Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
26 Arizona opinions name it 3 courts 1971–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Estate of Browngreen2 sentences2009I believe the common fund doctrine should apply and Claimant should be awarded her attorneys' fees. ¶ 26 "The common fund doctrine is a general rule of equity that `a person or persons who employ attorneys for the preservation of a common fund may be entitled to have their attorney's fees paid out of that fund.'" LaBombard v. Samaritan Health System, 195 Ariz. 543, 548 , 991 P.2d 246, 251 (quoting In re Estate of Brown, 137 Ariz. 309, 312 , 670 P.2d 414, 417 (App.1983)). 2009I believe the common fund doctrine should apply and Claimant should be awarded her attorneys' fees. ¶ 26 "The common fund doctrine is a general rule of equity that `a person or persons who employ attorneys for the preservation of a common fund may be entitled to have their attorney's fees paid out of that fund.'" LaBombard v. Samaritan Health System, 195 Ariz. 543, 548 , 991 P.2d 246, 251 (quoting In re Estate of Brown, 137 Ariz. 309, 312 , 670 P.2d 414, 417 (App.1983)). | 7 | 8 |
Kerr v. Killiangreen2 sentences2014“Under the common fund doctrine a court may award attorneys’ fees to counsel for the prevailing side whose efforts in litigation create or preserve a common fund from which others who have undertaken no risk or cost will nevertheless benefit.” Kerr v. Killian, 197 Ariz. 213 , 217-18 ¶ 19, 3 P.3d 1133,1137-38 (App.2000). 2014“Under the common fund doctrine a court may award attorneys’ fees to counsel for the prevailing side whose efforts in litigation create or preserve a common fund from which others who have undertaken no risk or cost will nevertheless benefit.” Kerr v. Killian, 197 Ariz. 213 , 217-18 ¶ 19, 3 P.3d 1133,1137-38 (App.2000). | 6 | 7 |
LaBombard v. Samaritan Health Systemgreen2 sentences2012We find that the trial court properly declined to apply the common fund doctrine to reduce the State’s award. ¶ 7 The common fund doctrine provides that a person who employs “attorneys for the preservation of a common fund may be entitled to have them attorney’s fees paid out of that fund.” LaBombard v. Samaritan Health Sys., 195 Ariz. 543, 548, ¶ 22 , 991 P.2d 246, 251 (App.1998). 2012We find that the trial court properly declined to apply the common fund doctrine to reduce the State’s award. ¶ 7 The common fund doctrine provides that a person who employs “attorneys for the preservation of a common fund may be entitled to have them attorney’s fees paid out of that fund.” LaBombard v. Samaritan Health Sys., 195 Ariz. 543, 548, ¶ 22 , 991 P.2d 246, 251 (App.1998). | 6 | 6 |
Boeing Co. v. Van Gemertgreen2 sentences2006Id. ¶23 To sum up, Arizona wrongful death law presents problems for the application of the common fund doctrine when more than one counsel meaningfully participate in establishing an award: (1) the “fund” (when viewed as the total damages awarded to the statutory plaintiff and beneficiaries) is based on a composite of damages of differing beneficiaries as contrasted with a “mathematically ascertainable claim to part of a lump-sum judgment,” Boeing, 444 U.S. at 479 , 100 S.Ct. 745 ; (2) those damages are separate and distinct and statutory beneficiaries may use separate counsel to establish the 2006Id. ¶23 To sum up, Arizona wrongful death law presents problems for the application of the common fund doctrine when more than one counsel meaningfully participate in establishing an award: (1) the “fund” (when viewed as the total damages awarded to the statutory plaintiff and beneficiaries) is based on a composite of damages of differing beneficiaries as contrasted with a “mathematically ascertainable claim to part of a lump-sum judgment,” Boeing, 444 U.S. at 479 , 100 S.Ct. 745 ; (2) those damages are separate and distinct and statutory beneficiaries may use separate counsel to establish the | 4 | 5 |
Steer Ex Rel. K & K Cable, Inc. v. Egglestongreen2 sentences2006See Burke, 206 Ariz. at 273, ¶ 9 , 77 P.3d at 448 (“The common fund doctrine is based on an equitable principle of allocating attorney fees among the benefitted group, not shifting them to the opposing party.”); see also Steer v. Eggleston, 202 Ariz. 523 , 47 P.3d 1161 (App.2002); Municipality of Anchorage v. Gallion, 944 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1997); Mountain W. 2006See Burke, 206 Ariz. at 273, ¶ 9 , 77 P.3d at 448 (“The common fund doctrine is based on an equitable principle of allocating attorney fees among the benefitted group, not shifting them to the opposing party.”); see also Steer v. Eggleston, 202 Ariz. 523 , 47 P.3d 1161 (App.2002); Municipality of Anchorage v. Gallion, 944 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1997); Mountain W. | 3 | 3 |
