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49 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Roseberrygreen2 sentences2009III. ¶ 129 Because Dann’s offenses occurred before August 1, 2002, we independently review the aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as the “propriety of the death sentence.” A.R.S. § 13-755.A; see also Roseberry, 210 Ariz. at 373 ¶ 77, 111 P.3d at 415 (stating that this Court “independently reviews the jury’s findings of aggravation and independently determines ‘if the mitigation is sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency in light of existing aggravation’ ” (quoting State v. Greene, 192 Ariz. 431 , 443-44 ¶ 60, 967 P.2d 106, 118-19 (1998))). 2008III. ¶ 71 Because the murders occurred before August 1, 2002, we independently review the aggravating and mitigating factors and the “propriety of the death sentence.” A.R.S. § 13-703.04.A; see also State v. Roseberry, 210 Ariz. 360 , 373 ¶ 77, 111 P.3d 402, 415 (2005) (“[The Court] independently determines ‘if the mitigation is sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency in light of existing aggravation.’ ” (citation omitted)). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Greenegreen2 sentences2009III. ¶ 129 Because Dann’s offenses occurred before August 1, 2002, we independently review the aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as the “propriety of the death sentence.” A.R.S. § 13-755.A; see also Roseberry, 210 Ariz. at 373 ¶ 77, 111 P.3d at 415 (stating that this Court “independently reviews the jury’s findings of aggravation and independently determines ‘if the mitigation is sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency in light of existing aggravation’ ” (quoting State v. Greene, 192 Ariz. 431 , 443-44 ¶ 60, 967 P.2d 106, 118-19 (1998))). 2009III. ¶ 129 Because Dann’s offenses occurred before August 1, 2002, we independently review the aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as the “propriety of the death sentence.” A.R.S. § 13-755.A; see also Roseberry, 210 Ariz. at 373 ¶ 77, 111 P.3d at 415 (stating that this Court “independently reviews the jury’s findings of aggravation and independently determines ‘if the mitigation is sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency in light of existing aggravation’ ” (quoting State v. Greene, 192 Ariz. 431 , 443-44 ¶ 60, 967 P.2d 106, 118-19 (1998))). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Woodgreen2 sentences2000We independently review both the aggravating and mitigating factors pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703.01 and State v. Wood, 180 Ariz. 53, 68 , 881 P.2d 1158, 1173 (1994). 2000We independently review both the aggravating and mitigating factors pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703.01 and State v. Wood, 180 Ariz. 53, 68 , 881 P.2d 1158, 1173 (1994). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences1985State v. Smith, 138 Ariz. 79, 85 , 673 P.2d 17, 23 (1983); State v. Richmond, 136 Ariz. 312, 317 , 666 P.2d 57, 62 , cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 435 , 78 L.Ed.2d 367 (1983). 1985State v. Smith, 138 Ariz. 79, 85 , 673 P.2d 17, 23 (1983); State v. Richmond, 136 Ariz. 312, 317 , 666 P.2d 57, 62 , cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 435 , 78 L.Ed.2d 367 (1983). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Carbajalgreen2 sentences2024See State v. Carbajal, 177 Ariz. 461, 463 (App. 1994) (‘The trial court is in the best position to determine the evidence surrounding the aggravating and mitigating factors and which factors should be given credence.”). 2023The superior court “is in the best position to determine the evidence surrounding the aggravating and mitigating factors[,]” including “which factors should be given credence,” Carbajal, 177 Ariz. at 463 , and “the weight to be given that evidence,” State v. Gonzales, 181 Ariz. 502, 515 (1995). ¶14 After the jury rendered its verdicts, the superior court granted Hall’s requests to appoint a mental health expert and order a mental examination and evaluation. | 2 | 3 |
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Weinrauchgreen2 sentences2010See In re Galbasini, 163 Ariz. at 121, 125-26 , 786 P.2d at 972, 976-77 (adopting recommended six-month suspension of attorney for knowingly failing to supervise nonlawyer employees who engaged in debt collection and improperly solicited clients in attorney's name); Davis & Goldberg v. Ala. State Bar, 676 So.2d 306, 307-08 (Ala.1996) (upholding two-month suspension of two partners for implementing policies designed to minimize expenses and maximize profits, to clients' detriment, when firm's practices resulted in unmanageable caseloads and permitted nonlawyers to perform legal services); Att'y 2010See In re Galbasini, 163 Ariz. at 121, 125-26 , 786 P.2d at 972, 976-77 (adopting recommended six-month suspension of attorney for knowingly failing to supervise nonlawyer employees who engaged in debt collection and improperly solicited clients in attorney’s name); Davis & Goldberg v. Ala. State Bar, 676 So.2d 306, 307-08 (Ala.1996) (upholding two-month suspension of two partners for implementing policies designed to minimize expenses and maximize profits, to clients’ detriment, when firm’s practices resulted in unmanageable caseloads and permitted nonlawyers to perform legal services); Att’y | 2 | 2 |
