Wife motion in South Carolina

2026See Swentor, 336 S.C. at 479 , 520 S.E.2d at 334 ("Once approved, an agreement may be enforced by the family court through its contempt powers, unless the agreement unambiguously denies the court continuing jurisdiction over the matter.").3 Because we reverse the family court's orders adopting and enforcing the Mediation Agreement and denying Wife's motion to reconsider, we also reverse the awards of fees and costs included in those orders.

2026See Swentor, 336 S.C. at 479 , 520 S.E.2d at 334 ("Once approved, an agreement may be enforced by the family court through its contempt powers, unless the agreement unambiguously denies the court continuing jurisdiction over the matter.").3 Because we reverse the family court's orders adopting and enforcing the Mediation Agreement and denying Wife's motion to reconsider, we also reverse the awards of fees and costs included in those orders.

2023STANDARD OF REVIEW "The family court is a court of equity." Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 386 , 709 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011).

2023STANDARD OF REVIEW "The family court is a court of equity." Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 386 , 709 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011).

2026See Bojilov v. Bojilov, 425 S.C. 161, 191 , 819 S.E.2d 791, 807 (Ct. App. 2018) ("The appellate court may reverse an attorney's fees award when the beneficial results achieved by trial counsel are reversed on appeal.").

2026See Bojilov v. Bojilov, 425 S.C. 161, 191 , 819 S.E.2d 791, 807 (Ct. App. 2018) ("The appellate court may reverse an attorney's fees award when the beneficial results achieved by trial counsel are reversed on appeal.").

2026See Myers v. Myers, 391 S.C. 308, 315, 705 S.E.2d 86, 90 (Ct. App. 2011) ("[I]t is error to award [a spouse] permanent alimony substantially in excess of her needs."); McElveen v. McElveen, 332 S.C. 583, 600, 506 S.E.2d 1, 10 (Ct. App. 1998), disapproved of on other grounds by Wooten v. Wooten, 364 S.C. 532, 615 S.E.2d 98 (2005) (reducing the husband's monthly alimony obligation from $11,000 per month to $7,500 per month after finding the wife's living expenses, as stated in her financial declaration, were unnecessarily inflated); Woodward v. Woodward, 294 S.C. 210, 217, 363 S.E.2d 413, 417 (C

2026See Myers v. Myers, 391 S.C. 308, 315, 705 S.E.2d 86, 90 (Ct. App. 2011) ("[I]t is error to award [a spouse] permanent alimony substantially in excess of her needs."); McElveen v. McElveen, 332 S.C. 583, 600, 506 S.E.2d 1, 10 (Ct. App. 1998), disapproved of on other grounds by Wooten v. Wooten, 364 S.C. 532, 615 S.E.2d 98 (2005) (reducing the husband's monthly alimony obligation from $11,000 per month to $7,500 per month after finding the wife's living expenses, as stated in her financial declaration, were unnecessarily inflated); Woodward v. Woodward, 294 S.C. 210, 217, 363 S.E.2d 413, 417 (C

2026See Myers v. Myers, 391 S.C. 308, 315, 705 S.E.2d 86, 90 (Ct. App. 2011) ("[I]t is error to award [a spouse] permanent alimony substantially in excess of her needs."); McElveen v. McElveen, 332 S.C. 583, 600, 506 S.E.2d 1, 10 (Ct. App. 1998), disapproved of on other grounds by Wooten v. Wooten, 364 S.C. 532, 615 S.E.2d 98 (2005) (reducing the husband's monthly alimony obligation from $11,000 per month to $7,500 per month after finding the wife's living expenses, as stated in her financial declaration, were unnecessarily inflated); Woodward v. Woodward, 294 S.C. 210, 217, 363 S.E.2d 413, 417 (C

2026See Myers v. Myers, 391 S.C. 308, 315, 705 S.E.2d 86, 90 (Ct. App. 2011) ("[I]t is error to award [a spouse] permanent alimony substantially in excess of her needs."); McElveen v. McElveen, 332 S.C. 583, 600, 506 S.E.2d 1, 10 (Ct. App. 1998), disapproved of on other grounds by Wooten v. Wooten, 364 S.C. 532, 615 S.E.2d 98 (2005) (reducing the husband's monthly alimony obligation from $11,000 per month to $7,500 per month after finding the wife's living expenses, as stated in her financial declaration, were unnecessarily inflated); Woodward v. Woodward, 294 S.C. 210, 217, 363 S.E.2d 413, 417 (C

