aggravating and mitigating factors in California

2015We must therefore uphold the judgment if satisfied from the individual facts that a reasonable jury could not have been led astray.” (People v. Murtishaw (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1001, 1030 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 773 P.2d 172 ].) In context, the court made clear during jury selection that the death penalty is not mandatory and, largely employing the language we suggested in Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at page 545 , footnote 19, stated that the jury was to return a verdict of death only if, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, it found the aggravating factors so substantially outweigh the

2006(See § 190.3; former § 190.3, added by Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 11, pp. 1258-1260.) Under both laws, the jury must consider the aggravating and mitigating factors and has the “responsibility to decide what penalty is appropriate under all the relevant circumstances.” (People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 544 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 834 , 726 P.2d 516 ].) The weighing requirement simply makes clear that jurors are to limit their consideration to the factors listed in the statute.

2012In making that determination, we emphasized that the prosecutor, during argument, did nothing to mislead the jury about the weighing process and its weighing discretion, but that “he in fact left it with the understanding that the value to be assigned to the aggravating and mitigating factors was a matter to be decided by each individual juror.” (Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1278 .) Also, we noted that during argument, the prosecutor never misled the jury about its sole responsibility of determining the appropriate penalty based on its individualized weighing discretion, but instead focused o

1992The trier of fact's function is to determine, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the appropriate penalty under the facts of the particular case. ( People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 541 ; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1277 [ 232 Cal. Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ].) Here, it is clear from the trial court's comments that it properly understood this to be its role.

1992Under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a sentencing jury in a capital case must be permitted to "consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence" offered by the defendant. ( Boyde, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 377-378 [108 L.Ed.2d at pp. 326-328]; see also Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 1, 6-7 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 ]; Eddings *1082 v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 110 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 8 , 102 S.Ct. 869 ]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 988-993 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 ] (plur. opn. of Burger, C.J.).) In California, the jur

1992Under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a sentencing jury in a capital case must be permitted to "consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence" offered by the defendant. ( Boyde, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 377-378 [108 L.Ed.2d at pp. 326-328]; see also Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 1, 6-7 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 ]; Eddings *1082 v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 110 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 8 , 102 S.Ct. 869 ]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 988-993 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 ] (plur. opn. of Burger, C.J.).) In California, the jur

2024(Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1387 .) This conclusion was grounded in the aggravating and mitigating factors enumerated under Penal Code section 190.3 and the California Rules of Court that a court must consider in sentencing under Penal Code section 190.5, subdivision (b). ( Gutierrez, supra, at p. 1387 .) Specifically, Penal Code section 190.3, subdivision (i), requires the court to consider the age of the defendant at the time of the crime. ( Gutierrez, supra, at p. 1388 .) The court explained this factor permits the sentencing court to consider “not simply a defendant’s age but also

2024(Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1387 .) This conclusion was grounded in the aggravating and mitigating factors enumerated under Penal Code section 190.3 and the California Rules of Court that a court must consider in sentencing under Penal Code section 190.5, subdivision (b). ( Gutierrez, supra, at p. 1387 .) Specifically, Penal Code section 190.3, subdivision (i), requires the court to consider the age of the defendant at the time of the crime. ( Gutierrez, supra, at p. 1388 .) The court explained this factor permits the sentencing court to consider “not simply a defendant’s age but also

2009The court stated that it “agrees with the jury” after making its own “personal assessment of the evidence.” The record demonstrates that “the court carefully and conscientiously performed its duty under section 190.4.” (People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1268.) Second, defendant contends the trial court also misconstrued section 190.3, factor (i), in stating that defendant’s age constituted an aggravating factor.

2007(People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1267 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 432 , 47 P.3d 225 ].) This court then independently reviews the trial court’s ruling in light of the record, “but we do not determine the penalty de novo.” (Ibid.) Defendant contends the trial court improperly failed to consider as mitigating factors the absence of criminal activity involving the attempted use of force or violence (§ 190.3, factor (b)) and the absence of any prior felony conviction (§ 190.3, factor (c)).

