equitable tolling doctrine in Illinois

2025See, e.g., Tolbert v. Godinez, 2020 IL App (4th) 180587, ¶ 24 ; but see Ralda-Sanden, 2013 IL App (1st) 121117, ¶ 50 (Connors, J., dissenting) (“Although Williams involved the equitable tolling doctrine, the court made clear that it was analyzing whether the federal equitable tolling doctrine could be applied to the federal Trade Act of 1974[.]”) (Emphasis in original)); City of Rockford, 2022 IL App (2d) 210521 , ¶ 65 (noting that our supreme court only applied the doctrine of equitable tolling once in Williams, where the issue before the court concerned a non- jurisdictional federal statute

2025Considering the language establishing the 30-day deadline, the underlying subject matter and purpose of the statute, and the practical effect of applying the doctrine of equitable tolling, we do not conclude that the 30-day deadline of section 9-219(2)(f) of the Code must be followed in all cases and can never be relaxed, no matter the equities. ¶ 25 Next, we address whether Moreci established facts sufficient to warrant the application of equitable tolling to section 9-219(2)(f)’s 30-day deadline. “[W]e apply the clearly erroneous standard for mixed questions of law and fact to the issue of w

2020However, he contends this period should be “equitably tolled.” The doctrine of equitable tolling “permits a court to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a statute of limitations where ‘because of disability, irremediable lack of information, or other circumstances beyond his control,’ the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to file suit on time.” Williams v. Board of Review, 241 Ill. 2d 352, 360-61 , 948 N.E.2d 561, 567 (2011) (quoting Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir. 1996)).

2013“Generally, the doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a statute of limitations where ‘because of disability, irremediable lack of information, or other circumstances beyond his control,’ the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to file suit on time.” Williams v. Board of Review, 241 Ill. 2d 352, 360 (2011) (quoting Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir. 1996)).

2015Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603, 614 (2000).

2013Rather, I disagree that the doctrine should be applied in this case. ¶ 54 As the law now stands in Illinois, the equitable tolling doctrine may be applied to suspend the running of a statute of limitations where the defendant has “actively misled the plaintiff, or if the plaintiff has been prevented from asserting his or her rights in some extraordinary way, or if the plaintiff has mistakenly asserted his or her rights in the wrong forum.” Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603, 614 (2000).

2025Block v. Pepper Construction Co., 304 Ill.

2013Block v. Pepper Construction Co., 304 Ill.

2011A “nonjurisdictional federal statute of limitations is normally subject to a ‘rebuttable presumption’ in favor ‘of equitable tolling.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S._,_, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990)). 2 Based on the presumption, application of the doctrine turns on the answer to the query: “Is there good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply?” (Emphasis in original.) United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997) (citing Irwin, 498 U.S. 89 ).

2011A “nonjurisdictional federal statute of limitations is normally subject to a ‘rebuttable presumption’ in favor ‘of equitable tolling.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. ___ , ___, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990)).2 Based on the presumption, application of the doctrine turns on the answer to the query: “Is there good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply?” (Emphasis in original.) United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997) (citing Irwin, 498 U.S. 8

2011A “nonjurisdictional federal statute of limitations is normally subject to a ‘rebuttable presumption’ in favor ‘of equitable tolling.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S._,_, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990)). 2 Based on the presumption, application of the doctrine turns on the answer to the query: “Is there good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply?” (Emphasis in original.) United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997) (citing Irwin, 498 U.S. 89 ).

2011A “nonjurisdictional federal statute of limitations is normally subject to a ‘rebuttable presumption’ in favor ‘of equitable tolling.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S._,_, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990)). 2 Based on the presumption, application of the doctrine turns on the answer to the query: “Is there good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply?” (Emphasis in original.) United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997) (citing Irwin, 498 U.S. 89 ).

2011A “nonjurisdictional federal statute of limitations is normally subject to a ‘rebuttable presumption’ in favor ‘of equitable tolling.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S._,_, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990)). 2 Based on the presumption, application of the doctrine turns on the answer to the query: “Is there good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply?” (Emphasis in original.) United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997) (citing Irwin, 498 U.S. 89 ).

2011While this similarity militates in favor of applying equitable tolling to the 8/16 week deadline, we must consider, as the Supreme Court instructs, whether “there [is] good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.” (Emphasis in original.) Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350 .

2011Congress is presumed to draft limitations periods in light of this presumption (Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49-50 (2002)), which operates in suits against private parties, as well as in suits against the federal government {Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95-96 ).

