23 Ohio opinions name it 1 courts 1923–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blakemore v. Blakemoregreen1 sentence2026An abuse of discretion “connotes more than an error of judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Maggiogreen1 sentence2025See also Anderson v. Maggio, 2025-Ohio-66, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.), quoting Xue Juan Chen v. Holder, 737 F.3d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e cannot write a party’s brief, pronounce ourselves convinced by it, and so rule in the party’s favor.”). 5 {¶9} Wife’s brief contains no argument whatsoever with respect to her second and third assignments of error. | 1 | 1 |
A.E. v. J.E.green1 sentence2025As a result, “debts incurred during the marriage are presumed to be marital unless proven otherwise.” Kaplan at ¶ 15 , citing Turner v. Davis-Turner, 2018-Ohio-2194 , ¶ 12 (8th Dist.) “Therefore, the party seeking to have the debt classified as a separate debt bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the debt was the separate obligation of the other spouse or was not for a valid marital purpose.” A.E. v. J.E., 2024-Ohio-1785, ¶ 77 (8th Dist.), citing Rossi v. Rossi, 2014-Ohio-1832, ¶ 62 (8th Dist.) There is nothing in the record to support Wife’s claim that the tri | 1 | 1 |
Rossi v. Rossigreen1 sentence2025As a result, “debts incurred during the marriage are presumed to be marital unless proven otherwise.” Kaplan at ¶ 15 , citing Turner v. Davis-Turner, 2018-Ohio-2194 , ¶ 12 (8th Dist.) “Therefore, the party seeking to have the debt classified as a separate debt bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the debt was the separate obligation of the other spouse or was not for a valid marital purpose.” A.E. v. J.E., 2024-Ohio-1785, ¶ 77 (8th Dist.), citing Rossi v. Rossi, 2014-Ohio-1832, ¶ 62 (8th Dist.) There is nothing in the record to support Wife’s claim that the tri | 1 | 1 |
Xue Chen v. Eric Holder, Jr.green1 sentence2025See also Anderson v. Maggio, 2025-Ohio-66, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.), quoting Xue Juan Chen v. Holder, 737 F.3d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e cannot write a party’s brief, pronounce ourselves convinced by it, and so rule in the party’s favor.”). 5 {¶9} Wife’s brief contains no argument whatsoever with respect to her second and third assignments of error. | 1 | 1 |
Lawson v. Taylorgreen1 sentence2024See Lawson v. Taylor, 105 Ohio App.3d 191, 194 (12th Dist.1995) ("[i]n reviewing a trial court's award of attorney fees, an appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial -9- Butler CA2023-07-079 court's decision amounts to an abuse of discretion"). | 1 | 1 |
Willis v. Willisgreen2 sentences2022See also Willis v. Willis, 19 Ohio App.3d 45, 48 , 482 N.E.2d 1274 (11th Dist.1984). 2022See also Willis v. Willis, 19 Ohio App.3d 45, 48 , 482 N.E.2d 1274 (11th Dist.1984). | 1 | 1 |
Derrit v. Derritgreen2 sentences2022At oral argument in the instant case, wife emphasized that documentation regarding the valuation of the pension was not necessary because the pension is a “defined benefits plan.” Wife’s claim is not supported by the case law authority. “[A]n assigned value for pension funds is necessary for adequate appellate review” and “[a] court’s decision to simply divide the marital portion of a pension equally between the two parties, without designating a specific dollar value to the marital portion of the pension, represents an abuse of discretion.” Derrit v. Derrit, 163 Ohio App.3d 52 , 2005-Ohio-477 2022At oral argument in the instant case, wife emphasized that documentation regarding the valuation of the pension was not necessary because the pension is a “defined benefits plan.” Wife’s claim is not supported by the case law authority. “[A]n assigned value for pension funds is necessary for adequate appellate review” and “[a] court’s decision to simply divide the marital portion of a pension equally between the two parties, without designating a specific dollar value to the marital portion of the pension, represents an abuse of discretion.” Derrit v. Derrit, 163 Ohio App.3d 52 , 2005-Ohio-477 | 1 | 1 |
Harrold v. Colliergreen1 sentence2016See Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44 , 2005-Ohio-5334 , ¶ 39; see also Cottrell v. Cottrell, 12th Dist. | 1 | 1 |
In Re G.N.green2 sentences2013“The effect of a reversal and an order of remand is to reinstate the case to the docket of the trial court in precisely the same condition that obtained before the error occurred.” In re G.N., 176 Ohio App.3d 236 , 2008-Ohio-1796, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.), quoting Wilson v. Kreusch, 111 Ohio App.3d 47, 51 (2d Dist.1996). {¶13} Therefore, on remand, the case was reinstated at the point at which both parties had rested after presenting their evidence on Wife’s motion to modify parenting time. 2013“The effect of a reversal and an order of remand is to reinstate the case to the docket of the trial court in precisely the same condition that obtained before the error occurred.” In re G.N., 176 Ohio App.3d 236 , 2008-Ohio-1796, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.), quoting Wilson v. Kreusch, 111 Ohio App.3d 47, 51 (2d Dist.1996). {¶13} Therefore, on remand, the case was reinstated at the point at which both parties had rested after presenting their evidence on Wife’s motion to modify parenting time. | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Kreuschgreen1 sentence2013“The effect of a reversal and an order of remand is to reinstate the case to the docket of the trial court in precisely the same condition that obtained before the error occurred.” In re G.N., 176 Ohio App.3d 236 , 2008-Ohio-1796, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.), quoting Wilson v. Kreusch, 111 Ohio App.3d 47, 51 (2d Dist.1996). {¶13} Therefore, on remand, the case was reinstated at the point at which both parties had rested after presenting their evidence on Wife’s motion to modify parenting time. | 1 | 1 |
