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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
County of Solano v. LIONSGATE CORP.green2 sentences2017(County of Solano v. Lionsgate Corp. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 741, 749, fn. 5 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 362 ]; see also Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 386-387.) This is currently a PAGA case, and Prudential is relying on a *446 2006 predispute arbitration agreement by Betancourt to compel arbitration in this 2015 case brought on behalf of the state. 2017(County of Solano v. Lionsgate Corp. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 741, 749, fn. 5 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 362 ]; see also Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 386-387.) This is currently a PAGA case, and Prudential is relying on a *446 2006 predispute arbitration agreement by Betancourt to compel arbitration in this 2015 case brought on behalf of the state. | 1 | 1 |
Sky Sports, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2017Because the trial court’s denial of Prudential’s motion was based upon a decision of law, we apply the de novo standard of review. 4 (Carlson v. Home Team Pest Defense, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 619, 630 [ 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 29 ].) “[T]o bring a motion to compel arbitration, a party must plead and prove: ‘(1) the parties’ written agreement to arbitrate a controversy . . . ; (2) a request or demand by one party to the other party or parties for arbitration of *445 such controversy pursuant to and under the terms of their written arbitration agreement; and (3) the refusal of the other party or pa 2017Because the trial court’s denial of Prudential’s motion was based upon a decision of law, we apply the de novo standard of review. 4 (Carlson v. Home Team Pest Defense, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 619, 630 [ 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 29 ].) “[T]o bring a motion to compel arbitration, a party must plead and prove: ‘(1) the parties’ written agreement to arbitrate a controversy . . . ; (2) a request or demand by one party to the other party or parties for arbitration of *445 such controversy pursuant to and under the terms of their written arbitration agreement; and (3) the refusal of the other party or pa | 1 | 1 |
Carlson v. Home Team Pest Defense, Inc.green2 sentences2017Because the trial court’s denial of Prudential’s motion was based upon a decision of law, we apply the de novo standard of review. 4 (Carlson v. Home Team Pest Defense, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 619, 630 [ 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 29 ].) “[T]o bring a motion to compel arbitration, a party must plead and prove: ‘(1) the parties’ written agreement to arbitrate a controversy . . . ; (2) a request or demand by one party to the other party or parties for arbitration of *445 such controversy pursuant to and under the terms of their written arbitration agreement; and (3) the refusal of the other party or pa 2017Because the trial court’s denial of Prudential’s motion was based upon a decision of law, we apply the de novo standard of review. 4 (Carlson v. Home Team Pest Defense, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 619, 630 [ 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 29 ].) “[T]o bring a motion to compel arbitration, a party must plead and prove: ‘(1) the parties’ written agreement to arbitrate a controversy . . . ; (2) a request or demand by one party to the other party or parties for arbitration of *445 such controversy pursuant to and under the terms of their written arbitration agreement; and (3) the refusal of the other party or pa | 1 | 1 |
Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLCred2 sentences2017At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court explained that a PAGA claim is not subject to an agreement to arbitrate. ( Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 .) The trial court further explained that, to the extent Betancourt’s requested remedies are inconsistent with a PAGA case, the proper procedure would be for Prudential to file a motion to strike. 2017(County of Solano v. Lionsgate Corp. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 741, 749, fn. 5 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 362 ]; see also Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 386-387.) This is currently a PAGA case, and Prudential is relying on a *446 2006 predispute arbitration agreement by Betancourt to compel arbitration in this 2015 case brought on behalf of the state. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2016(People v. Jones (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1264 (Jones); Davis v. U.S. (2011) 564 U.S. 229 , -- [ 180 L.Ed.2d 285 , 293] (Davis).) Exclusion is not a personal constitutional right, nor is it designed to redress the injury an unconstitutional search causes. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bennettgreen1 sentence2012Sound jurisprudence dictates that such issues be decided only in the context of cases and controversies actually raising the issue.‖ (People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 393 (conc. (footnote continued on next page) 3 case illustrates the prudential rule‘s wisdom, as defendant‘s failure to raise the parole search issue in the trial court, in response to the People‘s effort to justify the search (see Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th, 119, 136 ), prevented the development of a factual record that might have obviated any perceived need to revisit the permissible scope of warrantless searches. | 1 | 1 |
NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2007Proc., §§ 2002, 2005.) The conclusion we reach also permits us to avoid the difficult question whether the local rule and order violate petitioner’s right to due process of law, “[m]indful [as we are] of the prudential rule of judicial restraint that counsels against rendering a decision on constitutional grounds if a statutory basis for resolution exists.” (NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1190 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 778 , 980 P.2d 337 ].) This rule directs that “if reasonably possible, statutory provisions should be interpreted in a manner that avoids seriou 2007Proc., §§ 2002, 2005.) The conclusion we reach also permits us to avoid the difficult question whether the local rule and order violate petitioner's right to due process of law, "[m]indful [as we are] of the prudential rule of judicial restraint that counsels against rendering a decision on constitutional grounds if a statutory basis for resolution exists." ( NBC Subsidiary (KNBCTV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1190 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 778 , 980 P.2d 337 .) This rule directs that "if reasonably possible, statutory provisions should be interpreted in a manner that avoids serious | 1 | 1 |