Davis v. Alabama State Bargreen2 sentences2010See In re Galbasini, 163 Ariz. at 121, 125-26 , 786 P.2d at 972, 976-77 (adopting recommended six-month suspension of attorney for knowingly failing to supervise nonlawyer employees who engaged in debt collection and improperly solicited clients in attorney's name); Davis & Goldberg v. Ala. State Bar, 676 So.2d 306, 307-08 (Ala.1996) (upholding two-month suspension of two partners for implementing policies designed to minimize expenses and maximize profits, to clients' detriment, when firm's practices resulted in unmanageable caseloads and permitted nonlawyers to perform legal services); Att'y 2010See In re Galbasini, 163 Ariz. at 121, 125-26 , 786 P.2d at 972, 976-77 (adopting recommended six-month suspension of attorney for knowingly failing to supervise nonlawyer employees who engaged in debt collection and improperly solicited clients in attorney’s name); Davis & Goldberg v. Ala. State Bar, 676 So.2d 306, 307-08 (Ala.1996) (upholding two-month suspension of two partners for implementing policies designed to minimize expenses and maximize profits, to clients’ detriment, when firm’s practices resulted in unmanageable caseloads and permitted nonlawyers to perform legal services); Att’y | 2 | 2 |
In Re a Member of the State Bar of Arizona, Galbasinigreen2 sentences2010See In re Galbasini, 163 Ariz. at 121, 125-26 , 786 P.2d at 972, 976-77 (adopting recommended six-month suspension of attorney for knowingly failing to supervise nonlawyer employees who engaged in debt collection and improperly solicited clients in attorney’s name); Davis & Goldberg v. Ala. State Bar, 676 So.2d 306, 307-08 (Ala.1996) (upholding two-month suspension of two partners for implementing policies designed to minimize expenses and maximize profits, to clients’ detriment, when firm’s practices resulted in unmanageable caseloads and permitted nonlawyers to perform legal services); Att’y 2010See In re Galbasini, 163 Ariz. at 121, 125-26 , 786 P.2d at 972, 976-77 (adopting recommended six-month suspension of attorney for knowingly failing to supervise nonlawyer employees who engaged in debt collection and improperly solicited clients in attorney’s name); Davis & Goldberg v. Ala. State Bar, 676 So.2d 306, 307-08 (Ala.1996) (upholding two-month suspension of two partners for implementing policies designed to minimize expenses and maximize profits, to clients’ detriment, when firm’s practices resulted in unmanageable caseloads and permitted nonlawyers to perform legal services); Att’y | 2 | 2 |
State v. Scottgreen2 sentences2002Because it is but one fact, it cannot be weighed twice, even though it satisfied two separate aggravating factors. 177 Ariz. 131, 144 , 865 P.2d 792, 805 (1993). 2002Because it is but one fact, it cannot be weighed twice, even though it satisfied two separate aggravating factors. 177 Ariz. 131, 144 , 865 P.2d 792, 805 (1993). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Harrisongreen2 sentences2024See Webb, 164 Ariz. at 354-55 . ¶19 In support of his assertion that the court erred in “fail[ing] to enumerate the aggravating and mitigating factors on the record,” Alvarez cites State v. Bonfiglio, 231 Ariz. 371 (2013), and State v. Harrison, 195 Ariz. 1 (1999). 2001The aggravating circumstances are sufficiently substantial to warrant an aggravated sentence. ¶ 3 In his Rule 32 petition, petitioner challenged the aggravated sentence, arguing (1) that the trial court erred in relying on aggravating factors that were not alleged by the prosecutor in his sentencing memorandum; (2) that the trial court failed to consider and properly weigh mitigating evidence presented by the defense, contrary to State v. Harrison, 195 Ariz. 1 , 985 P.2d 486 (1999); (3) that the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that the crime was committed in an “especially hein | 1 | 2 |
State v. Gomezgreen1 sentence2026See State v. Gomez, 27 Ariz. App. 248, 251 (1976) (citing Ariz. R. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Granvillegreen1 sentence2025See id. at 473 ¶ 21 (describing the jury’s assessment of mitigating evidence as based on “[each] juror’s assessment of the quality and significance of the mitigating evidence”). ¶74 Second, the prosecutor did not suggest that jurors must unanimously agree on individual mitigating circumstances. | 1 | 1 |
State of Arizona v. Austin James Bonfigliogreen1 sentence2024See Webb, 164 Ariz. at 354-55 . ¶19 In support of his assertion that the court erred in “fail[ing] to enumerate the aggravating and mitigating factors on the record,” Alvarez cites State v. Bonfiglio, 231 Ariz. 371 (2013), and State v. Harrison, 195 Ariz. 1 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
