equitable tolling doctrine in Pennsylvania

2026The “period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling; instead, the time for filing a PCRA petition can be extended only if the PCRA permits it to be extended, i.e., by operation of one of the statutorily enumerated exceptions to the PCRA time-bar.” Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026The “period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling; instead, the time for filing a PCRA petition can be extended only if the PCRA permits it to be extended[.]” Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 222 (Pa. 1999) (limiting doctrine of equitable tolling only to that provided in subsections 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii)).

2023We are unable to entertain that argument because the period for filing a PCRA petition “is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling, save to the extent the doctrine is embraced by § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii),” and “a court has no authority to extend filing periods except as the [PCRA’s time-limitation] statute permits.” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 222 (Pa. 1999).

2022Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 222 (Pa. 1999) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa. 2011) (observing that PCRA does not confer authority on “this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the [PCRA]”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003)).

2014CRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling; instead, the time for filing a PCRA petition can be Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotations marks and citation Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).

2025The “period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling[.]” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 185 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).

2024It is well-settled that “the period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling; instead, the time for filing a PCRA petition can be extended only by operation of one of the statutorily enumerated exceptions to the PCRA time-bar.” [Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 185 (Pa. 2016).] “[I]n order for this Court to review a legality of sentence claim, there must be a basis for our jurisdiction to engage in such review. . . . [T]hough not technically waivable, a legality [of sentence] claim may nevertheless be lost should it be raised . . . in an untimely PC

2024It is well-settled that “the period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling; instead, the time for filing a PCRA petition can be extended only by operation of one of the statutorily enumerated exceptions to the PCRA time-bar.” [Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 185 (Pa. 2016).] “[I]n order for this Court to review a legality of sentence claim, there must be a basis for our jurisdiction to engage in such review. . . . [T]hough not technically waivable, a legality [of sentence] claim may nevertheless be lost should it be raised . . . in an untimely PC

2017It is well-settled that “the period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling; instead, the time for filing a PCRA petition can be extended only by operation of one of the statutorily enumerated exceptions to the PCRA time-bar.” Robinson, supra at 185 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n order for this Court to review a legality of sentence claim, there must be a basis for our jurisdiction to engage in such review. . . . [T]hough not technically waivable, a legality [of sentence] claim may nevertheless be lost should it be raised . . . in

2022Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 222 (Pa. 1999) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa. 2011) (observing that PCRA does not confer authority on “this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the [PCRA]”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003)).

2017It is well-settled that “a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling,” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 222 (Pa. 1999), and the time for filing a PCRA petition “can be extended only to the extent that the PCRA permits it to be extended, i.e., by operation of one of the statutorily enumerated exceptions to the PCRA time-bar,” Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287, 292 (Pa. 2004). “[T]he PCRA confers no authority upon [any Pennsylvania court] to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the Act.” Commo

2015Furthermore, our Supreme Court has held that apart from the specifically enumerated exceptions contained in section 9545(b), “the period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling[.]” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 222 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003). -7- J-S53003-15 (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States; (ii) the f

2015See Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum, 8/17/12, ¶¶ 7-8. -7- J-S53008-15 enumerated exceptions contained in section 9545(b), “the period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling[.]” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 222 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003).

2024See 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b)(1)(iii) ( requiring the right asserted to be a constitutional right that has been held to apply retroactively); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287, 292 ( Pa. 2004) (explaining that the period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling).

2017It is well-settled that “a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling,” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 222 (Pa. 1999), and the time for filing a PCRA petition “can be extended only to the extent that the PCRA permits it to be extended, i.e., by operation of one of the statutorily enumerated exceptions to the PCRA time-bar,” Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287, 292 (Pa. 2004). “[T]he PCRA confers no authority upon [any Pennsylvania court] to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the Act.” Commo

2019Commonwealth v. Smallwood, 155 A.3d 1054, 1059-60 (Pa. Super. 2017). -6- J-S72044-18 Finally, Stoneroad acknowledges that he did not file his latest PCRA petition within sixty days of the Muniz decision.

