fund doctrine in Pennsylvania

2010Apparently, Petow accepted the trial court’s reasoning that the “fund was not within the jurisdiction of the court.” Instead, Petow relies on the “common benefit” or “substantial benefit” doctrine, which he believes “is at the heart of this appeal.” Petow’s brief at 14. ¶ 9 Petow quotes extensively from Jones v. Muir, 511 Pa. 535 , 515 A.2d 855 (1986), in which the court discussed the common benefit doctrine, a theory that the Jones court indicated was extrapolated from the common fund doctrine.

2010Apparently, Petow accepted the trial court’s reasoning that the “fund was not within the jurisdiction of the court.” Instead, Petow relies on the “common benefit” or “substantial benefit” doctrine, which he believes “is at the heart of this appeal.” Petow’s brief at 14. ¶ 9 Petow quotes extensively from Jones v. Muir, 511 Pa. 535 , 515 A.2d 855 (1986), in which the court discussed the common benefit doctrine, a theory that the Jones court indicated was extrapolated from the common fund doctrine.

2010Furthermore, 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(8) authorizes the award of attorneys’ fees to “[a]ny participant who is awarded counsel fees out of a fund within the jurisdic *1088 tion of the court pursuant to any general rule relating to an award of counsel fees from a fund within the jurisdiction of the court.” This authorization has been taken to mean that the common fund exception applies not only when the fund is before the court prior to litigation, but where the successful litigation of the underlying suit resulted in a substantial benefit to a “group of others in the same manner as plaintiff,” Mills v

2010Furthermore, 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(8) authorizes the award of attorneys’ fees to “[a]ny participant who is awarded counsel fees out of a fund within the jurisdic *1088 tion of the court pursuant to any general rule relating to an award of counsel fees from a fund within the jurisdiction of the court.” This authorization has been taken to mean that the common fund exception applies not only when the fund is before the court prior to litigation, but where the successful litigation of the underlying suit resulted in a substantial benefit to a “group of others in the same manner as plaintiff,” Mills v

2010Furthermore, 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(8) authorizes the award of attorneys’ fees to “[a]ny participant who is awarded counsel fees out of a fund within the jurisdic *1088 tion of the court pursuant to any general rule relating to an award of counsel fees from a fund within the jurisdiction of the court.” This authorization has been taken to mean that the common fund exception applies not only when the fund is before the court prior to litigation, but where the successful litigation of the underlying suit resulted in a substantial benefit to a “group of others in the same manner as plaintiff,” Mills v

1991Pennsylvania Association of State Mental Health Hospital Physicians v. State Employees’ Retirement Board, 87 Pa.Cmwlth. 108 , 483 A.2d 1003 (1984). *471 Furthermore, 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(8) authorizes the award of attorneys’ fees to “[a]ny participant who is awarded counsel fees out of a fund within the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to any general rule relating to an award of counsel fees from a fund within the jurisdiction of the court.” This authorization has been taken to mean that the common fund exception applies not only when the fund is before the court prior to litigation, but where

2010Subsection (8) of Section 2503 of the Judicial Code authorizes an award of counsel fees out of a fund “within the jurisdiction of the court.” While this clearly authorizes awards based upon the traditional common fund doctrine, it does not appear to authorize awards in common benefit cases not involving a fund within the jurisdiction of the court such as Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 , 93 S.Ct. 1943 , 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973)[,] and Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 , 90 S.Ct. 616 , 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970). 1 .

2010Subsection (8) of Section 2503 of the Judicial Code authorizes an award of counsel fees out of a fund “within the jurisdiction of the court.” While this clearly authorizes awards based upon the traditional common fund doctrine, it does not appear to authorize awards in common benefit cases not involving a fund within the jurisdiction of the court such as Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 , 93 S.Ct. 1943 , 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973)[,] and Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 , 90 S.Ct. 616 , 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970). 1 .

2025A&J Builders, Inc., 78 A.3d at 1238 . 5 In the alternative, Claimant argues that if the WCJ did not err in granting the Fund’s motion to dismiss, it nonetheless erred in also dismissing the matter as to Employer.

2021The Shroms petitioned this Court for review of the Board’s order.7 Parties’ Arguments The Shroms’ assertion of error is premised upon their suggestion that, in requiring UST registration fees to be paid before the discovery of the subject release, the Board is enforcing a “de facto regulation.” (Shroms’ Br. at 12.) In support, the Shroms cite Transportation Services, Inc. v. Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Board, 67 A.3d 142, 155-56 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (Fund’s rule that section 705 fees must be paid until a permanent closure report is filed with the DEP was an unlawful de facto regulat

2016As this Court has previously recognized: We begin by noting that “a litigant cannot recover counsel fees from an adverse party unless there is express statutory authorization, a clear agreement of the parties, or some other established exception.” Gall v. Crawford, 982 A.2d 541 [, 549] (Pa.Super. 2009) (citing Trizechahn Gateway LLC v. Titus, 601 Pa. 637 , 976 A.2d 474, 482 (2009)).