Municipality of Anchorage v. Galliongreen2 sentences2006See Burke, 206 Ariz. at 273, ¶ 9 , 77 P.3d at 448 (“The common fund doctrine is based on an equitable principle of allocating attorney fees among the benefitted group, not shifting them to the opposing party.”); see also Steer v. Eggleston, 202 Ariz. 523 , 47 P.3d 1161 (App.2002); Municipality of Anchorage v. Gallion, 944 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1997); Mountain W. 2006See Burke, 206 Ariz. at 273, ¶ 9 , 77 P.3d at 448 (“The common fund doctrine is based on an equitable principle of allocating attorney fees among the benefitted group, not shifting them to the opposing party.”); see also Steer v. Eggleston, 202 Ariz. 523 , 47 P.3d 1161 (App.2002); Municipality of Anchorage v. Gallion, 944 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1997); Mountain W. | 2 | 3 |
Valder Law Offices v. Keenan Law Firmgreen2 sentences2020See id. ¶15 Under the common fund doctrine, this court considers whether: (1) the classes of persons benefitting from the lawsuit were small and easily identifiable; (2) the benefits could be traced accurately; and (3) the costs could be shifted to those benefitting with some precision. 2020Because of the second and third elements, “Arizona wrongful death law presents problems for the application of the common fund doctrine when more than one counsel meaningfully participate in establishing an award.” See Valder Law, 212 Ariz. at 251, ¶ 23 . ¶16 Lattimer Law satisfies the first element because the statutory beneficiaries and the estate are a small and easily identifiable class. | 2 | 2 |
Stagecoach Trails MHC, L.L.C. v. City of Bensongreen2 sentences2014Stagecoach Trails MHC, L.L.C. v. City of Benson, 231 Ariz. 366 , 370 ¶¶ 18-19, 295 P.3d 943, 947 (2013). ¶ 40 Fields sought to compel EORP to calculate benefit increases according to § 38-818’s formula rather than that of S.B. 1609. 2014Stagecoach Trails MHC, L.L.C. v. City of Benson, 231 Ariz. 366 , 370 ¶¶ 18-19, 295 P.3d 943, 947 (2013). ¶ 40 Fields sought to compel EORP to calculate benefit increases according to § 38-818’s formula rather than that of S.B. 1609. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mezagreen2 sentences2009But see London v. Green Acres Trust, 159 Ariz. 136, 147 , 765 P.2d 538, 549 (App.1988) (“Lajwarding attorney’s fees as punishment for bad faith has been codified in A.R.S. § 12-341.01(0),” but “theory underlying the statute has always been available to the courts”). 4 ¶ 13 In Alyeska Pipeline, the Supreme Court “affirmed the continuing vitality of the ‘American Rule’ that requires each party to bear the cost of its own attorneys’ fees absent express statutory authority,” but noted the following exceptions in federal courts: “(1) the common fund doctrine applies; (2) a party willfully disobeys 2009But see London v. Green Acres Trust, 159 Ariz. 136, 147 , 765 P.2d 538, 549 (App.1988) (“Lajwarding attorney’s fees as punishment for bad faith has been codified in A.R.S. § 12-341.01(0),” but “theory underlying the statute has always been available to the courts”). 4 ¶ 13 In Alyeska Pipeline, the Supreme Court “affirmed the continuing vitality of the ‘American Rule’ that requires each party to bear the cost of its own attorneys’ fees absent express statutory authority,” but noted the following exceptions in federal courts: “(1) the common fund doctrine applies; (2) a party willfully disobeys | 2 | 2 |
Steinfeld v. Zeckendorfgreen2 sentences2006B. ¶ 15 The common fund doctrine in Arizona has its basis in Steinfeld v. Zeckendorf, 15 Ariz. 335, 342 , 138 P. 1044, 1047 (1914), aff'd, 239 U.S. 26 , 36 S.Ct. 14 , 60 L.Ed. 125 (1915). 2006B. ¶ 15 The common fund doctrine in Arizona has its basis in Steinfeld v. Zeckendorf, 15 Ariz. 335, 342 , 138 P. 1044, 1047 (1914), aff'd, 239 U.S. 26 , 36 S.Ct. 14 , 60 L.Ed. 125 (1915). | 2 | 2 |
Burke v. Arizona State Retirement Systemgreen2 sentences2006Sys., 206 Ariz. 269, 272, ¶7 , 77 P.3d 444, 447 (App. 2003). ¶ 16 The common fund doctrine, however, is an exception to the general rule that attorneys’ fees may be awarded “only when expressly authorized by contract or statute.” Id.; see also Kerr, 197 Ariz. at 217-18, ¶ 19 , 3 P.3d at 1137-38 ; LaBombard v. Samaritan Health Sys., 195 Ariz. 543, 548-49, ¶22 , 991 P.2d 246, 251-52 (App.1998). 2006Sys., 206 Ariz. 269, 272, ¶7 , 77 P.3d 444, 447 (App. 2003). ¶ 16 The common fund doctrine, however, is an exception to the general rule that attorneys’ fees may be awarded “only when expressly authorized by contract or statute.” Id.; see also Kerr, 197 Ariz. at 217-18, ¶ 19 , 3 P.3d at 1137-38 ; LaBombard v. Samaritan Health Sys., 195 Ariz. 543, 548-49, ¶22 , 991 P.2d 246, 251-52 (App.1998). | 2 | 2 |
