prudential doctrine in Michigan

2023In contrast, “[a] motion for summary disposition asserting as its basis the doctrine of standing invokes a prudential doctrine that focuses on whether a litigant is a proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.” Pontiac Police & Fire Retiree Prefunded Group Health & Ins Trust Bd of Trustees v Pontiac No 2, 309 Mich App 611, 620-621 ; 873 NW2d 783 (2015), quoting Lansing Sch Educ Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Educ, 487 Mich 349, 355 ; 792 NW2d 686 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2022In doing so, the panel rejected the appellees’ argument that they could rely on the prudential standard for standing adopted in Lansing Sch, 487 Mich 349 , because the appellees had appealed a zoning board of appeals’ decision under the MZEA rather than commencing an original action.

2023In contrast, “[a] motion for summary disposition asserting as its basis the doctrine of standing invokes a prudential doctrine that focuses on whether a litigant is a proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.” Pontiac Police & Fire Retiree Prefunded Group Health & Ins Trust Bd of Trustees v Pontiac No 2, 309 Mich App 611, 620 ; 873 NW2d 783 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2023In contrast, “[a] motion for summary disposition asserting as its basis the doctrine of standing invokes a prudential doctrine that focuses on whether a litigant is a proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.” Pontiac Police & Fire Retiree Prefunded Group Health & Ins Trust Bd of Trustees v Pontiac No 2, 309 Mich App 611, 620 ; 873 NW2d 783 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2022Olsen, 325 Mich App at 193 . 2.

2022Olsen, 325 Mich App at 193 . 2.

2023In contrast, “[a] motion for summary disposition asserting as its basis the doctrine of standing invokes a prudential doctrine that focuses on whether a litigant is a proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.” Pontiac Police & Fire Retiree Prefunded Group Health & Ins Trust Bd of Trustees v Pontiac No 2, 309 Mich App 611, 620-621 ; 873 NW2d 783 (2015), quoting Lansing Sch Educ Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Educ, 487 Mich 349, 355 ; 792 NW2d 686 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2015A motion for summary disposition asserting as its basis the doctrine of standing invokes a prudential doctrine that “focuses on whether a litigant ‘is a proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.’ ” Lansing *621 Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 355 ; 792 NW2d 686 (2010) (citation omitted).

2007See Hein v Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc,_US_; 127 S Ct 2553 ; 168 L Ed 2d 424 (2007) (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment) (criticizing earlier Supreme Court cases that described the prohibition on generalized grievances as merely a prudential bar rather than an Article III standing consideration and characterizing Warth as the “fountainhead” of this dicta).

2007See Hein v Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc,_US_; 127 S Ct 2553 ; 168 L Ed 2d 424 (2007) (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment) (criticizing earlier Supreme Court cases that described the prohibition on generalized grievances as merely a prudential bar rather than an Article III standing consideration and characterizing Warth as the “fountainhead” of this dicta).

2007See also Cuno, 126 S Ct at 1867 (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press.”); Laidlaw, 528 US at 185 (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.”). 52 405 US 727 ; 92 S Ct 1361 ; 31 L Ed 2d 636 (1972). 53 Warth, 422 US at 501 . 25 plaintiffs met the threshold standing requirements to bring suit against the defendants.

2007See also Cuno, 126 S Ct at 1867 (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press.”); Laidlaw, 528 US at 185 (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.”). 52 405 US 727 ; 92 S Ct 1361 ; 31 L Ed 2d 636 (1972). 53 Warth, 422 US at 501 . 25 plaintiffs met the threshold standing requirements to bring suit against the defendants.

2024No such pecuniary interest exists between a condominium association and a condominium co- owner. 11 same proposition, hardly fulfills this Court’s role as “the principal steward of Michigan’s common law[.]” 29 “Our role [as principal steward] is ‘to determine which common-law rules best serve the interests of Michigan citizens.’ ” 30 “More particularly, our role . . . is to determine the ‘prevailing customs and practices of the people’ in this state.” 31 Indeed, this Court has acknowledged the prudential principle that we must “exercise caution and . . . defer to the Legislature when called up

2024House Speaker v Governor, 443 Mich 560, 574 ; 506 NW2d 190 (1993), citing Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996 , -10- 998; 100 S Ct 533 ; 62 L Ed 2d 428 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring), citing Baker, 369 US at 217 .

