fund doctrine in Oregon

2010Lastly, plaintiffs petition for supplemental attorney fees for the time and effort they have spent seeking their fees on appeal. 3 “[W]hen an attorney fees petition comports with the requirements of ORAP 13.10(5), * * * our inquiry into the request generally will be limited to the objections that are filed by the party opposing the petition.” Kahn v. Canfield, 330 Or 10, 13-14 , 998 P2d 651 (2000); see also Dockins v. State Farm Ins.

2010Lastly, plaintiffs petition for supplemental attorney fees for the time and effort they have spent seeking their fees on appeal. 3 “[W]hen an attorney fees petition comports with the requirements of ORAP 13.10(5), * * * our inquiry into the request generally will be limited to the objections that are filed by the party opposing the petition.” Kahn v. Canfield, 330 Or 10, 13-14 , 998 P2d 651 (2000); see also Dockins v. State Farm Ins.

2010The respondents argued that, under the common fund doctrine, “such multipliers are generally appropriate only in the face of ‘exceptional success.’ ” Id. at 245 .

2010They contended that, because the petitioners failed to prevail on all of their claims in Strunk I, they had failed to achieve “exceptional success.” Id.

2010Similarly, in Okeson v. City of Seattle, 130 Wash App 814, 828, 125 P3d 172 (2005), the plaintiff asked for attorney fees on appeal under the common fund doctrine.

2010Ins. v. Clinton, 267 Or 653, 657 , 518 P2d 645 (1974), where the court recognized: “It is * * * a well-established rule in Oregon that an attorney whose efforts result in the recovery of a fund payable to various persons is entitled to payment of reasonable attorney fees from that fund.” More recently, in Strunk II, the court concisely summarized the principles supporting the common fund doctrine.

2010Ins. v. Clinton, 267 Or 653, 657 , 518 P2d 645 (1974), where the court recognized: “It is * * * a well-established rule in Oregon that an attorney whose efforts result in the recovery of a fund payable to various persons is entitled to payment of reasonable attorney fees from that fund.” More recently, in Strunk II, the court concisely summarized the principles supporting the common fund doctrine.

2008Under the common fund doctrine, “plaintiffs whose legal efforts create, discover, increase, or preserve a fund of money to which others also have a claim, may recover the costs of their litigation, including their attorney fees, from the created or preserved fund.” Id. at 566 (quoting Strunk v. PERB, 341 Or 175, 181 , 139 P3d 956 (2006)).

2007And under that doctrine, two separate bases for attorney fee awards arise together in the wake of a created or preserved fund: the first inures to successful plaintiffs; the second to the successful plaintiffs’ lawyers. *243 The United States Supreme Court recognized a plaintiffs right to common fund attorney fees — essentially the right to reimbursement for legal expenditures — in Trustees v. Greenough, 105 US 527 , 26 L Ed 1157 (1881), the Court’s first common fund decision.

2007And under that doctrine, two separate bases for attorney fee awards arise together in the wake of a created or preserved fund: the first inures to successful plaintiffs; the second to the successful plaintiffs’ lawyers. *243 The United States Supreme Court recognized a plaintiffs right to common fund attorney fees — essentially the right to reimbursement for legal expenditures — in Trustees v. Greenough, 105 US 527 , 26 L Ed 1157 (1881), the Court’s first common fund decision.

2006In Wemme v. First Church of Christ, etc., 110 Or 179 , 219 P 618 (1923), for example, the plaintiffs instigated an action to account for and recover trust property administered by certain trustee churches after the churches had abandoned the program for which the trust had been established.

2006In Wemme v. First Church of Christ, etc., 110 Or 179 , 219 P 618 (1923), for example, the plaintiffs instigated an action to account for and recover trust property administered by certain trustee churches after the churches had abandoned the program for which the trust had been established.

1981The reason why such a computation would be in error under such a plan is well-stated by the Wisconsin court in Bloomer and Bloomer, 84 Wis 2d 124 , 267 NW 2d 235 (1978), although involving a variation of a “defined contribution” plan which was not a Keogh plan and although involving a different amount in contributions, rate of interest, and number of years before retirement.

1981The reason why such a computation would be in error under such a plan is well-stated by the Wisconsin court in Bloomer and Bloomer, 84 Wis 2d 124 , 267 NW 2d 235 (1978), although involving a variation of a “defined contribution” plan which was not a Keogh plan and although involving a different amount in contributions, rate of interest, and number of years before retirement.