43 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Tennessee Department of Employment Securitygreen2 sentences2016See Davis v. Tenn. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 23 S.W.3d 304, 313 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). 2002See Davis, 23 S.W.3d at 313 . | 3 | 3 |
Owens v. Owensgreen2 sentences2024See Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that a court may place a value on property that is within the range of values represented by the evidence); see also Barton v. Barton, No. E2019-01136-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 6580562 , at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2020) (“There were two conflicting values presented with respect to the real property: Husband’s opinion and the tax appraisal values presented by Wife, which were admitted into evidence without objection. 2017“Dividing a marital estate necessarily begins with the systematic identification of all of the parties’ property interests.” Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). | 2 | 2 |
Seal v. Sealgreen2 sentences2019Wife argues that both awards are 11 See, e.g., (Cooley) v. Cooley, 543 S.W.3d 674, 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (concluding that a professional’s steady increase in income was not unanticipated and therefore not a material change); Jekot, 362 S.W.3d at 83-84 (concluding that the wife’s receipt of rental income from a medical office building she was awarded in the division of marital property was not an “unanticipated or unforeseen” circumstance); Seal v. Seal, 802 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that stocks or bonds received in the division of marital property might produce inc 2000See Seal v. Seal, 802 S.W.2d 617, 624 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)(holding that wife was entitled to attorney’s fees incurred in defending her entitlement to alimony). | 2 | 2 |
Chadwell v. Knox Countygreen2 sentences2001“The motion to alter or amend allows the trial court to correct any errors as to the law or facts that may have arisen as a result of the court overlooking or failing to consider matters.” Chadwell v. Knox County, 980 S.W.2d 378, 383 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998). 2000“The motion to alter or amend allows the trial court to correct any errors as to the law or facts that may have arisen as a result of the court overlooking or failing to consider matters.” Chadwell v. Knox County, 980 S.W.2d 378, 383 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). | 2 | 2 |
Sherrod v. Wixgreen2 sentences2022In its order, the trial court stated that it was basing its decision on the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121.4 “When a trial court decides a case without a jury, its 3 There are statements in Wife’s brief where she appears to acknowledge that the matter has been transferred to Juvenile Court. 4 Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121(i) provides that: In determining whether the granting of an order for payment of support and maintenance to a party is appropriate, and in determining the nature, amount, length of term, and manner of payment, the court shall consid 2001In support of this argument, Husband relies upon the case of Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), in which this Court held that “[t]rial courts may act upon requests for legal expenses without a fully developed record as long as the party opposing the request has been afforded a fair opportunity to cross-examine the requesting parties' witnesses and to present proof of its own on the issue.” Id. at 785 . | 1 | 2 |
Morton v. Mortongreen2 sentences2019“A table that comprehensively lists the trial court’s division of a divorced couple’s assets is essential because the issue on appeal is ‘whether the overall property distribution was equitable’ not ‘whether the division as to particular assets was equitable.’” Blount v. Blount, No. E2017-00243-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 1433198 , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2018) (quoting Morton, 182 S.W.3d at 834 ) (underlining added, italics in original). 2007Finally, we consider Wife’s issue regarding whether this is a frivolous appeal. “ ‘A frivolous appeal is one that is ‘devoid of merit,’ or one in which there is little prospect that [an appeal] can ever succeed.’” Morton v. Morton, 182 S.W.3d 821, 838 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005) (quoting Industrial Dev. | 1 | 2 |
Chiozza v. Chiozzagreen2 sentences2018Thus, the trial court properly complied with the mandates of Rule 10B, § 1.02. 4 Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c) provides: The plaintiff spouse may recover from the defendant spouse, and the spouse or other person to whom the custody of the child, or children, is awarded may recover from the other spouse reasonable attorney fees incurred in enforcing any decree for alimony and/or child support, or in regard to any suit or action concerning the adjudication of the custody or the change of custody of any child, or children, of the parties, both upon the original divorce hearing and 2018Rule 2 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure permits this Court to waive the briefing requirements if good cause exists.4 Chiozza, 315 S.W.3d at 489 . | 1 | 2 |
Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co.green1 sentence2026“Subject matter jurisdiction involves a court’s lawful authority to adjudicate a controversy brought before it.” Chapman v. DaVita, Inc., 380 S.W.3d 710, 713 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 924 S.W.2d 632, 639 (Tenn. 1996); Standard Sur. & Cas. | 1 | 1 |
Lacey Chapman v. Davita, Inc.green1 sentence2026“Subject matter jurisdiction involves a court’s lawful authority to adjudicate a controversy brought before it.” Chapman v. DaVita, Inc., 380 S.W.3d 710, 713 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 924 S.W.2d 632, 639 (Tenn. 1996); Standard Sur. & Cas. | 1 | 1 |
