exhaustive analysis in Louisiana

2005In support of their substantive due process claim, challenging the bona fide change of residence rule as impermissibly vague, plaintiffs cite Dumez v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, 334 So.2d 494, 502 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 337 So.2d 225 (La.1976), in which this court held that an LHSAA rule "must stand the test of clarity” in that regard.

2005In support of their substantive due process claim, challenging the bona fide change of residence rule as impermissibly vague, plaintiffs cite Dumez v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, 334 So.2d 494, 502 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 337 So.2d 225 (La.1976), in which this court held that an LHSAA rule "must stand the test of clarity" in that regard.

1980Co., La.App. 3 Cir., 136 So.2d 288 , this court had occasion to make an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence concerning the question before us.

1965Co., La.App. 3 Cir., 136 So.2d 288 , this court had occasion to make an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence concerning the question before us.

1952The case of Holt v. U. S., 218 U.S. 245 , 31 S.Ct. 2, 6 , 54 L.Ed. 1021 , impresses us as being one of the leading cases on the subject and there the Supreme Court of the United States '■ ruled that “the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his ■ body as evidence when it may be material. * * and it referred to the objection made in the case as being one based upon “an extravagant extension of the 5th Amendment.” In Louisiana it would ap

1952The case of Holt v. U. S., 218 U.S. 245 , 31 S.Ct. 2, 6 , 54 L.Ed. 1021 , impresses us as being one of the leading cases on the subject and there the Supreme Court of the United States '■ ruled that “the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his ■ body as evidence when it may be material. * * and it referred to the objection made in the case as being one based upon “an extravagant extension of the 5th Amendment.” In Louisiana it would ap

2026Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033 , 1046 (9th Cir. 2004); Webb v. Webb, 18-0320, p. 17 (La. 12/5/18), 263 So.3d 321, 332 . 29 Remand Ruling—containing an exhaustive analysis relating to ERISA preemption.

2026Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033 , 1046 (9th Cir. 2004); Webb v. Webb, 18-0320, p. 17 (La. 12/5/18), 263 So.3d 321, 332 . 29 Remand Ruling—containing an exhaustive analysis relating to ERISA preemption.

2012Eagle Pipe, 79 So.3d at 275 .

2009Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); State v. Mahogany, 96-1137 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/30/97) , 694 So.2d 505 .

2009Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); State v. Mahogany, 96-1137 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/30/97) , 694 So.2d 505 .

2009Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); State v. Mahogany, 96-1137 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/30/97) , 694 So.2d 505 .

2009Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); State v. Mahogany, 96-1137 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/30/97) , 694 So.2d 505 .

1995Id. at 801 .

1994In reasons for judgment, the trial court stated: S.T.J. v. P.M., 556 So.2d 244 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1990) is an exhaustive analysis of the law pertinent to Defendant’s exception and it need not be repeated here.

1994Unlike the situation in State v. Jones, 596 So.2d 1360 (La.App. 1st Cir.1992), the trial judge did not conduct an exhaustive inquiry into the jurors’ qualifications and biases thus rendering defendant’s voir dire repetitious.

1960State v. Rose, 147 La. 243 , 84 So. 643 , ‘lewd dancing’; State v. Saibold, 213 La. 415 , 34 So. 2d 909 , 'lewd or lascivious act with the intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires, etc.’; State v. Roth, 226 La. 1 , 74 So.2d 392 , 'sexually indecent’.’’ Counsel for the state, in their original brief, did not challenge this jurisprudence, and concede that the decision in this' case depends entirely on whether the performance of an “act of lewdness or indecency” is sufficiently descriptive to (1) inform the accused with exactness the charge against her, and (2) give her an opportuni

1960State v. Rose, 147 La. 243 , 84 So. 643 , ‘lewd dancing’; State v. Saibold, 213 La. 415 , 34 So. 2d 909 , 'lewd or lascivious act with the intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires, etc.’; State v. Roth, 226 La. 1 , 74 So.2d 392 , 'sexually indecent’.’’ Counsel for the state, in their original brief, did not challenge this jurisprudence, and concede that the decision in this' case depends entirely on whether the performance of an “act of lewdness or indecency” is sufficiently descriptive to (1) inform the accused with exactness the charge against her, and (2) give her an opportuni

1960The trial judge, in quashing the bill of information charging the defendant, Lilly Christine, with obscenity, in violation of RS 14:106(3), gives, in an able and well-considered opinion, an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence of this court on the subj ect matter; and, in concluding that the phrase “Performance * * * of any act of lewdness or indecency” as used in the act and in charging the accused is, taken either alone or in context, so indefinite, vague, and uncertain it renders Paragraph 3 of RS 14:-106 invalid and unenforceable, summarizes the substance of the pertinent jurisprudence

