prudential doctrine in Arizona

2020See, e.g., Dobson, 233 Ariz. at 122 ¶ 9 (“[S]tanding is not jurisdictional, but instead is a prudential doctrine.”); Bennett v. Napolitano, 206 Ariz. 520 , 524 ¶ 16, 529 ¶ 41 (2003) (declining review on the merits for lack of standing).

2015But more importantly, the County’s argument incorrectly conflates standing, which is a prudential doctrine by which courts eschew deciding issues when the plaintiff fails to allege a sufficient injury, see e.g., Bennett v. Napolitano, 206 Ariz. 520 , 524 ¶ 16, 81 P.3d 311, 315 (2003), with the question of who is statutorily authorized, as an “interested person,” to file objections in an ADWR administrative proceeding under § 45-172(A). 1130 The County cites A.R.S. § 11-269.09(A) for the proposition that ADWR must consult and coordinate with the County before deciding on the applications.

2024See Bennett v. Brownlow, 211 Ariz. 193 , 195–96, ¶¶ 14–15 (2005); see also Dobson v. State, 233 Ariz. 119, 122, ¶ 9 (2013) (“Under Arizona’s Constitution, standing is not jurisdictional, but instead is a prudential doctrine . . . .”). ¶68 Plaintiffs argue that they did allege “distinct, palpable and individualized injuries”—that CAP and FEC, fearing unchecked enforcement actions by the Commission, have been forced to allocate resources to ensure compliance and possibly “refrain from speaking [al]together.” But beyond these generalized assertions, Plaintiffs have identified no enforcement actio

2021See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (“[T]he constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts . . . .”); Dobson v. State, 233 Ariz. 119, 122 (2013) (“Under Arizona’s constitution, standing is not jurisdictional, but instead is a prudential doctrine requiring ‘a litigant seeking relief in Arizona courts [to] first establish standing to sue.’ By contrast, in federal court, standing requirements are rooted in Article III of the United States Constitution, which limits jurisdiction to ‘cases or controversies.’ Arizona’s Constitution has no counterpart ‘case or controversy’ requireme

2023“The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be free from ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’ but it is silent about how this right is to be enforced.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 230–31 (2011). ¶38 “The exclusionary rule, which allows suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, is a prudential doctrine invoked to deter future violations.” Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. at 308–09, ¶ 31.

2019State v. Havatone , 241 Ariz. 506 , 509 ¶ 11, 389 P.3d 1251 , 1254 (2017). ¶6 "The exclusionary rule, which allows suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, is a prudential doctrine invoked [solely] to deter future violations." Valenzuela II , 239 Ariz. at 308-09 ¶ 31, 371 P.3d at 636-37 (citing Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 236-37, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) ).

2019Winkle v. City of Tucson, 190 Ariz. 413, 415 (1997).

2019Winkle v. City of Tucson, 190 Ariz. 413, 415 (1997).

2019See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134 , 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The constitutional component of the ripeness inquiry is often treated under the rubric of standing and, in many cases, ripeness coincides squarely with standing’s injury in fact prong.”); Town of Gilbert v. Maricopa Cty., 213 Ariz. 241 , 244 ¶ 8 (App. 2006) (stating that “[r]ipeness is analogous to standing”). ¶36 Ripeness is a prudential doctrine that prevents a court from rendering a premature decision on an issue that may never arise.

2019See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134 , 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The constitutional component of the ripeness inquiry is often treated under the rubric of standing and, in many cases, ripeness coincides squarely with standing’s injury in fact prong.”); Town of Gilbert v. Maricopa Cty., 213 Ariz. 241 , 244 ¶ 8 (App. 2006) (stating that “[r]ipeness is analogous to standing”). ¶36 Ripeness is a prudential doctrine that prevents a court from rendering a premature decision on an issue that may never arise.

2023“The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be free from ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’ but it is silent about how this right is to be enforced.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 230–31 (2011). ¶38 “The exclusionary rule, which allows suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, is a prudential doctrine invoked to deter future violations.” Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. at 308–09, ¶ 31.

