difference between rule in New York

2024The primary difference between a rule and an interpretive statement "is that the former set[s] standards that substantially alter or . . . can determine the result of future agency [action] while the latter simply provide[s] additional detail and clarification as to how such standards are met by the public and upheld by the agency" ( Matter of North Shore Hematology-Oncology Assoc., P.C. v New York State Dept. of Health , —-AD3d —-, —-, 2024 NY Slip Op 05165, *2 [3d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks and [*3]citations omitted]).

2024The primary difference between a rule and an interpretive statement "is that the former set[s] standards that substantially alter or . . . can determine the result of future agency [action] while the latter simply provide[s] additional detail and clarification as to how such standards are met by the public and upheld by the agency" ( Matter of North Shore Hematology-Oncology Assoc., P.C. v New York State Dept. of Health , — AD3d — , —, 2024 NY Slip Op 05165, *2 [3d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks and [*3]citations omitted]).

2016The primary difference between a rule or regulation and an interpretive statement or guideline is that the former “ ‘set[ ] standards that substantially alter or, in fact, can determine the result of future agency adjudications’ ” while the latter simply provide additional detail and clarification as to how such standards are met by the public and upheld by the agency (Matter of Council of the City of N.Y. v Department of Homeless Servs. of the City of N.Y., 22 NY3d 150, 155 [2013], quoting Matter of Alca Indus. v Delaney, 92 NY2d at 778 ; see People v Cull, 10 NY2d 123, 126 [1961]).

2016The primary difference between a rule or regulation and an interpretive statement or guideline is that the former “ ‘set[ ] standards that substantially alter or, in fact, can determine the result of future agency adjudications’ ” while the latter simply provide additional detail and clarification as to how such standards are met by the public and upheld by the agency (Matter of Council of the City of N.Y. v Department of Homeless Servs. of the City of N.Y., 22 NY3d 150, 155 [2013], quoting Matter of Alca Indus. v Delaney, 92 NY2d at 778 ; see People v Cull, 10 NY2d 123, 126 [1961]).

2016The primary difference between a rule or regulation and an interpretive statement or guideline is that the former “ ‘set[ ] standards that substantially alter or, in fact, can determine the result of future agency adjudications’ ” while the latter simply provide additional detail and clarification as to how such standards are met by the public and upheld by the agency (Matter of Council of the City of N.Y. v Department of Homeless Servs. of the City of N.Y., 22 NY3d 150, 155 [2013], quoting Matter of Alca Indus. v Delaney, 92 NY2d at 778 ; see People v Cull, 10 NY2d 123, 126 [1961]).

2016The primary difference between a rule or regulation and an interpretive statement or guideline is that the former “ ‘set[ ] standards that substantially alter or, in fact, can determine the result of future agency adjudications’ ” while the latter simply provide additional detail and clarification as to how such standards are met by the public and upheld by the agency (Matter of Council of the City of N.Y. v Department of Homeless Servs. of the City of N.Y., 22 NY3d 150, 155 [2013], quoting Matter of Alca Indus. v Delaney, 92 NY2d at 778 ; see People v Cull, 10 NY2d 123, 126 [1961]).

2016Here, the policy memorandum broadly and invariably affects “that segment of the ‘general public’ over which” the state respondents have authority, inasmuch as it applies to all individuals eligible for NYSHIP coverage who seek to participate in the health insurance buyout program (Matter of Jones v Smith, 64 NY2d 1003, 1005 [1985]; see generally Civil Service Law §§ 161 [1]; 163 [2], [4]).

2016Here, the policy memorandum broadly and invariably affects “that segment of the ‘general public’ over which” the state respondents have authority, inasmuch as it applies to all individuals eligible for NYSHIP coverage who seek to participate in the health insurance buyout program (Matter of Jones v Smith, 64 NY2d 1003, 1005 [1985]; see generally Civil Service Law §§ 161 [1]; 163 [2], [4]).