| Linam v. Linam, Unpublished Decision (12-17-2003)green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Eyre v. Eyre
green
2 sentences2021On May 18, 2020, the trial court adopted the 1Husband did not object to, or appeal from, the findings of fact and conclusions of law relative to Wife’s motion for contempt. [Cite as Eyre v. Eyre, 2021-Ohio-1308 .] magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. 2021In the instant case, the continuing jurisdiction of the court was already invoked by Wife’s motion in contempt and service of same upon Husband. {¶36} Husband further argues the trial court should have dismissed Wife’s contempt motion for failure to serve Husband’s counsel because his motions were [Cite as Eyre v. Eyre, 2021-Ohio-1308 .] dismissed for failure to serve Wife’s counsel. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In re Nauth
neutral
1 sentence2018The probate court ultimately denied Wife’s motion to terminate the guardianship because the Ward “‘[was] not competent’ and ‘require[d] a guardian.’” Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Davila v. Oriana House, Inc.
green
1 sentence2017Importantly, “‘[a]n appearance of bias can be just as damaging to public confidence as actual bias.’” In re Disqualification of Burge, 10 138 Ohio St.3d 1271 , 2014-Ohio-1458, ¶ 9 , quoting In re Disqualification of Murphy, 110 Ohio St.3d 1206 , 2005-Ohio-7148 , ¶ 6. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Cox v. Cox
green
1 sentence2017Warren No. CA2016-05-040, 2017-Ohio-1010, ¶ 10 . {¶ 15} Following a thorough review of the record, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wife's motion for modification. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
In re Disqualification of Burge
green
2 sentences2017Importantly, “‘[a]n appearance of bias can be just as damaging to public confidence as actual bias.’” In re Disqualification of Burge, 10 138 Ohio St.3d 1271 , 2014-Ohio-1458, ¶ 9 , quoting In re Disqualification of Murphy, 110 Ohio St.3d 1206 , 2005-Ohio-7148 , ¶ 6. 2017Importantly, “‘[a]n appearance of bias can be just as damaging to public confidence as actual bias.’” In re Disqualification of Burge, 10 138 Ohio St.3d 1271 , 2014-Ohio-1458, ¶ 9 , quoting In re Disqualification of Murphy, 110 Ohio St.3d 1206 , 2005-Ohio-7148 , ¶ 6. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Wilson v. Wilson, Unpublished Decision (8-17-2006)
green
1 sentence2016Cuyahoga No. 86817, 2006-Ohio-4261, ¶ 21 . {¶10} Here, although Wife’s motion for relief from judgment indicates that “the social security benefit off-set was inadvertently omitted from the [SPSA],” and “[t]he omission * * * was a mutual mistake by both counsel,” Wife did not specifically identify the subsection of Civ.R. 60(B) from which she sought relief. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
King v. King
green
1 sentence2016Medina No. 12CA0060-M, 2013-Ohio-3070, ¶ 9 . {¶68} Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Wife’s motion to remove the GAL. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Szymczak v. Tanner
neutral
2 sentences2013Szymczak, 2012-Ohio-540, at ¶ 25 . 2013Medina No. 10CA0101-M, 2012-Ohio-540 , was a change in the law. {¶17} In light of the lengthy period of time that Wife’s motion was pending and the fact that both parties had a full and fair opportunity to present evidence and to be heard on the matter, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to hear additional evidence before entering an order consistent with this Court’s remand. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Kostelnik v. Helper
green
1 sentence2012No. 06 CA 837, 2008-Ohio-3326, ¶ 51 . {¶5} In Wife’s motion to set aside the settlement agreement, Wife asserted that she “was under the influence of a drug that affected her regular medications * * * [and] [a]s a direct and proximate result, [Wife] was not able to fully comprehend the import of this settlement suggested on the record.” In addition, Wife submitted an affidavit stating that the drug caused her to not “comprehend what [she] agreed to until later.” We note that the “[e]ssential elements of a contract include an offer, acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration (the bargained | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Blodgett v. Blodgett
green