1960The trial judge, in quashing the bill of information charging the defendant, Lilly Christine, with obscenity, in violation of RS 14:106(3), gives, in an able and well-considered opinion, an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence of this court on the subj ect matter; and, in concluding that the phrase “Performance * * * of any act of lewdness or indecency” as used in the act and in charging the accused is, taken either alone or in context, so indefinite, vague, and uncertain it renders Paragraph 3 of RS 14:-106 invalid and unenforceable, summarizes the substance of the pertinent jurisprudence

1960The trial judge, in quashing the bill of information charging the defendant, Lilly Christine, with obscenity, in violation of RS 14:106(3), gives, in an able and well-considered opinion, an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence of this court on the subj ect matter; and, in concluding that the phrase “Performance * * * of any act of lewdness or indecency” as used in the act and in charging the accused is, taken either alone or in context, so indefinite, vague, and uncertain it renders Paragraph 3 of RS 14:-106 invalid and unenforceable, summarizes the substance of the pertinent jurisprudence

1960The trial judge, in quashing the bill of information charging the defendant, Lilly Christine, with obscenity, in violation of RS 14:106(3), gives, in an able and well-considered opinion, an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence of this court on the subj ect matter; and, in concluding that the phrase “Performance * * * of any act of lewdness or indecency” as used in the act and in charging the accused is, taken either alone or in context, so indefinite, vague, and uncertain it renders Paragraph 3 of RS 14:-106 invalid and unenforceable, summarizes the substance of the pertinent jurisprudence

1960The trial judge, in quashing the bill of information charging the defendant, Lilly Christine, with obscenity, in violation of RS 14:106(3), gives, in an able and well-considered opinion, an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence of this court on the subj ect matter; and, in concluding that the phrase “Performance * * * of any act of lewdness or indecency” as used in the act and in charging the accused is, taken either alone or in context, so indefinite, vague, and uncertain it renders Paragraph 3 of RS 14:-106 invalid and unenforceable, summarizes the substance of the pertinent jurisprudence

1960The trial judge, in quashing the bill of information charging the defendant, Lilly Christine, with obscenity, in violation of RS 14:106(3), gives, in an able and well-considered opinion, an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence of this court on the subj ect matter; and, in concluding that the phrase “Performance * * * of any act of lewdness or indecency” as used in the act and in charging the accused is, taken either alone or in context, so indefinite, vague, and uncertain it renders Paragraph 3 of RS 14:-106 invalid and unenforceable, summarizes the substance of the pertinent jurisprudence

1960The trial judge, in quashing the bill of information charging the defendant, Lilly Christine, with obscenity, in violation of RS 14:106(3), gives, in an able and well-considered opinion, an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence of this court on the subj ect matter; and, in concluding that the phrase “Performance * * * of any act of lewdness or indecency” as used in the act and in charging the accused is, taken either alone or in context, so indefinite, vague, and uncertain it renders Paragraph 3 of RS 14:-106 invalid and unenforceable, summarizes the substance of the pertinent jurisprudence

1960The trial judge, in quashing the bill of information charging the defendant, Lilly Christine, with obscenity, in violation of RS 14:106(3), gives, in an able and well-considered opinion, an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence of this court on the subj ect matter; and, in concluding that the phrase “Performance * * * of any act of lewdness or indecency” as used in the act and in charging the accused is, taken either alone or in context, so indefinite, vague, and uncertain it renders Paragraph 3 of RS 14:-106 invalid and unenforceable, summarizes the substance of the pertinent jurisprudence

1960The trial judge, in quashing the bill of information charging the defendant, Lilly Christine, with obscenity, in violation of RS 14:106(3), gives, in an able and well-considered opinion, an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence of this court on the subj ect matter; and, in concluding that the phrase “Performance * * * of any act of lewdness or indecency” as used in the act and in charging the accused is, taken either alone or in context, so indefinite, vague, and uncertain it renders Paragraph 3 of RS 14:-106 invalid and unenforceable, summarizes the substance of the pertinent jurisprudence

1960The trial judge, in quashing the bill of information charging the defendant, Lilly Christine, with obscenity, in violation of RS 14:106(3), gives, in an able and well-considered opinion, an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence of this court on the subj ect matter; and, in concluding that the phrase “Performance * * * of any act of lewdness or indecency” as used in the act and in charging the accused is, taken either alone or in context, so indefinite, vague, and uncertain it renders Paragraph 3 of RS 14:-106 invalid and unenforceable, summarizes the substance of the pertinent jurisprudence

1960The trial judge, in quashing the bill of information charging the defendant, Lilly Christine, with obscenity, in violation of RS 14:106(3), gives, in an able and well-considered opinion, an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence of this court on the subj ect matter; and, in concluding that the phrase “Performance * * * of any act of lewdness or indecency” as used in the act and in charging the accused is, taken either alone or in context, so indefinite, vague, and uncertain it renders Paragraph 3 of RS 14:-106 invalid and unenforceable, summarizes the substance of the pertinent jurisprudence