2011Congress is presumed to draft limitations periods in light of this presumption (Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49-50 (2002)), which operates in suits against private parties, as well as in suits against the federal government (Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95-96 ).

2008Varga v. Rumsfeld, 12 172 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1327 (D.

2008Varga v. Rumsfeld, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1327 (D.

2007Brice v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 240 F.3d 1367, 1373-74 (Fed.

2007Brice v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 240 F.3d 1367, 1373-74 (Fed.

2015We find the following statement by our supreme court instructive: “Generally, the doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a statute of limitations where ‘because of disability, irremediable lack of information, or other circumstances beyond his control,’ the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to file suit on time. [Citation.] Unlike the related doctrine of equitable estoppel, equitable tolling requires no fault on the part of the defendant. [Citation]; see also Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 19

2011See Miller, 77 F.3d at 191 ; Tregenza, 12 F.3d at 721 .

2025See, e.g., Tolbert v. Godinez, 2020 IL App (4th) 180587, ¶ 24 ; but see Ralda-Sanden, 2013 IL App (1st) 121117, ¶ 50 (Connors, J., dissenting) (“Although Williams involved the equitable tolling doctrine, the court made clear that it was analyzing whether the federal equitable tolling doctrine could be applied to the federal Trade Act of 1974[.]”) (Emphasis in original)); City of Rockford, 2022 IL App (2d) 210521 , ¶ 65 (noting that our supreme court only applied the doctrine of equitable tolling once in Williams, where the issue before the court concerned a non- jurisdictional federal statute

2025Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254 (1995). ¶ 19 The equitable tolling doctrine may be applied to suspend the running of a statute of limitations period or other statutory and administrative deadlines in certain limited circumstances.

2025See, e.g., Tolbert v. Godinez, 2020 IL App (4th) 180587, ¶ 24 ; but see Ralda-Sanden, 2013 IL App (1st) 121117, ¶ 50 (Connors, J., dissenting) (“Although Williams involved the equitable tolling doctrine, the court made clear that it was analyzing whether the federal equitable tolling doctrine could be applied to the federal Trade Act of 1974[.]”) (Emphasis in original)); City of Rockford, 2022 IL App (2d) 210521 , ¶ 65 (noting that our supreme court only applied the doctrine of equitable tolling once in Williams, where the issue before the court concerned a non- jurisdictional federal statute

2025Further, “[i]t is clear that federal courts recognize that there are important differences in the way that state and federal tolling doctrines are applied based largely on matters of legislative policy.” Ralda-Sanden, 2013 IL App (1st) 121117, ¶ 50 (Connors, J., dissenting).

2025See, e.g., Tolbert v. Godinez, 2020 IL App (4th) 180587, ¶ 24 ; but see Ralda-Sanden, 2013 IL App (1st) 121117, ¶ 50 (Connors, J., dissenting) (“Although Williams involved the equitable tolling doctrine, the court made clear that it was analyzing whether the federal equitable tolling doctrine could be applied to the federal Trade Act of 1974[.]”) (Emphasis in original)); City of Rockford, 2022 IL App (2d) 210521 , ¶ 65 (noting that our supreme court only applied the doctrine of equitable tolling once in Williams, where the issue before the court concerned a non- jurisdictional federal statute

2015Co., 380 U.S. 424, 433 (1965) (“The incorporation of variant state saving statutes would defeat the aim of a federal limitation provision designed to produce national uniformity.”). ¶ 18 In support of his request this court reverse the trial court’s judgment dismissing his complaint, Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled during the pendency of his original complaint under the doctrine of equitable tolling.

2015We find the following statement by our supreme court instructive: “Generally, the doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a statute of limitations where ‘because of disability, irremediable lack of information, or other circumstances beyond his control,’ the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to file suit on time. [Citation.] Unlike the related doctrine of equitable estoppel, equitable tolling requires no fault on the part of the defendant. [Citation]; see also Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 19

2013The Third and Fourth Appellate Districts have refined that rule, borrowing heavily from the language of the federal doctrine, to apply equitable tolling where “the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to sue in time because of disability, irremediable lack of information, or other circumstances beyond his control,” as when “a plaintiff cannot discover his injurer’s identity within the statutory period despite the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Griffin v. Willoughby, 369 Ill.

2013See Neaterour v. Holt, 188 Ill.

2013Van Milligen v. Department of Employment Security, 373 Ill.

2013Tolan & Son, Inc. v. KLLM Architects, Inc., 308 Ill.