In re Davisgreen1 sentence2024Although the presumptive length of a suspension is six months, ABA Standard 2.3, we take into account this Court’s observation in In re Davis “that, as a solo practitioner, any suspension will be devastating to her practice . . . [and] a six-month suspension would be tantamount to disbarment.” 181 Ariz. 263, 266 (1995) (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Trujillogreen1 sentence2024See Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 144, ¶ 34; Trujillo, 227 Ariz. at 319, ¶ 21 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Webbgreen2 sentences2024See Webb, 164 Ariz. at 354-55 . ¶19 In support of his assertion that the court erred in “fail[ing] to enumerate the aggravating and mitigating factors on the record,” Alvarez cites State v. Bonfiglio, 231 Ariz. 371 (2013), and State v. Harrison, 195 Ariz. 1 (1999). 2024State v. Webb, 164 Ariz. 348, 355 (App. 1990). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Van Adamsgreen1 sentence2024See State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, 421-22, ¶¶48-50 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gonzalesgreen1 sentence2023The superior court “is in the best position to determine the evidence surrounding the aggravating and mitigating factors[,]” including “which factors should be given credence,” Carbajal, 177 Ariz. at 463 , and “the weight to be given that evidence,” State v. Gonzales, 181 Ariz. 502, 515 (1995). ¶14 After the jury rendered its verdicts, the superior court granted Hall’s requests to appoint a mental health expert and order a mental examination and evaluation. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sunigagreen1 sentence2023State v. Suniga, 145 Ariz. 389, 395 (App. 1985). ¶13 The record does not show that the trial court used Martin’s lack of remorse to impose consecutive or aggravated sentences. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cidgreen1 sentence2020The record here reflects the court received and therefore considered character letters, mental health records, and information regarding Wallace’s methamphetamine use and history of trauma and made findings on all the relevant statutory mitigating factors before imposing his sentence. 3 See State v. Cid, 181 Ariz. 496, 501 (App. 1995) (“[A]n appellate court presumes that the trial court considered all relevant mitigating factors in rendering its sentencing decision.”). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cazaresgreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stokleygreen1 sentence2020“The trial court is in the best position to determine the evidence surrounding the aggravating and mitigating factors and which factors should be given credence.” State v. Carbajal, 177 Ariz. 461, 463 (App. 1994). 8 ¶25 Wallace admits that while the court must consider mitigation evidence, see A.R.S. § 13-701(E), the court “is not required to accept such evidence,” State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 519 (1995); see also State v. Cazares, 205 Ariz. 425, 427, ¶ 8 (App. 2003) (“[A] sentencing court is not required to find that mitigating circumstances exist merely because mitigating evidence is pre | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Alcorngreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Fattygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gilliesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hoskinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Viramontesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Guytangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. McKinneyred | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Milkegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Styersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lopezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Holstungreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Libbertongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gilliesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jordangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Richmond
green
2 sentences1996Rather, they point to State v. Gretzler, supra, which issued subsequent to the re-sentencing but prior to [State v. Richmond, 136 Ariz. 312 , 666 P.2d 57 (1983) ] (Richmond II), and which provided an adequate narrowing construction of the “especially heinous, cruel or depraved” factor. 1996Rather, they point to State v. Gretzler, supra, which issued subsequent to the re-sentencing but prior to [State v. Richmond, 136 Ariz. 312 , 666 P.2d 57 (1983) ] (Richmond II), and which provided an adequate narrowing construction of the “especially heinous, cruel or depraved” factor. | 4 | 1984–1996 |
In the Matter of Rachel R. Alexander
green
2 sentences2024“Lawyer discipline also ‘deter[s] the [disciplined] attorney and others from engaging in the same or similar misconduct.’” Id. (quoting In re Alexander, 232 Ariz. at 15 ¶ 63) (alterations in original). ¶56 After having considered the aggravating and mitigating factors involved and the relative weight to give to each, we conclude that a 17 suspension is appropriate. 2014“The sanction to be imposed, however, requires consideration of any pertinent aggravating and mitigating factors.” In re Alexander, 232 Ariz. at 14 ¶ 57, 300 P.3d at 549 . ¶ 41 After considering the aggravating and mitigating factors, we conclude that disbarment is too severe a sanction. | 3 | 2014–2024 |