Snodgrass v. Snodgrassgreen1 sentence2026“The classification of particular property as either separate or marital is a question of fact to be determined in 3 Husband acknowledges Wife’s issue regarding waiver in his reply brief but concedes that she “cannot unilaterally modify a final judgment through appellate representations, and child support belongs to the children and cannot be waived by parents.” - 11 - light of all relevant circumstances.” Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d 240, 245 (Tenn. 2009). | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Doyle v. Huntgreen1 sentence2024See id. (“Rule 60.02 affords a party a means to seek relief from a final, non-appealable judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Kisha Dean Trezevant v. Stanley H. Trezevant, IIIgreen1 sentence2024Trezevant v. Trezevant, 568 S.W.3d 595, 624 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018) (“Because the trial court may award spousal support only after the court has equitably divided the parties’ marital property, the awards of alimony are vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of a proper valuation and distribution of the marital estate.”); Beyer v. Beyer, 428 S.W.3d 59, 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (“In light of our remand to the trial court to reconsider its distribution of the parties’ marital estate, however, the trial court must reconsider its awards of alimony as well.”). | 1 | 1 |
Batson v. Batsongreen1 sentence2024GOLDIN, JUDGE 10 “If one spouse is economically disadvantaged compared to the other, the courts are generally inclined to provide some type of support.” Batson v. Batson, 769 S.W.2d 849, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). 11 As to Wife’s request for appellate attorney’s fees specifically, we note that, whereas Wife’s brief’s argument section concerning her request for appellate fees does not directly pinpoint the statutory legal authority undergirding her request, the cases she cites to relate to the attorney’s fee provision in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c). | 1 | 1 |
Desiree M. Beyer v. Erik A. Beyergreen1 sentence2024Trezevant v. Trezevant, 568 S.W.3d 595, 624 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018) (“Because the trial court may award spousal support only after the court has equitably divided the parties’ marital property, the awards of alimony are vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of a proper valuation and distribution of the marital estate.”); Beyer v. Beyer, 428 S.W.3d 59, 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (“In light of our remand to the trial court to reconsider its distribution of the parties’ marital estate, however, the trial court must reconsider its awards of alimony as well.”). | 1 | 1 |
Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp.green1 sentence2022“Parties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal treatment -2- by the courts.” Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Paehler v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Barrowgreen1 sentence2022“Parties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal treatment -2- by the courts.” Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Paehler v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). | 1 | 1 |
Paehler v. Union Planters National Bank, Inc.green1 sentence2022“Parties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal treatment -2- by the courts.” Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Paehler v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). | 1 | 1 |
Mary C. Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc.green1 sentence2021Specifically, Wife’s issue is [w]hether the Trial Judge erred in adopting arguments and claims from [Husband’s] Response in opposition to [Wife’s] Rule 10B Motion incorporating it into and making it a part of his Order denying recusal as Exhibit A, showing that his deliberation and decision not to recuse was not the exercise of the Trial Judge’s own Independent Judgment, in violation of Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., 439 S.W.3d 303, 314-16 (Tenn. 2014). 8 In the Third 10B Petition, Wife alleges that the trial court’s reliance on Guo is misplaced. | 1 | 1 |
Karen Johnson v. Beverly Nunis and Farmer's Insurance Exchangegreen1 sentence2020Rule 54.02 serves as “an exception to Rule 3 that permits the trial court, without permission from the appellate court, to certify an order as final and appealable, even if parts of the overall litigation remain pending in the trial court.” Johnson v. Nunis, 383 S.W.3d 122, 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
Kinard v. Kinardgreen1 sentence2019“Courts frown upon the manipulation of the impartiality issue to gain procedural advantage and will not permit litigants to refrain from asserting known grounds for disqualification in order ‘to experiment with the court . . . and raise the objection later when the result of the trial is unfavorable.’” Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Holmes v. Eason, 76 Tenn. 754 (Tenn. 1882)). | 1 | 1 |
Renee Pembroke (Cooley) v. Christopher Eugene Cooleygreen1 sentence2019Wife argues that both awards are 11 See, e.g., (Cooley) v. Cooley, 543 S.W.3d 674, 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (concluding that a professional’s steady increase in income was not unanticipated and therefore not a material change); Jekot, 362 S.W.3d at 83-84 (concluding that the wife’s receipt of rental income from a medical office building she was awarded in the division of marital property was not an “unanticipated or unforeseen” circumstance); Seal v. Seal, 802 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that stocks or bonds received in the division of marital property might produce inc | 1 | 1 |