Bowles v. Department of Retirement Systemsgreen2 sentences2003Sys., 121 Wash.2d 52 , 847 P.2d 440, 449 (1993); see also Van Gemert (common fund doctrine differs from other theories authorizing attorney fee awards in that award is borne by prevailing parties, not losing party); Camden I Condo. 2003Sys., 121 Wash.2d 52 , 847 P.2d 440, 449 (1993); see also Van Gemert (common fund doctrine differs from other theories authorizing attorney fee awards in that award is borne by prevailing parties, not losing party); Camden I Condo. | 2 | 2 |
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Societyred2 sentences2009But see London v. Green Acres Trust, 159 Ariz. 136, 147 , 765 P.2d 538, 549 (App.1988) (“Lajwarding attorney’s fees as punishment for bad faith has been codified in A.R.S. § 12-341.01(0),” but “theory underlying the statute has always been available to the courts”). 4 ¶ 13 In Alyeska Pipeline, the Supreme Court “affirmed the continuing vitality of the ‘American Rule’ that requires each party to bear the cost of its own attorneys’ fees absent express statutory authority,” but noted the following exceptions in federal courts: “(1) the common fund doctrine applies; (2) a party willfully disobeys 2009But see London v. Green Acres Trust, 159 Ariz. 136, 147 , 765 P.2d 538, 549 (App.1988) (“Lajwarding attorney’s fees as punishment for bad faith has been codified in A.R.S. § 12-341.01(0),” but “theory underlying the statute has always been available to the courts”). 4 ¶ 13 In Alyeska Pipeline, the Supreme Court “affirmed the continuing vitality of the ‘American Rule’ that requires each party to bear the cost of its own attorneys’ fees absent express statutory authority,” but noted the following exceptions in federal courts: “(1) the common fund doctrine applies; (2) a party willfully disobeys | 1 | 6 |
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.green2 sentences2009And in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 , 111 S.Ct. 2123 , 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991), the Court held that although a federal court “ordinarily should rely on the Rules” if they apply to bad faith conduct at issue, “if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the [federal] statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power.” According to the Court, the inherent power to sanction is “ ‘governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious dispositi 2009And in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 , 111 S.Ct. 2123 , 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991), the Court held that although a federal court “ordinarily should rely on the Rules” if they apply to bad faith conduct at issue, “if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the [federal] statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power.” According to the Court, the inherent power to sanction is “ ‘governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious dispositi | 1 | 2 |
Arizona Department of Administration v. Coxgreen2 sentences2012Relying on Arizona Department of Administration v. Cox, 222 Ariz. 270 , 213 P.3d 707 (App.2009), the court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment for the full amount of its claim and declined to apportion Wang’s attorneys’ fees against the claim. ¶ 5 Wang timely appealed. 2012Id. at 280, ¶ 40 , 213 P.3d at 717 (emphasis added). ¶ 17 The equitable concerns underlying the common fund doctrine identified in Cox are not present in this case. | 1 | 1 |
Hobson v. Mid-Century Insurancegreen2 sentences2009For that reason, the claimant argues that the equitable "common fund doctrine" should require Banner's disability benefits department to pay its proportionate share of the attorney's fees and costs incurred by the claimant in litigating the petition to reopen. ¶ 14 In Hobson v. Mid-Century Insurance Company, 199 Ariz. 525 , 19 P.3d 1241 (App. 2001), the court discussed the common fund doctrine in the context of workers' compensation benefits. 2009For that reason, the claimant argues that the equitable "common fund doctrine" should require Banner's disability benefits department to pay its proportionate share of the attorney's fees and costs incurred by the claimant in litigating the petition to reopen. ¶ 14 In Hobson v. Mid-Century Insurance Company, 199 Ariz. 525 , 19 P.3d 1241 (App. 2001), the court discussed the common fund doctrine in the context of workers' compensation benefits. | 1 | 1 |
