equitable tolling doctrine in Florida

2017Machules v. Dep’t of Admin., 523 So.2d 1132, 1134 (Fla. 1988); Pro Tech Monitoring, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 72 So.3d 277, 280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); see Williams v. Dep’t of Corr., 156 So.3d 563, 565 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (“The doctrine of equitable tolling can be applied to extend an administrative filing deadline.”).

2011Indeed, there are numerous cases upholding benefits claimants' rights of fundamental due process, [4] and FUAC has correctly acknowledged that the rationale is similar to the doctrine of equitable tolling, citing Machules v. Department of Administration, 523 So.2d 1132 (Fla.1988).

2026The Florida Supreme Court further noted that the equitable tolling doctrine “‘focuses on the plaintiff’s excusable ignorance of the limitations period and on [the] lack of prejudice to the defendant.’” Id. (quoting Cocke v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 817 F.2d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir.1987)).

2005The supreme court further noted that the equitable tolling doctrine "`focuses on the plaintiff's excusable ignorance of the limitations period and on [the] lack of prejudice to the defendant.'" 523 So.2d at 1134 (quoting Naton v. Bank of California, 649 *1248 F.2d 691, 696 (9th Cir.1981)), quoted in Cocke v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 817 F.2d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir.1987).

2009See Patz v. Dep’t of Health, 864 So.2d 79 , 80 n. 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (finding that doctrine of equitable tolling did not apply because appellant *694 failed to demonstrate that he “was misled or lulled into inaction, that he was in some extraordinary way prevented from asserting his rights, or that he mistakenly asserted his rights in the wrong forum”).

2008Contra Patz v. Dep’t of Health, 864 So.2d 79, 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (finding that doctrine of equitable tolling did not apply because appellant failed to demonstrate that he “was misled or lulled into inaction, that he was in some extraordinary way prevented from asserting his rights, or that he mistakenly asserted his rights in the wrong forum”); Jancyn Mfg.

2025See Aleong, 963 So. 2d at 801 (“Three of Florida's district courts have held that the untimely filing of a request for hearing by counsel is not an ‘extraordinary’ circumstance which warrants the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling.

2025Tr. v. Islamorada, Vill. of Islands, 225 So. 3d 312, 317 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous there is no occasion for judicial interpretation.” (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 454 (Fla. 1992))).

2025Tr. v. Islamorada, Vill. of Islands, 225 So. 3d 312, 317 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous there is no occasion for judicial interpretation.” (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 454 (Fla. 1992))).

2017Machules v. Dep’t of Admin., 523 So.2d 1132, 1134 (Fla. 1988); Pro Tech Monitoring, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 72 So.3d 277, 280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); see Williams v. Dep’t of Corr., 156 So.3d 563, 565 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (“The doctrine of equitable tolling can be applied to extend an administrative filing deadline.”).

2017Machules v. Dep’t of Admin., 523 So.2d 1132, 1134 (Fla. 1988); Pro Tech Monitoring, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 72 So.3d 277, 280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); see Williams v. Dep’t of Corr., 156 So.3d 563, 565 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (“The doctrine of equitable tolling can be applied to extend an administrative filing deadline.”).

2015She also alleged that those actions “prevented/prohibited me from seeking legal assistance and learning through a personal injury attorney the nuances of negligence products liability, and causation factors,” and that, but for her husband’s actions, she “would have had the ability to choose to educate myself regarding my injuries by way of talking to a personal injury attorney.” Finally, Appellant claimed that “[t]he earliest that I could have had any idea about causes of action regarding my injuries, or that someone had wronged me,occurred on November 25, 2013.” In the judgment under review,

2014See Morsani, 790 So.2d at 1076 n. 11 (“Equitable tolling ... involves no misconduct on the part of the defendant ... [and] may delay the running of the limitations period based on the plaintiffs blameless ignorance and the lack of prejudice to the defendant.”).

