exhaustive analysis in Arkansas

1999Agency v. Desiderata, Inc., 331 Ark. 144 , 958 S.W.2d 7 (1998) (approving the rule adopted by the court of appeals in Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 6 Ark.App. 333 , 641 S.W.2d 723 (1982) that even though the Workers' Compensation Commission may not have authority to declare statutes unconstitutional, such constitutional issues should first be raised at the Administrative Law Judge or Commission level, because such issues often require an exhaustive analysis that is best accomplished by an adversary proceeding, which can only be done at the hearing level).

1999Agency v. Desiderata, Inc., 331 Ark. 144 , 958 S.W.2d 7 (1998) (approving the rule adopted by the court of appeals in Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 6 Ark.App. 333 , 641 S.W.2d 723 (1982) that even though the Workers' Compensation Commission may not have authority to declare statutes unconstitutional, such constitutional issues should first be raised at the Administrative Law Judge or Commission level, because such issues often require an exhaustive analysis that is best accomplished by an adversary proceeding, which can only be done at the hearing level).

2012In awarding attorney’s fees, the circuit court may use its own experience as a guide Rand can consider the types of factors set forth in Chrisco v. Sun Industries, Inc., 304 Ark. 227 , 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990). 1 The court need not, however, conduct an exhaustive hearing on the amount of attorney’s fees because it has presided over the proceedings and gained familiarity with the case and the services rendered by the attorney.

2012In awarding attorney’s fees, the circuit court may use its own experience as a guide Rand can consider the types of factors set forth in Chrisco v. Sun Industries, Inc., 304 Ark. 227 , 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990). 1 The court need not, however, conduct an exhaustive hearing on the amount of attorney’s fees because it has presided over the proceedings and gained familiarity with the case and the services rendered by the attorney.

2020Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224 , 309 S.W.3d 179 . 13

2020Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224 , 309 S.W.3d 179 . 13

2019The company relies on Payne v. Donaldson, 2011 Ark. App. 467 , 385 S.W.3d 296 to support the court’s decision.

2019The company relies on Payne v. Donaldson, 2011 Ark. App. 467 , 385 S.W.3d 296 to support the court’s decision.

2014Some pertinent legal principles quoted in Dupwe are particularly appropriate and relevant to our analysis: The best beginning point in our analysis is Muncrief [v. Green, 251 Ark. 580 , 473 S.W.2d 907 (1971) ] where this court stated that the appellee in that case was asserting judicial estoppel, “by which a party may be prevented from taking inconsistent position in successive cases with the same adversary.” [[Image here]] In discussing judicial estoppel in Daley [v. City of Little Rock, 36 Ark.App. 80 , 818 S.W.2d 259 (1991)], the court of appeals cited to Rinke [v. Weedman, 232 Ark. 900 , 3

2014Some pertinent legal principles quoted in Dupwe are particularly appropriate and relevant to our analysis: The best beginning point in our analysis is Muncrief [v. Green, 251 Ark. 580 , 473 S.W.2d 907 (1971) ] where this court stated that the appellee in that case was asserting judicial estoppel, “by which a party may be prevented from taking inconsistent position in successive cases with the same adversary.” [[Image here]] In discussing judicial estoppel in Daley [v. City of Little Rock, 36 Ark.App. 80 , 818 S.W.2d 259 (1991)], the court of appeals cited to Rinke [v. Weedman, 232 Ark. 900 , 3

2014Some pertinent legal principles quoted in Dupwe are particularly appropriate and relevant to our analysis: The best beginning point in our analysis is Muncrief [v. Green, 251 Ark. 580 , 473 S.W.2d 907 (1971) ] where this court stated that the appellee in that case was asserting judicial estoppel, “by which a party may be prevented from taking inconsistent position in successive cases with the same adversary.” [[Image here]] In discussing judicial estoppel in Daley [v. City of Little Rock, 36 Ark.App. 80 , 818 S.W.2d 259 (1991)], the court of appeals cited to Rinke [v. Weedman, 232 Ark. 900 , 3