| Wilmot v. Wilmotgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Burlington v. Daguegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Focal Point, Inc. v. U-Haul Co. of Arizona, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shattuck v. Precision-Toyota, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
cluster 779517green1 sentence2006Fischel, 307 F.3d at 1008. ¶ 32 Accordingly, the superior court’s authority to apply a multiplier also applies to a situation where fee-shifting rather than fee-spreading applies, but the parties have agreed to use the common fund doctrine to determine the amount of fees. | 1 | 1 |
Barmat v. John and Jane Doe Partners ADgreen2 sentences2006As our supreme court stated in Barmat , “where the implied contract does no more than place the parties in a relationship in which the law then imposes certain duties recognized by public policy, the gravamen of the subsequent action for breach is tort, not contract.” Id. at 523 , 747 P.2d at 1222 (citations omitted). ¶ 33 As noted, the critical question in this case is whether the common fund doctrine applies. 2006As our supreme court stated in Barmat , “where the implied contract does no more than place the parties in a relationship in which the law then imposes certain duties recognized by public policy, the gravamen of the subsequent action for breach is tort, not contract.” Id. at 523 , 747 P.2d at 1222 (citations omitted). ¶ 33 As noted, the critical question in this case is whether the common fund doctrine applies. | 1 | 1 |
| Miller v. Hehlengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Linda Marie Zambrano, and Jose E. Tafolla, Esq. Philip W. Orr, Esq., Claimants-Appellants v. City of Tustin David Kreylinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Donald Knight and Foster Pepper & Shefelman, a Law Partnership, Plaintiffs/cross-Appellants v. The United States of Americagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Couy v. Nardei Enterprisesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rhoad v. McLEAN TRUCKING COMPANYgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dennis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kadish v. Arizona State Land Departmentgreen | 1 | 1 |
| IRBY Construction Co v. Arizona Department of Revenuegreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Phoenix v. Paper Distributors of Arizona, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Ricksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare Systemgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kennedy v. Wollenberggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Betancourt v. Arizona Property & Casualty Insurance Fundgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
London v. Green Acres Trustgreen2 sentences2009But see London v. Green Acres Trust, 159 Ariz. 136, 147 , 765 P.2d 538, 549 (App.1988) (“Lajwarding attorney’s fees as punishment for bad faith has been codified in A.R.S. § 12-341.01(0),” but “theory underlying the statute has always been available to the courts”). 4 ¶ 13 In Alyeska Pipeline, the Supreme Court “affirmed the continuing vitality of the ‘American Rule’ that requires each party to bear the cost of its own attorneys’ fees absent express statutory authority,” but noted the following exceptions in federal courts: “(1) the common fund doctrine applies; (2) a party willfully disobeys 2009But see London v. Green Acres Trust, 159 Ariz. 136, 147 , 765 P.2d 538, 549 (App.1988) (“Lajwarding attorney’s fees as punishment for bad faith has been codified in A.R.S. § 12-341.01(0),” but “theory underlying the statute has always been available to the courts”). 4 ¶ 13 In Alyeska Pipeline, the Supreme Court “affirmed the continuing vitality of the ‘American Rule’ that requires each party to bear the cost of its own attorneys’ fees absent express statutory authority,” but noted the following exceptions in federal courts: “(1) the common fund doctrine applies; (2) a party willfully disobeys | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
cluster 666044
green
