6 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Olsen v. Stategreen1 sentence2003Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102 (Lexis Nexis 2003); which, although it contains no express weighing provision, has been interpreted by the court to require balancing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, to require that “the burden of negating [the] mitigating evidence by proof beyond a reasonable doubt remains with the State.” Olsen v. State, 67 P.3d 536, 590 (Wyo. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Webb
green
2 sentences2004“In [State v. Webb], supra, 238 Conn. 389 , we explained that comparative proportionality review can be performed in one of two ways: the frequency method, pursuant to which a reviewing court uses a complicated method of statistical analysis that purports to quantify, with something like mathematical precision, the various factors leading to the imposition, or nonimposition, of the death penalty, and the frequency with which the death penalty is imposed in certain circumstances; id., 511; and the precedent seeking approach, pursuant to which a reviewing court compares the case before it to oth 2003In Webb I, supra, 238 Conn. 389 , we explained that comparative proportionality review can be performed in one of two ways: the frequency method, pursuant to which a reviewing court “uses a complicated method of statistical analysis that purports to quantify, with something like mathematical precision, the various factors leading to the imposition, or nonimposition, of the death penalty, and the frequency with which the death penalty is imposed in certain circumstances”; id., 511; and the precedent seeking approach, pursuant to which a reviewing court “compares the case before it to other case | 2 | 2003–2004 |
Runningen v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence2025Pattis argues that ‘‘[t]he dismissed grievance does not fall within the aggravating factors recommended by the ABA and approved by our Supreme Court in Burton [v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1 , 835 A.2d 998 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073 , 124 S. Ct. 2422 , 158 L. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Risdal v. Halford
green
1 sentence2025Pattis argues that ‘‘[t]he dismissed grievance does not fall within the aggravating factors recommended by the ABA and approved by our Supreme Court in Burton [v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1 , 835 A.2d 998 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073 , 124 S. Ct. 2422 , 158 L. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Sanyo North America Corp. v. Harris Corp
green
1 sentence2025Pattis argues that ‘‘[t]he dismissed grievance does not fall within the aggravating factors recommended by the ABA and approved by our Supreme Court in Burton [v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1 , 835 A.2d 998 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073 , 124 S. Ct. 2422 , 158 L. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Burton v. Mottolese
green
2 sentences2025Pattis argues that ‘‘[t]he dismissed grievance does not fall within the aggravating factors recommended by the ABA and approved by our Supreme Court in Burton [v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1 , 835 A.2d 998 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073 , 124 S. Ct. 2422 , 158 L. 2025Pattis argues that ‘‘[t]he dismissed grievance does not fall within the aggravating factors recommended by the ABA and approved by our Supreme Court in Burton [v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1 , 835 A.2d 998 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073 , 124 S. Ct. 2422 , 158 L. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Rizzo
green
2 sentences2004Additionally, we conclude that, pursuant to our decision in State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171, 242 , 833 A.2d 363 (2003), the trial court did not instruct the jury properly under § 53a-46a (e) and (f) with respect to the process of weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors. 6 Accordingly, we reverse the judg ment of the trial court insofar as it imposes the death penalty and remand the case for a new penalty phase hearing. 2004Additionally, we conclude that, pursuant to our decision in State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171, 242 , 833 A.2d 363 (2003), the trial court did not instruct the jury properly under § 53a-46a (e) and (f) with respect to the process of weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors. 6 Accordingly, we reverse the judg ment of the trial court insofar as it imposes the death penalty and remand the case for a new penalty phase hearing. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Ramseur
green
2 sentences2003Id., 521; cf. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 321 , 524 A.2d 188 (1987) (improper for prosecutor to argue that death penalty was appropriate to protect society from “cruel, horrible, inhumane acts of murder”). 2003Id., 521; cf. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 321 , 524 A.2d 188 (1987) (improper for prosecutor to argue that death penalty was appropriate to protect society from “cruel, horrible, inhumane acts of murder”). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Blystone v. Pennsylvania
green
1 sentence1994Indeed, in this case, the trial court underscored this deficiency in the statutory scheme by limiting counsel in their summations from explaining to the jurors the consequences of their decision on the aggravating and mitigating factors. 36 The majority holds that our statutory scheme meets eighth amendment requirements in reliance on Blystone v. Pennsylvania, supra, 494 U.S. 299 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Caldwell v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences1994The United States Supreme Court has held “that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.” Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 , 105 S. Ct. 2633 , 86 L. 1994The United States Supreme Court has held “that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.” Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 , 105 S. Ct. 2633 , 86 L. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.