aggravating and mitigating factors in Illinois

2024See Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 213 (reviewing court cannot substitute its sentencing judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors differently). ¶ 33 As such, we do not find that Mr. Reveles’ sentence was manifestly disproportionate to his offenses.

2023We will not disturb a sentence unless the trial court abused its discretion (People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010)), and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court merely because we may have weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors differently (id. at 213). ¶ 52 Where a sentence is within the statutory range, it is not excessive unless it greatly varies with the spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.

2026A reviewing court cannot reweigh the aggravating and mitigating factors in reviewing a sentence, nor can it “substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed these factors differently.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000).

2025A reviewing court cannot reweigh the aggravating and mitigating factors in reviewing a sentence, nor can it “substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed these factors differently.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000).

2025It is the resentencing court’s role to strike the balance between the aggravating and mitigating factors (Walker, 2021 IL App (4th) 190073, ¶ 73 (citing People v. Crenshaw, 2011 IL App (4th) 090908, ¶ 24 )), and a resentencing court is not required to give greater weight to mitigating evidence than to the severity of the offense and its attendant circumstances (Jones, 2019 IL App (1st) 170478, ¶ 55 ).

2025See People v. Crenshaw, 2011 IL App (4th) 090908, ¶ 24 (“The balance to be struck amongst the aggravating and mitigating factors is a matter of judicial discretion that should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”). ¶ 49 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed. ¶ 50 Affirmed. - 15 -

2021Citing Hernandez in People v. Crenshaw, 2011 IL App (4th) 090908, ¶ 24 , 959 N.E.2d 703 , this court said, “[t]he balance to be struck amongst the aggravating and mitigating factors is a matter of judicial discretion that should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” “In considering the propriety of a sentence, the reviewing court must proceed with great caution and must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed the factors differently.” People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 , 723 N.E.2d 207, 209 (1999).

2021Citing Hernandez in People v. Crenshaw, 2011 IL App (4th) 090908, ¶ 24 , 959 N.E.2d 703 , this court said, “[t]he balance to be struck amongst the aggravating and mitigating factors is a matter of judicial discretion that should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” “In considering the propriety of a sentence, the reviewing court must proceed with great caution and must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed the factors differently.” People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 , 723 N.E.2d 207, 209 (1999).

2020See People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 40-42 (stating a prison sentence of 40 years or less does not constitute a de facto life sentence in violation of the eighth amendment protections set forth in Miller). ¶ 142 Cornejo essentially asks that we substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court and reweigh the aggravating and mitigating factors presented to the circuit court, which we cannot do.

2020See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 47 ; Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 45 ; People v. Smolley, 2018 IL App (3d) 150577, ¶¶ 21-22 . ¶ 36 In light of our determination, we need not consider defendant’s claim that the court failed to properly weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors at sentencing. ¶ 37 III.

1992(Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d at 525-26 .) This court went on to conclude that a new sentencing hearing was required because the sentencing body could have considered, in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors at the second phase of the hearing, an aggravating factor which this court had determined did not exist.

1983In People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 508, 528-34 , this court rejected a contention that the statute is constitutionally inadequate because it does not set out specific standards as to the weight to be given to the aggravating and mitigating factors.

2022See Abrams, 2015 IL App (1st) 133746, ¶ 34 (the seriousness of the offense may outweigh the goal of rehabilitation).

2021See Abrams, 2015 IL App (1st) 133746, ¶ 34 (the seriousness of the offense may outweigh the goal of rehabilitating defendant).

1993(Holman, 103 Ill. 2d at 172-73 .) The reason this rule is essential at the sentencing phase of a criminal case is because of the substantial risk that a statement of opinion, if interpreted as supplemental evidence justifying a sentence of death, will distract the jury from properly weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors.

1988“Unsupported predictions as to the kinds of crimes the defendant will commit if not executed are even more to be condemned than references to the possibility of parole, for they convey more directly to jurors the vivid, but misleading, message that the death penalty is the only way to protect society from the defendant and forestall his violence.” (People v. Holman (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 133, 165 .) The prosecutor’s statements on this point and concerning parole could well have caused the jury to consider the death penalty as the only way to protect society from the defendant and diverted its att

1997People v. Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342, 383-84 (1981); People v. Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d 508, 541-44 (1980).

1983The legislature may well have considered that such a statement would at the least confuse the jurors, and might also impair their ability to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors disclosed by the testimony as the statute directs them to do.” 88 Ill. 2d 342, 380 .

2016Wilson’s sentence does fall within the statutory limits, but I believe that because of the nature of his offense it was excessive and triggers our constitutional obligation to provide relief. ¶ 22 “A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense,” Justice Kennedy reemphasized in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010).

2016Wilson's sentence does fall within the statutory limits, but I believe that because of the nature of his offense it was excessive and triggers our constitutional obligation to provide relief. -9- 1-14-1063 ¶ 22 "A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense," Justice Kennedy reemphasized in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010).

1999We point out that “each capital case is unique and must be evaluated on its own facts, focusing on whether the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant are such that the deterrent and retributive functions of the ultimate sanction will be served by imposing the death penalty.” People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 280 (1989).

1999We point out that "each capital case is unique and must be evaluated on its own facts, focusing on whether the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant are such that the deterrent and retributive functions of the ultimate sanction will be served by imposing the death penalty." People v. Johnson, 128 Ill.2d 253, 280 , 131 Ill.Dec. 562 , 538 N.E.2d 1118 (1989).

2020People v. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 20 (A reviewing court will not reweigh the aggravating and mitigating factors and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court just because it would weigh those factors differently.) The trial court properly considered all mitigating and aggravating factors and did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a sentence that fell within the permissible statutory guidelines.

2020Although defendant’s sentence was near the maximum under the applicable statutory range, there is no indication that the trial court abused its discretion in considering the aggravating and mitigating factors in arriving at the sentence. ¶ 22 Defendant, however, contends, relying on People v. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941 , and People v. Allen, 2017 IL App (1st) 151540 , that a five-year prison sentence for the theft of two items under $300 in value was disproportionate to the nature of the offense.

1988This court has consistently held that argument by the prosecutor at a death sentencing hearing that raises the possibility of parole as a reason that the defendant should be sentenced to death is improper and prejudicial. ( People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill.2d 327, 366-67 ; People v. Walker (1982), 91 Ill.2d 502, 515 ; People v. Brisbon (1985), 106 Ill.2d 342, 366-68 .) In People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill.2d 327 , the court stated that comments of that character divert the jury's attention from the aggravating and mitigating factors as it considers the record and the circumstances surrounding the c

1988(People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327, 366-67 ; People v. Walker (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 502, 515 ; People v. Brisbon (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 342, 366-68 .) In People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327 , the court stated that comments of that character divert the jury’s attention from the aggravating and mitigating factors as it considers the record and the circumstances surrounding the crimes.

1988(People v. Cox (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 268, 279-80 , 412 N.E.2d 541, 547 ; People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 159 , 368 N.E.2d 822, 885 .) Accordingly, based upon the aggravating and mitigating factors in the record and the court’s compliance with statutory sentencing mandates, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion here by imposing a seven-year prison sentence.

1983(People v. Waud (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 588, 596 , 373 N.E.2d 1 ; People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 156 , 368 N.E.2d 882 .) The task of weighing the various aggravating and mitigating factors is the function of the trial court.

2011People v. Hernandez, 204 Ill.App.3d 732, 740 , 149 Ill.Dec. 755 , 562 N.E.2d 219, 225 (1990).

2011People v. Hernandez, 204 Ill.App.3d 732, 740 , 149 Ill.Dec. 755 , 562 N.E.2d 219, 225 (1990).