2024House Speaker v Governor, 443 Mich 560, 574 ; 506 NW2d 190 (1993), citing Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996 , -10- 998; 100 S Ct 533 ; 62 L Ed 2d 428 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring), citing Baker, 369 US at 217 .

2024House Speaker v Governor, 443 Mich 560, 574 ; 506 NW2d 190 (1993), citing Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996 , -10- 998; 100 S Ct 533 ; 62 L Ed 2d 428 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring), citing Baker, 369 US at 217 .

2024House Speaker v Governor, 443 Mich 560, 574 ; 506 NW2d 190 (1993), citing Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996 , -10- 998; 100 S Ct 533 ; 62 L Ed 2d 428 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring), citing Baker, 369 US at 217 .

2024House Speaker v Governor, 443 Mich 560, 574 ; 506 NW2d 190 (1993), citing Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996 , -10- 998; 100 S Ct 533 ; 62 L Ed 2d 428 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring), citing Baker, 369 US at 217 .

2024No such pecuniary interest exists between a condominium association and a condominium co- owner. 11 same proposition, hardly fulfills this Court’s role as “the principal steward of Michigan’s common law[.]” 29 “Our role [as principal steward] is ‘to determine which common-law rules best serve the interests of Michigan citizens.’ ” 30 “More particularly, our role . . . is to determine the ‘prevailing customs and practices of the people’ in this state.” 31 Indeed, this Court has acknowledged the prudential principle that we must “exercise caution and . . . defer to the Legislature when called up

2024No such pecuniary interest exists between a condominium association and a condominium co- owner. 11 same proposition, hardly fulfills this Court’s role as “the principal steward of Michigan’s common law[.]” 29 “Our role [as principal steward] is ‘to determine which common-law rules best serve the interests of Michigan citizens.’ ” 30 “More particularly, our role . . . is to determine the ‘prevailing customs and practices of the people’ in this state.” 31 Indeed, this Court has acknowledged the prudential principle that we must “exercise caution and . . . defer to the Legislature when called up

2024No such pecuniary interest exists between a condominium association and a condominium co- owner. 11 same proposition, hardly fulfills this Court’s role as “the principal steward of Michigan’s common law[.]” 29 “Our role [as principal steward] is ‘to determine which common-law rules best serve the interests of Michigan citizens.’ ” 30 “More particularly, our role . . . is to determine the ‘prevailing customs and practices of the people’ in this state.” 31 Indeed, this Court has acknowledged the prudential principle that we must “exercise caution and . . . defer to the Legislature when called up

2024No such pecuniary interest exists between a condominium association and a condominium co- owner. 11 same proposition, hardly fulfills this Court’s role as “the principal steward of Michigan’s common law[.]” 29 “Our role [as principal steward] is ‘to determine which common-law rules best serve the interests of Michigan citizens.’ ” 30 “More particularly, our role . . . is to determine the ‘prevailing customs and practices of the people’ in this state.” 31 Indeed, this Court has acknowledged the prudential principle that we must “exercise caution and . . . defer to the Legislature when called up

2021Davis v United States, 564 US 229, 236 ; 131 S Ct 2419 ; 180 L Ed 2d 285 (2011); People v Hill, 299 Mich App 402, 412 ; 829 NW2d 908 (2013). “[A]pplication of the exclusionary rule is inappropriate in the absence of governmental misconduct.” Frazier, 478 Mich at 250 .

2021Davis v United States, 564 US 229, 236 ; 131 S Ct 2419 ; 180 L Ed 2d 285 (2011); People v Hill, 299 Mich App 402, 412 ; 829 NW2d 908 (2013). “[A]pplication of the exclusionary rule is inappropriate in the absence of governmental misconduct.” Frazier, 478 Mich at 250 .