Oklahoma State & Education Employees Group Insurance Board v. Fullertongreen1 sentence2002Emp. v. Fullerton (Okla.Civ.App. 1993) 852 P.2d 813, 814 [rights of full-time student dependent under group health plan vested when accident occurred during policy period].) Therefore, to determine whether Prudential’s motion for summary judgment should be granted, we must consider the threshold issue of whether the undisputed facts show that Michelle was not insured under the Plan as a qualified dependent on the date of her accident. | 1 | 1 |
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authoritygreen2 sentences1999Mindful of the prudential rule of judicial restraint that counsels against rendering a decision on constitutional grounds if a statutory basis for resolution exists (see, e.g., Ashwander v. Valley Authority (1936) 297 U.S. 288, 347 [ 56 S.Ct. 466, 483 , 80 L.Ed. 688 ] (cone. opn. of Brandéis, J.)), we amended our specification of issues to include a preliminary additional issue: Does the trial court’s exclusion order in this case violate section 124? 1999Mindful of the prudential rule of judicial restraint that counsels against rendering a decision on constitutional grounds if a statutory basis for resolution exists (see, e.g., Ashwander v. Valley Authority (1936) 297 U.S. 288, 347 [ 56 S.Ct. 466, 483 , 80 L.Ed. 688 ] (cone. opn. of Brandéis, J.)), we amended our specification of issues to include a preliminary additional issue: Does the trial court’s exclusion order in this case violate section 124? | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014(Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1315-1318 .) DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded with directions that the trial court enter a new judgment awarding Ole Prahm $247,225, plus prejudgment interest on that amount from December 31, 2007. 2014(Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1315-1318 .) DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded with directions that the trial court enter a new judgment awarding Ole Prahm $247,225, plus prejudgment interest on that amount from December 31, 2007. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Wilson & Wilson v. City Council
green
1 sentence2023(In re M.F. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 86 , 106.) “‘A controversy is “ripe” when it has reached, but has not passed, the point that the facts have sufficiently congealed to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made.’ [Citation.]” (Wilson, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1573 .) The ripeness requirement prevents courts from issuing purely advisory opinions. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Davis v. United States
green
2 sentences2016(People v. Jones (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1264 (Jones); Davis v. U.S. (2011) 564 U.S. 229 , -- [ 180 L.Ed.2d 285 , 293] (Davis).) Exclusion is not a personal constitutional right, nor is it designed to redress the injury an unconstitutional search causes. 2016(People v. Jones (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1264 (Jones); Davis v. U.S. (2011) 564 U.S. 229 , -- [ 180 L.Ed.2d 285 , 293] (Davis).) Exclusion is not a personal constitutional right, nor is it designed to redress the injury an unconstitutional search causes. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services of Nebras
green
1 sentence2016(Culhane, supra, 708 F.3d at p. 290 .) Two aspects of Massachusetts law on nonjudicial foreclosure persuaded the court such a broad rule is unwarranted. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Riva
green
1 sentence2013(See, e.g., Riva, supra, 112 13 Cal.App.4th at pp. 992-993 [“comity” militates against reversing another judge’s ruling absent “a highly persuasive reason for doing so--mere disagreement” insufficient].)3 We agree with the People that, at best for defendant, Riva states a prudential rule cautioning against reopening all issues previously decided in a case. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2012Sound jurisprudence dictates that such issues be decided only in the context of cases and controversies actually raising the issue.‖ (People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 393 (conc. (footnote continued on next page) 3 case illustrates the prudential rule‘s wisdom, as defendant‘s failure to raise the parole search issue in the trial court, in response to the People‘s effort to justify the search (see Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th, 119, 136 ), prevented the development of a factual record that might have obviated any perceived need to revisit the permissible scope of warrantless searches. 2012Sound jurisprudence dictates that such issues be decided only in the context of cases and controversies actually raising the issue.‖ (People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 393 (conc. (footnote continued on next page) 3 case illustrates the prudential rule‘s wisdom, as defendant‘s failure to raise the parole search issue in the trial court, in response to the People‘s effort to justify the search (see Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th, 119, 136 ), prevented the development of a factual record that might have obviated any perceived need to revisit the permissible scope of warrantless searches. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Manriquez
green
2 sentences2007Proc., §§ 2002, 2005.) The conclusion we reach also permits us to avoid the difficult question whether the local rule and order violate petitioner's right to due process of law, "[m]indful [as we are] of the prudential rule of judicial restraint that counsels against rendering a decision on constitutional grounds if a statutory basis for resolution exists." ( NBC Subsidiary (KNBCTV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1190 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 778 , 980 P.2d 337 .) This rule directs that "if reasonably possible, statutory provisions should be interpreted in a manner that avoids serious 2007Proc., §§ 2002, 2005.) The conclusion we reach also permits us to avoid the difficult question whether the local rule and order violate petitioner's right to due process of law, "[m]indful [as we are] of the prudential rule of judicial restraint that counsels against rendering a decision on constitutional grounds if a statutory basis for resolution exists." ( NBC Subsidiary (KNBCTV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1190 , 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 778 , 980 P.2d 337 .) This rule directs that "if reasonably possible, statutory provisions should be interpreted in a manner that avoids serious | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.