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21 California opinions name it 2 courts 1921–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Prudential Insurance v. Broadhurstgreen2 sentences1959Co. v. Broadhurst, 157 Cal.App.2d 375, 380 [ 321 P.2d 75 ].) However, we need not apply the above-mentioned presumption nor invoke the above-stated rule, because without the aid of extrinsic evidence, we would regard the trial court’s interpretation of the decree (and of the will) as most reasonable. 1959Co. v. Broadhurst, 157 Cal.App.2d 375, 380 [ 321 P.2d 75 ].) However, we need not apply the above-mentioned presumption nor invoke the above-stated rule, because without the aid of extrinsic evidence, we would regard the trial court’s interpretation of the decree (and of the will) as most reasonable. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Oxideangreen2 sentences1970See also In re Oxidean (1961) 195 Cal. App.2d 814, 817 [ 16 Cal. Rptr. 193 ]; Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure, § 797, supra, at p. 770.) Thus, as we said in In re Bell, supra, 19 Cal.2d 488, 495 , "While a few courts require that all available remedies by appeal be exhausted before habeas corpus can be invoked to test constitutionality [citation], most jurisdictions, including California, do not make the requirement mandatory...." In view of the foregoing we conclude that petitioner has demonstrated that the instant case presents special circumstances within the above-mentioned rule. 1970See also In re Oxidean (1961) 195 Cal. App.2d 814, 817 [ 16 Cal. Rptr. 193 ]; Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure, § 797, supra, at p. 770.) Thus, as we said in In re Bell, supra, 19 Cal.2d 488, 495 , "While a few courts require that all available remedies by appeal be exhausted before habeas corpus can be invoked to test constitutionality [citation], most jurisdictions, including California, do not make the requirement mandatory...." In view of the foregoing we conclude that petitioner has demonstrated that the instant case presents special circumstances within the above-mentioned rule. | 1 | 1 |
Cooke v. Ramponigreen2 sentences1960The principal basis for this view is the doctrine of equitable estoppel; the license, similar in its essentials to an easement, is declared to be irrevocable to prevent the licensor from perpetrating a fraud upon the licensee. ...” (Cooke v. Bamponi, 38 Cal.2d 282, at 286 [ 239 P.2d 638 ].) Judgment affirmed. 1960The principal basis for this view is the doctrine of equitable estoppel; the license, similar in its essentials to an easement, is declared to be irrevocable to prevent the licensor from perpetrating a fraud upon the licensee. ...” (Cooke v. Bamponi, 38 Cal.2d 282, at 286 [ 239 P.2d 638 ].) Judgment affirmed. | 1 | 1 |
Switzer v. Eaklegreen2 sentences1951(Estate of Eakle, 33 Cal.App.2d 379, 387 [ 91 P.2d 954 ].) Immediately following the above-mentioned instruction the court instructed the jury “that as a matter of law Alice Harriet Schlyen has unduly profited by such will, in the manner as the term ‘unduly profited’ is used in these instructions.” Immediately thereafter the court *662 instructed the jury “that a confidential relationship existed between David Sehlyen and Alice Harriet Schlyen while they resided together as husband and wife.” Immediately thereafter the court gave the following instruction: “ [I]f you find that Alice Harriet Sc 1951(Estate of Eakle, 33 Cal.App.2d 379, 387 [ 91 P.2d 954 ].) Immediately following the above-mentioned instruction the court instructed the jury “that as a matter of law Alice Harriet Schlyen has unduly profited by such will, in the manner as the term ‘unduly profited’ is used in these instructions.” Immediately thereafter the court *662 instructed the jury “that a confidential relationship existed between David Sehlyen and Alice Harriet Schlyen while they resided together as husband and wife.” Immediately thereafter the court gave the following instruction: “ [I]f you find that Alice Harriet Sc | 1 | 1 |
Golden v. State Bargreen2 sentences1943In Golden v. State Bar, 213 Cal. 237, 247 [ 2 P.2d 325 ], it is stated that charges against an attorney “must be sustained by convincing proof to a reasonable certainty and any reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.” Aside from any question as to the soundness of petitioner’s judgment in filing the second action against his former client, I find nothing in the record indicating that he intended thereby to take any advantage of such former client and the disciplinary proceeding should therefore be dismissed. 1943In Golden v. State Bar, 213 Cal. 237, 247 [ 2 P.2d 325 ], it is stated that charges against an attorney “must be sustained by convincing proof to a reasonable certainty and any reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.” Aside from any question as to the soundness of petitioner’s judgment in filing the second action against his former client, I find nothing in the record indicating that he intended thereby to take any advantage of such former client and the disciplinary proceeding should therefore be dismissed. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Phelangreen2 sentences1940Evidence of such intoxication may be considered by the jury for the purpose of determining the degree of the crime, and in determining the purpose, motive or intent with which he committed the act, ...” Appellant contends that this last-mentioned instruction should not have been given because of the criticism enunciated in People v. Phelan, 93 Cal. 111, 113 [ 28 Pac. 855 ]). 1940Evidence of such intoxication may be considered by the jury for the purpose of determining the degree of the crime, and in determining the purpose, motive or intent with which he committed the act, ...” Appellant contends that this last-mentioned instruction should not have been given because of the criticism enunciated in People v. Phelan, 93 Cal. 111, 113 [ 28 Pac. 855 ]). | 1 | 1 |
Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial Homegreen2 sentences1930The employment of the cestui may be made to commence in the future and to depend for its commencement upon the termination of an existing life or lives or of an intermediate estate.” The above doctrine made applicable to a conveyance in trust is, of course, equally applicable to a conveyance of any other estate in property, which was the case in Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial Home, 167 Cal. 570, 577 [ 140 Pac. 242 ], where we find the above-mentioned rule specially approved. 1930The employment of the cestui may be made to commence in the future and to depend for its commencement upon the termination of an existing life or lives or of an intermediate estate.” The above doctrine made applicable to a conveyance in trust is, of course, equally applicable to a conveyance of any other estate in property, which was the case in Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial Home, 167 Cal. 570, 577 [ 140 Pac. 242 ], where we find the above-mentioned rule specially approved. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hawkinson v. Oatway
neutral
2 sentences1941(See, generally, Hawkinson v. Oatway, 143 Wis. 136 [ 126 N. W. 683 , 139 Am. 1941(See, generally, Hawkinson v. Oatway, 143 Wis. 136 [ 126 N. W. 683 , 139 Am. | 2 | 1936–1941 |
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023The court reiterated the above-mentioned rule, “[C]ourts ‘should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so.’” (Henry Schein, supra, 139 S.Ct. at p. 531 .) Hyundai attempts to undermine the persuasiveness of Kramer by noting, “Kramer was decided before Henry Schein.” We find no merit to Hyundai’s assertion because Henry Schein recognized the appropriate rule is the one Kramer applied. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
McCarty v. McCarty
red
2 sentences1983Shortly thereafter, husband’s counsel read in the newspaper that the United States Supreme Court had granted certiorari to review an unpublished California Court of Appeal decision (McCarty v. McCarty (1981) 453 U.S. 210 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 589 , 101 S.Ct. 2728 ]), where the community interest in military retirement pensions was at issue. 1983Shortly thereafter, husband’s counsel read in the newspaper that the United States Supreme Court had granted certiorari to review an unpublished California Court of Appeal decision (McCarty v. McCarty (1981) 453 U.S. 210 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 589 , 101 S.Ct. 2728 ]), where the community interest in military retirement pensions was at issue. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Paradise v. Nowlin
green
2 sentences1978The reason for the distinction was explained in Paradise v. Nowlin (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 897 , at page 898 [ 195 P.2d 867 ], as follows: “A corporation is not a natural person. 1978The reason for the distinction was explained in Paradise v. Nowlin (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 897 , at page 898 [ 195 P.2d 867 ], as follows: “A corporation is not a natural person. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
In Re Bell
green
2 sentences1970See also In re Oxidean (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 814, 817 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 193 ]; Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure, § 797, supra, at p. 770.) Thus, as we said in In re Bell, supra, 19 Cal.2d 488, 495 , “While a few courts require that all available remedies by appeal be exhausted before habeas corpus can be invoked to test constitutionality [citation], most jurisdictions, including California, do not make the requirement mandatory. . . .” In view of the foregoing we conclude that petitioner has demonstrated that the instant case presents special circumstances within the above-mentioned rule. 1970See also In re Oxidean (1961) 195 Cal. App.2d 814, 817 [ 16 Cal. Rptr. 193 ]; Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure, § 797, supra, at p. 770.) Thus, as we said in In re Bell, supra, 19 Cal.2d 488, 495 , "While a few courts require that all available remedies by appeal be exhausted before habeas corpus can be invoked to test constitutionality [citation], most jurisdictions, including California, do not make the requirement mandatory...." In view of the foregoing we conclude that petitioner has demonstrated that the instant case presents special circumstances within the above-mentioned rule. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Dahms v. General Elevator Co.
