exhaustive analysis in Pennsylvania

2000Effective appellate review also necessitates “a comprehensive opinion containing an exhaustive analysis of the record and specific reasons for the court’s ultimate decision.” Alfred v. Braxton, 442 Pa.Super. 381 , 659 A.2d 1040 (1995). ¶ 46 In the instant case, the trial court provided us with the following analysis: [Appellant] next argues that the Hearing Officer erred in determining that it would be in the child’s best interests to allow [Appellee] to have visitation with the child.

2000Effective appellate review also necessitates “a comprehensive opinion containing an exhaustive analysis of the record and specific reasons for the court’s ultimate decision.” Alfred v. Braxton, 442 Pa.Super. 381 , 659 A.2d 1040 (1995). ¶ 46 In the instant case, the trial court provided us with the following analysis: [Appellant] next argues that the Hearing Officer erred in determining that it would be in the child’s best interests to allow [Appellee] to have visitation with the child.

1995Artzt v. Artzt, 383 Pa.Super. 23 , 556 A.2d 409 (1989); see Harner v. Harner, 330 Pa.Super. 343 , 479 A.2d 583 (1984); Berresford v. Berresford, 308 Pa.Super. 278 , 454 A.2d 129 (1982).

1995Artzt v. Artzt, 383 Pa.Super. 23 , 556 A.2d 409 (1989); see Harner v. Harner, 330 Pa.Super. 343 , 479 A.2d 583 (1984); Berresford v. Berresford, 308 Pa.Super. 278 , 454 A.2d 129 (1982).

1977Time and again in referring to the duty of juries in fixing the penalty between death and life imprisonment we have insisted that the jury exercise its discretion only after it has considered all the evidence, culpatory and exculpatory, incriminating and extenuating, including what manner of man the criminal is and has been: Com. v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 557 , 50 A.2d 328 ; Com. v. Stabinsky, 313 Pa. 231, 237, 238 , 169 A. 439 ; Com. v. Dague, 302 Pa. 13, 15 , 152 A. 839 ; Com. v. Bentley, 287 Pa. 539 , 135 A. 310 .

1977Time and again in referring to the duty of juries in fixing the penalty between death and life imprisonment we have insisted that the jury exercise its discretion only after it has considered all the evidence, culpatory and exculpatory, incriminating and extenuating, including what manner of man the criminal is and has been: Com. v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 557 , 50 A.2d 328 ; Com. v. Stabinsky, 313 Pa. 231, 237, 238 , 169 A. 439 ; Com. v. Dague, 302 Pa. 13, 15 , 152 A. 839 ; Com. v. Bentley, 287 Pa. 539 , 135 A. 310 .

1977Time and again in referring to the duty of juries in fixing the penalty between death and life imprisonment we have insisted that the jury exercise its discretion only after it has considered all the evidence, culpatory and exculpatory, incriminating and extenuating, including what manner of man the criminal is and has been: Com. v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 557 , 50 A.2d 328 ; Com. v. Stabinsky, 313 Pa. 231, 237, 238 , 169 A. 439 ; Com. v. Dague, 302 Pa. 13, 15 , 152 A. 839 ; Com. v. Bentley, 287 Pa. 539 , 135 A. 310 .

1977Time and again in referring to the duty of juries in fixing the penalty between death and life imprisonment we have insisted that the jury exercise its discretion only after it has considered all the evidence, culpatory and exculpatory, incriminating and extenuating, including what manner of man the criminal is and has been: Com. v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 557 , 50 A.2d 328 ; Com. v. Stabinsky, 313 Pa. 231, 237, 238 , 169 A. 439 ; Com. v. Dague, 302 Pa. 13, 15 , 152 A. 839 ; Com. v. Bentley, 287 Pa. 539 , 135 A. 310 .

1977Time and again in referring to the duty of juries in fixing the penalty between death and life imprisonment we have insisted that the jury exercise its discretion only after it has considered all the evidence, culpatory and exculpatory, incriminating and extenuating, including what manner of man the criminal is and has been: Com. v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 557 , 50 A.2d 328 ; Com. v. Stabinsky, 313 Pa. 231, 237, 238 , 169 A. 439 ; Com. v. Dague, 302 Pa. 13, 15 , 152 A. 839 ; Com. v. Bentley, 287 Pa. 539 , 135 A. 310 .

1977Time and again in referring to the duty of juries in fixing the penalty between death and life imprisonment we have insisted that the jury exercise its discretion only after it has considered all the evidence, culpatory and exculpatory, incriminating and extenuating, including what manner of man the criminal is and has been: Com. v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 557 , 50 A.2d 328 ; Com. v. Stabinsky, 313 Pa. 231, 237, 238 , 169 A. 439 ; Com. v. Dague, 302 Pa. 13, 15 , 152 A. 839 ; Com. v. Bentley, 287 Pa. 539 , 135 A. 310 .

2025As applied to Appellant’s particular circumstances, Sections 6105, 6106, and 6110.2, are “consistent with the country’s historical tradition of firearms regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17 .