2021Davis v United States, 564 US 229, 236 ; 131 S Ct 2419 ; 180 L Ed 2d 285 (2011); People v Hill, 299 Mich App 402, 412 ; 829 NW2d 908 (2013). “[A]pplication of the exclusionary rule is inappropriate in the absence of governmental misconduct.” Frazier, 478 Mich at 250 .

2021“Although absolute impossibility is not required, there must be a showing of impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss involved.” Roberts, 275 Mich App at 74 .

2013We are “bound by the rule of stare decisis to follow the decisions of our Supreme Court.” Tenneco Inc v Amerisure Mut Ins Co, 281 Mich App 429, 447 ; 761 NW2d 846 (2008).

2013We are “bound by the rule of stare decisis to follow the decisions of our Supreme Court.” Tenneco Inc v Amerisure Mut Ins Co, 281 Mich App 429, 447 ; 761 NW2d 846 (2008).

2007Thus, standing could, throughout the history of Michigan, be altered by statutes such as MCL 129.61. [10] Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

2007Thus, standing could, throughout the history of Michigan, be altered by statutes such as MCL 129.61. [10] Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

2007The prudential test requires “a demonstration that the plaintiffs substantial interest will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large.” House Speaker, supra at 554 .

2007The prudential test requires "a demonstration that the plaintiff's substantial interest will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large." House Speaker, supra at 554, 495 N.W.2d 539 .

2006The authorities of a hospital necessarily and naturally endeavor to their 28 Derderian v Genesys Health Care Sys, 263 Mich App 364, 376-377 ; 689 NW2d 145 (2004), lv den 474 Mich 955 (2005). 29 See id.

2006The authorities of a hospital necessarily and naturally endeavor to their 28 Derderian v Genesys Health Care Sys, 263 Mich App 364, 376-377 ; 689 NW2d 145 (2004), lv den 474 Mich 955 (2005). 29 See id.

2006The authorities of a hospital necessarily and naturally endeavor to their 28 Derderian v Genesys Health Care Sys, 263 Mich App 364, 376-377 ; 689 NW2d 145 (2004), lv den 474 Mich 955 (2005). 29 See id.

2006The authorities of a hospital necessarily and naturally endeavor to their 28 Derderian v Genesys Health Care Sys, 263 Mich App 364, 376-377 ; 689 NW2d 145 (2004), lv den 474 Mich 955 (2005). 29 See id.

2006In both In re Midland Publishing Co, Inc, 420 Mich 148 , 151 n 2; 362 NW2d 580 (1984), and Federated Publications, Inc v City of Lansing, 467 Mich 98 ; 649 NW2d 383 (2002), the Court cited the venerable rule that the Court will not decide moot issues unless the issue is one of public significance that is likely to recur, yet may evade judicial review.

2006In both In re Midland Publishing Co., Inc., 420 Mich. 148 , 151 n. 2, 362 N.W.2d 580 (1984), and Federated Publications, Inc. v. City of Lansing, 467 Mich. 98 , 649 N.W.2d 383 (2002), the Court cited the venerable rule that the Court will not decide moot issues unless the issue is one of public significance that is likely to recur, yet may evade judicial review.

2006In both In re Midland Publishing Co, Inc, 420 Mich 148 , 151 n 2; 362 NW2d 580 (1984), and Federated Publications, Inc v City of Lansing, 467 Mich 98 ; 649 NW2d 383 (2002), the Court cited the venerable rule that the Court will not decide moot issues unless the issue is one of public significance that is likely to recur, yet may evade judicial review.

2006In both In re Midland Publishing Co, Inc, 420 Mich 148 , 151 n 2; 362 NW2d 580 (1984), and Federated Publications, Inc v City of Lansing, 467 Mich 98 ; 649 NW2d 383 (2002), the Court cited the venerable rule that the Court will not decide moot issues unless the issue is one of public significance that is likely to recur, yet may evade judicial review.