Wilson principle in Maryland

2025The Dorsey Court expressly declined to decide “[w]hether such vicarious provocation can ever be deemed legally adequate[.]” Id.

2025The Dorsey Court recognized that Wilson’s claim of adequate provocation was “more tenuous” than that of Dorsey, his wife: “If he was provoked, he was provoked vicariously out of regard for the appellant Dorsey.” Id. at 104 .

2020While a reviewing court in Maryland must typically evaluate the Wilson factors to ascertain the likelihood that the undisclosed evidence would have swayed the jury as fact-finder, Wilson, 363 Md. at 351– 52, a court trial presents a different calculus.

2020While a reviewing court in Maryland must typically evaluate the Wilson factors to ascertain the likelihood that the undisclosed evidence would have swayed the jury as fact-finder, Wilson, 363 Md. at 351– 52, a court trial presents a different calculus.

2012Adopting a definition from an unemployment compensation case, we concluded that “misconduct,” for the purposes of analyzing Wilson’s claim, meant “a transgression of some established rule or policy of the employer, the commission of a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, or a course of wrongful conduct committed by an employee, within the scope of his employment relationship, during hours of employment, or on the employer’s premises.” Wilson, 389 Md. at 77 , 882 A.2d at 879 (quoting Dep’t of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v. Hider, 349 Md. 71, 85 , 706 A.2d 1073, 1079 (1998)).

2012Adopting a definition from an unemployment compensation case, we concluded that “misconduct,” for the purposes of analyzing Wilson’s claim, meant “a transgression of some established rule or policy of the employer, the commission of a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, or a course of wrongful conduct committed by an employee, within the scope of his employment relationship, during hours of employment, or on the employer’s premises.” Wilson, 389 Md. at 77 , 882 A.2d at 879 (quoting Dep’t of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v. Hider, 349 Md. 71, 85 , 706 A.2d 1073, 1079 (1998)).

2007Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 3 .

2007Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 3 .

2006The court declared that the fellow employee exclusion was invalid as a matter of law and that Nationwide was obligated to fully indemnify Allegheny and McFarland “for any sums that Daniel Richard McFarland, as an employee of Allegheny Industries, Inc. becomes legally obligated to pay as a result of the accident that occurred June 20, 2002.” Nationwide noted this timely appeal. 1 *534 STANDARD OF REVIEW Under Maryland Rule 2 — 501(f), a court “shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

2006The court declared that the fellow employee exclusion was invalid as a matter of law and that Nationwide was obligated to fully indemnify Allegheny and McFarland “for any sums that Daniel Richard McFarland, as an employee of Allegheny Industries, Inc. becomes legally obligated to pay as a result of the accident that occurred June 20, 2002.” Nationwide noted this timely appeal. 1 *534 STANDARD OF REVIEW Under Maryland Rule 2 — 501(f), a court “shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

2004It held that “the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.” 477 U.S. at 459 , 106 S.Ct. 2616 .

2004It held that “the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.” 477 U.S. at 459 , 106 S.Ct. 2616 .

2002Then Chief Judge Wilner, now of the Court of Appeals, said for this Court in Hebron v. State, 92 Md.App. 508, 516-17 , 608 A.2d 1291 (1992), aff'd, 331 Md. 219 , 627 A.2d 1029 (1993), in regard to circumstantial evidence and the effect of Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 , 75 S.Ct. 127 , 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954), in Maryland: Assuming arguendo that a case based solely on a single strand of circumstantial evidence is properly presentable to the jury in the first instance, which we think is not allowed, an instruction on reasonable doubt is all that is needed.

2002Then Chief Judge Wilner, now of the Court of Appeals, said for this Court in Hebron v. State, 92 Md.App. 508, 516-17 , 608 A.2d 1291 (1992), aff'd, 331 Md. 219 , 627 A.2d 1029 (1993), in regard to circumstantial evidence and the effect of Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 , 75 S.Ct. 127 , 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954), in Maryland: Assuming arguendo that a case based solely on a single strand of circumstantial evidence is properly presentable to the jury in the first instance, which we think is not allowed, an instruction on reasonable doubt is all that is needed.