Jekot v. Jekotgreen1 sentence2019Wife argues that both awards are 11 See, e.g., (Cooley) v. Cooley, 543 S.W.3d 674, 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (concluding that a professional’s steady increase in income was not unanticipated and therefore not a material change); Jekot, 362 S.W.3d at 83-84 (concluding that the wife’s receipt of rental income from a medical office building she was awarded in the division of marital property was not an “unanticipated or unforeseen” circumstance); Seal v. Seal, 802 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that stocks or bonds received in the division of marital property might produce inc | 1 | 1 |
Tenn-Tex Properties v. Brownell-Electro, Inc.green1 sentence2019Wife did not challenge Mr. Bratton’s qualifications on appeal. - 14 - credibility of witnesses, the trial court is the best judge of the credibility and its findings of credibility are entitled to great weight.” Tenn-Tex Properties v. Brownell-Electro, Inc., 778 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Alley v. Stategreen1 sentence2019ISSUE PRESENTED This appeal involves a single issue: whether the trial judge erred in denying Wife’s motion to recuse.3 Recusal should be granted “whenever the judge has any doubts about his or her ability to preside impartially” or “when a person of ordinary prudence in the judge’s position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality.” Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 820 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Whalum v. Marshallgreen1 sentence2018Thus, the trial court properly complied with the mandates of Rule 10B, § 1.02. 4 Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c) provides: The plaintiff spouse may recover from the defendant spouse, and the spouse or other person to whom the custody of the child, or children, is awarded may recover from the other spouse reasonable attorney fees incurred in enforcing any decree for alimony and/or child support, or in regard to any suit or action concerning the adjudication of the custody or the change of custody of any child, or children, of the parties, both upon the original divorce hearing and | 1 | 1 |
Hodges v. Tennessee Attorney Generalgreen1 sentence2018As the trial court pointed out in its order denying Wife’s motion for recusal, however, “[t]rial courts possess inherent, common- law authority to control their dockets and the proceedings in their courts,” and “[t]heir authority is quite broad . . . .” Hodges v. Attorney Gen., 43 S.W.3d 918, 921 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); see also TENN. | 1 | 1 |
| Bowden v. Wardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pylant v. Spiveygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Towner v. Townergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moody v. Leagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fred v. Wilson v. Monroe County, Tennesseegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bogan v. Bogangreen | 1 | 1 |
| CHILDRENS v. Union Realty Co., Ltd.green | 1 | 1 |
| Archer v. Archergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dunlap v. Dunlapgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Eldridge v. Eldridgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Discover Bank v. Morgangreen | 1 | 1 |
| McCracken v. Brentwood United Methodist Churchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moody v. Moodygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jerkins v. McKinneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City
green
1 sentence2021Our Supreme Court has set forth the standard for a trial court’s practice of receiving and utilizing party-prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows in pertinent part: In the almost thirty years since Anderson [v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564 (1985),] was decided, most courts have approved, but not recommended, the practice of trial courts receiving and using party- prepared findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders as long as two conditions are satisfied. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Holmes v. Eason
green
1 sentence2019“Courts frown upon the manipulation of the impartiality issue to gain procedural advantage and will not permit litigants to refrain from asserting known grounds for disqualification in order ‘to experiment with the court . . . and raise the objection later when the result of the trial is unfavorable.’” Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Holmes v. Eason, 76 Tenn. 754 (Tenn. 1882)). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Estate of Jenkins v. Guyton
green
1 sentence2018See Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 918-19 (Tenn. 2000); In re Estate of Jenkins, 912 S.W.2d at 138 n. 3; In re Estate of Luck, No. W2004-01554-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1356448 , at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 7, 2005). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Elizabeth Eberbach v. Christopher Eberbach
green
1 sentence2018Thus, the trial court properly complied with the mandates of Rule 10B, § 1.02. 4 Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c) provides: The plaintiff spouse may recover from the defendant spouse, and the spouse or other person to whom the custody of the child, or children, is awarded may recover from the other spouse reasonable attorney fees incurred in enforcing any decree for alimony and/or child support, or in regard to any suit or action concerning the adjudication of the custody or the change of custody of any child, or children, of the parties, both upon the original divorce hearing and | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Ferguson v. Brown green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Gonsewski v. Gonsewski green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Lori Lee Grissom (Brown) v. Jeffrey Donald Grissom green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Duncan v. Duncan green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Gilliam v. Gilliam green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.