2015Siegfried v. Borough of Wilson, 695 A.2d 892 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997).

2010Robbins was followed in Hiller v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Deberardinis), 131 Pa.Cmwlth. 189 , 569 A.2d 1024 (1990).

2010Robbins was followed in Hiller v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Deberardinis), 131 Pa.Cmwlth. 189 , 569 A.2d 1024 (1990).

2010Furthermore, 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(8) authorizes the award of attorneys’ fees to “[a]ny participant who is awarded counsel fees out of a fund within the jurisdic *1088 tion of the court pursuant to any general rule relating to an award of counsel fees from a fund within the jurisdiction of the court.” This authorization has been taken to mean that the common fund exception applies not only when the fund is before the court prior to litigation, but where the successful litigation of the underlying suit resulted in a substantial benefit to a “group of others in the same manner as plaintiff,” Mills v

2003Co. v. Pistone, 555 Pa. 616 , 726 A.2d 339 (1999), for determining whether the acts alleged in Plaintiff Brown's civil action constituted professional health care services.

2003Co. v. Pistone, 555 Pa. 616 , 726 A.2d 339 (1999), for determining whether the acts alleged in Plaintiff Brown's civil action constituted professional health care services.

1989In Jones, 511 Pa. at 541-42 , 515 A.2d at 858 , the supreme court provided the following explanation of the common fund doctrine: In Hempstead v. Meadville Theological School, 286 Pa. 493 , 134 A. 103 (1926), the doctrine was explained thusly: Where the services protect a common fund for administration or distribution under the direction of the court, or where such fund has been raised for like purpose, it is liable for costs and expenses, including counsel fees incurred.

1989In Jones, 511 Pa. at 541-42 , 515 A.2d at 858 , the supreme court provided the following explanation of the common fund doctrine: In Hempstead v. Meadville Theological School, 286 Pa. 493 , 134 A. 103 (1926), the doctrine was explained thusly: Where the services protect a common fund for administration or distribution under the direction of the court, or where such fund has been raised for like purpose, it is liable for costs and expenses, including counsel fees incurred.

1986Id. at 257-59 , 95 S.Ct. at 1621-22 .

1986Id. at 257-59 , 95 S.Ct. at 1621-22 .

1938It is well settled that an insolvent holder of a fund who has a claim against the fund cannot participate pro rata with other claimants to whom the insolvent is also indebted by reason of a guaranty: Worrall’s Appeal, 41 Pa. 524 (1862) ; Appeals of Fourth National Bank et al., 123 Pa. 473 (1889); North City Trust Company Case, 327 Pa. 356 (1937).

1938It is well settled that an insolvent holder of a fund who has a claim against the fund cannot participate pro rata with other claimants to whom the insolvent is also indebted by reason of a guaranty: Worrall’s Appeal, 41 Pa. 524 (1862) ; Appeals of Fourth National Bank et al., 123 Pa. 473 (1889); North City Trust Company Case, 327 Pa. 356 (1937).

1938It is well settled that an insolvent holder of a fund who has a claim against the fund cannot participate pro rata with other claimants to whom the insolvent is also indebted by reason of a guaranty: Worrall’s Appeal, 41 Pa. 524 (1862) ; Appeals of Fourth National Bank et al., 123 Pa. 473 (1889); North City Trust Company Case, 327 Pa. 356 (1937).

1915Co. v. Veltri, 37 Pa. Superior Ct. 399, 404 ], and we find nothing in the statutory proceedings at bar, or in the pleadings thereunder, to work an estoppel in law that would forbid the school district asserting against this fund its claim for damages, alleged to have been suffered prior to the payment of the money into court, through the failure of Finn to complete his contract.

1897In Hill v. Johnston, 29 Pa. 362 , it was held that though a debtor might not enforce a demand for appraisement against a mortgage creditor proceeding by levari facias to a sale, yet he might come in upon the fund and claim his $300 as against judgment creditors who had taken no execution.

1883He cannot claim adversely to it: Okie’s Appeal, 9 W. & S. 156 ; Jefferis’ Appeal, 9 Casey 39; Bush’s Appeal, 15 P. F. S. 366; Wylie’s Appeal, 11 Norris 196; Strickler’s Appeal, 10 W.

1877The parol evidence was conflicting, and only due weight was given to the return made by the constable, in the discharge of his legal duty, on the 7th of August, five days before the appellant acquired any adversary right by placing his execution in the sheriff’s hands. “ It is a Avoll-settled rule of law,” it was said by Justice Kennedy, in Fitler v. Patton, 8 W. & S. 455 , “ that where any act is required to be done by any one, and especially by an officer, within a limited time, which were he not to perform as required, would render him guilty of a criminal neglect of duty, the law will pres