16 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
F.H.U. v. A.C.U.green2 sentences2025In Barron v. Gersten, we underscored the narrow scope and stringent standards of the equitable tolling doctrine, holding: A statute of limitations may be equitably tolled under very limited circumstances: "(1) [if] the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff, (2) if the plaintiff has 'in some extraordinary way' been prevented from asserting his [or her] rights, or (3) if the plaintiff has timely asserted his [or her] rights mistakenly in the wrong forum." F.H.U. v. A.C.U., 427 N.J. 2020"Equitable tolling is traditionally reserved for limited occasions ." F.H.U. v. A.C.U., 427 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
Maltese v. Township of North Brunswickgreen1 sentence2026Plaintiff attempts to circumvent the plain statutory language by invoking the doctrine of equitable tolling, a remedy largely reserved for "very compelling circumstances, where the interest of justice, morality and common fairness dictate that course." Maltese v. Twp. of N. Brunswick, 353 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Bustamante v. Borough of Paramusgreen1 sentence2025It may be available 'when a plaintiff is misled . . . and as a A-2672-22 15 result fails to act within the prescribed time limit.'" Bustamante v. Borough of Paramus, 413 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Roa v. Roagreen1 sentence2025The court also correctly denied plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint based on the doctrine of equitable tolling.4 Moreover, the continuing violation doctrine does not permit "the aggregation of discrete discriminatory acts for the purpose of reviving an untimely act of discrimination that the victim knew or should have known was actionable." Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 569 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Lopez v. Swyergreen1 sentence2024The court also considered whether plaintiff was entitled to relief under the discovery rule, which is "a rule of equity." Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 273 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
Rac v. Pjs, Jr.green1 sentence2021We discern no basis in the evidence to support application of the doctrine of equitable tolling here. "[T]he doctrine of equitable tolling of limitations periods [is] applied only in narrowly-defined circumstances," R.A.C. v. P.J.S., Jr., 192 N.J. 81, 100 (2007), when "tolling of the statute of limitations is the fair and responsible result," Price v. N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Philip J. Podobnik v. United States Postal Service National Rural Letter Carriers Association John E. Potter, Postmaster General of the United Statesgreen1 sentence2008However, in Podobnik v. United States Postal Service, 409 F. 3d 584, 593 (3d Cir.2005), the Court recognized that the statute will be equitably tolled "only until the aggrieved person seeks out an attorney or acquires actual knowledge of his rights." In a similar vein, we have said that the doctrine of equitable tolling "requires the exercise of reasonable insight and diligence by a person seeking its protection." Villalobos v. Fava, 342 N.J.Super. 38, 52 , 775 A. 2d 700 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 210 , 785 A. 2d 438 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Pobieglo v. Monsanto Co.green2 sentences2001In Pobieglo v. Monsanto Co., 402 Mass. 112 , 521 N.E.2d 728, 730 (1988), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the equitable tolling principle of the discovery rule may not be applied to the statute of limitations for claims under the wrongful-death statute, which provided that a claim for wrongful death must be brought within “three years from the date of death.” The court stated unequivocally: Here it is of no significance that the wrongful death claim has common law origins, since we are first concerned with the meaning of the [wrongful death statute], which limits the right to 2001In Pobieglo v. Monsanto Co., 402 Mass. 112 , 521 N.E.2d 728, 730 (1988), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the equitable tolling principle of the discovery rule may not be applied to the statute of limitations for claims under the wrongful-death statute, which provided that a claim for wrongful death must be brought within “three years from the date of death.” The court stated unequivocally: Here it is of no significance that the wrongful death claim has common law origins, since we are first concerned with the meaning of the [wrongful death statute], which limits the right to | 1 | 1 |
Gibbons v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. (In Re Princeton-New York Investors, Inc.)green1 sentence1997Accord In re Princeton — New York Investors, Inc., 199 B.R. 285 , 293 n. 4 (Bankr.D.N.J.1996) ("This Court finds that N.J.S.A. § 25:2-31 is a statute of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose, the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed.”); First Southwestern Financial Services v. Pulliam, 121 N.M. 436 , 912 P.2d 828, 830 (App.1996) ("[T]he UFTA operates in the same manner as other statutes of repose that extinguish a cause of action as of a certain date rather than simply blocking the remedy.”); McMaster v. Farme | 1 | 1 |
Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Associatesgreen1 sentence1997Johnson & Assoc., 910 P.2d 1252, 1259 (Utah.Ct.App.1996) ("The 'transfer’ referred to in section [25:2-31(c)] is the same transfer which gives rise to a claim under section [25:2-27(b) ]. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Vellalosgreen1 sentence1997Accord In re Princeton — New York Investors, Inc., 199 B.R. 285 , 293 n. 4 (Bankr.D.N.J.1996) ("This Court finds that N.J.S.A. § 25:2-31 is a statute of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose, the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed.”); First Southwestern Financial Services v. Pulliam, 121 N.M. 436 , 912 P.2d 828, 830 (App.1996) ("[T]he UFTA operates in the same manner as other statutes of repose that extinguish a cause of action as of a certain date rather than simply blocking the remedy.”); McMaster v. Farme | 1 | 1 |
