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7 Arkansas opinions name it 1 courts 1899–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Redmond v. Kestergreen2 sentences2010See Redmond v. Kester, 284 Kan. 209 , 159 P.3d 1004 (2007) (holding that a bankruptcy debtor may claim the homestead exemption for real property transferred to a self-settled revocable trust, even though the settlor and the beneficiary, as well as the bankruptcy debtor, were the same person); Engelke v. Engelke, 921 So.2d 693 (Fla.App.2006) (holding that the property held by the revocable trust, in which the trustee was the beneficiary and the property was his permanent residence, was a constitutionally protected homestead property); Callava v. Feinberg, 864 So.2d 429 (Fla.App.2003) (holding t 2010See Redmond v. Kester, 284 Kan. 209 , 159 P.3d 1004 (2007) (holding that a bankruptcy debtor may claim the homestead exemption for real property transferred to a self-settled revocable trust, even though the settlor and the beneficiary, as well as the bankruptcy debtor, were the same person); Engelke v. Engelke, 921 So.2d 693 (Fla.App.2006) (holding that the property held by the revocable trust, in which the trustee was the beneficiary and the property was his permanent residence, was a constitutionally protected homestead property); Callava v. Feinberg, 864 So.2d 429 (Fla.App.2003) (holding t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Berthenia Tollett, Joined by Kelsie Tollett, Her Husband v. Austin Mashburn and Lorene Hendricks (Hendrix)
green
2 sentences1970Sisemore v. Neal, 236 Ark. 574 , 367 S.W.2d 417 . [2] Appellee relies upon Tollett v. Mashburn, 291 F.2d 89 (8 Cir.), D.C., 183 F.Supp. 120 , and dictum in Sisemore quoting from the opinion in the district court, in asserting that Lopez's claim is barred. 1970Sizemore v. Neal, 236 Ark. 574 , 367 S. W. 2d 417 . 2 Appellee relies upon Tollett v. Mashburn, 291 F. 2d 89 , 183 F. Supp. 120 , and dictum in Sisemore quoting from the opinion in the district court, in asserting that Lopez’s claim is barred. | 2 | 1970–1970 |
Tollett v. Mashburn
green
2 sentences1970Sisemore v. Neal, 236 Ark. 574 , 367 S.W.2d 417 . [2] Appellee relies upon Tollett v. Mashburn, 291 F.2d 89 (8 Cir.), D.C., 183 F.Supp. 120 , and dictum in Sisemore quoting from the opinion in the district court, in asserting that Lopez's claim is barred. 1970Sizemore v. Neal, 236 Ark. 574 , 367 S. W. 2d 417 . 2 Appellee relies upon Tollett v. Mashburn, 291 F. 2d 89 , 183 F. Supp. 120 , and dictum in Sisemore quoting from the opinion in the district court, in asserting that Lopez’s claim is barred. | 2 | 1970–1970 |
Sisemore v. Neal
green
2 sentences1970Sizemore v. Neal, 236 Ark. 574 , 367 S. W. 2d 417 . 2 Appellee relies upon Tollett v. Mashburn, 291 F. 2d 89 , 183 F. Supp. 120 , and dictum in Sisemore quoting from the opinion in the district court, in asserting that Lopez’s claim is barred. 1970Sizemore v. Neal, 236 Ark. 574 , 367 S. W. 2d 417 . 2 Appellee relies upon Tollett v. Mashburn, 291 F. 2d 89 , 183 F. Supp. 120 , and dictum in Sisemore quoting from the opinion in the district court, in asserting that Lopez’s claim is barred. | 2 | 1970–1970 |
Engelke v. Estate of Engelke
green
1 sentence2010See Redmond v. Kester, 284 Kan. 209 , 159 P.3d 1004 (2007) (holding that a bankruptcy debtor may claim the homestead exemption for real property transferred to a self-settled revocable trust, even though the settlor and the beneficiary, as well as the bankruptcy debtor, were the same person); Engelke v. Engelke, 921 So.2d 693 (Fla.App.2006) (holding that the property held by the revocable trust, in which the trustee was the beneficiary and the property was his permanent residence, was a constitutionally protected homestead property); Callava v. Feinberg, 864 So.2d 429 (Fla.App.2003) (holding t | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Callava v. Feinberg
green
1 sentence2010See Redmond v. Kester, 284 Kan. 209 , 159 P.3d 1004 (2007) (holding that a bankruptcy debtor may claim the homestead exemption for real property transferred to a self-settled revocable trust, even though the settlor and the beneficiary, as well as the bankruptcy debtor, were the same person); Engelke v. Engelke, 921 So.2d 693 (Fla.App.2006) (holding that the property held by the revocable trust, in which the trustee was the beneficiary and the property was his permanent residence, was a constitutionally protected homestead property); Callava v. Feinberg, 864 So.2d 429 (Fla.App.2003) (holding t | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Harbison v. Vaughan
green
1 sentence1975In Hollis v. State, 59 Ark. 211 , 27 S.W. 73 , we determined that when the husband abandoned the wife and children, the wife could claim the exemption of the homestead which they continued to occupy, saying that the wife could do this when the husband neglects or refuses to do so (because the object of the homestead exemption was to protect the debtor’s family from dependence and want) but not for his own benefit apart from that of his family, citing Harbison v. Vaughan, 42 Ark. 539 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Hollis v. State
green
2 sentences1975In Hollis v. State, 59 Ark. 211 , 27 S.W. 73 , we determined that when the husband abandoned the wife and children, the wife could claim the exemption of the homestead which they continued to occupy, saying that the wife could do this when the husband neglects or refuses to do so (because the object of the homestead exemption was to protect the debtor’s family from dependence and want) but not for his own benefit apart from that of his family, citing Harbison v. Vaughan, 42 Ark. 539 . 1975In Hollis v. State, 59 Ark. 211 , 27 S.W. 73 , we determined that when the husband abandoned the wife and children, the wife could claim the exemption of the homestead which they continued to occupy, saying that the wife could do this when the husband neglects or refuses to do so (because the object of the homestead exemption was to protect the debtor’s family from dependence and want) but not for his own benefit apart from that of his family, citing Harbison v. Vaughan, 42 Ark. 539 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
McCaffrey v. Manogue
neutral
2 sentences1927The origin and reason of this rule is considered by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of McCaffrey v. Manogue, 196 U. S. 563 , 25 S. Ct. 319 , 49 L. ed. 600. 1927The origin and reason of this rule is considered by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of McCaffrey v. Manogue, 196 U. S. 563 , 25 S. Ct. 319 , 49 L. ed. 600. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Langley v. Langley
neutral
1 sentence1920The effect of the holding in Langley v. Langley, supra, was that the widow was not entitled to dower as against the grantee of the husband, and this holding is in accordance with the general rule that if the husband during his lifetime disposes of any equitable estate he may have in the lands, the dower right qf his wife therein will be defeated. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Commonwealth v. Hayden
green
1 sentence1899Com. v. Hayden (Mass.), 40 N. E. 846 . | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.