1996Character, Background, History, Mental Condition and Physical Condition In addition to instructing the jury on the aggravating and mitigating factors expressly set forth in section 190.3, the trial court also instructed the jury to consider: “The defendant’s character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition.” This language was no doubt taken from the first paragraph of section 190.3, which states in pertinent part that, “In the proceedings on the question of penalty, evidence may be presented by both the people and the defendant as to any matter relevant to aggravation, m

1996Character, Background, History, Mental Condition and Physical Condition In addition to instructing the jury on the aggravating and mitigating factors expressly set forth in section 190.3, the trial court also instructed the jury to consider: “The defendant’s character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition.” This language was no doubt taken from the first paragraph of section 190.3, which states in pertinent part that, “In the proceedings on the question of penalty, evidence may be presented by both the people and the defendant as to any matter relevant to aggravation, m

2026While recent legislation has changed the parameters of the trial court’s sentencing discretion, trial courts still have “wide discretion in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors” (People v. Evans (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1022 ), and may balance them in qualitative as well as quantitative terms (see People v. Lambeth (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 495, 501 ).

2024Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) permits the trial court to “impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been . . . found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury.” At sentencing, trial courts have “wide discretion in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors” (People v. Evans (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1022 ) and may balance them in qualitative as well as quantitative terms (see People

2003(See McCleskey v. Kemp, supra, 481 U.S. 279, 305 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 .) The claim fails *250 because the required narrowing function is performed in California by the special circumstances set out in section 190.2, rather than by the aggravating and mitigating factors set out in section 190.3. ( Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 53 , 104 S.Ct. 871 , 79 L.Ed.2d 29 ; People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 659-660 , 274 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 798 P.2d 849 .) 15.

2003(See McCleskey v. Kemp, supra, 481 U.S. 279, 305 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 .) The claim fails *250 because the required narrowing function is performed in California by the special circumstances set out in section 190.2, rather than by the aggravating and mitigating factors set out in section 190.3. ( Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 53 , 104 S.Ct. 871 , 79 L.Ed.2d 29 ; People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 659-660 , 274 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 798 P.2d 849 .) 15.

2002As we have explained, “[t]he primary vice in referring to the Bible and other religious authority is that such argument may ‘diminish the jury’s sense of responsibility for its verdict and . . . imply that another, higher law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court’s instructions.’” (People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 261 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421 , 861 P.2d 1107 ], quoting People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1107 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 , 839 P.2d 1020 ] (Wrest).) Defendant argues that the prosecutor in this case exhorted the jury to “follow God’s law of mandatory exe

2002As we have explained, “[t]he primary vice in referring to the Bible and other religious authority is that such argument may ‘diminish the jury’s sense of responsibility for its verdict and . . . imply that another, higher law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court’s instructions.’” (People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 261 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421 , 861 P.2d 1107 ], quoting People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1107 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 , 839 P.2d 1020 ] (Wrest).) Defendant argues that the prosecutor in this case exhorted the jury to “follow God’s law of mandatory exe

1992Under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a sentencing jury in a capital case must be permitted to "consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence" offered by the defendant. ( Boyde, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 377-378 [108 L.Ed.2d at pp. 326-328]; see also Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 1, 6-7 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 ]; Eddings *1082 v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 110 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 8 , 102 S.Ct. 869 ]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 988-993 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 ] (plur. opn. of Burger, C.J.).) In California, the jur

1992Under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a sentencing jury in a capital case must be permitted to "consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence" offered by the defendant. ( Boyde, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 377-378 [108 L.Ed.2d at pp. 326-328]; see also Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 1, 6-7 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 ]; Eddings *1082 v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 110 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 8 , 102 S.Ct. 869 ]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 988-993 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 ] (plur. opn. of Burger, C.J.).) In California, the jur

1992Under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a sentencing jury in a capital case must be permitted to "consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence" offered by the defendant. ( Boyde, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 377-378 [108 L.Ed.2d at pp. 326-328]; see also Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 1, 6-7 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 ]; Eddings *1082 v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 110 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 8 , 102 S.Ct. 869 ]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 988-993 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 ] (plur. opn. of Burger, C.J.).) In California, the jur

1992Under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a sentencing jury in a capital case must be permitted to "consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence" offered by the defendant. ( Boyde, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 377-378 [108 L.Ed.2d at pp. 326-328]; see also Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 1, 6-7 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 ]; Eddings *1082 v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 110 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 8 , 102 S.Ct. 869 ]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 988-993 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 ] (plur. opn. of Burger, C.J.).) In California, the jur

2024(People v. Parra Martinez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 317 , 322.) “The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977 .) Under section 1385, the dismissal of an enhancement will “endanger public safety” if there is “a likelihood that the dismissal … would result in physical injury or 16. other serious danger to others.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) A trial court’s finding of such a likelihood may be based upon the circumstances of the current offense.