2026See Myers v. Myers, 391 S.C. 308, 315, 705 S.E.2d 86, 90 (Ct. App. 2011) ("[I]t is error to award [a spouse] permanent alimony substantially in excess of her needs."); McElveen v. McElveen, 332 S.C. 583, 600, 506 S.E.2d 1, 10 (Ct. App. 1998), disapproved of on other grounds by Wooten v. Wooten, 364 S.C. 532, 615 S.E.2d 98 (2005) (reducing the husband's monthly alimony obligation from $11,000 per month to $7,500 per month after finding the wife's living expenses, as stated in her financial declaration, were unnecessarily inflated); Woodward v. Woodward, 294 S.C. 210, 217, 363 S.E.2d 413, 417 (C

2026See Myers v. Myers, 391 S.C. 308, 315, 705 S.E.2d 86, 90 (Ct. App. 2011) ("[I]t is error to award [a spouse] permanent alimony substantially in excess of her needs."); McElveen v. McElveen, 332 S.C. 583, 600, 506 S.E.2d 1, 10 (Ct. App. 1998), disapproved of on other grounds by Wooten v. Wooten, 364 S.C. 532, 615 S.E.2d 98 (2005) (reducing the husband's monthly alimony obligation from $11,000 per month to $7,500 per month after finding the wife's living expenses, as stated in her financial declaration, were unnecessarily inflated); Woodward v. Woodward, 294 S.C. 210, 217, 363 S.E.2d 413, 417 (C

2023See Davis v. Davis, 372 S.C. 64, 75 , 641 S.E.2d 446, 451 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Where an agreement is clear and capable of legal construction the court's only function is to interpret its lawful meaning and the intention of the parties as found within the agreement and give effect to them." (quoting Bogan v. Bogan, 298 S.C. 139, 142 , 378 S.E.2d 606, 608 (Ct. App. 1989))).

2023See Davis v. Davis, 372 S.C. 64, 75 , 641 S.E.2d 446, 451 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Where an agreement is clear and capable of legal construction the court's only function is to interpret its lawful meaning and the intention of the parties as found within the agreement and give effect to them." (quoting Bogan v. Bogan, 298 S.C. 139, 142 , 378 S.E.2d 606, 608 (Ct. App. 1989))).

2023See Davis v. Davis, 372 S.C. 64, 75 , 641 S.E.2d 446, 451 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Where an agreement is clear and capable of legal construction the court's only function is to interpret its lawful meaning and the intention of the parties as found within the agreement and give effect to them." (quoting Bogan v. Bogan, 298 S.C. 139, 142 , 378 S.E.2d 606, 608 (Ct. App. 1989))).

2023See Davis v. Davis, 372 S.C. 64, 75 , 641 S.E.2d 446, 451 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Where an agreement is clear and capable of legal construction the court's only function is to interpret its lawful meaning and the intention of the parties as found within the agreement and give effect to them." (quoting Bogan v. Bogan, 298 S.C. 139, 142 , 378 S.E.2d 606, 608 (Ct. App. 1989))).

2023See Rule 14(a), SCRFC, note ("The rule to show cause provided [in Rule 14(a), SCRFC,] is for contempt of court arising from failure to comply with the Court's orders, decrees or judgments and for enforcement thereof." (emphasis added)); Moseley, 279 S.C. at 353 , 306 S.E.2d at 627 ("With the court's approval, the terms [of an agreement] become a part of the decree and are binding on the parties and the court.").

2023See Rule 14(a), SCRFC, note ("The rule to show cause provided [in Rule 14(a), SCRFC,] is for contempt of court arising from failure to comply with the Court's orders, decrees or judgments and for enforcement thereof." (emphasis added)); Moseley, 279 S.C. at 353 , 306 S.E.2d at 627 ("With the court's approval, the terms [of an agreement] become a part of the decree and are binding on the parties and the court.").