1960The trial judge, in quashing the bill of information charging the defendant, Lilly Christine, with obscenity, in violation of RS 14:106(3), gives, in an able and well-considered opinion, an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence of this court on the subj ect matter; and, in concluding that the phrase “Performance * * * of any act of lewdness or indecency” as used in the act and in charging the accused is, taken either alone or in context, so indefinite, vague, and uncertain it renders Paragraph 3 of RS 14:-106 invalid and unenforceable, summarizes the substance of the pertinent jurisprudence

1960State v. Rose, 147 La. 243 , 84 So. 643 , ‘lewd dancing’; State v. Saibold, 213 La. 415 , 34 So. 2d 909 , 'lewd or lascivious act with the intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires, etc.’; State v. Roth, 226 La. 1 , 74 So.2d 392 , 'sexually indecent’.’’ Counsel for the state, in their original brief, did not challenge this jurisprudence, and concede that the decision in this' case depends entirely on whether the performance of an “act of lewdness or indecency” is sufficiently descriptive to (1) inform the accused with exactness the charge against her, and (2) give her an opportuni

1960State v. Rose, 147 La. 243 , 84 So. 643 , ‘lewd dancing’; State v. Saibold, 213 La. 415 , 34 So. 2d 909 , 'lewd or lascivious act with the intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires, etc.’; State v. Roth, 226 La. 1 , 74 So.2d 392 , 'sexually indecent’.’’ Counsel for the state, in their original brief, did not challenge this jurisprudence, and concede that the decision in this' case depends entirely on whether the performance of an “act of lewdness or indecency” is sufficiently descriptive to (1) inform the accused with exactness the charge against her, and (2) give her an opportuni

1953See Frost Lumber Industries v. Union Power Co., Inc., 182 La. 439 , 162 So. 37 , containing ’ an exhaustive analysis of prior jurisprudence on the subject; Bremer v. North Central Texas Oil Co., Inc., 185 La. 917 , 171 So. 75 ; Goldsmith v. McCoy, 190 La. 320 , 182 So. 519 ; Spears v. Nesbitt, 197 La. 931 , 2 So.2d 650 .

1953See Frost Lumber Industries v. Union Power Co., Inc., 182 La. 439 , 162 So. 37 , containing ’ an exhaustive analysis of prior jurisprudence on the subject; Bremer v. North Central Texas Oil Co., Inc., 185 La. 917 , 171 So. 75 ; Goldsmith v. McCoy, 190 La. 320 , 182 So. 519 ; Spears v. Nesbitt, 197 La. 931 , 2 So.2d 650 .

1953See Frost Lumber Industries v. Union Power Co., Inc., 182 La. 439 , 162 So. 37 , containing ’ an exhaustive analysis of prior jurisprudence on the subject; Bremer v. North Central Texas Oil Co., Inc., 185 La. 917 , 171 So. 75 ; Goldsmith v. McCoy, 190 La. 320 , 182 So. 519 ; Spears v. Nesbitt, 197 La. 931 , 2 So.2d 650 .

1953See Frost Lumber Industries v. Union Power Co., Inc., 182 La. 439 , 162 So. 37 , containing ’ an exhaustive analysis of prior jurisprudence on the subject; Bremer v. North Central Texas Oil Co., Inc., 185 La. 917 , 171 So. 75 ; Goldsmith v. McCoy, 190 La. 320 , 182 So. 519 ; Spears v. Nesbitt, 197 La. 931 , 2 So.2d 650 .

1953See Frost Lumber Industries v. Union Power Co., Inc., 182 La. 439 , 162 So. 37 , containing ’ an exhaustive analysis of prior jurisprudence on the subject; Bremer v. North Central Texas Oil Co., Inc., 185 La. 917 , 171 So. 75 ; Goldsmith v. McCoy, 190 La. 320 , 182 So. 519 ; Spears v. Nesbitt, 197 La. 931 , 2 So.2d 650 .

1953See Frost Lumber Industries v. Union Power Co., Inc., 182 La. 439 , 162 So. 37 , containing ’ an exhaustive analysis of prior jurisprudence on the subject; Bremer v. North Central Texas Oil Co., Inc., 185 La. 917 , 171 So. 75 ; Goldsmith v. McCoy, 190 La. 320 , 182 So. 519 ; Spears v. Nesbitt, 197 La. 931 , 2 So.2d 650 .

1953In the case of Achee v. Caillouet, 197 La. 313 , 1 So.2d 530 , it was contended', that a mineral lease, for a primary term, extending beyond the date when prescription would have accrued on a mineral servitude affecting the property, signed by both the landowner and the mineral owner, was a joint lease; and as such it constituted an acknowledgment on the part of the landowner, interrupting the prescrip- tion running in his favor.

1953In the case of Achee v. Caillouet, 197 La. 313 , 1 So.2d 530 , it was contended', that a mineral lease, for a primary term, extending beyond the date when prescription would have accrued on a mineral servitude affecting the property, signed by both the landowner and the mineral owner, was a joint lease; and as such it constituted an acknowledgment on the part of the landowner, interrupting the prescrip- tion running in his favor.