2024See General Motors, 265 A.3d at 368-373 (discussing Cope’s Estate, 43 Pa. 79 (Pa. 1899); Kelley v. Kalodner, 181 A. 598 (Pa. 1935); Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel, 196 A.2d 664 (Pa. 1964), Amidon v. Kane, 279 A.2d 53 (Pa. 1971) and Mount Airy, L.LC. v. Pa. Department of Revenue, 154 A.3d 268 (Pa. 2016)).

2024See General Motors, 265 A.3d at 368-373 (discussing Cope’s Estate, 43 Pa. 79 (Pa. 1899); Kelley v. Kalodner, 181 A. 598 (Pa. 1935); Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel, 196 A.2d 664 (Pa. 1964), Amidon v. Kane, 279 A.2d 53 (Pa. 1971) and Mount Airy, L.LC. v. Pa. Department of Revenue, 154 A.3d 268 (Pa. 2016)).

2024See General Motors, 265 A.3d at 368-373 (discussing Cope’s Estate, 43 Pa. 79 (Pa. 1899); Kelley v. Kalodner, 181 A. 598 (Pa. 1935); Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel, 196 A.2d 664 (Pa. 1964), Amidon v. Kane, 279 A.2d 53 (Pa. 1971) and Mount Airy, L.LC. v. Pa. Department of Revenue, 154 A.3d 268 (Pa. 2016)).

2024See General Motors, 265 A.3d at 368-373 (discussing Cope’s Estate, 43 Pa. 79 (Pa. 1899); Kelley v. Kalodner, 181 A. 598 (Pa. 1935); Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel, 196 A.2d 664 (Pa. 1964), Amidon v. Kane, 279 A.2d 53 (Pa. 1971) and Mount Airy, L.LC. v. Pa. Department of Revenue, 154 A.3d 268 (Pa. 2016)).

2017Ford, after an exhaustive analysis of relevant law, the Superior Court stated that, "claims of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness cannot be raised for the first time after a notice of appeal has been taken from the underlying PCRA matter." ··•. 44 A.3d 1190 , 120L(Pa. Super.

2001See: School District of Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh Federation of Teachers, 486 Pa. 365, 373 , 406 A.2d 324, 328 (1979); Soja v. Factoryville Sportsmen’s Club, 361 Pa.Super. 473 , 522 A.2d 1129, 1131 (1987); Burrell Education Association v. Burrell School District, 674 A.2d 348 , 350 n. 3 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996).

1995Artzt v. Artzt, 383 Pa.Super. 23 , 556 A.2d 409 (1989); see Harner v. Harner, 330 Pa.Super. 343 , 479 A.2d 583 (1984); Berresford v. Berresford, 308 Pa.Super. 278 , 454 A.2d 129 (1982).

1995Artzt v. Artzt, 383 Pa.Super. 23 , 556 A.2d 409 (1989); see Harner v. Harner, 330 Pa.Super. 343 , 479 A.2d 583 (1984); Berresford v. Berresford, 308 Pa.Super. 278 , 454 A.2d 129 (1982).

1982Our observations in Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 498 Pa. 342 , 446 A.2d 591 (1982), are, unfortunately, as apt today as they were when Shaffer was decided: A review of our many decisions in the guilty plea area shows that these standards have generated confusion where there should be clarity.

1982Our observations in Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 498 Pa. 342 , 446 A.2d 591 (1982), are, unfortunately, as apt today as they were when Shaffer was decided: A review of our many decisions in the guilty plea area shows that these standards have generated confusion where there should be clarity.

1975After reviewing the brief, we conclude it fails to comport with the standards mandated by Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and adopted by this Court in Commonwealth v. Baker, 429 Pa. 209 , 239 A.2d 201 (1968).

1975After reviewing the brief, we conclude it fails to comport with the standards mandated by Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and adopted by this Court in Commonwealth v. Baker, 429 Pa. 209 , 239 A.2d 201 (1968).

1975After reviewing the brief, we conclude it fails to comport with the standards mandated by Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and adopted by this Court in Commonwealth v. Baker, 429 Pa. 209 , 239 A.2d 201 (1968).

1975After reviewing the brief, we conclude it fails to comport with the standards mandated by Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and adopted by this Court in Commonwealth v. Baker, 429 Pa. 209 , 239 A.2d 201 (1968).

1975He points out that a careful reading of the entire Peterson opinion, giving effect to all of its parts, leads to the conclusion that what at first appears to be a broad rule of law (as set forth in the preceding paragraph of this opinion) is actually intended to be a much narrower holding that “. . . a writ of summons which was never served upon the defendant is a complete nullity once the time for reissuance of the writ has expired.” Id., at page 667.

1971We there reviewed the basis of the defense of privilege under Pennsylvania law and the modifications thereof necessitated in situations where a public official or public figure is the object of the libel by the decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 11 L.

1971We there reviewed the basis of the defense of privilege under Pennsylvania law and the modifications thereof necessitated in situations where a public official or public figure is the object of the libel by the decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 11 L.

1971We have had occasion recently to make an exhaustive analysis of the Pennsylvania law of defamation : Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432 , 273 A. 2d 899 (1971).

1971We have had occasion recently to make an exhaustive analysis of the Pennsylvania law of defamation : Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432 , 273 A. 2d 899 (1971).