2 sentences2006WPPSS, 19 F.3d at 1299 n. 8 (no consensus on issue but most courts reject Dague in common-fund cases); Martha Pacold, Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions Governed by Fee-Shifting Statutes, 68 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1007, 1024 (2001) (“Pacold”) (majority view is Dague rationale does not apply in common-fund context). ¶ 26 Microsoft also suggests the superior court lacked authority to apply a multiplier because “Arizona appellate courts have never enhanced a lodestar with a multiplier when awarding fees under the common fund doctrine.” We note that there is some Arizona precedent to use a multiplier in the c 2003Litig., 19 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir.1994); Florida v. Dunne, 915 F.2d 542 (9th Cir.1990). ¶ 8 In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 , 95 S.Ct. 1612 , 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the common fund doctrine may be appropriately applied when (1) the class is sufficiently identifiable, (2) the benefits can be accurately traced, and (3) the fee can be apportioned with some exactitude among those receiving the benefits. | 2 | 2003–2006 |
cluster 696566
green
2 sentences2003Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that the parties’ settlement agreement required ASRS to separately pay the class’s attorney fees pursuant to the common fund doctrine appears fundamentally inconsistent with both the concept and application of the doctrine. ¶ 11 In its decision to apply the common fund doctrine, the trial court relied on two cases class counsel cited, Johnston v. Comerica Mortgage Corp., 83 F.3d 241 (8th Cir. 1996), and In re General Motors Corp. Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.1995). 6 In both decisions, the courts stated that at 2003In agreeing with objecting class members that the common fund doctrine was preferable to the lodestar method under the facts of the case, although not necessarily required, the Third Circuit noted: “In this case, the fee clearly was not made pursuant to a statute; therefore no legislatively endorsed policy favors assuring counsel an adequate fee.” 55 F.3d at 822 . | 2 | 2003–2003 |
cluster 717620
green
2 sentences2003Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that the parties’ settlement agreement required ASRS to separately pay the class’s attorney fees pursuant to the common fund doctrine appears fundamentally inconsistent with both the concept and application of the doctrine. ¶ 11 In its decision to apply the common fund doctrine, the trial court relied on two cases class counsel cited, Johnston v. Comerica Mortgage Corp., 83 F.3d 241 (8th Cir. 1996), and In re General Motors Corp. Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.1995). 6 In both decisions, the courts stated that at 2003Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that the parties’ settlement agreement required ASRS to separately pay the class’s attorney fees pursuant to the common fund doctrine appears fundamentally inconsistent with both the concept and application of the doctrine. ¶11 In its decision to apply the common fund doctrine, the trial court relied on two cases class counsel cited, Johnston v. Comerica Mortgage Corp., 83 F.3d 241 (8th Cir. 1996), and In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).6 In both decisions, the courts stated that at | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Connolly v. Harris Trust Co.
green
2 sentences2003In re Miniscribe Corp., 309 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2002) ; Brytus v. Spang & Co., 203 F.3d 238 (3d Cir.2000); Edwards v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 920 P.2d 751 (Alaska 1996). 2003In re Miniscribe Corp., 309 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2002); Brytus v. Spang & Co., 203 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2000); Edwards v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 920 P.2d 751 (Alaska 1996). | 2 | 2003–2003 |
ABC Supply, Inc. v. Edwards
green
2 sentences2003Similarly, although attorney fee awards are generally subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, see ABC Supply, Inc. v. Edwards, 191 Ariz. 48 , 952 P.2d 286 (App. 1996), whether the common fund doctrine applies is also a question of law. 2003Similarly, although attorney fee awards are generally subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, see ABC Supply, Inc. v. Edwards, 191 Ariz. 48 , 952 P.2d 286 (App. 1996), whether the common fund doctrine applies is also a question of law. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
cluster 767593
green
2 sentences2003In re Miniscribe Corp., 309 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2002) ; Brytus v. Spang & Co., 203 F.3d 238 (3d Cir.2000); Edwards v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 920 P.2d 751 (Alaska 1996). 2003In re Miniscribe Corp., 309 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2002); Brytus v. Spang & Co., 203 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2000); Edwards v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 920 P.2d 751 (Alaska 1996). | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Edwards v. Alaska Pulp Corp.