2019State v. Havatone , 241 Ariz. 506 , 509 ¶ 11, 389 P.3d 1251 , 1254 (2017). ¶6 "The exclusionary rule, which allows suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, is a prudential doctrine invoked [solely] to deter future violations." Valenzuela II , 239 Ariz. at 308-09 ¶ 31, 371 P.3d at 636-37 (citing Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 236-37, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) ).

2025See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 209 Ariz. 544, n.9 (2005).

2025See Fay, 251 Ariz. at 541 ¶ 22.

2024See Bennett v. Brownlow, 211 Ariz. 193 , 195–96, ¶¶ 14–15 (2005); see also Dobson v. State, 233 Ariz. 119, 122, ¶ 9 (2013) (“Under Arizona’s Constitution, standing is not jurisdictional, but instead is a prudential doctrine . . . .”). ¶68 Plaintiffs argue that they did allege “distinct, palpable and individualized injuries”—that CAP and FEC, fearing unchecked enforcement actions by the Commission, have been forced to allocate resources to ensure compliance and possibly “refrain from speaking [al]together.” But beyond these generalized assertions, Plaintiffs have identified no enforcement actio

2024See Davis, 564 U.S. at 236 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)); Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. at 308–09 ¶ 31.

2021See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (“[T]he constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts . . . .”); Dobson v. State, 233 Ariz. 119, 122 (2013) (“Under Arizona’s constitution, standing is not jurisdictional, but instead is a prudential doctrine requiring ‘a litigant seeking relief in Arizona courts [to] first establish standing to sue.’ By contrast, in federal court, standing requirements are rooted in Article III of the United States Constitution, which limits jurisdiction to ‘cases or controversies.’ Arizona’s Constitution has no counterpart ‘case or controversy’ requireme

2020And, despite differences between federal and state standing requirements, we “have previously found federal case law instructive.” Bennett, 206 Ariz. at 525 ¶ 22; see also Dobson, 233 Ariz. at 122 9 Arizonans For Second Chances, et al. v. Hobbs Opinion of the Court ¶ 9 (“[T]his Court is informed, but not bound, by federal standing jurisprudence.”). ¶23 To establish standing, a party must first establish “a causal nexus between the defendant’s conduct and [their] injury.” Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82 , 91–92 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 1992)); see Be

2020And, despite differences between federal and state standing requirements, we “have previously found federal case law instructive.” Bennett, 206 Ariz. at 525 ¶ 22; see also Dobson, 233 Ariz. at 122 9 Arizonans For Second Chances, et al. v. Hobbs Opinion of the Court ¶ 9 (“[T]his Court is informed, but not bound, by federal standing jurisprudence.”). ¶23 To establish standing, a party must first establish “a causal nexus between the defendant’s conduct and [their] injury.” Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82 , 91–92 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 1992)); see Be

2020And, despite differences between federal and state standing requirements, we “have previously found federal case law instructive.” Bennett, 206 Ariz. at 525 ¶ 22; see also Dobson, 233 Ariz. at 122 9 Arizonans For Second Chances, et al. v. Hobbs Opinion of the Court ¶ 9 (“[T]his Court is informed, but not bound, by federal standing jurisprudence.”). ¶23 To establish standing, a party must first establish “a causal nexus between the defendant’s conduct and [their] injury.” Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82 , 91–92 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 1992)); see Be

2019"Exclusion is 'not a personal constitutional right,' nor is it designed to 'redress the injury' occasioned by an unconstitutional search." Davis , 564 U.S. at 236 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (quoting Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. 465 , 486, 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) ).

2019"Exclusion is 'not a personal constitutional right,' nor is it designed to 'redress the injury' occasioned by an unconstitutional search." Davis , 564 U.S. at 236 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (quoting Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. 465 , 486, 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) ).

2019E.g., Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. at 308-09 , ¶ 31 , 371 P.3d at 636-37 ("the exclusionary *975 rule ... is a prudential doctrine invoked to deter future violations."); Mitchell , 234 Ariz. at 419 , ¶ 31 , 323 P.3d at 78 ("the exclusionary rule ... incentivizes law enforcement to err on the side of constitutional behavior."); Booker , 212 Ariz. at 504 , ¶ 11 , 135 P.3d at 59 ("when there is no cognitive nexus between the police misconduct and the crime for which the defendant is ultimately tried, the exclusionary rule's primary deterrent purpose is not served.").