2022See Sanders v. Smith, 431 S.C. 605 , 611, 848 S.E.2d 604 , 607 (Ct. App. 2020) ("The family court has discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b) and [an appellate court] review[s] such decisions using an abuse of discretion standard."); Rule 60(b)(1) ("On motion and upon such terms as are just, the [family] court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."); Griffith v. Griffith, 332 S.C. 630, 646-47 , 506 S.E.2d 526, 535 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[W]hen an order from t

2022See Sanders v. Smith, 431 S.C. 605 , 611, 848 S.E.2d 604 , 607 (Ct. App. 2020) ("The family court has discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b) and [an appellate court] review[s] such decisions using an abuse of discretion standard."); Rule 60(b)(1) ("On motion and upon such terms as are just, the [family] court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."); Griffith v. Griffith, 332 S.C. 630, 646-47 , 506 S.E.2d 526, 535 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[W]hen an order from t

2022See Sanders, 431 S.C. at 611, 848 S.E.2d at 607 ("The family court has discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b) and we review such decisions using an abuse of discretion standard."); Rule 60(b)(5) ("On motion and upon such terms as are just, the [family] court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" if "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application."); Bowers v. Bowers, 304 S.C. 65, 67 , 403 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The movant in a Rule 60(b) motion has the burden of presenting

2022See Sanders, 431 S.C. at 611, 848 S.E.2d at 607 ("The family court has discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b) and we review such decisions using an abuse of discretion standard."); Rule 60(b)(5) ("On motion and upon such terms as are just, the [family] court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" if "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application."); Bowers v. Bowers, 304 S.C. 65, 67 , 403 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The movant in a Rule 60(b) motion has the burden of presenting

2022See Sanders v. Smith, 431 S.C. 605 , 611, 848 S.E.2d 604 , 607 (Ct. App. 2020) ("The family court has discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b) and [an appellate court] review[s] such decisions using an abuse of discretion standard."); Rule 60(b)(1) ("On motion and upon such terms as are just, the [family] court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."); Griffith v. Griffith, 332 S.C. 630, 646-47 , 506 S.E.2d 526, 535 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[W]hen an order from t

2022See Sanders v. Smith, 431 S.C. 605 , 611, 848 S.E.2d 604 , 607 (Ct. App. 2020) ("The family court has discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b) and [an appellate court] review[s] such decisions using an abuse of discretion standard."); Rule 60(b)(1) ("On motion and upon such terms as are just, the [family] court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."); Griffith v. Griffith, 332 S.C. 630, 646-47 , 506 S.E.2d 526, 535 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[W]hen an order from t

2022See Sanders, 431 S.C. at 611, 848 S.E.2d at 607 ("The family court has discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b) and we review such decisions using an abuse of discretion standard."); Rule 60(b)(5) ("On motion and upon such terms as are just, the [family] court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" if "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application."); Bowers v. Bowers, 304 S.C. 65, 67 , 403 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The movant in a Rule 60(b) motion has the burden of presenting

2022See Sanders, 431 S.C. at 611, 848 S.E.2d at 607 ("The family court has discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b) and we review such decisions using an abuse of discretion standard."); Rule 60(b)(5) ("On motion and upon such terms as are just, the [family] court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" if "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application."); Bowers v. Bowers, 304 S.C. 65, 67 , 403 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The movant in a Rule 60(b) motion has the burden of presenting

2022See Sanders v. Smith, 431 S.C. 605 , 611, 848 S.E.2d 604 , 607 (Ct. App. 2020) ("The family court has discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b) and [an appellate court] review[s] such decisions using an abuse of discretion standard."); Rule 60(b)(1) ("On motion and upon such terms as are just, the [family] court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."); Griffith v. Griffith, 332 S.C. 630, 646-47 , 506 S.E.2d 526, 535 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[W]hen an order from t

2022See Sanders v. Smith, 431 S.C. 605 , 611, 848 S.E.2d 604 , 607 (Ct. App. 2020) ("The family court has discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b) and [an appellate court] review[s] such decisions using an abuse of discretion standard."); Rule 60(b)(1) ("On motion and upon such terms as are just, the [family] court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."); Griffith v. Griffith, 332 S.C. 630, 646-47 , 506 S.E.2d 526, 535 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[W]hen an order from t

2021See Penny v. Green, 357 S.C. 583, 589 , 594 S.E.2d 171, 174 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Several considerations relevant to the initial determination of alimony may be applied in the modification context as well, including the parties' standard of living during the marriage . . . .").

2021See Penny v. Green, 357 S.C. 583, 589 , 594 S.E.2d 171, 174 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Several considerations relevant to the initial determination of alimony may be applied in the modification context as well, including the parties' standard of living during the marriage . . . .").

2017See Srivastava v. Srivastava, 411 S.C. 481, 489 , 769 S.E.2d 442 , 447 (Ct. App. 2015) ("An award of attorney's fees rests within the sound discretion of the [family court] and should not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting Doe v. Doe, 319 S.C. 151, 157 , 459 S.E.2d 892, 896 (Ct. App. 1995))).