green
2 sentences1958The facts and weight of the evidence were for the jury, and we would not be warranted in disturbing the verdict of the jury unless it be against the manifest weight of the evidence. ’ “While our search has not disclosed a case where the courts of this state have applied the above-mentioned rule where, by the act of a shipper, injury resulted to a consignee or his employee, the principle has been employed in Dahms v. General Elevator Co., supra [ 214 Cal. 733 ( 7 P.2d 1013 )], where the elevator operator in a business building was injured by the negligence of the defendant which had entered int 1958The facts and weight of the evidence were for the jury, and we would not be warranted in disturbing the verdict of the jury unless it be against the manifest weight of the evidence. ’ “While our search has not disclosed a case where the courts of this state have applied the above-mentioned rule where, by the act of a shipper, injury resulted to a consignee or his employee, the principle has been employed in Dahms v. General Elevator Co., supra [ 214 Cal. 733 ( 7 P.2d 1013 )], where the elevator operator in a business building was injured by the negligence of the defendant which had entered int | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Dalzell v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences1954The trend of the California decisions in this direction is shown by Dalzell v. County of Los Angeles, 88 Cal.App.2d 271 [ 198 P.2d 554 ], and Murphy v. County of Lake, supra, 106 Cal.App.2d 61 . 1954The trend of the California decisions in this direction is shown by Dalzell v. County of Los Angeles, 88 Cal.App.2d 271 [ 198 P.2d 554 ], and Murphy v. County of Lake, supra, 106 Cal.App.2d 61 . | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Murphy v. County of Lake
green
1 sentence1954The trend of the California decisions in this direction is shown by Dalzell v. County of Los Angeles, 88 Cal.App.2d 271 [ 198 P.2d 554 ], and Murphy v. County of Lake, supra, 106 Cal.App.2d 61 . | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Potvin v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc.
green
2 sentences1942Our conclusion is fully supported by the leading case of Gunder v. Gunder, 208 Cal. 559 [ 282 Pac. 794 ], and the many cases which follow it, notably De Vally v. Kendall De Vally etc. Co., 220 Cal. 742 [ 32 P. (2d) 638 ]; Middleton v. Finney, 214 Cal. 523 [ 6 P. (2d) 938 ], and Potvin v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 130 Cal. App. 510 [ 20 P. (2d) 129 ].” Neither party to this record has mentioned the applicability of the above-mentioned rule to the facts of this ease. 1942Our conclusion is fully supported by the leading case of Gunder v. Gunder, 208 Cal. 559 [ 282 Pac. 794 ], and the many cases which follow it, notably De Vally v. Kendall De Vally etc. Co., 220 Cal. 742 [ 32 P. (2d) 638 ]; Middleton v. Finney, 214 Cal. 523 [ 6 P. (2d) 938 ], and Potvin v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 130 Cal. App. 510 [ 20 P. (2d) 129 ].” Neither party to this record has mentioned the applicability of the above-mentioned rule to the facts of this ease. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Middleton v. Finney
green
2 sentences1942Our conclusion is fully supported by the leading case of Gunder v. Gunder, 208 Cal. 559 [ 282 Pac. 794 ], and the many cases which follow it, notably De Vally v. Kendall De Vally etc. Co., 220 Cal. 742 [ 32 P. (2d) 638 ]; Middleton v. Finney, 214 Cal. 523 [ 6 P. (2d) 938 ], and Potvin v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 130 Cal. App. 510 [ 20 P. (2d) 129 ].” Neither party to this record has mentioned the applicability of the above-mentioned rule to the facts of this ease. 1942Our conclusion is fully supported by the leading case of Gunder v. Gunder, 208 Cal. 559 [ 282 Pac. 794 ], and the many cases which follow it, notably De Vally v. Kendall De Vally etc. Co., 220 Cal. 742 [ 32 P. (2d) 638 ]; Middleton v. Finney, 214 Cal. 523 [ 6 P. (2d) 938 ], and Potvin v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 130 Cal. App. 510 [ 20 P. (2d) 129 ].” Neither party to this record has mentioned the applicability of the above-mentioned rule to the facts of this ease. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
De Vally v. Kendall De Vally Operalogue Co.