2014(See Ybarra, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1089–1093.) Section 190.5(b) does not expressly direct the sentencing court to consider those factors, but “since all discretionary authority is contextual, those factors that direct similar sentencing decisions are relevant, including ‘the nature and circumstances of the 40 offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, or his traits of character as evidenced by his behavior and demeanor at the trial.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 978 .) The factors that a sentencing court must consider under

2018Nor did the trial court err by instructing the jury about the aggravating and mitigating factors using a unitary list (see, e.g., People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181 , 1222, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 786 , 274 P.3d 413 ), by using the word "extreme" in CALJIC No. 8.85 (see, e.g., Myles , at p. 1223, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 786 , 274 P.3d 413 ); or by telling jurors to consider section 190.3 factors "if applicable" (see, e.g., People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342 , 439, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 68 P.3d 1 ).

2018Nor did the trial court err by instructing the jury about the aggravating and mitigating factors using a unitary list (see, e.g., People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181 , 1222, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 786 , 274 P.3d 413 ), by using the word "extreme" in CALJIC No. 8.85 (see, e.g., Myles , at p. 1223, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 786 , 274 P.3d 413 ); or by telling jurors to consider section 190.3 factors "if applicable" (see, e.g., People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342 , 439, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 68 P.3d 1 ).

2014But Miller ‘requirefs] [the sentencer] to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1390.) Although section 190.5, subdivision (b) does not expressly so provide, in making a decision under that statute, “a sentencing court must consider the aggravating and mitigating factors enumerated in Penal Code section 190.3 and the California Rules of Court. [Citation.]” (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1387; accord, People v. Ybarra (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1089, 1092 [ 83 C

2014But Miller ‘requirefs] [the sentencer] to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1390.) Although section 190.5, subdivision (b) does not expressly so provide, in making a decision under that statute, “a sentencing court must consider the aggravating and mitigating factors enumerated in Penal Code section 190.3 and the California Rules of Court. [Citation.]” (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1387; accord, People v. Ybarra (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1089, 1092 [ 83 C

2013(Cf. U.S. v. McCullah (10th Cir. 1996) 76 F.3d 1087, 1111-1112 [under a weighing scheme, the use of duplicative aggravating factors creates an unconstitutional skewing of the weighing process, which necessitates a reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors].) We find nothing improper in the prosecutor’s argument.

2013(Cf. United States v. McCullah (10th Cir. 1996) 76 F.3d 1087 , 1111- 1112 [under a weighing scheme, the use of duplicative aggravating factors creates 96 an unconstitutional skewing of the weighing process, which necessitates a reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors].) We find nothing improper in the prosecutor‘s argument.

1990(Cf. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 761.) More importantly, the prosecutor, despite occasional forays into mechanical and mandatory language, made clear that the jury was to arrive at the "appropriate" penalty by "weighing" the aggravating and mitigating factors in light of their own consciences.

1990(Cf. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 761.) More importantly, the prosecutor, despite occasional forays into mechanical and mandatory language, made clear that the jury was to arrive at the “appropriate” penalty by “weighing” the aggravating and mitigating factors in light of their own consciences.

1989California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [ 93 L.Ed.2d 934 , 107 S.Ct. *899 837]); see also Harris v. Pulley (9th Cir.1982) 692 F.2d 1189, 1195-1196 (vacated and remanded on other grounds, Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37 [ 79 L.Ed.2d 29 , 104 S.Ct. 871 ].) Finally, he asserts that the statute is unconstitutional because it fails to: (1) require written findings regarding the aggravating and mitigating factors found true; (2) require that aggravating factors be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) exclude nonstatutory aggravating factors as a basis for the death penalty; and (4) require unan

1989California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [ 93 L.Ed.2d 934 , 107 S.Ct. *899 837]); see also Harris v. Pulley (9th Cir.1982) 692 F.2d 1189, 1195-1196 (vacated and remanded on other grounds, Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37 [ 79 L.Ed.2d 29 , 104 S.Ct. 871 ].) Finally, he asserts that the statute is unconstitutional because it fails to: (1) require written findings regarding the aggravating and mitigating factors found true; (2) require that aggravating factors be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) exclude nonstatutory aggravating factors as a basis for the death penalty; and (4) require unan

2024This matter does not involve a situation where “the sentencing court was not aware of the scope of its discretionary powers at sentencing.” (Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 425 ; see Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 1390–1391.) Nor is this a situation where no “ ‘discretionary decision was made in the first place.’ ” (Salazar, at p. 425.) A trial court imposing the upper term under the prior DSL has exercised its discretion and selected the most appropriate sentence in light of the aggravating and mitigating factors.

