Wife motion in New Mexico

2022See Gilmore v. Gilmore, 2010-NMCA-013, ¶ 27 , 147 N.M. 625 , 227 P.3d 115 .

2022See Gilmore v. Gilmore, 2010-NMCA-013, ¶ 27 , 147 N.M. 625 , 227 P.3d 115 .

2009Talley v. Talley, 115 N.M. 89 , 17 92, 847 P.2d 323, 326 (Ct. App. 1993). 18 Because of Wife’s failure to provide an adequate record, we must presume that 19 the facts and circumstances adduced at the hearing support the district court’s denial 4 1 of Wife’s motion to continue and that the court therefore did not abuse its discretion 2 by declining to continue the trial.

2009Talley v. Talley, 115 N.M. 89 , 17 92, 847 P.2d 323, 326 (Ct. App. 1993). 18 Because of Wife’s failure to provide an adequate record, we must presume that 19 the facts and circumstances adduced at the hearing support the district court’s denial 4 1 of Wife’s motion to continue and that the court therefore did not abuse its discretion 2 by declining to continue the trial.

2024See Trujillo v. Serrano, 1994-NMSC-024 , ¶ 19, 117 N.M. 273 , 871 P.2d 369 (stating that “[o]nly the most unusual circumstances beyond the control of the parties—such as error on the part of the [district] court—will warrant overlooking procedural defects”).

2024See Trujillo v. Serrano, 1994-NMSC-024 , ¶ 19, 117 N.M. 273 , 871 P.2d 369 (stating that “[o]nly the most unusual circumstances beyond the control of the parties—such as error on the part of the [district] court—will warrant overlooking procedural defects”).

2023See State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421 , 759 P.2d 1003 (stating that “[a] party responding to a summary calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out errors of law and fact” and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this requirement), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Harris, 2013-NMCA-031, ¶ 3 , 297 P.3d 374 .

2023See State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421 , 759 P.2d 1003 (stating that “[a] party responding to a summary calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out errors of law and fact” and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this requirement), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Harris, 2013-NMCA-031, ¶ 3 , 297 P.3d 374 .

2023See State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421 , 759 P.2d 1003 (stating that “[a] party responding to a summary calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out errors of law and fact” and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this requirement), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Harris, 2013-NMCA-031, ¶ 3 , 297 P.3d 374 .

2023See Benz, 2013-NMCA-111, ¶ 24 . {6} Accordingly, for the reasons stated in our notice of proposed disposition and herein, we affirm. {7} IT IS SO ORDERED.

2016See Harkins v. Harkins, 3 1984-NMSC-057 , ¶ 3, 101 N.M. 296 , 681 P.2d 722 (“In New Mexico, parties in a 4 divorce may agree and stipulate to a division of property and payment of alimony 5 upon dissolution of marriage.

2016See Harkins v. Harkins, 3 1984-NMSC-057 , ¶ 3, 101 N.M. 296 , 681 P.2d 722 (“In New Mexico, parties in a 4 divorce may agree and stipulate to a division of property and payment of alimony 5 upon dissolution of marriage.

2013Further, “the conversion of nonexempt 6 funds into funds that are ordinarily exempt under Section[] 42-10-2 . . . are not 7 automatically protected from attachment by creditors without an analysis of whether 8 the transfer served the underlying purpose of the exemption statute[] and was not in 9 furtherance of an intent to defraud creditors.” Doña Ana Sav. & Loan, 115 N.M. at 10 594, 855 P.2d at 1058 .

2013In sum, Husband argues that the district court erred in 13 securing Husband’s debt to Wife with a lien against his retirement account because, 14 pursuant to Section 42-10-2, his retirement account was exempt from Wife’s claim as 15 a creditor. 16 {10} Section 42-10-2 provides, in pertinent part, that “any interest in or proceeds 17 from a pension or retirement fund of every person supporting only himself is exempt 18 from receivers or trustees in bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings, executors 19 or administrators in probate, fines, attachment, execution[,] or foreclosure by a 6 1 judgm

2011See Becenti, 2004-NMCA-091, ¶ 10 , 136 N.M. 124 , 94 P.3d 867 (looking to federal law for guidance in interpreting Rule l-041(A)(l)(a) after recognizing that this Court may look to federal law for guidance in interpreting rules of civil procedure identical to their federal counterparts); see also Ped.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) (providing that after service of an answer or motion for summary judgment, “an action may be dismissed at the plaintiffs request only by court order, on terms that the court [deems] proper”). {23} We review the district court’s denial of Wife’s motion to dismiss for an abuse of d

2011See Becenti, 2004-NMCA-091, ¶ 10 , 136 N.M. 124 , 94 P.3d 867 (looking to federal law for guidance in interpreting Rule l-041(A)(l)(a) after recognizing that this Court may look to federal law for guidance in interpreting rules of civil procedure identical to their federal counterparts); see also Ped.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) (providing that after service of an answer or motion for summary judgment, “an action may be dismissed at the plaintiffs request only by court order, on terms that the court [deems] proper”). {23} We review the district court’s denial of Wife’s motion to dismiss for an abuse of d

2011See Ohlander, 114 F.3d at 1537-38 (reasoning that a district court’s failure to consider the applicable legal standard under the federal counterpart to Rule 1-041(A)(2) constitutes an abuse of discretion and may serve as a basis for remanding to the district court to apply the correct legal standard); see also Gilmore v. Gilmore, 2010-NMCA-013, ¶ 53 , 147 N.M. 625 , 227 P.3d 115 (remanding to the district court to reconsider its method of calculating a wife’s interest in a husband’s retirement benefits where the district court felt bound by what it believed was a statutory mandate and did not

2009We therefore 8 address the merits of Wife’s appeal bearing in mind that all presumptions and 9 inferences must be resolved in support of the district court’s denial of Wife’s motion 10 to continue. 11 We review the denial of a motion for continuance for an abuse of discretion. 12 Rubin v. Rubin, 120 N.M. 592, 595 , 904 P.2d 41, 44 (Ct. App. 1995).