green
2 sentences1942Our conclusion is fully supported by the leading case of Gunder v. Gunder, 208 Cal. 559 [ 282 Pac. 794 ], and the many cases which follow it, notably De Vally v. Kendall De Vally etc. Co., 220 Cal. 742 [ 32 P. (2d) 638 ]; Middleton v. Finney, 214 Cal. 523 [ 6 P. (2d) 938 ], and Potvin v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 130 Cal. App. 510 [ 20 P. (2d) 129 ].” Neither party to this record has mentioned the applicability of the above-mentioned rule to the facts of this ease. 1942Our conclusion is fully supported by the leading case of Gunder v. Gunder, 208 Cal. 559 [ 282 Pac. 794 ], and the many cases which follow it, notably De Vally v. Kendall De Vally etc. Co., 220 Cal. 742 [ 32 P. (2d) 638 ]; Middleton v. Finney, 214 Cal. 523 [ 6 P. (2d) 938 ], and Potvin v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 130 Cal. App. 510 [ 20 P. (2d) 129 ].” Neither party to this record has mentioned the applicability of the above-mentioned rule to the facts of this ease. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Gunder v. Gunder
green
2 sentences1942Our conclusion is fully supported by the leading case of Gunder v. Gunder, 208 Cal. 559 [ 282 Pac. 794 ], and the many cases which follow it, notably De Vally v. Kendall De Vally etc. Co., 220 Cal. 742 [ 32 P. (2d) 638 ]; Middleton v. Finney, 214 Cal. 523 [ 6 P. (2d) 938 ], and Potvin v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 130 Cal. App. 510 [ 20 P. (2d) 129 ].” Neither party to this record has mentioned the applicability of the above-mentioned rule to the facts of this ease. 1942Our conclusion is fully supported by the leading case of Gunder v. Gunder, 208 Cal. 559 [ 282 Pac. 794 ], and the many cases which follow it, notably De Vally v. Kendall De Vally etc. Co., 220 Cal. 742 [ 32 P. (2d) 638 ]; Middleton v. Finney, 214 Cal. 523 [ 6 P. (2d) 938 ], and Potvin v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 130 Cal. App. 510 [ 20 P. (2d) 129 ].” Neither party to this record has mentioned the applicability of the above-mentioned rule to the facts of this ease. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
People v. Morales
green
1 sentence1940(People v. Morales, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 442, 444 [ 79 Pac. (2d) 771 ].) In addition to the above-mentioned instruction the court gave another instruction on this subject reading in part as follows: “ . . . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
People v. Wright
green
2 sentences1940(People v. Wright, 79 Cal.App. 523 [ 250 P. 204 ].) Since the offense was shown to have been committed in a city in which the court was sitting, referred to by the witnesses as "this city", it must be concluded, in view of the above-mentioned presumption, that the court had jurisdiction of the offense with which defendant was charged. 1940(People v. Wright, 79 Cal.App. 523 [ 250 P. 204 ].) Since the offense was shown to have been committed in a city in which the court was sitting, referred to by the witnesses as "this city", it must be concluded, in view of the above-mentioned presumption, that the court had jurisdiction of the offense with which defendant was charged. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
People v. Aymar
green
2 sentences1932In People v. Aymar, 98 Cal. App. 1 [ 276 Pac. 595 ], and authorities therein cited, an exception to the above-mentioned rule is recognized in cases where the judgment is in fact not entered in accordance with the consent relied on, on the theory that in such a case a consent judgment is not involved. 1932In People v. Aymar, 98 Cal. App. 1 [ 276 Pac. 595 ], and authorities therein cited, an exception to the above-mentioned rule is recognized in cases where the judgment is in fact not entered in accordance with the consent relied on, on the theory that in such a case a consent judgment is not involved. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Alcamisi v. Market Street Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1931Co., 67 Cal. App. 710 [ 228 Pac. 410 ].) Aside from the other points raised by appellant, in my opinion the giving of the above-mentioned instruction in itself requires a reversal. 1931Co., 67 Cal. App. 710 [ 228 Pac. 410 ].) Aside from the other points raised by appellant, in my opinion the giving of the above-mentioned instruction in itself requires a reversal. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Donnatin v. Union Hardware & Metal Co.
green
2 sentences1929As to the law, it is well established that insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict is a ground for a new trial appealing peculiarly to the discretion of the trial court, and its order either- granting or refusing a new trial will' not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion. (2 Cal. Jur. 908; Donnatin v. Union Hardware & Metal Co., 38 Cal. App. 8 [ 175 Pac. 26, 27 , 177 Pac. 845 ].) With the foregoing facts and the above-mentioned rule of law in mind, can it be said that the court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial? 1929As to the law, it is well established that insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict is a ground for a new trial appealing peculiarly to the discretion of the trial court, and its order either- granting or refusing a new trial will' not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion. (2 Cal. Jur. 908; Donnatin v. Union Hardware & Metal Co., 38 Cal. App. 8 [ 175 Pac. 26, 27 , 177 Pac. 845 ].) With the foregoing facts and the above-mentioned rule of law in mind, can it be said that the court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial? | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Pearl v. Pearl
green
1 sentence1929As to the law, it is well established that insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict is a ground for a new trial appealing peculiarly to the discretion of the trial court, and its order either- granting or refusing a new trial will' not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion. (2 Cal. Jur. 908; Donnatin v. Union Hardware & Metal Co., 38 Cal. App. 8 [ 175 Pac. 26, 27 , 177 Pac. 845 ].) With the foregoing facts and the above-mentioned rule of law in mind, can it be said that the court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial? | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Merchants' National Bank of Crookston v. Stanton
green
1 sentence1921Bank v. Stanton, 55 Minn. 211 , [ 43 Am. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.