 144 , italics added.) She also disagrees with Gerwig’s narrower holding concerning supervisory violations and reliability, maintaining that the court there took an unduly narrow view of what constitutes the reliability of a test.

2023As explained in Davenport, “what is directly presumed is not the actual reliability of the test.” (Davenport, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 144 .) Rather, “what is actually presumed under Evidence Code [section] 664 is compliance with statutory and regulatory standards, which in turn gives rise to an inference of reliability.” (Ibid., italics omitted.) Proof that a test was completed in violation of a regulatory or statutory standard unrelated to reliability is therefore irrelevant because it would not meaningfully disrupt the inference that a test was reliable.

2020Some tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police response or require further investigation before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized.” (Adams v. Williams (1972) 407 U.S. 143, 147 .) Both quantity and quality matter: “if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable.” (Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 330 (White).) Case law offers useful guideposts on the reliability requirement for citizen tips.

2020Some tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police response or require further investigation before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized.” (Adams v. Williams (1972) 407 U.S. 143, 147 .) Both quantity and quality matter: “if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable.” (Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 330 (White).) Case law offers useful guideposts on the reliability requirement for citizen tips.

2009The recorded test results are presumptively valid and the DMV is not required to present additional foundational *1002 evidence.” (Shannon v. Gourley (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 60, 64-65 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 ].) With this presumption, an officer’s sworn statement that the breath-testing device recorded a certain blood-alcohol level is sufficient to establish the foundation, even without testimony at the hearing establishing the reliability of the test.

2009The recorded test results are presumptively valid and the DMV is not required to present additional foundational *1002 evidence.” (Shannon v. Gourley (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 60, 64-65 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 ].) With this presumption, an officer’s sworn statement that the breath-testing device recorded a certain blood-alcohol level is sufficient to establish the foundation, even without testimony at the hearing establishing the reliability of the test.

2003(Baker v. Gourley, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1173 .) Rockwell could not and did not challenge Officer Fenton’s actual observations because he was not present at the scene; his opinion was based only on an understanding that regulation 1219.3 required the test subject to be in the officer’s direct eyesight for the requisite 15-minute period. 5 Rockwell’s testimony did not constitute affirmative evidence (or permit an inference) that Officer Fenton did not in fact continuously observe Manriquez within the meaning of regulation 1219.3, and thus no burden shifted to the DMV to establish the reli

2003The recorded test results are presumptively valid and the DMV is not required to present additional foundational evidence. [Citation.]’ ” (Manriquez, at p. 1232, quoting Shannon v. Gourley (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 60, 64-65 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 ].) “With this presumption, the officer’s sworn statement that the breath-testing device recorded a certain blood-alcohol level is sufficient to establish the foundation, even without testimony at the hearing establishing the reliability of the test.” (Manriquez, at p. 1233, citing Davenport v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 133, 140-1

2018Rather, as Lucero L. made clear, the reliability requirement is an important procedural safeguard against the risk of erroneous determinations based solely on hearsay statements "in an area in which the truth of a hearsay statement [is] particularly open to question," and in which the cost of error may be to needlessly separate families from one another, at substantial cost to parents and children alike. ( Id. at p. 1248, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 56 , 998 P.2d 1019 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.); id. at p. 1247, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 56 , 998 P.2d 1019 ; *891 id. at pp. 1250-1251, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 56 , 998 P.2d 1019 (

2018Rather, as Lucero L. made clear, the reliability requirement is an important procedural safeguard against the risk of erroneous determinations based solely on hearsay statements "in an area in which the truth of a hearsay statement [is] particularly open to question," and in which the cost of error may be to needlessly separate families from one another, at substantial cost to parents and children alike. ( Id. at p. 1248, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 56 , 998 P.2d 1019 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.); id. at p. 1247, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 56 , 998 P.2d 1019 ; *891 id. at pp. 1250-1251, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 56 , 998 P.2d 1019 (

2014The Attorney General also argues that the reliability of defense expert Riley’s evaluation was undermined by the presence of habeas corpus counsel during her evaluation of petitioner (see In re Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400, 411 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 753 , 406 P.2d 33 ] [“Surely the presence and participation of counsel would hinder the establishment of the rapport that is so necessary in a psychiatric examination.”]), and by Dr. Riley’s failure to use ethnically corrected norms in evaluating the results of the neuropsychological tests she administered to petitioner (although these were not in use at

2014The Attorney General also argues that the reliability of defense expert Riley’s evaluation was undermined by the presence of habeas corpus counsel during her evaluation of petitioner (see In re Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400, 411 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 753 , 406 P.2d 33 ] [“Surely the presence and participation of counsel would hinder the establishment of the rapport that is so necessary in a psychiatric examination.”]), and by Dr. Riley’s failure to use ethnically corrected norms in evaluating the results of the neuropsychological tests she administered to petitioner (although these were not in use at

