Wife motion in Arizona

2023After reviewing the competing allegations, the court found Lieb's account of the events to be credible and denied Wife's motion. 7 SWANSON v. SWANSON Decision of the Court ¶31 We must "defer to the trial court's determination of witnesses' credibility and the weight to give conflicting evidence." Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347, ¶ 13 (App. 1998).

2016See Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347, ¶ 13 (App. 1998). 4 HILEMAN v. HILEMAN Decision of the Court CONCLUSION ¶12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court's order denying Wife's motion to set aside the judgment. :ama 5

2024See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 2 In the order denying Wife’s motion to vacate, the probate court also noted that she still had not requested an initial hearing on her cross-petition, and that it would be dismissed within 30 days from the order.

2017No such motion shall be granted, however, without the court providing an opportunity for written response.” By granting Wife’s motion without directing Husband to submit a response, the court committed clear error. ¶9 The error was not harmless, because it denied Husband a fundamental due-process right.1 Each party has a fundamental right to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situati

2015See Clemens v. Clark, 101 Ariz. 413, 414 , 420 P.2d 284, 285 (1966); Lederman v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 19 Ariz. App. 107, 108 , 505 P.2d 275, 276 (1973). 3 This court previously denied Wife’s motion to add documents to the record, including a letter dated January 20, 2015, and a print-out concerning 2 TUTORA v. DOMINGUEZ Decision of the Court who had two children from a previous marriage.

2015See Clemens v. Clark, 101 Ariz. 413, 414 , 420 P.2d 284, 285 (1966); Lederman v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 19 Ariz. App. 107, 108 , 505 P.2d 275, 276 (1973). 3 This court previously denied Wife’s motion to add documents to the record, including a letter dated January 20, 2015, and a print-out concerning 2 TUTORA v. DOMINGUEZ Decision of the Court who had two children from a previous marriage.

2015See Clemens v. Clark, 101 Ariz. 413, 414 , 420 P.2d 284, 285 (1966); Lederman v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 19 Ariz. App. 107, 108 , 505 P.2d 275, 276 (1973). 3 This court previously denied Wife’s motion to add documents to the record, including a letter dated January 20, 2015, and a print-out concerning 2 TUTORA v. DOMINGUEZ Decision of the Court who had two children from a previous marriage.

2015See Clemens v. Clark, 101 Ariz. 413, 414 , 420 P.2d 284, 285 (1966); Lederman v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 19 Ariz. App. 107, 108 , 505 P.2d 275, 276 (1973). 3 This court previously denied Wife’s motion to add documents to the record, including a letter dated January 20, 2015, and a print-out concerning 2 TUTORA v. DOMINGUEZ Decision of the Court who had two children from a previous marriage.

1990It would, for instance, allow a wife with a claim for loss of consortium resulting from bodily injury inflicted upon her husband to satisfy her claim from the increased coverage available by statute where there has been injury to or death of “two or more persons in only one accident.” 144 Ariz. at 256 , 697 P.2d at 339 (emphasis added).

1990It would, for instance, allow a wife with a claim for loss of consortium resulting from bodily injury inflicted upon her husband to satisfy her claim from the increased coverage available by statute where there has been injury to or death of “two or more persons in only one accident.” 144 Ariz. at 256 , 697 P.2d at 339 (emphasis added).

2026See Dyrek I, 1 CA-CV 23-0237, at *2, ¶ 9; Brietbart-Napp v. Napp, 216 Ariz. 74, 79, ¶ 13 (App. 2007) (“[W]e determine that whether a separation agreement has merged is of no consequence in determining that the court can reopen its determination that a separation agreement is [or is not] unfair.” (citation modified)); see also Keller v. Keller, 137 Ariz. 447, 448 (App. 1983) (holding that in the absence of fraud or undue influence, parties to divorce are bound by their own agreements); Wick v. Wick, 107 Ariz. 382, 384 (1971) (explaining that a property settlement agreement is valid if it is fre

2026Fleming v. Tanner, 248 Ariz. 63 , 70, ¶ 23 (App. 2019) (community debts not allocated in the decree remain joint obligations and are apportioned equally); accord Fischer v. Sommer, 160 Ariz. 530, 531 (App. 1989) (community debts not allocated in a decree “remain the joint obligations of the parties”); Jankowski v. Jankowski, 114 Ariz. 406, 407 (App. 1977) (parties remain jointly and severally liable for community debts not allocated in the decree).

2026See Dyrek I, 1 CA-CV 23-0237, at *2, ¶ 9; Brietbart-Napp v. Napp, 216 Ariz. 74, 79, ¶ 13 (App. 2007) (“[W]e determine that whether a separation agreement has merged is of no consequence in determining that the court can reopen its determination that a separation agreement is [or is not] unfair.” (citation modified)); see also Keller v. Keller, 137 Ariz. 447, 448 (App. 1983) (holding that in the absence of fraud or undue influence, parties to divorce are bound by their own agreements); Wick v. Wick, 107 Ariz. 382, 384 (1971) (explaining that a property settlement agreement is valid if it is fre

2026Fleming v. Tanner, 248 Ariz. 63 , 70, ¶ 23 (App. 2019) (community debts not allocated in the decree remain joint obligations and are apportioned equally); accord Fischer v. Sommer, 160 Ariz. 530, 531 (App. 1989) (community debts not allocated in a decree “remain the joint obligations of the parties”); Jankowski v. Jankowski, 114 Ariz. 406, 407 (App. 1977) (parties remain jointly and severally liable for community debts not allocated in the decree).