2023The lease being void, the covenants in the lease which relate to preliminary notice as a condition to instituting eviction proceedings have no probative effect" ( Murphy v Relaxation Plus Commodore, Ltd. , 83 Misc 2d 838, 839 [App Term, 1st Dept 1975]).

2000II The commonsense principle at the heart of the due process guarantees in the United States and New York Constitutions is that when the State seeks to take life, liberty or property from an individual, the State must provide effective procedures that guard against an erroneous deprivation (US Const, Amend XIV, § 1; NY Const, art I, § 6; Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 334-335 ; Wisconsin v Constantineau, 400 US 433, 436 [“(I)t is procedure that marks much of the difference between rule by law and rule by fiat”]).

2000II The commonsense principle at the heart of the due process guarantees in the United States and New York Constitutions is that when the State seeks to take life, liberty or property from an individual, the State must provide effective procedures that guard against an erroneous deprivation (US Const, Amend XIV, § 1; NY Const, art I, § 6; Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 334-335 ; Wisconsin v Constantineau, 400 US 433, 436 [“(I)t is procedure that marks much of the difference between rule by law and rule by fiat”]).

2000Due process, however, is a flexible concept that “generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural *137 requirement would entail.” (Mathews v Eldridge, supra, at 335.) Here, the proc

1995In People v Deegan, 69 NY2d, at 979, supra), on which the trial court relied, we held that even in a case involving wholly circumstantial Grand Jury evidence, the duty of the court reviewing the viability of an indictment is limited to "determining whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes.” As is evident from the Court’s opinion in People v Jennings (supra, at 114-115), that formula is appropriate for judging the legal sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence — an inquiry that is used in appellat

1995In People v Deegan, 69 NY2d, at 979, supra), on which the trial court relied, we held that even in a case involving wholly circumstantial Grand Jury evidence, the duty of the court reviewing the viability of an indictment is limited to "determining whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes.” As is evident from the Court’s opinion in People v Jennings (supra, at 114-115), that formula is appropriate for judging the legal sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence — an inquiry that is used in appellat

1994In People v Corley ( 67 NY2d 105, 110 [1986], supra), the Court of Appeals explained the difference between waiver and forfeiture, noting that, "Whereas waiver results from a knowing, voluntary and intelligent decision, forfeiture occurs by operation of law, based on objective facts and circumstances and without regard to the defendant’s actual state of mind.” Thus, "the forfeiture of a right may occur even though a defendant never made an informed, deliberate decision to relinquish that right.” (People v Parker, 57 NY2d 136, 140 [1982], supra.) In Parker , the People argued that whenever a de

1994The Court of Appeals rejected the argument, reasoning that because a defendant’s right to be present at trial is "of a fundamental constitutional nature”, the right could be relinquished only by a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver. ( 57 NY2d, at 140-141 .) In People v Sanchez ( 65 NY2d 436 , 444 [1985]), however, the Court clarified its ruling in Parker (supra), explaining that Parker’s conduct did not constitute a forfeiture of her right to be present because it was not a sufficiently unambiguous "defiance of the processes of law.” In contrast, the Court considered in Sanchez the case

1994In People v Corley ( 67 NY2d 105, 110 [1986], supra), the Court of Appeals explained the difference between waiver and forfeiture, noting that, "Whereas waiver results from a knowing, voluntary and intelligent decision, forfeiture occurs by operation of law, based on objective facts and circumstances and without regard to the defendant’s actual state of mind.” Thus, "the forfeiture of a right may occur even though a defendant never made an informed, deliberate decision to relinquish that right.” (People v Parker, 57 NY2d 136, 140 [1982], supra.) In Parker , the People argued that whenever a de

1975In Holodook v Spencer (supra, pp 50-51), the court explained the difference between the rule of Gelbman v Gelbman (supra) and the rule then being promulgated by the use of the following language: "The mutual obligations of the parent-child relation derive their strength and vitality from such forces as natural instinct, love and morality, and not from the essentially negative compulsions of the law’s directives and sanctions.