2024(See Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 428, fn. 8 [observing a court would not abuse its “broad sentencing discretion” by imposing a middle term or lower term sentence after weighing aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstance of childhood trauma]; Hilburn, supra, 10 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 206 [court did not abuse its sentencing discretion where “the record establishes the court carefully considered the relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances” and determined the aggravating factors warranted the middle term].) In other words, the court did not abuse its discretion by d

2018Defendant also concedes that we have repeatedly held that certain procedural distinctions between capital and noncapital sentences are sufficiently justified (see, e.g., People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210 , 1290, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 465 , 253 P.3d 553 [" '[C]apital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated and therefore may be treated differently without violating constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws' "] ), and that arguments based on international law along the lines of what defendant advances in this case are not a basis to invalidate death sentences that are

2018Defendant also concedes that we have repeatedly held that certain procedural distinctions between capital and noncapital sentences are sufficiently justified (see, e.g., People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210 , 1290, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 465 , 253 P.3d 553 [" '[C]apital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated and therefore may be treated differently without violating constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws' "] ), and that arguments based on international law along the lines of what defendant advances in this case are not a basis to invalidate death sentences that are

2012He cites our statement in People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 692 , 809 P.2d 351 ], that a trial court “may be required to give a properly formulated lingering doubt instruction when warranted by the evidence.” (Id. at p. 678, fn. 20.) We have since concluded, however, that such an instruction is unnecessary when the jury is properly instructed—as was defendant’s jury—regarding the aggravating and mitigating factors described in Penal Code section 190.3, factors (a) (circumstances of the crime) and (k) (other circumstances that extenuate the gravity of the crime).

2012He cites our statement in People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 692 , 809 P.2d 351 ], that a trial court “may be required to give a properly formulated lingering doubt instruction when warranted by the evidence.” (Id. at p. 678, fn. 20.) We have since concluded, however, that such an instruction is unnecessary when the jury is properly instructed—as was defendant’s jury—regarding the aggravating and mitigating factors described in Penal Code section 190.3, factors (a) (circumstances of the crime) and (k) (other circumstances that extenuate the gravity of the crime).

2006(People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 884, fn. 19 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 309 , 671 P.2d 813 ]; see Murtishaw, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1027-1028, fn. 12.) Because the jury was not instructed to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors, defendant’s further request for an instruction that the jury could return a verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole even if the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors was irrelevant and unnecessary.

2006(People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 884, fn. 19 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 309 , 671 P.2d 813 ]; see Murtishaw, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1027-1028, fn. 12.) Because the jury was not instructed to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors, defendant’s further request for an instruction that the jury could return a verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole even if the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors was irrelevant and unnecessary.

2001Since Beardslee , we have adhered to our position that the jury need not be instructed to consider the sentences received by codefendants. [16] ( Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1188-1189, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 ; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 479-480 , 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 .) We maintain that position here. *364 g) Defense special instruction No. 15 Defendant asked the trial court to read special instruction No. 15: "After weighing all the aggravating and mitigating factors, it is up to you individually to decide which of the punishments, life imprisonment wit

2001Since Beardslee , we have adhered to our position that the jury need not be instructed to consider the sentences received by codefendants. [16] ( Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1188-1189, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 ; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 479-480 , 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 .) We maintain that position here. *364 g) Defense special instruction No. 15 Defendant asked the trial court to read special instruction No. 15: "After weighing all the aggravating and mitigating factors, it is up to you individually to decide which of the punishments, life imprisonment wit

2005Appeals to divine authority in jury arguments in capital cases are prejudicial when jurors for whom the aggravating and mitigating factors appear closely balanced use religious considerations to resolve their doubts, as the prosecutor's improper argument invites them to do." ( Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1228 , 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477 , 47 P.3d 262 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Like the majority in Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1187 , 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477 , 47 P.3d 262 , the majority here considers the prosecutor's improper biblical argument harmless because it was only a part of the p

2005Appeals to divine authority in jury arguments in capital cases are prejudicial when jurors for whom the aggravating and mitigating factors appear closely balanced use religious considerations to resolve their doubts, as the prosecutor's improper argument invites them to do." ( Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1228 , 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477 , 47 P.3d 262 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Like the majority in Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1187 , 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477 , 47 P.3d 262 , the majority here considers the prosecutor's improper biblical argument harmless because it was only a part of the p