equitable tolling doctrine in Ohio

2008Welcome Ctr. v. Brown (1984), 466 U.S. 147 , 151 , 104 S.Ct. 1723 , rehearing denied, 467 U.S. 1231 , 104 S.Ct. 2691 (stating that "[o]ne who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence"). {¶ 56} This court also has declared: "`The doctrine of equitable tolling is to be applied sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances.'" McNeely , at ¶ 11, quoting Gray , supra, citing Wilson v. Grumman Ohio Corp. (C.A.6, 1987), 815 F.2d 26 .

2008Co. (S.D.Ohio 2005), 2005 WL 2372845 , citing Wilson v. Grumman Ohio Corp. (C.A.6, 1987), 815 F.2d 26 .

2026Courts apply the doctrine of equitable tolling “sparingly and only in -12- exceptional circumstances.” Roach, supra, at ¶ 8 , citing Moore v. Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 2011-Ohio-1607 , ¶ 21 (10th Dist.), and Engler v. Adjutant Gen., 2018- Ohio-2273, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.) A determination of whether equitable tolling is appropriate is made on a case-by-case basis.

2023The equitable-tolling doctrine “is to be applied sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances.” Roach v. Vapor Station Columbus, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-511, 2022-Ohio-2106, ¶ 8 .

2026Strother, supra, at ¶ 29 , citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010).

2023To establish entitlement to equitable tolling, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he has diligently pursued his rights, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Strother v. Columbus, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 22AP- 7, 2022-Ohio-4097, ¶ 29 .

2013Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Serv., 145 Ohio App.3d 651, 655 , 736 N.E.2d 1238 (10th Dist.2001).

2008Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Job Family Serv. (2001), 145 Ohio App.3d 651 , 655 , 736 N.E.2d 1238 .

2008Accordingly, the “doctrine of equitable tolling,” which this court recognized in In re Holzer, 2004-Ohio-5533 , 2004 WL 2341322 , is inapplicable.

2008Health Sys. v. Ohio Dept. of Health , Franklin App. No. 03AP-1020, 2004-Ohio-5533 , ¶ 10 , it was held: Appellees do not contest the applicability of Ohio Adm. Code 3701-12-232(A) and (E) to the application, but instead, argue that the Director appropriately found that the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply.

2021(Emphasis added.) Darby v. Twinsburg Township, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29593, 2020-Ohio-2702, ¶ 11 , quoting Jacobson-Kirsch v. Kaforey, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26102, 2012-Ohio-3553, ¶ 12 , citing Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122, 1126 (6th Cir.1982).

2021(Emphasis added.) Darby v. Twinsburg Township, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29593, 2020-Ohio-2702, ¶ 11 , quoting Jacobson-Kirsch v. Kaforey, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26102, 2012-Ohio-3553, ¶ 12 , citing Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122, 1126 (6th Cir.1982).

2020Summit No. 25498, 2011-Ohio-2240, ¶ 26 . {¶11} As to Ms. Darby’s argument in her second assignment of error that the trial court failed to, or improperly applied, the doctrine of equitable tolling, Ms. Darby only briefly mentioned the equitable tolling doctrine of fraudulent concealment in her summary judgment materials.

2020Summit No. 25498, 2011-Ohio-2240, ¶ 26 . {¶11} As to Ms. Darby’s argument in her second assignment of error that the trial court failed to, or improperly applied, the doctrine of equitable tolling, Ms. Darby only briefly mentioned the equitable tolling doctrine of fraudulent concealment in her summary judgment materials.

2018No. 08AP-204, 2008-Ohio-4833, ¶ 56 . {¶ 10} Here, Engler's complaint alleges no facts suggesting the existence of an extraordinary circumstance warranting the application of the equitable tolling doctrine.

2017Id. at 620 .

2016It is equally clear that the burden to show a duty to disclose is upon the party asserting fraudulent concealment.”); Loer v. Neal, 127 Ind.App. 246, 254-255 , 137 N.E.2d 728 (1956).8 While we acknowledge that “fraudulent concealment” is an equitable tolling doctrine under 8 Indiana law, we do not agree that Indiana courts refuse to recognize a claim of fraud based on a defendant’s act of concealing a fact when a duty to disclose exists.