green
2 sentences2003“The common fund doctrine differs from exceptions to the American rule in that the doctrine is a mechanism for fee-spreading, not fee-shifting; the common fund doctrine requires reimbursement of fees ‘by the prevailing party, not the losing party.’ ” Edwards, 920 P.2d at 755 , quoting Bowles v. Wash. Dep’t of Ret. 2003“The common fund doctrine differs from exceptions to the American rule in that the doctrine is a mechanism for fee-spreading, not fee-shifting; the common fund doctrine requires reimbursement of fees ‘by the prevailing party, not the losing party.’” Edwards, 920 P.2d at 755 , quoting Bowles v. Wash. Dep’t of Ret. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Estate of Bullock
green
2 sentences1983Citing In re Bullock’s Estate, 133 Ca.App.2d 542, 284 P.2d 960 (1955), the bank argues that the common fund rule does not apply when other primary beneficiaries of an estate are represented by attorneys who rendered services substantially the same as those rendered by the beneficiaries petitioning for the allowance of attorney fees. 1983Citing In re Bullock's Estate, 133 Ca.App.2d 542, 284 P.2d 960 (1955), the bank argues that the common fund rule does not apply when other primary beneficiaries of an estate are represented by attorneys who rendered services substantially the same as those rendered by the beneficiaries petitioning for the allowance of attorney fees. | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Hmielewski v. Maricopa County
green
2 sentences2009And in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991), the Court held that although a federal court “ordinarily should rely on the Rules” if they apply to bad faith conduct at issue, “if in 3 In Hmielewski, for example, the trial court imposed fines, not attorney fees. 192 Ariz. 1, ¶ 12 , 960 P.2d at 49 . 2009And in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991), the Court held that although a federal court “ordinarily should rely on the Rules” if they apply to bad faith conduct at issue, “if in 3 In Hmielewski, for example, the trial court imposed fines, not attorney fees. 192 Ariz. 1, ¶ 12 , 960 P.2d at 49 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Steinfeld v. Zeckendorf
neutral
2 sentences2006B. ¶ 15 The common fund doctrine in Arizona has its basis in Steinfeld v. Zeckendorf, 15 Ariz. 335, 342 , 138 P. 1044, 1047 (1914), aff'd, 239 U.S. 26 , 36 S.Ct. 14 , 60 L.Ed. 125 (1915). 2006B. ¶ 15 The common fund doctrine in Arizona has its basis in Steinfeld v. Zeckendorf, 15 Ariz. 335, 342 , 138 P. 1044, 1047 (1914), aff'd, 239 U.S. 26 , 36 S.Ct. 14 , 60 L.Ed. 125 (1915). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Nunez v. Nunez
green
2 sentences2006Id. ¶23 To sum up, Arizona wrongful death law presents problems for the application of the common fund doctrine when more than one counsel meaningfully participate in establishing an award: (1) the “fund” (when viewed as the total damages awarded to the statutory plaintiff and beneficiaries) is based on a composite of damages of differing beneficiaries as contrasted with a “mathematically ascertainable claim to part of a lump-sum judgment,” Boeing, 444 U.S. at 479 , 100 S.Ct. 745 ; (2) those damages are separate and distinct and statutory beneficiaries may use separate counsel to establish the 2006Id. ¶23 To sum up, Arizona wrongful death law presents problems for the application of the common fund doctrine when more than one counsel meaningfully participate in establishing an award: (1) the “fund” (when viewed as the total damages awarded to the statutory plaintiff and beneficiaries) is based on a composite of damages of differing beneficiaries as contrasted with a “mathematically ascertainable claim to part of a lump-sum judgment,” Boeing, 444 U.S. at 479 , 100 S.Ct. 745 ; (2) those damages are separate and distinct and statutory beneficiaries may use separate counsel to establish the | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Morris B. Chapman & Associates, Ltd. v. Kitzman green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| cluster 548778 green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Young v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Bills v. Arizona Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Larkin v. State Ex Rel. Rottas green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Hagge v. Iowa Department of Revenue & Finance green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Dennis v. Higgins green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| United States v. Brockamp green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Trustees v. Greenough green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| In Re Guardianship of Bloomquist green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Arizona State Department of Economic Security v. Mahoney green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Sanchez v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.