2003The recorded test results are presumptively valid and the DMV is not required to present additional foundational evidence. [Citation.]’ ” (Manriquez, at p. 1232, quoting Shannon v. Gourley (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 60, 64-65 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 ].) “With this presumption, the officer’s sworn statement that the breath-testing device recorded a certain blood-alcohol level is sufficient to establish the foundation, even without testimony at the hearing establishing the reliability of the test.” (Manriquez, at p. 1233, citing Davenport v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 133, 140-1

2003The recorded test results are presumptively valid and the DMV is not required to present additional foundational evidence. [Citation.]’ ” (Manriquez, at p. 1232, quoting Shannon v. Gourley (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 60, 64-65 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 ].) “With this presumption, the officer’s sworn statement that the breath-testing device recorded a certain blood-alcohol level is sufficient to establish the foundation, even without testimony at the hearing establishing the reliability of the test.” (Manriquez, at p. 1233, citing Davenport v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 133, 140-1

2011(Manriquez v. Gourley, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1233 .) “[W]hat is directly presumed is not the actual reliability of the test.

2003The recorded test results are presumptively valid and the DMV is not required to present additional foundational evidence. [Citation.]’ ” (Manriquez, at p. 1232, quoting Shannon v. Gourley (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 60, 64-65 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 ].) “With this presumption, the officer’s sworn statement that the breath-testing device recorded a certain blood-alcohol level is sufficient to establish the foundation, even without testimony at the hearing establishing the reliability of the test.” (Manriquez, at p. 1233, citing Davenport v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 133, 140-1

2023Discussing the reliability requirement, the California Supreme Court has “explained: ‘The nonexhaustive list of factors that the United States Supreme Court has cited as relevant to the reliability of hearsay statements made by child witnesses in sexual abuse cases are (1) spontaneity and 7 consistent repetition; (2) the mental state of the declarant; (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of a similar age; and (4) lack of motive to fabricate.’ [Citation.]” (In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1239 , citing Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 , 821–822.) A “child’s ability to underst

2018(See Idaho v. Wright , at p. 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139 .) But ultimately the question is simply whether the " 'time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability' " to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding, considering the important interests at stake. ( Lucero L. , supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1248 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 56 , 998 P.2d 1019 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.), quoting Cindy L. , supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 29 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 803 , 947 P.2d 1340 .) This reliability requirement is not designed to be "especially formidable," or to be "so stringent" that "

2023Discussing the reliability requirement, the California Supreme Court has “explained: ‘The nonexhaustive list of factors that the United States Supreme Court has cited as relevant to the reliability of hearsay statements made by child witnesses in sexual abuse cases are (1) spontaneity and 7 consistent repetition; (2) the mental state of the declarant; (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of a similar age; and (4) lack of motive to fabricate.’ [Citation.]” (In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1239 , citing Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 , 821–822.) A “child’s ability to underst

2018(See Idaho v. Wright , at p. 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139 .) But ultimately the question is simply whether the " 'time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability' " to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding, considering the important interests at stake. ( Lucero L. , supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1248 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 56 , 998 P.2d 1019 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.), quoting Cindy L. , supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 29 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 803 , 947 P.2d 1340 .) This reliability requirement is not designed to be "especially formidable," or to be "so stringent" that "

2013(Id. at pp. 814-816; see Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 .) Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 60-61 , overruled the reliability test as applied to extrajudicial testimonial statements, noting, “Reliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept.

2005(See Cindy L., supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 30 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 803 , 947 P.2d 1340 ; Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1249 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 56 , 998 P.2d 1019 .) Hugo argues that the United States Supreme Court has now squarely rejected the reliability test upon which the child dependency exception was based, when it held that the test is so "malleable" and "unpredictable" that it fails to provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation violations. ( Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 63 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 .) We conclude that Crawford does not apply in juvenile dependency proceedings and d

2007(See People v. Brown, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 454 , 263 Cal.Rptr. 391 [reliability equates with trustworthiness].) We prefer the reliability rule quoted in the text because Chief Justice Lucas, Maki's author, used it in the court's holding. ( Maki, supra, at p. 709 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 676 , 704 P.2d 743 .) In Maki , the court cited two out of state cases where sufficient reliability existed.

2007(See People v. Brown, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 454 [reliability equates with trustworthiness].) We prefer the reliability rule quoted in the text because Justice Lucas, Maki’s author, used it in the court’s holding.