2014Some pertinent legal principles quoted in Dupwe are particularly appropriate and relevant to our analysis: The best beginning point in our analysis is Muncrief [v. Green, 251 Ark. 580 , 473 S.W.2d 907 (1971) ] where this court stated that the appellee in that case was asserting judicial estoppel, “by which a party may be prevented from taking inconsistent position in successive cases with the same adversary.” [[Image here]] In discussing judicial estoppel in Daley [v. City of Little Rock, 36 Ark.App. 80 , 818 S.W.2d 259 (1991)], the court of appeals cited to Rinke [v. Weedman, 232 Ark. 900 , 3

2014Some pertinent legal principles quoted in Dupwe are particularly appropriate and relevant to our analysis: The best beginning point in our analysis is Muncrief [v. Green, 251 Ark. 580 , 473 S.W.2d 907 (1971) ] where this court stated that the appellee in that case was asserting judicial estoppel, “by which a party may be prevented from taking inconsistent position in successive cases with the same adversary.” [[Image here]] In discussing judicial estoppel in Daley [v. City of Little Rock, 36 Ark.App. 80 , 818 S.W.2d 259 (1991)], the court of appeals cited to Rinke [v. Weedman, 232 Ark. 900 , 3

2014Some pertinent legal principles quoted in Dupwe are particularly appropriate and relevant to our analysis: The best beginning point in our analysis is Muncrief [v. Green, 251 Ark. 580 , 473 S.W.2d 907 (1971) ] where this court stated that the appellee in that case was asserting judicial estoppel, “by which a party may be prevented from taking inconsistent position in successive cases with the same adversary.” [[Image here]] In discussing judicial estoppel in Daley [v. City of Little Rock, 36 Ark.App. 80 , 818 S.W.2d 259 (1991)], the court of appeals cited to Rinke [v. Weedman, 232 Ark. 900 , 3

2014Some pertinent legal principles quoted in Dupwe are particularly appropriate and relevant to our analysis: The best beginning point in our analysis is Muncrief [v. Green, 251 Ark. 580 , 473 S.W.2d 907 (1971) ] where this court stated that the appellee in that case was asserting judicial estoppel, “by which a party may be prevented from taking inconsistent position in successive cases with the same adversary.” [[Image here]] In discussing judicial estoppel in Daley [v. City of Little Rock, 36 Ark.App. 80 , 818 S.W.2d 259 (1991)], the court of appeals cited to Rinke [v. Weedman, 232 Ark. 900 , 3

2011Stout, supra; Paulson v. Paulson, 8 Ark.

1998The Hamilton court concluded that requiring constitutional issues to be considered by the Commission can assure such issues will be thoroughly developed before an appellate court is asked to rule on a statute’s validity. 2 The rule in Hamilton has been consistendy followed by the court of appeals, see Green v. Smith & Scott Logging, 54 Ark.

1993The relationship between the cross-employee exclusionary clause and the severability of interest clause was the subject of an exhaustive analysis by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Barnette v. Hartford Insurance Group, 653 P.2d 1375 (Wyo. 1982).

1993As noted by the majority, the policy excludes coverage for injury to "any fellow employee of the insured." The effect of this cross-employee exclusionary clause, by its terms, depends upon the definition of "insured." However, the definition of "insured" contained in the policy incorporates a severability of interest clause which provides that the "coverage applies separately to each insured who is seeking coverage or against whom a claim or `suit' is brought." The relationship between the cross-employee exclusionary clause and the severability of interest clause was the subject of an exhausti

1983Lytle v. Lytle, supra; Pitcher v. Baltz, 242 Ark. 625 , 414 S.W.2d 859 (1967).

1983Lytle v. Lytle, supra; Pitcher v. Baltz, 242 Ark. 625 , 414 S.W.2d 859 (1967).

