Wilson challenge in Washington

2013Meggyesy, 90 Wn.

2013Meggyesy, 90 Wn.

2010State v. Wilson, 168 Wash.2d 1018 , 228 P.3d 17 (2010).

2010State v. Wilson, 168 Wn.2d 1018 , 228 P.3d 17 (2010).

2010State v. Wilson, 168 Wash.2d 1018 , 228 P.3d 17 (2010).

2010State v. Wilson, 168 Wn.2d 1018 , 228 P.3d 17 (2010).

2008It has no final or binding effect, unless formally incorporated into the findings, conclusions, and judgment." Ferree, 62 Wash.2d at 567 , 383 P.2d 900 . [5] ¶ 17 Here, because the superior court entered a written order that is not incomplete and does not need clarification, we grant Wilson's motion to strike.

2008It has no final or binding effect, unless formally incorporated into the findings, conclusions, and judgment.” Ferree, 62 Wn.2d at 567 . 5 ¶17 Here, because the superior court entered a written order that is not incomplete and does not need clarification, we grant Wilson’s motion to strike.

2004It is well settled that driver’s licenses may not be suspended or revoked “ ‘without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 , 97 S. Ct. 1723 , 52 L.

2004It is well settled that driver’s licenses may not be suspended or revoked “ ‘without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 , 97 S. Ct. 1723 , 52 L.

2024App. 417, 428-29 , 220 P.3d 1273 (2009).4 The trial court did not err by denying Wilson’s motion for a mistrial.5 4.

2021State v. Harrison, 148 Wn.2d 550, 561 , 61 P.3d 1104 (2003).

2021State v. Harrison, 148 Wn.2d 550, 561 , 61 P.3d 1104 (2003).

2018App. 373, 387 , 28 P.3d 780 (2001).

2018EVEN IF ACCURATE, NOT REQUIRED We next examine whether even assuming Wilson’s instruction properly stated Washington law, the trial court correctly refused to give the instruction. “[L]anguage from appellate court decisions should not necessarily be incorporated into jury instructions.” State v. Summers, 107 Wn.

2017Wilson, 169 Wn.

2016But we address Wilson’s challenge to Haske’s testimony on the merits, and accordingly we reject his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground. 15 No. 47772-6-II 696, 704, 286 P.3d 673 (2012).

2016RAP 16.4(a), (c)(3); Williams, 96 Wn.2d at 223 .6 In conclusion, because Wilson’s claim for relief is based on inadmissible evidence and evidence that could have been discovered before trial, his petition is denied.

2015Restraint of Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1, 21-22 , 296 P.3d 872 (2013); State v. Rice, 120 Wn.2d 549, 561 , 844 P.2d 416 (1993). 33 CrR 6.4(b). 34 CrR 6.4(b). -12- NO. 69449-9-1/13 In Wilson, Division Two noted that our Supreme Court has often used the terms "jury selection and "voir dire" interchangeably in the public trial context.35 But our Supreme Court's public trial cases, as well as cases the court cites for support, are consistent with Wilson's analysis.

2015Restraint of Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1, 21-22 , 296 P.3d 872 (2013); State v. Rice, 120 Wn.2d 549, 561 , 844 P.2d 416 (1993). 33 CrR 6.4(b). 34 CrR 6.4(b). -12- NO. 69449-9-1/13 In Wilson, Division Two noted that our Supreme Court has often used the terms "jury selection and "voir dire" interchangeably in the public trial context.35 But our Supreme Court's public trial cases, as well as cases the court cites for support, are consistent with Wilson's analysis.

2015Restraint of Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1, 21-22 , 296 P.3d 872 (2013); State v. Rice, 120 Wn.2d 549, 561 , 844 P.2d 416 (1993). 33 CrR 6.4(b). 34 CrR 6.4(b). -12- NO. 69449-9-1/13 In Wilson, Division Two noted that our Supreme Court has often used the terms "jury selection and "voir dire" interchangeably in the public trial context.35 But our Supreme Court's public trial cases, as well as cases the court cites for support, are consistent with Wilson's analysis.

2015Restraint of Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1, 21-22 , 296 P.3d 872 (2013); State v. Rice, 120 Wn.2d 549, 561 , 844 P.2d 416 (1993). 33 CrR 6.4(b). 34 CrR 6.4(b). -12- NO. 69449-9-1/13 In Wilson, Division Two noted that our Supreme Court has often used the terms "jury selection and "voir dire" interchangeably in the public trial context.35 But our Supreme Court's public trial cases, as well as cases the court cites for support, are consistent with Wilson's analysis.

2014The court noted that the excusals were not based on any circumstances related to Wilson personally or to the issues in his case. ]d Moreover, there was no showing that his presence bore any "'relation, reasonably substantial, to the ful[l]ness of his opportunity to defend against the -7- No. 70516-4-1/8 charge'" or "'that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.'" jd (quoting State v. Irbv. 170 Wn.2d 874, 881 , 246 P.3d 796 (2011)).