First Southwestern Financial Services v. Pulliamgreen2 sentences1997Accord In re Princeton — New York Investors, Inc., 199 B.R. 285 , 293 n. 4 (Bankr.D.N.J.1996) ("This Court finds that N.J.S.A. § 25:2-31 is a statute of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose, the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed.”); First Southwestern Financial Services v. Pulliam, 121 N.M. 436 , 912 P.2d 828, 830 (App.1996) ("[T]he UFTA operates in the same manner as other statutes of repose that extinguish a cause of action as of a certain date rather than simply blocking the remedy.”); McMaster v. Farme 1997Accord In re Princeton — New York Investors, Inc., 199 B.R. 285 , 293 n. 4 (Bankr.D.N.J.1996) ("This Court finds that N.J.S.A. § 25:2-31 is a statute of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose, the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed.”); First Southwestern Financial Services v. Pulliam, 121 N.M. 436 , 912 P.2d 828, 830 (App.1996) ("[T]he UFTA operates in the same manner as other statutes of repose that extinguish a cause of action as of a certain date rather than simply blocking the remedy.”); McMaster v. Farme | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Villalobos v. Fava
green
2 sentences2008However, in Podobnik v. United States Postal Service, 409 F. 3d 584, 593 (3d Cir.2005), the Court recognized that the statute will be equitably tolled "only until the aggrieved person seeks out an attorney or acquires actual knowledge of his rights." In a similar vein, we have said that the doctrine of equitable tolling "requires the exercise of reasonable insight and diligence by a person seeking its protection." Villalobos v. Fava, 342 N.J.Super. 38, 52 , 775 A. 2d 700 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 210 , 785 A. 2d 438 (2001). 2008However, in Podobnik v. United States Postal Service, 409 F. 3d 584, 593 (3d Cir.2005), the Court recognized that the statute will be equitably tolled "only until the aggrieved person seeks out an attorney or acquires actual knowledge of his rights." In a similar vein, we have said that the doctrine of equitable tolling "requires the exercise of reasonable insight and diligence by a person seeking its protection." Villalobos v. Fava, 342 N.J.Super. 38, 52 , 775 A. 2d 700 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 210 , 785 A. 2d 438 (2001). | 3 | 2008–2020 |
Dunn v. Borough of Mountainside
green
2 sentences2005Dunn, supra, 301 N.J.Super. at 280 , 693 A.2d 1248 . 2005Dunn, supra, 301 N.J.Super. at 280 , 693 A.2d 1248 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., LLP
green
1 sentence2025Binder, 393 N.J. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Evernham v. Selected Risks Insurance Company
green
2 sentences2001The Presslaff court, quoting the extensive discussion in Evernham v. Selected Risks Insurance Co., 163 N.J.Super. 132, 136 , 394 A.2d 373 (App.Div.1978), properly noted that the equitable tolling principle set forth in the discovery rule is peculiar to statutes of limitations with “accrual” language. 2001The Presslaff court, quoting the extensive discussion in Evernham v. Selected Risks Insurance Co., 163 N.J.Super. 132, 136 , 394 A.2d 373 (App.Div.1978), properly noted that the equitable tolling principle set forth in the discovery rule is peculiar to statutes of limitations with “accrual” language. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Presslaff v. Robins
green
2 sentences2001Presslaff, supra, 168 N.J.Super. at 546-47 , 403 A.2d 939 . 2001Presslaff, supra, 168 N.J.Super. at 546-47 , 403 A.2d 939 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, Inc.
green
2 sentences1998Whenever dismissal would not further the legislature's objectives in prescribing the limitations, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to assert his claim. [ Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 256 , 440 A. 2d 1329 (1982)(quoting Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, 82 N.J. 188, 193 , 412 A. 2d 122 (1980)) (citations omitted).] The above language expresses the doctrine of equitable tolling. 1998Whenever dismissal would not further the legislature's objectives in prescribing the limitations, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to assert his claim. [ Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 256 , 440 A. 2d 1329 (1982)(quoting Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, 82 N.J. 188, 193 , 412 A. 2d 122 (1980)) (citations omitted).] The above language expresses the doctrine of equitable tolling. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Zaccardi v. Becker
green
2 sentences1998Whenever dismissal would not further the legislature's objectives in prescribing the limitations, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to assert his claim. [ Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 256 , 440 A. 2d 1329 (1982)(quoting Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, 82 N.J. 188, 193 , 412 A. 2d 122 (1980)) (citations omitted).] The above language expresses the doctrine of equitable tolling. 1998Whenever dismissal would not further the legislature's objectives in prescribing the limitations, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to assert his claim. [ Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 256 , 440 A. 2d 1329 (1982)(quoting Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, 82 N.J. 188, 193 , 412 A. 2d 122 (1980)) (citations omitted).] The above language expresses the doctrine of equitable tolling. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
McMaster v. Farmer
green
1 sentence1997Accord In re Princeton — New York Investors, Inc., 199 B.R. 285 , 293 n. 4 (Bankr.D.N.J.1996) ("This Court finds that N.J.S.A. § 25:2-31 is a statute of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose, the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed.”); First Southwestern Financial Services v. Pulliam, 121 N.M. 436 , 912 P.2d 828, 830 (App.1996) ("[T]he UFTA operates in the same manner as other statutes of repose that extinguish a cause of action as of a certain date rather than simply blocking the remedy.”); McMaster v. Farme | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.