2014In contrast, the administrative complaint informed Giordano, just as it informed appellant in the present case, that the failure to timely request a hearing constituted a waiver of the right to do so and that a final order would be entered, so that there was "no error in the failure to hold an evidentiary proceeding on the allegations of the complaint prior to entry of the final order.” Giordano v. Dep’t of Banking & Fin., 596 So.2d 712, 714 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). .We reject appellant’s argument that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies here.

2011See Machules, 523 So.2d at 1134 ; cf. Riverwood Nursing Ctr., LLC v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 58 So.3d 907, 910 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (concluding that the facts did not support equitable tolling where an agency informed the petitioner after the deadline for filing a request for hearing had passed that its late-filed request would be accepted as timely).

2009See Leslie v. Carnival Corp., 22 So.3d 561 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), on rehearing en banc, 22 So.3d 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) Ms. Morrissette has lost nothing substantively by this decision because, on the authority of the equitable tolling principle applied in Booth v. Carnival Corp., 522 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir.2008), see Carnival Corp. v. Booth, 946 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), the federal District Court has denied Norwegian’s motion to dismiss her identical, “protective” action in that court, even though it was filed there on July 19, 2007, after the one year period had expired: The Eleventh Circuit

2009See Leslie v. Carnival Corp., 22 So.3d 561 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), on rehearing en banc, 22 So.3d 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) Ms. Morrissette has lost nothing substantively by this decision because, on the authority of the equitable tolling principle applied in Booth v. Carnival Corp., 522 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir.2008), see Carnival Corp. v. Booth, 946 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), the federal District Court has denied Norwegian’s motion to dismiss her identical, “protective” action in that court, even though it was filed there on July 19, 2007, after the one year period had expired: The Eleventh Circuit

2009See Leslie v. Carnival Corp., 22 So.3d 561 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), on rehearing en banc, 22 So.3d 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) Ms. Morrissette has lost nothing substantively by this decision because, on the authority of the equitable tolling principle applied in Booth v. Carnival Corp., 522 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir.2008), see Carnival Corp. v. Booth, 946 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), the federal District Court has denied Norwegian’s motion to dismiss her identical, “protective” action in that court, even though it was filed there on July 19, 2007, after the one year period had expired: The Eleventh Circuit

2009See Leslie v. Carnival Corp., 22 So.3d 561 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), on rehearing en banc, 22 So.3d 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) Ms. Morrissette has lost nothing substantively by this decision because, on the authority of the equitable tolling principle applied in Booth v. Carnival Corp., 522 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir.2008), see Carnival Corp. v. Booth, 946 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), the federal District Court has denied Norwegian’s motion to dismiss her identical, “protective” action in that court, even though it was filed there on July 19, 2007, after the one year period had expired: The Eleventh Circuit

2008Corp. v. State Dep’t of Health, 742 So.2d 473, 476 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (finding that failure to seek extension or file Chapter 120 proceeding was the result of appellant’s own inattention and therefore equitable tolling doctrine did not apply where the Department did not mislead appellant).

1986Equitable tolling of time limits has been permitted in federal actions where “active deception” took place, Cottrell v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 590 F.2d 836, 838-39 (10th Cir.1979); where plaintiff has been “lulled into inaction by past employer, state or federal agencies, or the courts.” Miller v. Marsh, 766 F.2d 490, 493 (11th Cir.1985), Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1112 (10th Cir.1984); and where plaintiff has been “actively misled” or “has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his or her rights”, Wilkerson v. Siegfried Insurance Agency, Inc., 683 F.2d 344, 348 (10th Ci

1986Equitable tolling of time limits has been permitted in federal actions where “active deception” took place, Cottrell v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 590 F.2d 836, 838-39 (10th Cir.1979); where plaintiff has been “lulled into inaction by past employer, state or federal agencies, or the courts.” Miller v. Marsh, 766 F.2d 490, 493 (11th Cir.1985), Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1112 (10th Cir.1984); and where plaintiff has been “actively misled” or “has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his or her rights”, Wilkerson v. Siegfried Insurance Agency, Inc., 683 F.2d 344, 348 (10th Ci