2016It is equally clear that the burden to show a duty to disclose is upon the party asserting fraudulent concealment.”); Loer v. Neal, 127 Ind.App. 246, 254-255 , 137 N.E.2d 728 (1956).8 While we acknowledge that “fraudulent concealment” is an equitable tolling doctrine under 8 Indiana law, we do not agree that Indiana courts refuse to recognize a claim of fraud based on a defendant’s act of concealing a fact when a duty to disclose exists.

2008(C.A.6, 2003), 339 F.3d 454 , 469 . {¶ 15} The federal courts have not only followed the equitable tolling doctrine, they have expressed the need for a hearing on the matter.

2008In Dixon v. Gonzales (C.A.6, 2007), 481 F.3d 324 , 330 , the court held: The equitable tolling doctrine does not delay the start of the limitations clock, but rather halts its ticking after the limitations period has accrued.

2008Cf. In re Holzer (determining that the doctrine of equitable tolling applied and tolled the 12-month limitations period when the application for the CON was filed approximately three months before the 12-month period would have expired and, but for the objection of an affected party, the director of ODH could have rendered a decision before the 12-month limitations period expired); Summit Villa Care Ctr., Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Health (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 761 , 612 N.E.2d 377 (strictly applying the 12-month rule when the application for CON was filed two days before the 12-month limitations p

2008Cf. In re Holzer (determining that the doctrine of equitable tolling applied and tolled the 12-month limitations period when the application for the CON was filed approximately three months before the 12-month period would have expired and, but for the objection of an affected party, the director of ODH could have rendered a decision before the 12-month limitations period expired); Summit Villa Care Ctr., Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Health (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 761 , 612 N.E.2d 377 (strictly applying the 12-month rule when the application for CON was filed two days before the 12-month limitations p

2008State v. Culberson , 142 Ohio App.3d 656 , 662 , 2001-Ohio-3261 , 756 N.E.2d 734 .

2008State v. Culberson , 142 Ohio App.3d 656 , 662 , 2001-Ohio-3261 , 756 N.E.2d 734 .

2008Welcome Ctr. v. Brown (1984), 466 U.S. 147 , 151 , 104 S.Ct. 1723 , rehearing denied, 467 U.S. 1231 , 104 S.Ct. 2691 (stating that "[o]ne who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence"). {¶ 56} This court also has declared: "`The doctrine of equitable tolling is to be applied sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances.'" McNeely , at ¶ 11, quoting Gray , supra, citing Wilson v. Grumman Ohio Corp. (C.A.6, 1987), 815 F.2d 26 .

2008In Lyons v. Potter (C.A.8, 2008), 521 F.3d 981 , 983 , it was held: In the absence of a developed record, a district court may be required to hold an evidentiary hearing on an equitable tolling claim.

2008In Lyons v. Potter (C.A.8, 2008), 521 F.3d 981 , 983 , it was held: In the absence of a developed record, a district court may be required to hold an evidentiary hearing on an equitable tolling claim.

2008Welcome Ctr. v. Brown (1984), 466 U.S. 147 , 151 , 104 S.Ct. 1723 , rehearing denied, 467 U.S. 1231 , 104 S.Ct. 2691 (stating that "[o]ne who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence"). {¶ 56} This court also has declared: "`The doctrine of equitable tolling is to be applied sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances.'" McNeely , at ¶ 11, quoting Gray , supra, citing Wilson v. Grumman Ohio Corp. (C.A.6, 1987), 815 F.2d 26 .

2008Welcome Ctr. v. Brown (1984), 466 U.S. 147 , 151 , 104 S.Ct. 1723 , rehearing denied, 467 U.S. 1231 , 104 S.Ct. 2691 (stating that "[o]ne who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence"). {¶ 56} This court also has declared: "`The doctrine of equitable tolling is to be applied sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances.'" McNeely , at ¶ 11, quoting Gray , supra, citing Wilson v. Grumman Ohio Corp. (C.A.6, 1987), 815 F.2d 26 .