2017See Srivastava v. Srivastava, 411 S.C. 481, 489 , 769 S.E.2d 442 , 447 (Ct. App. 2015) ("An award of attorney's fees rests within the sound discretion of the [family court] and should not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting Doe v. Doe, 319 S.C. 151, 157 , 459 S.E.2d 892, 896 (Ct. App. 1995))).

2017See Buist, 410 S.C. at 574 , 766 S.E.2d at 383 ("It is well settled that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved." (quoting Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 564 , 633 S.E.2d 505, 510 (2006))).

2017See Buist, 410 S.C. at 574 , 766 S.E.2d at 383 ("It is well settled that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved." (quoting Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 564 , 633 S.E.2d 505, 510 (2006))).

2017See Srivastava v. Srivastava, 411 S.C. 481, 489 , 769 S.E.2d 442 , 447 (Ct. App. 2015) ("An award of attorney's fees rests within the sound discretion of the [family court] and should not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting Doe v. Doe, 319 S.C. 151, 157 , 459 S.E.2d 892, 896 (Ct. App. 1995))).

2017See Srivastava v. Srivastava, 411 S.C. 481, 489 , 769 S.E.2d 442 , 447 (Ct. App. 2015) ("An award of attorney's fees rests within the sound discretion of the [family court] and should not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting Doe v. Doe, 319 S.C. 151, 157 , 459 S.E.2d 892, 896 (Ct. App. 1995))).

2017See Doe v. Doe, 370 S.C. 206, 212 , 634 S.E.2d 51, 54 (Ct. App. 2006) ("To preserve an issue for appellate review, the issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [family] court."); id. at 212 , 634 S.E.2d at 55 ("[W]hen an appellant neither raises an issue at trial nor through a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion, the issue is not preserved for appellate review."). 5.

2017See Doe v. Doe, 370 S.C. 206, 212 , 634 S.E.2d 51, 54 (Ct. App. 2006) ("To preserve an issue for appellate review, the issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [family] court."); id. at 212 , 634 S.E.2d at 55 ("[W]hen an appellant neither raises an issue at trial nor through a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion, the issue is not preserved for appellate review."). 5.

2017See Buist, 410 S.C. at 574 , 766 S.E.2d at 383 ("It is well settled that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved." (quoting Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 564 , 633 S.E.2d 505, 510 (2006))).

2017See Buist, 410 S.C. at 574 , 766 S.E.2d at 383 ("It is well settled that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved." (quoting Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 564 , 633 S.E.2d 505, 510 (2006))).

2014See Gallagher v. Evert, 353 S.C. 59, 63 , 577 S.E.2d 217, 219 (Ct. App. 2002) ("The notes to Rule 59, SCRCP, indicate that subsection (g) was added to help insure the judge is promptly notified that the motion has been filed.

2014See Gallagher v. Evert, 353 S.C. 59, 63 , 577 S.E.2d 217, 219 (Ct. App. 2002) ("The notes to Rule 59, SCRCP, indicate that subsection (g) was added to help insure the judge is promptly notified that the motion has been filed.

2014As to whether the family court improperly sanctioned Wife pursuant to Rule 11, SCRCP, and exceeded its authority in the sanctions ordered, including its decision to dismiss Wife's claim that Husband should have to reimburse her for a drug test: Runyon v. Wright, 322 S.C. 15, 18-19 , 471 S.E.2d 160, 161-62 (1996) (stating under Rule 11, SCRCP, a party may be sanctioned for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper, or for making frivolous arguments); id. at 19 , 471 S.E.2d at 162 (stating the party "may also be sanctioned for filing a pleading, motion, or other paper in bad faith (i.e

2014As to whether the family court improperly sanctioned Wife pursuant to Rule 11, SCRCP, and exceeded its authority in the sanctions ordered, including its decision to dismiss Wife's claim that Husband should have to reimburse her for a drug test: Runyon v. Wright, 322 S.C. 15, 18-19 , 471 S.E.2d 160, 161-62 (1996) (stating under Rule 11, SCRCP, a party may be sanctioned for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper, or for making frivolous arguments); id. at 19 , 471 S.E.2d at 162 (stating the party "may also be sanctioned for filing a pleading, motion, or other paper in bad faith (i.e

2013See Chafin v. Chafen, 101 So.3d 234 (Ala.Civ.App. 2012) (holding the trial court had jurisdiction to divorce the parties where the husband alleged that he had been a resident of Alabama for more than six months when he filed his complaint for divorce and the wife did not challenge the fact that husband was an Alabama resident); see also Ala.Code § 30-2-5 (2011) (“When the defendant is a nonresident, the other party to the marriage must have been a bona fide resident of this state for six months next before the filing of the complaint, which must be alleged in the complaint and proved.”).