2014The court noted that the excusals were not based on any circumstances related to Wilson personally or to the issues in his case. ]d Moreover, there was no showing that his presence bore any "'relation, reasonably substantial, to the ful[l]ness of his opportunity to defend against the -7- No. 70516-4-1/8 charge'" or "'that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.'" jd (quoting State v. Irbv. 170 Wn.2d 874, 881 , 246 P.3d 796 (2011)).

2012Restraint of Gentry, 137 Wn.2d 378, 388-89 , 972 P.2d 1250 (1999). ¶18 Having concluded that Wilson’s claim of ineffective assistance relating to the instructional error is neither time barred nor successive, we address it on the merits. ¶19 To convict Wilson of first degree felony murder, the jury had to find that Wilson or an accomplice was commit ting or attempting to commit first or second degree robbery, first or second degree rape, or first degree burglary: To convict defendant George Wilson of the charged crime of Felony Murder in the First Degree, each of the following elements of the

2012Restraint of Hankerson, 149 Wn.2d 695, 697, 702-03 , 72 P.3d 703 (2003); Stoudmire, 141 Wn.2d at 349 . ¶38 Even though a claim for insufficiency of the evidence is listed in RCW 10 .73.100 as an exception to the one-year time limit, Wilson’s claim cannot be heard because it was “mixed” or included in an untimely amended petition with a claim of prosecutorial misconduct that does not fit any exception to the one-year time limit.

2012Restraint of Hankerson, 149 Wn.2d 695, 697, 702-03 , 72 P.3d 703 (2003); Stoudmire, 141 Wn.2d at 349 . ¶38 Even though a claim for insufficiency of the evidence is listed in RCW 10 .73.100 as an exception to the one-year time limit, Wilson’s claim cannot be heard because it was “mixed” or included in an untimely amended petition with a claim of prosecutorial misconduct that does not fit any exception to the one-year time limit.

2012Restraint of Gentry, 137 Wn.2d 378, 388-89 , 972 P.2d 1250 (1999). ¶18 Having concluded that Wilson’s claim of ineffective assistance relating to the instructional error is neither time barred nor successive, we address it on the merits. ¶19 To convict Wilson of first degree felony murder, the jury had to find that Wilson or an accomplice was commit ting or attempting to commit first or second degree robbery, first or second degree rape, or first degree burglary: To convict defendant George Wilson of the charged crime of Felony Murder in the First Degree, each of the following elements of the

2004It is well settled that driver's licenses may not be suspended or revoked "`without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 , 97 S.Ct. 1723 , 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977) (quoting Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 , 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971)); City of Redmond v. Arroyo-Murillo, 149 Wash.2d 607, 612 , 70 P.3d 947 (2003).

2004It is well settled that driver's licenses may not be suspended or revoked "`without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 , 97 S.Ct. 1723 , 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977) (quoting Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 , 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971)); City of Redmond v. Arroyo-Murillo, 149 Wash.2d 607, 612 , 70 P.3d 947 (2003).

2004It is well settled that driver's licenses may not be suspended or revoked "`without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 , 97 S.Ct. 1723 , 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977) (quoting Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 , 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971)); City of Redmond v. Arroyo-Murillo, 149 Wash.2d 607, 612 , 70 P.3d 947 (2003).

2004It is well settled that driver's licenses may not be suspended or revoked "`without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 , 97 S.Ct. 1723 , 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977) (quoting Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 , 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971)); City of Redmond v. Arroyo-Murillo, 149 Wash.2d 607, 612 , 70 P.3d 947 (2003).

1997Further, the record does not support a determination that Wilson’s violation of his employer’s policy "continue[d] to take place after notice or warnings.” Tapper, 122 Wn.2d at 409 .

1997He is correct that "the fact that the material in the amended pleading could have been included in the original pleading will not preclude amendment, absent prejudice to the nonmoving party.” Herron, 108 Wn.2d at 166 .

1992The court also held that Christianson's and/or Urban Construction's fault eliminated the Department's right to reimbursement. 1 After the trial court granted Wilson's summary judgment, the Washington Supreme Court handed down its decision in Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wn.2d 167 , 822 P.2d 162 (1991).

1992The court also held that Christianson's and/or Urban Construction's fault eliminated the Department's right to reimbursement. 1 After the trial court granted Wilson's summary judgment, the Washington Supreme Court handed down its decision in Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wn.2d 167 , 822 P.2d 162 (1991).

1992However, defendants and amicus failed to address the factors set forth in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 , 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986) in asserting a violation under the state constitution.

1992However, defendants and amicus failed to address the factors set forth in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 , 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986) in asserting a violation under the state constitution.