2009We therefore 8 address the merits of Wife’s appeal bearing in mind that all presumptions and 9 inferences must be resolved in support of the district court’s denial of Wife’s motion 10 to continue. 11 We review the denial of a motion for continuance for an abuse of discretion. 12 Rubin v. Rubin, 120 N.M. 592, 595 , 904 P.2d 41, 44 (Ct. App. 1995).

2009See Reeves, 107 N.M. at 236 , 755 P.2d at 80 . 3 Despite this presumption, because Wife argues that Rule 1-089(B) required the court 4 as a matter of law to automatically grant her a continuance, we briefly address Wife’s 5 argument, which involves a question of law that we review de novo.

2009See Reeves, 107 N.M. at 236 , 755 P.2d at 80 . 3 Despite this presumption, because Wife argues that Rule 1-089(B) required the court 4 as a matter of law to automatically grant her a continuance, we briefly address Wife’s 5 argument, which involves a question of law that we review de novo.

2009See Woolwine v. Furr’s, Inc., 106 N.M. 492, 496 , 745 P.2d 717, 721 (Ct.App.1987) (“To preserve an issue for review on appeal, it must appear that appellant fairly invoked a ruling of the trial court on the same grounds argued in the appellate court.”). {69} We then went on to note that: “[W]e have not been provided with a copy of the transcript from the hearing on Wife’s motion....

2009See Woolwine v. Furr’s, Inc., 106 N.M. 492, 496 , 745 P.2d 717, 721 (Ct.App.1987) (“To preserve an issue for review on appeal, it must appear that appellant fairly invoked a ruling of the trial court on the same grounds argued in the appellate court.”). {69} We then went on to note that: “[W]e have not been provided with a copy of the transcript from the hearing on Wife’s motion....

2005See Monsanto v. Monsanto, 119 N.M. 678, 680-82 , 894 P.2d 1034, 1036-38 (Ct.App.1995) (explaining that a grant or denial of an award of attorney fees in a domestic relations case must be supported by substantial evidence and the trial court is required to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue).

2005See Monsanto v. Monsanto, 119 N.M. 678, 680-82 , 894 P.2d 1034, 1036-38 (Ct.App.1995) (explaining that a grant or denial of an award of attorney fees in a domestic relations case must be supported by substantial evidence and the trial court is required to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue).

1996See Clark v. Clark, 361 P.2d 207, 210-11 (Okla.1961).

1995See In Matter of I.N.M., 105 N.M. 664 , 669, 735 P.2d 1170 , 1175 (Ct.App.1987) (trial court is presumed to have disregarded incompetent evidence, absent a showing that the court was influenced thereby).

1995See In Matter of I.N.M., 105 N.M. 664 , 669, 735 P.2d 1170 , 1175 (Ct.App.1987) (trial court is presumed to have disregarded incompetent evidence, absent a showing that the court was influenced thereby).

1994Although we agree with Husband that Wife’s SCRA 1-060(B)(6) motion did not provide exceptional circumstances, and therefore was properly denied, see Wehrle v. Robison, 92 N.M. 485, 487 , 590 P.2d 633, 635 (1979); Mendoza v. Mendoza, 103 N.M. 327, 331-32 , 706 P.2d 869, 873-74 (Ct.App.1985), nevertheless, we conclude the district court had jurisdiction under SCRA 1-060(B) to set aside its earlier supplemental judgment.

1994Although we agree with Husband that Wife’s SCRA 1-060(B)(6) motion did not provide exceptional circumstances, and therefore was properly denied, see Wehrle v. Robison, 92 N.M. 485, 487 , 590 P.2d 633, 635 (1979); Mendoza v. Mendoza, 103 N.M. 327, 331-32 , 706 P.2d 869, 873-74 (Ct.App.1985), nevertheless, we conclude the district court had jurisdiction under SCRA 1-060(B) to set aside its earlier supplemental judgment.

1994Although we agree with Husband that Wife’s SCRA 1-060(B)(6) motion did not provide exceptional circumstances, and therefore was properly denied, see Wehrle v. Robison, 92 N.M. 485, 487 , 590 P.2d 633, 635 (1979); Mendoza v. Mendoza, 103 N.M. 327, 331-32 , 706 P.2d 869, 873-74 (Ct.App.1985), nevertheless, we conclude the district court had jurisdiction under SCRA 1-060(B) to set aside its earlier supplemental judgment.

1994Although we agree with Husband that Wife’s SCRA 1-060(B)(6) motion did not provide exceptional circumstances, and therefore was properly denied, see Wehrle v. Robison, 92 N.M. 485, 487 , 590 P.2d 633, 635 (1979); Mendoza v. Mendoza, 103 N.M. 327, 331-32 , 706 P.2d 869, 873-74 (Ct.App.1985), nevertheless, we conclude the district court had jurisdiction under SCRA 1-060(B) to set aside its earlier supplemental judgment.