2012See Green v. Green, 320 S.C. 347, 350-51 , 465 S.E.2d 130, 132-33 (Ct. App. 1995) (upon Wife's challenge to the timeliness of a Rule 59(e) motion, the family court found Husband had produced credible evidence of the motion's timeliness; on appeal, the court of appeals upheld the family court's implicit credibility determination that the motion was timely served).

2012See Green v. Green, 320 S.C. 347, 350-51 , 465 S.E.2d 130, 132-33 (Ct. App. 1995) (upon Wife's challenge to the timeliness of a Rule 59(e) motion, the family court found Husband had produced credible evidence of the motion's timeliness; on appeal, the court of appeals upheld the family court's implicit credibility determination that the motion was timely served).

2011As to whether the family court erred by awarding Wife $4,504.62 in attorney's fees in connection to Wife's motion to compel, we find no error.[1] See High v. High , 389 S.C. 226, 249 , 697 S.E.2d 690, 702 (Ct. App. 2010) (providing the award of attorney's fees in a domestic action rests within the sound discretion of the family court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion); Dickert v. Dickert , 387 S.C. 1 , 10–11, 691 S.E.2d 448, 453 (2010) (holding the family court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees when it properly considered the E.D.M. and Glasscock fac

2011As to whether the family court erred by awarding Wife $4,504.62 in attorney's fees in connection to Wife's motion to compel, we find no error.[1] See High v. High , 389 S.C. 226, 249 , 697 S.E.2d 690, 702 (Ct. App. 2010) (providing the award of attorney's fees in a domestic action rests within the sound discretion of the family court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion); Dickert v. Dickert , 387 S.C. 1 , 10–11, 691 S.E.2d 448, 453 (2010) (holding the family court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees when it properly considered the E.D.M. and Glasscock fac

2011See Reiss v. Reiss , 392 S.C. 198, 210 , 708 S.E.2d 799, 805 (Ct. App. 2011) ("In deciding whether to award attorney's fees and costs, the family court should consider '(1) the party's ability to pay his/her own attorney's fee; (2) beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties' respective financial conditions; [and] (4) effect of the attorney's fee on each party's standard of living.'" (quoting E.D.M. v. T.A.M. , 307 S.C. 471 , 476–77, 415 S.E.2d 812, 816 (1992))); id. ("In determining a reasonable attorney's fee the family court should consider '(1) the nature, extent, and diff

2011See Reiss v. Reiss , 392 S.C. 198, 210 , 708 S.E.2d 799, 805 (Ct. App. 2011) ("In deciding whether to award attorney's fees and costs, the family court should consider '(1) the party's ability to pay his/her own attorney's fee; (2) beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties' respective financial conditions; [and] (4) effect of the attorney's fee on each party's standard of living.'" (quoting E.D.M. v. T.A.M. , 307 S.C. 471 , 476–77, 415 S.E.2d 812, 816 (1992))); id. ("In determining a reasonable attorney's fee the family court should consider '(1) the nature, extent, and diff

2011As to whether the family court erred by awarding Wife $4,504.62 in attorney's fees in connection to Wife's motion to compel, we find no error.[1] See High v. High , 389 S.C. 226, 249 , 697 S.E.2d 690, 702 (Ct. App. 2010) (providing the award of attorney's fees in a domestic action rests within the sound discretion of the family court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion); Dickert v. Dickert , 387 S.C. 1 , 10–11, 691 S.E.2d 448, 453 (2010) (holding the family court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees when it properly considered the E.D.M. and Glasscock fac

2011As to whether the family court erred by awarding Wife $4,504.62 in attorney's fees in connection to Wife's motion to compel, we find no error.[1] See High v. High , 389 S.C. 226, 249 , 697 S.E.2d 690, 702 (Ct. App. 2010) (providing the award of attorney's fees in a domestic action rests within the sound discretion of the family court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion); Dickert v. Dickert , 387 S.C. 1 , 10–11, 691 S.E.2d 448, 453 (2010) (holding the family court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees when it properly considered the E.D.M. and Glasscock fac