2000But important too is the interest in producing "an accurate and just resolution" of dependency proceedings. ( In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 989 , 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 771 , 920 P.2d 716 .) This interest is explicitly acknowledged in the final paragraph of section 300, which mandates "that nothing in this section disrupt the family unnecessarily or intrude inappropriately into family life...." Nor do we believe the reliability requirement is so stringent that it will impede the government's ability to protect children in an abusive situation.

2000But important too is the interest in producing "an accurate and just resolution" of dependency proceedings. ( In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 989 , 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 771 , 920 P.2d 716 .) This interest is explicitly acknowledged in the final paragraph of section 300, which mandates "that nothing in this section disrupt the family unnecessarily or intrude inappropriately into family life...." Nor do we believe the reliability requirement is so stringent that it will impede the government's ability to protect children in an abusive situation.

2023Discussing the reliability requirement, the California Supreme Court has “explained: ‘The nonexhaustive list of factors that the United States Supreme Court has cited as relevant to the reliability of hearsay statements made by child witnesses in sexual abuse cases are (1) spontaneity and 7 consistent repetition; (2) the mental state of the declarant; (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of a similar age; and (4) lack of motive to fabricate.’ [Citation.]” (In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1239 , citing Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 , 821–822.) A “child’s ability to underst

2023Discussing the reliability requirement, the California Supreme Court has “explained: ‘The nonexhaustive list of factors that the United States Supreme Court has cited as relevant to the reliability of hearsay statements made by child witnesses in sexual abuse cases are (1) spontaneity and 7 consistent repetition; (2) the mental state of the declarant; (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of a similar age; and (4) lack of motive to fabricate.’ [Citation.]” (In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1239 , citing Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 , 821–822.) A “child’s ability to underst

2003(Davenport v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 133, 140-141 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 818 ]; Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1364, 1366 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 281 ].) Once the DMV establishes its prima facie case by presenting documents contemplated in the statutory scheme, the driver must produce affirmative evidence of the nonexistence of the presumed facts sufficient to shift the burden of proof back to the DMV.

2003(Davenport v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 133, 140-141 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 818 ]; Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1364, 1366 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 281 ].) Once the DMV establishes its prima facie case by presenting documents contemplated in the statutory scheme, the driver must produce affirmative evidence of the nonexistence of the presumed facts sufficient to shift the burden of proof back to the DMV.

2026(Molenda v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 974, 1001-1002 (Molenda).) This case fits well within these parameters. “ ‘Once the DMV establishes its prima facie case by presenting documents contemplated in the statutory scheme, the driver must produce affirmative evidence of the nonexistence of the presumed facts sufficient to shift the burden of proof back to the DMV. [Citations.] ‘The licensee must show, ‘through cross-examination of the officer or by the introduction of affirmative evidence, that official standards were in any respect not observed[.]’ ” (Molenda, supra, 1

2026(Molenda v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 974, 1001-1002 (Molenda).) This case fits well within these parameters. “ ‘Once the DMV establishes its prima facie case by presenting documents contemplated in the statutory scheme, the driver must produce affirmative evidence of the nonexistence of the presumed facts sufficient to shift the burden of proof back to the DMV. [Citations.] ‘The licensee must show, ‘through cross-examination of the officer or by the introduction of affirmative evidence, that official standards were in any respect not observed[.]’ ” (Molenda, supra, 1

2021(See Lawson, supra, 291 P.3d at pp. 745, 759, 777–778; Young v. State (Alaska 2016) 374 P.3d 395 , 426–427; State v. Guzman (Utah 2006) 133 P.3d 363, 366 .) Numerous federal courts have also acknowledged that empirical research has “undercut[] the hypothesis that there is a strong correlation between certainty and accuracy.” (Haliym v. Mitchell (6th Cir. 2007) 492 F.3d 680, 705, fn. 15 ; see U.S. v. Greene (4th Cir. 2013) 704 F.3d 298, 309, fn. 4 [“We observe that . . . (witness certainty) . . . has come under withering attack as not relevant to the reliability analysis”]; Young v. Conway (2d

2021(See Lawson, supra, 291 P.3d at pp. 745, 759, 777–778; Young v. State (Alaska 2016) 374 P.3d 395 , 426–427; State v. Guzman (Utah 2006) 133 P.3d 363, 366 .) Numerous federal courts have also acknowledged that empirical research has “undercut[] the hypothesis that there is a strong correlation between certainty and accuracy.” (Haliym v. Mitchell (6th Cir. 2007) 492 F.3d 680, 705, fn. 15 ; see U.S. v. Greene (4th Cir. 2013) 704 F.3d 298, 309, fn. 4 [“We observe that . . . (witness certainty) . . . has come under withering attack as not relevant to the reliability analysis”]; Young v. Conway (2d