exhaustive analysis in Rhode Island

1999However, "the trial justice need not make an exhaustive analysis of the evidence or state all h[er] conclusions as to the weight of the evidence of the witnesses' credibility, but [s]he should at least refer sufficiently to what motivates [her] to rule as [s]he does so that the reviewing court can determine whether [s]he has overlooked or misconceived material evidence on a controlling issue or is otherwise clearly wrong." Morinville v. Morinville , 116 R.I. 507 , 511-12, 359 A.2d 48 , 51 (1976) (citations omitted).

1999However, "the trial justice need not make an exhaustive analysis of the evidence or state all h[er] conclusions as to the weight of the evidence of the witnesses' credibility, but [s]he should at least refer sufficiently to what motivates [her] to rule as [s]he does so that the reviewing court can determine whether [s]he has overlooked or misconceived material evidence on a controlling issue or is otherwise clearly wrong." Morinville v. Morinville , 116 R.I. 507 , 511-12, 359 A.2d 48 , 51 (1976) (citations omitted).

1996In resolving such an issue, “[a] trial justice should state, however briefly, the reasons upon which his ultimate conclusions are based. * * * [His] duty to be factual rather than conclusional * * * ‘does not require an exhaustive analysis of the evidence or a specific statement of all the reasons for his conclusion. * * * Instead, it will suffice if the decision reasonably indicates that he exercised his independent judgment in passing on the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses.’ ” Brum v. Brum, 468 A.2d 924, 926 (R.I.1983) (quoting Smith v. Smith, 119 R.I. 642, 648 ,

1996In resolving such an issue, “[a] trial justice should state, however briefly, the reasons upon which his ultimate conclusions are based. * * * [His] duty to be factual rather than conclusional * * * ‘does not require an exhaustive analysis of the evidence or a specific statement of all the reasons for his conclusion. * * * Instead, it will suffice if the decision reasonably indicates that he exercised his independent judgment in passing on the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses.’ ” Brum v. Brum, 468 A.2d 924, 926 (R.I.1983) (quoting Smith v. Smith, 119 R.I. 642, 648 ,

2016However, this Court previously has acknowledged that, in passing on a motion for a new trial, “the trial justice need not make an exhaustive analysis of all of the evidence upon which he relies,” only that he “refer to the evidence that motivated him to rule as he did.” Juchnik v. Betters, 471 A.2d 222, 223 (R.I.1984).

1985Juchnik v. Betters, R.I., 471 A.2d 222, 223 (1984).

2010The trial justice is not required to provide “an exhaustive analysis of the evidence or a specific statement of all the reasons for his conclusion.” State v. Aurgemma, 116 R.I. 425, 436 , 358 A.2d 46, 52 (1976).

2010The trial justice is not required to provide “an exhaustive analysis of the evidence or a specific statement of all the reasons for his conclusion.” State v. Aurgemma, 116 R.I. 425, 436 , 358 A.2d 46, 52 (1976).

1996In resolving such an issue, “[a] trial justice should state, however briefly, the reasons upon which his ultimate conclusions are based. * * * [His] duty to be factual rather than conclusional * * * ‘does not require an exhaustive analysis of the evidence or a specific statement of all the reasons for his conclusion. * * * Instead, it will suffice if the decision reasonably indicates that he exercised his independent judgment in passing on the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses.’ ” Brum v. Brum, 468 A.2d 924, 926 (R.I.1983) (quoting Smith v. Smith, 119 R.I. 642, 648 ,

1991Section 15-5-16(a) provides in pertinent part: “The decree may be made retroactive in the court’s discretion to the date that the court finds that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred; provided however, the court shall set forth in its decision the specific findings of fact which show a substantial change in circumstances and upon which findings of facts the court has decided to make the decree retroactive.” This court has recognized that specific findings of fact do “not require an exhaustive analysis of the evidence or a specific statement of all the reasons for [the judge’s] c

2007Furthermore, while the trial justice "need not perform an exhaustive analysis of the evidence, he or she should refer with some specificity to the facts which prompted him or her to make the decision so that the reviewing court can determine whether error was committed." Reccko v. Criss Cadillac Co., Inc. , 610 A.2d 542 , 545 (R.I. 1992) (citing Zarrella v. Robinson , 460 A.2d 415 , 418 (R.I. 1983)).

2007Furthermore, while the trial justice "need not perform an exhaustive analysis of the evidence, he or she should refer with some specificity to the facts which prompted him or her to make the decision so that the reviewing court can determine whether error was committed." Reccko v. Criss Cadillac Co., Inc. , 610 A.2d 542 , 545 (R.I. 1992) (citing Zarrella v. Robinson , 460 A.2d 415 , 418 (R.I. 1983)).

2011See State v. Tate, 109 R.I. 586, 588-89 , 288 A.2d 494, 496 (1972) (“[W]e give a trial justice wide latitude with respect to the form of his decis ion, and we have never insisted that it be lengthy or that it contain an exhaustive analysis of the evidence, or that it literally tag the testimony of each witness as ‘credible’ or ‘incredible.’ ”).

2011See State v. Tate, 109 R.I. 586, 588-89 , 288 A.2d 494, 496 (1972) (“[W]e give a trial justice wide latitude with respect to the form of his decis ion, and we have never insisted that it be lengthy or that it contain an exhaustive analysis of the evidence, or that it literally tag the testimony of each witness as ‘credible’ or ‘incredible.’ ”).

1984Dixon v. Royal Cab, Inc., 121 R.I. 110, 120 , 396 A.2d 930, 935 (1979).

1984Dixon v. Royal Cab, Inc., 121 R.I. 110, 120 , 396 A.2d 930, 935 (1979).