Hydroculture, Inc. v. Coopers
green
2 sentences1985State v. Smith, 138 Ariz. 79, 85 , 673 P.2d 17, 23 (1983); State v. Richmond, 136 Ariz. 312, 317 , 666 P.2d 57, 62 , cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 435 , 78 L.Ed.2d 367 (1983). 1985State v. Smith, 138 Ariz. 79, 85 , 673 P.2d 17, 23 (1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1429 , 79 L.Ed.2d 753 (1984); State v. Richmond, 136 Ariz. 312, 317 , 666 P.2d 57, 62 , cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 435 , 78 L.Ed.2d 367 (1983). | 3 | 1984–1985 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kimmel
green
2 sentences2010See In re Galbasini, 163 Ariz. at 121, 125-26 , 786 P.2d at 972, 976-77 (adopting recommended six-month suspension of attorney for knowingly failing to supervise nonlawyer employees who engaged in debt collection and improperly solicited clients in attorney's name); Davis & Goldberg v. Ala. State Bar, 676 So.2d 306, 307-08 (Ala.1996) (upholding two-month suspension of two partners for implementing policies designed to minimize expenses and maximize profits, to clients' detriment, when firm's practices resulted in unmanageable caseloads and permitted nonlawyers to perform legal services); Att'y 2010See In re Galbasini, 163 Ariz. at 121, 125-26 , 786 P.2d at 972, 976-77 (adopting recommended six-month suspension of attorney for knowingly failing to supervise nonlawyer employees who engaged in debt collection and improperly solicited clients in attorney’s name); Davis & Goldberg v. Ala. State Bar, 676 So.2d 306, 307-08 (Ala.1996) (upholding two-month suspension of two partners for implementing policies designed to minimize expenses and maximize profits, to clients’ detriment, when firm’s practices resulted in unmanageable caseloads and permitted nonlawyers to perform legal services); Att’y | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Matter of Rivkind
green
2 sentences1992Considering the ABA-recommended sanctions, and the aggravating and mitigating factors involved, the Commission does not believe suspension would serve the purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is "... to protect the public and deter similar conduct by other lawyers.” In re Rivkind, 164 Ariz. 154 , 791 P.2d 1037 (1990). 1992Considering the ABA-recommended sanctions, and the aggravating and mitigating factors involved, the Commission does not believe suspension would serve the purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is "... to protect the public and deter similar conduct by other lawyers.” In re Rivkind, 164 Ariz. 154 , 791 P.2d 1037 (1990). | 2 | 1992–1992 |
In Re Zawada
green
1 sentence2025Importantly, though, “[t]he sanction is not intended to punish the disciplined lawyer.” Id. ¶113 After considering the aggravating and mitigating factors involved, and comparing similar cases, we conclude that the presumptive sanction of suspension is warranted. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Baum
green
1 sentence2024Id. at 140 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State of Arizona v. Easton Courtney Murray
green
1 sentence2024“Lawyer discipline also ‘deter[s] the [disciplined] attorney and others from engaging in the same or similar misconduct.’” Id. (quoting In re Alexander, 232 Ariz. at 15 ¶ 63) (alterations in original). ¶56 After having considered the aggravating and mitigating factors involved and the relative weight to give to each, we conclude that a 17 suspension is appropriate. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Zuck
green
1 sentence2023State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 509 , 512-13 (1982). ¶11 After weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial court sentenced Blunt to maximum terms of 28 years’ imprisonment for armed robbery and kidnapping, to be served concurrently with maximum terms of 20 years’ imprisonment for the remaining offenses.4 Blunt timely appealed. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. Beasley green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Styers v. Arizona green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Scott v. Arizona green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| In Re Ockrassa green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Patton green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Grier green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Richmond v. Arizona green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Broncucia v. Colorado green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Fulminante green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Richmond red | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Leslie green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Russell v. Texas green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.