2 sentences2012(Emphasis and citation omitted.) Blodgett v. Blodgett, 49 Ohio St.3d 243, 246 , 551 N.E.2d 1249 (1990). {¶12} Upon review we find that Wife did not present sufficient operative facts to allege the defense of duress or to demonstrate fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct under Civ.R. 60(B). 2012(Emphasis and citation omitted.) Blodgett v. Blodgett, 49 Ohio St.3d 243, 246 , 551 N.E.2d 1249 (1990). {¶12} Upon review we find that Wife did not present sufficient operative facts to allege the defense of duress or to demonstrate fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct under Civ.R. 60(B). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Kostelnik v. Helper
green
1 sentence2012No. 06 CA 837, 2008-Ohio-3326, ¶ 51 . {¶5} In Wife’s motion to set aside the settlement agreement, Wife asserted that she “was under the influence of a drug that affected her regular medications * * * [and] [a]s a direct and proximate result, [Wife] was not able to fully comprehend the import of this settlement suggested on the record.” In addition, Wife submitted an affidavit stating that the drug caused her to not “comprehend what [she] agreed to until later.” We note that the “[e]ssential elements of a contract include an offer, acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration (the bargained | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Settonni v. Settonni
green
1 sentence2012No. 97784, 2012-Ohio-3084, ¶ 25 . {¶11} In Wife’s motion for relief from judgment, as well as her accompanying affidavit, she states the following regarding Husband’s alleged overreaching: Wife signed the separation under duress because Husband threatened that she “would fair much worse if the case went to trial * * *, the pressure of the trial taking place during the holiday period, and the anticipation of the children having to deal with their parents’ contentious matters during the holiday.” An allegation of duress includes (1) that one side involuntarily accepted the terms of another; (2) | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Maury v. Maury, 06 Ca 837 (6-24-2008)
green
1 sentence2012No. 06 CA 837, 2008-Ohio-3326, ¶ 51 . {¶5} In Wife’s motion to set aside the settlement agreement, Wife asserted that she “was under the influence of a drug that affected her regular medications * * * [and] [a]s a direct and proximate result, [Wife] was not able to fully comprehend the import of this settlement suggested on the record.” In addition, Wife submitted an affidavit stating that the drug caused her to not “comprehend what [she] agreed to until later.” We note that the “[e]ssential elements of a contract include an offer, acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration (the bargained | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Gordon v. Gordon
green
1 sentence2011The magistrate issued a written opinion recommending that the court grant Wife’s motion for relief from judgment and adopt Wife’s proposed QDRO. {¶ 4} The magistrate identified the issue before it as follows: “When minimalist language is used in a separation agreement regarding the division of marital pension by coverture fraction, exactly what terms can a court subsequently adopt in a QDRO to clarify the intent of the parties as evidenced in the separation agreement, without crossing over legal boundaries where the post-decree QDRO becomes a void modification of the divorce decree’s division | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Mandelbaum v. Mandelbaum
green
2 sentences2011Thus, I would conclude that Mandelbaum v. Mandelbaum, 121 Ohio St.3d 433 , 2009-Ohio-1222 , is not applicable to the instant matter. 2011Thus, I would conclude that Mandelbaum v. Mandelbaum, 121 Ohio St.3d 433 , 2009-Ohio-1222 , is not applicable to the instant matter. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Grava v. Parkman Township
green
1 sentence2008No. 22993, 2006-Ohio-2559 , at ¶ 22 , quoting Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379 , syllabus. {¶ 17} Husband argues that the trial court erred in not determining that res judicata applied to preclude Wife's motion to clarify. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Perrine v. Patterson, Unpublished Decision (5-24-2006)
neutral
1 sentence2008No. 22993, 2006-Ohio-2559 , at ¶ 22 , quoting Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379 , syllabus. {¶ 17} Husband argues that the trial court erred in not determining that res judicata applied to preclude Wife's motion to clarify. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Cherry v. Cherry
green
1 sentence2006Cherry v. Cherry (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 348 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Pitts v. Ohio Department of Transportation green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Helman v. Epl Prolong, Inc.
green
1 sentence2006Helman v. EPL Prolong, Inc. (2000), 139 Ohio App.3d 231 , 240 , citing Pitts v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 378 , 380 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Harkai v. Scherba Industries, Inc. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Rand v. Rand green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Pons v. Ohio State Medical Board green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Mottice v. Mottice green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Collins v. . Collins green | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.