2018See Commonwealth v. Smallwood, 155 A.3d 1054, 1059 (Pa. Super. 2017) (explaining statutory time period for filing PCRA petition is not subject to the -6- J-S08021-18 doctrine of equitable tolling; rather, the time for filing can be extended only if the PCRA statute permits it to be extended by operation of one of the enumerated exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar).

2026Additionally, for a second or subsequent PCRA petition, the petitioner must -7- J-S45044-25 make “a strong prima facie showing that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1267 (Pa. 2008); see also Commonwealth v. Lawson, 549 A.2d 107, 112 (Pa. 1988).

2025Additionally, for a second or subsequent PCRA petition, the petitioner must make “a strong prima facie showing that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1267 (Pa. 2008).

2017It is well-settled that “[a]lthough legality of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the exceptions thereto.” Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 592 (Pa. -7- J-S05035-17 Super. 2007), appeal denied, 944 A.2d 756 (Pa. 2008) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

2016It is well-settled that “[a]lthough legality of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the exceptions thereto.” Commonwealth v. ____________________________________________ 9 Appellant’s characterization of the restitution order as “open-ended” is inaccurate and misleading since the court ordered the fixed amount of $15,980.00. -7- J-S82032-16 Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 592 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 944 A.2d 756 (Pa. 2008) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

2017This Court has explained that “[c]ase law has strictly interpreted the requirement that the petitioner be currently serving a sentence for the crime to be eligible for relief.” Plunkett, 151 A.3d at 1109 ; see also Lewis, 63 A.3d at 1279 (stating the general rule that the PCRA’s timeliness requirements are “not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling[.]”).

2015However, our Supreme Court has held that apart from the specifically enumerated exceptions contained in Section 9545(b), “the period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling[.]” Commonwealth v. Lewis, 2013 PA Super 62 , 63 A.3d 1274, 1278-79 (Pa. Super.

2017“The court cannot ignore a petition’s untimeliness and reach the merits of the petition.” [Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. 2013)].

2016“The court cannot ignore a petition’s untimeliness and reach the merits of the petition.” Taylor, 67 A.3d at 1248 . “[A] petition for post-conviction relief in a capital case may be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 820 (Pa. 2004); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 909(B)(2).

2026Additionally, for a second or subsequent PCRA petition, the petitioner must -7- J-S45044-25 make “a strong prima facie showing that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1267 (Pa. 2008); see also Commonwealth v. Lawson, 549 A.2d 107, 112 (Pa. 1988).

2026Additionally, for a second or subsequent PCRA petition, the petitioner must make a strong prima facie showing that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. -7- J-S07027-26 Commonwealth v. Giles, -- A.3d --, 2026 PA Super 87, at *3-4 (Pa. Super. 2026) (internal citations, quotations and brackets omitted).

2022See Commonwealth v. Lee, 206 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc).

2018The period for filing a PCRA petition "is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling." Commonwealth v. RiZf)i, 166 A.3d 344, 347 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted).

2018See generally, Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118 (Pa. Super. 2014).

2017Finally, with regard to Appellant’s assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel, (see Appellant’s Brief, at 89-94, 100-01), it is well-settled that “claim[s] that counsel was ineffective will not save an untimely PCRA petition.” Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1167 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citations omitted).

2017Fahy, 737 A.2d at 222 (citations omitted). -4- J-S94039-16 The three timeliness exceptions are: (i) The failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States; (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the Uni

2016“The court cannot ignore a petition’s untimeliness and reach the merits of the petition.” Taylor, 67 A.3d at 1248 . “[A] petition for post-conviction relief in a capital case may be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 820 (Pa. 2004); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 909(B)(2).

2016“The court cannot ignore a petition’s untimeliness and reach the merits of the petition.” Taylor, 67 A.3d at 1248 . “[A] petition for post-conviction relief in a capital case may be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Commonwealth v. D ’Amato, 579 Pa. 490 , 856 A.2d 806, 820 (2004); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 909(B)(2).

2016However, it is well settled that the “period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling; instead, the time for filing a PCRA petition can be extended only if the PCRA permits it to be extended, i.e., by operation of one of the statutorily enumerated exceptions to the PCRA time-bar.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 141 A.3d 1277, 1284 (Pa. 2016) (internal citations and quotation -6- J-S60007-16 marks omitted).