Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 Virginia opinions name it 3 courts 1976–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McCulloch v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025“Determining whether the defendant has made an adequate showing is a decision that lies within the trial court’s discretion.” McCulloch v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 769, 774 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
Lenz v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025The trial court did not err when it denied Wilson’s motion for a sanity evaluation. “[A]n indigent defendant who seeks the appointment of an expert, at the Commonwealth’s expense, must show a particularized need for such services and that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance.” Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 462 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Potts v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025“The United States Supreme Court in Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981),] adopted a three-part test to evaluate the admissibility of a statement given after the right to counsel had been invoked.” Potts v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 485, 493 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Fisher v. Gordongreen2 sentences2024To that end, the Court in Jones v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 412 , 415 (2018), found that when we examine issues of statutory interpretation, we are bound by the plain meaning of the statutory language when it is unambiguous, as it is here where the statute plainly reads that motorists are in violation of Code § 46.2-848 if they fail to use a proper signal “whenever the operation of any other vehicle may be affected by such movement.” Appellant argues that rather than the Wilson standard, this Court should follow the “objectively reasonable standard,” which was applied in Fisher v. Gordon, 210 Va. 2024To that end, the Court in Jones v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 412 , 415 (2018), found that when we examine issues of statutory interpretation, we are bound by the plain meaning of the statutory language when it is unambiguous, as it is here where the statute plainly reads that motorists are in violation of Code § 46.2-848 if they fail to use a proper signal “whenever the operation of any other vehicle may be affected by such movement.” Appellant argues that rather than the Wilson standard, this Court should follow the “objectively reasonable standard,” which was applied in Fisher v. Gordon, 210 Va. | 1 | 1 |
Esparza v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2009In Esparza v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 600, 603 , 513 S.E.2d 885, 886 (1999), we addressed the question of whether a trial court has jurisdiction to modify a sentence pursuant to Code § 19.2-303. 2009In Esparza v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 600, 603 , 513 S.E.2d 885, 886 (1999), we addressed the question of whether a trial court has jurisdiction to modify a sentence pursuant to Code § 19.2-303. | 1 | 1 |
Farley v. Farleygreen2 sentences2007In denying Wilson’s motion to vacate the court order terminating her residual parental rights, “[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best interests.” Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 329 , 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). 2007In denying Wilson’s motion to vacate the court order terminating her residual parental rights, “[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best interests.” Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 329 , 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Com., Commonwealth's Attorneygreen2 sentences2005See generally In re: Commonwealth of Virginia, 229 Va. 159, 163 , 326 S.E.2d 695, 697 (1985) (“Clearly, therefore, by prescribing a mandatory sentence, the General Assembly has divested trial judges of all discretion respecting punishment.”). 2005See generally In re: Commonwealth of Virginia, 229 Va. 159, 163 , 326 S.E.2d 695, 697 (1985) (“Clearly, therefore, by prescribing a mandatory sentence, the General Assembly has divested trial judges of all discretion respecting punishment.”). | 1 | 1 |
Cauthorn v. British Leyland, UK, Ltd.green2 sentences1989The statute provides that "[i]n any verdict returned against a health care provider in an action for malpractice ... the total amount recoverable for any injury to ... a patient shall not exceed seven hundred fifty thousand dollars." (Emphasis added.) Wilson's claim was for an indivisible injury, see, e.g., Cauthorn v. British Leyland, U.K., Ltd., 233 Va. 202, 205 , 355 S.E.2d 306, 307-08 (1987), caused by the concurring negligence of each defendant. 1989The statute provides that "[i]n any verdict returned against a health care provider in an action for malpractice ... the total amount recoverable for any injury to ... a patient shall not exceed seven hundred fifty thousand dollars." (Emphasis added.) Wilson's claim was for an indivisible injury, see, e.g., Cauthorn v. British Leyland, U.K., Ltd., 233 Va. 202, 205 , 355 S.E.2d 306, 307-08 (1987), caused by the concurring negligence of each defendant. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Edwards v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2025“The United States Supreme Court in Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981),] adopted a three-part test to evaluate the admissibility of a statement given after the right to counsel had been invoked.” Potts v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 485, 493 (2001). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Wilson v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2013Id. at 640, 681 S.E.2d at 78 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Sollie v. Sollie
green
1 sentence2002Sollie v. Sollie, 202 Va. 855 (1961). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences1997Exculpatory Evidence Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), recognizes the prosecution’s duty to disclose to an accused exculpatory evidence which is material to guilt or punishment. 1997Exculpatory Evidence Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), recognizes the prosecution’s duty to disclose to an accused exculpatory evidence which is material to guilt or punishment. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Johnson v. Commonwealth
red
1 sentence1997The Defendant further argued that . . . the Commonwealth bears the burden of proof that the defendant performed the act with the intent to sexually molest, arouse or gratify any person. - 3 - To constitute sexual battery, the force employed by Wilson to overcome G.W.'s will requires "some force other than merely that force required to accomplish the unlawful touching . . . ." Id. at 534, 365 S.E.2d at 240 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
City of Tacoma v. Kitchen
green
2 sentences1976Appellee, on the other hand, maintains that revocation of the will should be determined by the law in effect at the date of Papen’s death. *882 She relies primarily on In re Ziegner’s Estate, 146 Wash. 587 , 264 P. 12 (1928), holding that when a statute providing for revocation upon divorce was enacted after execution of a will and after divorce, as in the present case, revocation, because of the ambulatory nature of wills, was determined by the law in effect at death. 1976Appellee, on the other hand, maintains that revocation of the will should be determined by the law in effect at the date of Papen’s death. *882 She relies primarily on In re Ziegner’s Estate, 146 Wash. 587 , 264 P. 12 (1928), holding that when a statute providing for revocation upon divorce was enacted after execution of a will and after divorce, as in the present case, revocation, because of the ambulatory nature of wills, was determined by the law in effect at death. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.