2026Wife’s tort claims are not barred by issue preclusion because they have yet to be “actually litigated.” See Crosby-Garbotz v. Fell, 246 Ariz. 54, 59, ¶ 19 (2019).

2026See Dyrek I, 1 CA-CV 23-0237, at *2, ¶ 9; Brietbart-Napp v. Napp, 216 Ariz. 74, 79, ¶ 13 (App. 2007) (“[W]e determine that whether a separation agreement has merged is of no consequence in determining that the court can reopen its determination that a separation agreement is [or is not] unfair.” (citation modified)); see also Keller v. Keller, 137 Ariz. 447, 448 (App. 1983) (holding that in the absence of fraud or undue influence, parties to divorce are bound by their own agreements); Wick v. Wick, 107 Ariz. 382, 384 (1971) (explaining that a property settlement agreement is valid if it is fre

2025See Walsh v. Walsh, 230 Ariz. 486, 490, ¶ 9 (App. 2012) (a court abuses its discretion if it commits a substantial error of law).

2025Duckstein, 230 Ariz. at 233, ¶ 18 (a judgment is void if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction due to improper service). ¶18 The superior court abused its discretion in denying Wife’s motion to set aside the void decree.

2025We have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 12-2101(A)(1), and Rule 78(c). 1 See Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592, 596, ¶ 19 (App. 2017) (“A spouse who voluntarily services community debt and maintains community assets with separate property should not be penalized when a mutual agreement cannot be reached; when such payments are made, they must be accounted for in an equitable property distribution.”). 3 SEDILLO v. COOLEY Decision of the Court DISCUSSION ¶9 Wife challenges the superior court’s property division orders.

2023See id. ¶17 Under the reserved jurisdiction method, the pension’s community share is calculated “by dividing the length of time worked during the marriage by the total length of time worked toward earning the pension.” Boncoskey, 216 Ariz. at 452 , ¶ 18 (quoting Johnson, 131 Ariz. at 41 n.4).

2023See id. ¶17 Under the reserved jurisdiction method, the pension’s community share is calculated “by dividing the length of time worked during the marriage by the total length of time worked toward earning the pension.” Boncoskey, 216 Ariz. at 452 , ¶ 18 (quoting Johnson, 131 Ariz. at 41 n.4).

2023See id. ¶17 Under the reserved jurisdiction method, the pension’s community share is calculated “by dividing the length of time worked during the marriage by the total length of time worked toward earning the pension.” Boncoskey, 216 Ariz. at 452 , ¶ 18 (quoting Johnson, 131 Ariz. at 41 n.4).

2022Wife appealed, and we vacated the Default Decree because the court had not addressed whether the PNA was fair and equitable: 2 OBERG v. OBERG Decision of the Court Although the agreement need not comply with the property distribution and spousal maintenance provisions of A.R.S. §§ 25-318 and -319, Husband concedes the post-nuptial agreement is governed “by case law, such as” [In re] Harber’s Estate, [ 104 Ariz. 79, 88 (1969),] Austin v. Austin, 237 Ariz. 201 (App. 2015) and Hutki v. Hutki, 244 Ariz. 39 (App. 2018).

2022See Flynn v. Rogers, 172 Ariz. 62 , 67–68 (1992) (expenditure of other spouse’s benefits alone does not constitute prejudice). ¶15 Both parties request attorneys’ fees on appeal.

2022See Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146 (App. 1978).

2022Thus, the court correctly 6 KOIZUMI v. MOROGIELLO Decision of the Court denied Wife equalization for payment of the tax debt because the evidence she offered was insufficient. ¶22 Regarding Wife’s claim that the court erred in not treating her $10,000 in attorneys’ fees as a community obligation, Wife cites Cardinal & Stachel, P.C. v. Curtiss, 225 Ariz. 381, 384, ¶¶ 7, 10 (App. 2010), for the proposition that pre-petition fees may benefit the community by facilitating the orderly and lawful division of assets and such fees need not be incurred with the primary intent to benefit the marital com

2022Laches will bar a claim “only upon a showing by clear and compelling evidence that the obligee unreasonably delayed bringing a claim . . . and the obligor was prejudiced by this delay.” In re Marriage of Yuro, 192 Ariz. 568, 573, ¶ 13 (App. 1998).

2022Seidman v. Seidman, 222 Ariz. 408, 411, ¶ 18 (App. 2009).

2021City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 218 Ariz. 172, 189, ¶ 58 (App. 2008). ¶25 Section 25-504(A) provides that “[i]n a proceeding in which spousal maintenance is ordered to be paid the court shall order the assignment on either party’s request.” In its denial of Wife’s motion, the superior court stated that the statute requires formal request, but that Wife 8 SOLDWEDEL v. SOLDWEDEL Decision of the Court had only informally requested assignment via email and Husband had complied with spousal-maintenance payments.

2020Lastly, the court granted Wife’s claim for attorney’s fees and costs because of the “substantial disparity of financial resources between the parties” and denied Husband’s request because he “acted unreasonably in the litigation.” Husband timely appealed the decree and we have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-2101(A)(1), -120.21(A)(1), and Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 78(c). 3 STEVENS v. STEVENS Decision of the Court DISCUSSION ¶8 “We apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the superior court’s division of property, but review the court’s