1937As the trusts of this class are imposed by equity, contrary to the trustee’s intention and will, upon property in his hands, they are often termed trusts in invitwn; and this phrase furnished a criterion, generally accurate and sufficient, for determining what trusts are truly ‘ constructive. ’ An exhaustive analysis would show, I think, that all instances of constructive trusts, properly so-called, may be referred to what equity denominates fraud, either actual or constructive, as an essential element, and as their final source. ’ ’ And, again, in Edlin v. Moser in 176 Ark. 1107 , 5 S. W. (2d

1937As the trusts of this class are imposed by equity, contrary to the trustee’s intention and will, upon property in his hands, they are often termed trusts in invitwn; and this phrase furnished a criterion, generally accurate and sufficient, for determining what trusts are truly ‘ constructive. ’ An exhaustive analysis would show, I think, that all instances of constructive trusts, properly so-called, may be referred to what equity denominates fraud, either actual or constructive, as an essential element, and as their final source. ’ ’ And, again, in Edlin v. Moser in 176 Ark. 1107 , 5 S. W. (2d

1937As the trusts of this class are imposed by equity, contrary to the trustee’s intention and will, upon property in his hands, they are often termed trusts in invitwn; and this phrase furnished a criterion, generally accurate and sufficient, for determining what trusts are truly ‘ constructive. ’ An exhaustive analysis would show, I think, that all instances of constructive trusts, properly so-called, may be referred to what equity denominates fraud, either actual or constructive, as an essential element, and as their final source. ’ ’ And, again, in Edlin v. Moser in 176 Ark. 1107 , 5 S. W. (2d

1937As the trusts of this class are imposed by equity, contrary to the trustee’s intention and will, upon property in his hands, they are often termed trusts in invitwn; and this phrase furnished a criterion, generally accurate and sufficient, for determining what trusts are truly ‘ constructive. ’ An exhaustive analysis would show, I think, that all instances of constructive trusts, properly so-called, may be referred to what equity denominates fraud, either actual or constructive, as an essential element, and as their final source. ’ ’ And, again, in Edlin v. Moser in 176 Ark. 1107 , 5 S. W. (2d

1937As the trusts of this class are imposed by equity, contrary to the trustee’s intention and will, upon property in his hands, they are often termed trusts in invitwn; and this phrase furnished a criterion, generally accurate and sufficient, for determining what trusts are truly ‘ constructive. ’ An exhaustive analysis would show, I think, that all instances of constructive trusts, properly so-called, may be referred to what equity denominates fraud, either actual or constructive, as an essential element, and as their final source. ’ ’ And, again, in Edlin v. Moser in 176 Ark. 1107 , 5 S. W. (2d

1937As the trusts of this class are imposed by equity, contrary to the trustee’s intention and will, upon property in his hands, they are often termed trusts in invitwn; and this phrase furnished a criterion, generally accurate and sufficient, for determining what trusts are truly ‘ constructive. ’ An exhaustive analysis would show, I think, that all instances of constructive trusts, properly so-called, may be referred to what equity denominates fraud, either actual or constructive, as an essential element, and as their final source. ’ ’ And, again, in Edlin v. Moser in 176 Ark. 1107 , 5 S. W. (2d

1926Even in that single class where equity proceeds upon the maxim that an intention to fulfill an obligation should be imputed, and assumes that the purchaser intended to act in pursuance of his fiduciary duty, the notion of fraud is not invoked, simply because it is not absolutely necessary under the circumstances; the existence of the trust in all cases of this class might be referred to constructive fraud. * * * Certain species of the constructive trusts arise from actual fraud'; many others spring from the violation of some positive fiduciary obligation ; in all the remaining instances there

1926Even in that single class where equity proceeds upon the maxim that an intention to fulfill an obligation should be imputed, and assumes that the purchaser intended to act in pursuance of his fiduciary duty, the notion of fraud is not invoked, simply because it is not absolutely necessary under the circumstances; the existence of the trust in all cases of this class might be referred to constructive fraud. * * * Certain species of the constructive trusts arise from actual fraud'; many others spring from the violation of some positive fiduciary obligation ; in all the remaining instances there

1926Even in that single class where equity proceeds upon the maxim that an intention to fulfill an obligation should be imputed, and assumes that the purchaser intended to act in pursuance of his fiduciary duty, the notion of fraud is not invoked, simply because it is not absolutely necessary under the circumstances; the existence of the trust in all cases of this class might be referred to constructive fraud. * * * Certain species of the constructive trusts arise from actual fraud'; many others spring from the violation of some positive fiduciary obligation ; in all the remaining instances there