2019E.g., Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. at 308-09 , ¶ 31 , 371 P.3d at 636-37 ("the exclusionary *975 rule ... is a prudential doctrine invoked to deter future violations."); Mitchell , 234 Ariz. at 419 , ¶ 31 , 323 P.3d at 78 ("the exclusionary rule ... incentivizes law enforcement to err on the side of constitutional behavior."); Booker , 212 Ariz. at 504 , ¶ 11 , 135 P.3d at 59 ("when there is no cognitive nexus between the police misconduct and the crime for which the defendant is ultimately tried, the exclusionary rule's primary deterrent purpose is not served.").

2019E.g., Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. at 308-09 , ¶ 31 , 371 P.3d at 636-37 ("the exclusionary *975 rule ... is a prudential doctrine invoked to deter future violations."); Mitchell , 234 Ariz. at 419 , ¶ 31 , 323 P.3d at 78 ("the exclusionary rule ... incentivizes law enforcement to err on the side of constitutional behavior."); Booker , 212 Ariz. at 504 , ¶ 11 , 135 P.3d at 59 ("when there is no cognitive nexus between the police misconduct and the crime for which the defendant is ultimately tried, the exclusionary rule's primary deterrent purpose is not served.").

2019E.g., Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. at 308-09 , ¶ 31 , 371 P.3d at 636-37 ("the exclusionary *975 rule ... is a prudential doctrine invoked to deter future violations."); Mitchell , 234 Ariz. at 419 , ¶ 31 , 323 P.3d at 78 ("the exclusionary rule ... incentivizes law enforcement to err on the side of constitutional behavior."); Booker , 212 Ariz. at 504 , ¶ 11 , 135 P.3d at 59 ("when there is no cognitive nexus between the police misconduct and the crime for which the defendant is ultimately tried, the exclusionary rule's primary deterrent purpose is not served.").

2018See Stillman, supra at 1299 (stating that the plurality opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer , 541 U.S. 267 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 , 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004), was "unique" in that "it relied on the lack of judicially discernible and manageable standards as an independently sufficient rationale" under the political question doctrine "without any genuine argument that the issue was textually committed to a coordinate federal branch"); see also Nixon , 506 U.S. at 228-30 , 113 S.Ct. 732 (holding that the question was non-justiciable because it was textually delegated to another branch and reasoning that "the us

2018See Stillman, supra at 1299 (stating that the plurality opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer , 541 U.S. 267 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 , 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004), was "unique" in that "it relied on the lack of judicially discernible and manageable standards as an independently sufficient rationale" under the political question doctrine "without any genuine argument that the issue was textually committed to a coordinate federal branch"); see also Nixon , 506 U.S. at 228-30 , 113 S.Ct. 732 (holding that the question was non-justiciable because it was textually delegated to another branch and reasoning that "the us

2018“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).

2018See, e.g., Kromko, 216 Ariz. at 192–93 ¶¶ 11–12 (citing to United States Supreme Court case law and the “federal political question doctrine”).

2018MAESTAS JUSTICE BOLICK, concurring textually committed to a coordinate federal branch”); see also Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–30 (holding that the question was non-justiciable because it was textually delegated to another branch and reasoning that “the use of the word ‘try’ in the first sentence of the Impeachment Trial Clause lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of review of the Senate’s actions”). ¶34 This Court applied the prudential requirement doctrine to hold an issue non-justiciable in Kromko, 216 Ariz. at 194 ¶ 21.

2018MAESTAS JUSTICE BOLICK, concurring textually committed to a coordinate federal branch”); see also Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–30 (holding that the question was non-justiciable because it was textually delegated to another branch and reasoning that “the use of the word ‘try’ in the first sentence of the Impeachment Trial Clause lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of review of the Senate’s actions”). ¶34 This Court applied the prudential requirement doctrine to hold an issue non-justiciable in Kromko, 216 Ariz. at 194 ¶ 21.

2018Id. at 193 ¶¶ 13-14, 194 ¶ 21, 165 P.3d at 171, 172 . ¶ 35 Whether the prudential requirement standing alone renders an issue non-justiciable thus remains an open question.