fund doctrine in Florida

2013Our review of the caselaw from our sister states indicates only a minority of them have even discussed the substantial benefit doctrine. . 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).

1986The Florida supreme court recently upheld the constitutionality of section 768.-56, Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla.1985); however, the court limited the applicability of the statute to causes of action accruing after July 1, 1980.

1997See Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. O'Shea, 397 So.2d 1196 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); and State, Dep't of Citrus v. Griffin, 332 So.2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).

1981As we noted in State Department of Citrus v. Griffin, 332 So.2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), the right to an award of attorney's fees under the common fund rule is based on the theory that plaintiff's successful litigation confers on members of a class a substantial benefit in a fund.

2014Instead, the Second District concluded that the common fund doctrine applied—resulting in Parker’s attorney’s fees being paid out of the settlement proceeds—because -5- “[b]oth elements that implicate use of the common fund doctrine are met in this case: the presence of a fund and a pecuniary benefit to a party.” Id. at 69 .

2014Instead, the Second District concluded that the common fund doctrine applied— resulting in Parker’s attorney’s fees being paid out of the settlement proceeds — because “[b]oth elements that implicate use of the common fund doctrine are met in this case: the presence of a fund and a pecuniary benefit to a party.” Id. at 69 .

2013Grp. of Me. v. Van Hall, 704 A.2d 366 , 368 & n. 3 (Me. 1997) (stating that the majority of jurisdictions have adopted the common fund doctrine).

1997The first of these cases is Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 , 26 L.Ed. 1157 (1881), which gave birth to the common fund doctrine.

1997The first of these cases is Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 , 26 L.Ed. 1157 (1881), which gave birth to the common fund doctrine.

1997The third case, and the one which appears to have firmly established the common fund doctrine, is Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161 , 59 S.Ct. 777 , 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939).

1997The third case, and the one which appears to have firmly established the common fund doctrine, is Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161 , 59 S.Ct. 777 , 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939).

1997The Florida Supreme Court again approved the common fund doctrine in Universal Construction Co. v. Gore, 51 So.2d 429 (Fla.1950).

1990As recognized in Special Disability Trust Fund, Department of Labor and Employment Security, State of Florida v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 551 So.2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), citing Special Disability Trust Fund v. Brevard County Board of Public Instruction, 9 FCR 164 (1975), cert. denied, 320 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1975): The clear intent, and effect [of the 60-day limitation in the pre-1987 Section 440.49(2)(g), Florida Statutes] is that the claim is barred ... it is dead and no further act by ANYONE can breathe life into the right to claim reimbursement as to those benefits.

1990As recognized in Special Disability Trust Fund, Department of Labor and Employment Security, State of Florida v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 551 So.2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), citing Special Disability Trust Fund v. Brevard County Board of Public Instruction, 9 FCR 164 (1975), cert. denied, 320 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1975): The clear intent, and effect [of the 60-day limitation in the pre-1987 Section 440.49(2)(g), Florida Statutes] is that the claim is barred ... it is dead and no further act by ANYONE can breathe life into the right to claim reimbursement as to those benefits.

1986Further, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. v. Ritchey, 394 So.2d 1057 (Fla.2d DCA 1981), indicates that the rule should apply only "in the absence of contract or statute," id. at 1058 n. 2, and in the instant case there is a contractual provision for recovery of attorney's fees.

1986Further, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. v. Ritchey, 394 So.2d 1057 (Fla.2d DCA 1981), indicates that the rule should apply only "in the absence of contract or statute," id. at 1058 n. 2, and in the instant case there is a contractual provision for recovery of attorney's fees.

1984Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. O'Shea, 397 So.2d 1196 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Estate of Hampton v. Fair-child-Florida Construction Co., 341 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1976).

1984The common fund rule serves to award attorney's fees "from a fund or estate which has been benefitted by the rendering of legal services." Estate of Hampton, 341 So.2d at 761 .

1980In Tropicana Products, Inc., supra, the court reviewed the judge of industrial claim’s denial of the Fund’s motion for joinder in the settlement proceedings, and held that “the Fund may have a right to intervene in workmen’s compensation lump sum settle ment proceedings when the employer or carrier is seeking Fund reimbursement . 358 So.2d at 2 .

1980In Tropicana Products, Inc., supra, the court reviewed the judge of industrial claim’s denial of the Fund’s motion for joinder in the settlement proceedings, and held that “the Fund may have a right to intervene in workmen’s compensation lump sum settle ment proceedings when the employer or carrier is seeking Fund reimbursement . 358 So.2d at 2 .

1971This Court recently stated that: “It is elementary, and without need of citation of authorities to support, that neither this Court nor the Commission in reviewing such findings is justified in superimposing its interpretation of the facts in lieu of an equally valid one reached by the Judge of Industrial Claims sitting as the duly constituted trier of the facts.” (Clayton v. Lease-Way Transportation Corp., Fla.1970, 236 So.2d 765, 766 .) The Judge of Industrial Claims in the instant case heard the testimony; his belief that Dudley notified the employer of his previous injury should be respect

1971This Court recently stated that: “It is elementary, and without need of citation of authorities to support, that neither this Court nor the Commission in reviewing such findings is justified in superimposing its interpretation of the facts in lieu of an equally valid one reached by the Judge of Industrial Claims sitting as the duly constituted trier of the facts.” (Clayton v. Lease-Way Transportation Corp., Fla.1970, 236 So.2d 765, 766 .) The Judge of Industrial Claims in the instant case heard the testimony; his belief that Dudley notified the employer of his previous injury should be respect