2002Then Chief Judge Wilner, now of the Court of Appeals, said for this Court in Hebron v. State, 92 Md.App. 508, 516-17 , 608 A.2d 1291 (1992), aff'd, 331 Md. 219 , 627 A.2d 1029 (1993), in regard to circumstantial evidence and the effect of Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 , 75 S.Ct. 127 , 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954), in Maryland: Assuming arguendo that a case based solely on a single strand of circumstantial evidence is properly presentable to the jury in the first instance, which we think is not allowed, an instruction on reasonable doubt is all that is needed.

2002Then Chief Judge Wilner, now of the Court of Appeals, said for this Court in Hebron v. State, 92 Md.App. 508, 516-17 , 608 A.2d 1291 (1992), aff'd, 331 Md. 219 , 627 A.2d 1029 (1993), in regard to circumstantial evidence and the effect of Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 , 75 S.Ct. 127 , 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954), in Maryland: Assuming arguendo that a case based solely on a single strand of circumstantial evidence is properly presentable to the jury in the first instance, which we think is not allowed, an instruction on reasonable doubt is all that is needed.

2002Then Chief Judge Wilner, now of the Court of Appeals, said for this Court in Hebron v. State, 92 Md.App. 508, 516-17 , 608 A.2d 1291 (1992), aff'd, 331 Md. 219 , 627 A.2d 1029 (1993), in regard to circumstantial evidence and the effect of Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 , 75 S.Ct. 127 , 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954), in Maryland: Assuming arguendo that a case based solely on a single strand of circumstantial evidence is properly presentable to the jury in the first instance, which we think is not allowed, an instruction on reasonable doubt is all that is needed.

2002Then Chief Judge Wilner, now of the Court of Appeals, said for this Court in Hebron v. State, 92 Md.App. 508, 516-17 , 608 A.2d 1291 (1992), aff'd, 331 Md. 219 , 627 A.2d 1029 (1993), in regard to circumstantial evidence and the effect of Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 , 75 S.Ct. 127 , 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954), in Maryland: Assuming arguendo that a case based solely on a single strand of circumstantial evidence is properly presentable to the jury in the first instance, which we think is not allowed, an instruction on reasonable doubt is all that is needed.

2002As pointed out by Judge Eyler, Wilson was recently cited with approval by the Court of Appeals in Moye v. State, 369 Md. at 14, 796 A.2d 821 (2002).

2002As pointed out by Judge Eyler, Wilson was recently cited with approval by the Court of Appeals in Moye v. State, 369 Md. at 14 , 796 A.2d 821 (2002). *1128 In publishing Wilson's premature obituary, I believe too much is read into the quote from State v. Edwards, 298 S.C. 272 , 379 S.E.2d 888, 889 (1989), which was included by Chief Judge Bell in Hebron and cited in Judge Eyler's dissent.

1997The court denied Wilson’s motion for judgment of acquittal and, after instructions and closing argument, the case was submitted to the jury- DISCUSSION The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that an accused in a criminal prosecution has the right “to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.... ” Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which has been part of our Constitution since 1776 and may have served as the model for Madison’s draft of the Sixth Amendment, affords a similar right. 2 The Sixth Amendment right did not become ap

1997The court denied Wilson’s motion for judgment of acquittal and, after instructions and closing argument, the case was submitted to the jury- DISCUSSION The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that an accused in a criminal prosecution has the right “to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.... ” Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which has been part of our Constitution since 1776 and may have served as the model for Madison’s draft of the Sixth Amendment, affords a similar right. 2 The Sixth Amendment right did not become ap

1994The majority unreservedly acknowledges “that Wilson’s statements and Lee’s statement were substantially alike in all significant aspects.” 334 Md. at 338 , 639 A.2d at 137 .

1994The majority unreservedly acknowledges “that Wilson’s statements and Lee’s statement were substantially alike in all significant aspects.” 334 Md. at 338 , 639 A.2d at 137 .

1974The general rule that the public funds of municipalities cannot properly be devoted to a private use, even when expressly authorized by the Legislature, was noted by Judge Henderson for this Court in Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 14 , 136 A. 2d 852 (1957).

1974The general rule that the public funds of municipalities cannot properly be devoted to a private use, even when expressly authorized by the Legislature, was noted by Judge Henderson for this Court in Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 14 , 136 A. 2d 852 (1957).