11 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1912–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Coffin v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025In doing so, the court provided the language which Guillen relies on: “the presumption of innocence is a conclusion drawn by the law in favor of the citizen, by virtue whereof, when brought to trial upon a criminal charge, he must be acquitted, unless he is proven to be guilty.” 156 U.S. at 458-59 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bartelsgreen1 sentence2017The difference between warnings that are statutorily incorrect but not misleading as a matter oflaw, e.g., Murray, 187 Wn.2d 115 ; Bartels, 112 Wn.2d at 889-90 (nonindigent defendants), and warnings that are misleading as a matter oflaw, e.g.. 12 State V. | 1 | 1 |
Columbia Steel Co. v. Stategreen2 sentences1974Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 34 Wn.2d 700 , 209 P.2d 482 *612 (1949), provides a demonstration of the difference between the waiver of immunity as a defense and consent to suit. 1974Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 34 Wn.2d 700 , 209 P.2d 482 *612 (1949), provides a demonstration of the difference between the waiver of immunity as a defense and consent to suit. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Avenue Associates
green
2 sentences2015This distinction is clear in Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Avenue Assocs., 116 Wn.2d · 217, 226, 802 P.2d 1360 (1991), when we discussed the difference between an inquiry into whether the landowner had notice of criminal activity sufficient to give rise to a duty, and foreseeability of harm as a limitation on the scope of a defendant's duty once duty is determined. 2015In the latter sense, it is a question of fact for the jury. “ ‘Generally, the duty to use ordinary care is bounded by the foreseeable range of danger.’ ” Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wn.2d 381, 395 , 755 P.2d 759 (1988) (quoting Wells v. City of Vancouver, 77 Wn.2d 800, 803 , 467 P.2d 292 (1970)). ¶15 This distinction is clear in Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Avenue Associates, 116 Wn.2d 217, 226 , 802 P.2d 1360 (1991), when we discussed the difference between an inquiry into whether the landowner had notice of criminal activity sufficient to give rise to a duty, and foreseeability of harm as a limitatio | 3 | 2015–2015 |
Guffey v. State
green
2 sentences2000Although the Guffey court sought guidance from § 1983 precedents, Guffey, 103 Wash.2d at 150-51 , 690 P.2d 1163 , the three-part test set out by Guffey is not the standard used in § 1983 actions which is based upon whether or not the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time. 2000Although the Guffey court sought guidance from § 1983 precedents, Guffey, 103 Wash.2d at 150-51 , 690 P.2d 1163 , the three-part test set out by Guffey is not the standard used in § 1983 actions which is based upon whether or not the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Murray
green
1 sentence2017The difference between warnings that are statutorily incorrect but not misleading as a matter oflaw, e.g., Murray, 187 Wn.2d 115 ; Bartels, 112 Wn.2d at 889-90 (nonindigent defendants), and warnings that are misleading as a matter oflaw, e.g.. 12 State V. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Burkhart v. Harrod
green
2 sentences2015In the latter sense, it is a question of fact for the jury. “ ‘Generally, the duty to use ordinary care is bounded by the foreseeable range of danger.’ ” Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wn.2d 381, 395 , 755 P.2d 759 (1988) (quoting Wells v. City of Vancouver, 77 Wn.2d 800, 803 , 467 P.2d 292 (1970)). ¶15 This distinction is clear in Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Avenue Associates, 116 Wn.2d 217, 226 , 802 P.2d 1360 (1991), when we discussed the difference between an inquiry into whether the landowner had notice of criminal activity sufficient to give rise to a duty, and foreseeability of harm as a limitatio 2015In the latter sense, it is a question of fact for the jury. “ ‘Generally, the duty to use ordinary care is bounded by the foreseeable range of danger.’ ” Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wn.2d 381, 395 , 755 P.2d 759 (1988) (quoting Wells v. City of Vancouver, 77 Wn.2d 800, 803 , 467 P.2d 292 (1970)). ¶15 This distinction is clear in Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Avenue Associates, 116 Wn.2d 217, 226 , 802 P.2d 1360 (1991), when we discussed the difference between an inquiry into whether the landowner had notice of criminal activity sufficient to give rise to a duty, and foreseeability of harm as a limitatio | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Wells v. City of Vancouver
green
2 sentences2015In the latter sense, it is a question of fact for the jury. “ ‘Generally, the duty to use ordinary care is bounded by the foreseeable range of danger.’ ” Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wn.2d 381, 395 , 755 P.2d 759 (1988) (quoting Wells v. City of Vancouver, 77 Wn.2d 800, 803 , 467 P.2d 292 (1970)). ¶15 This distinction is clear in Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Avenue Associates, 116 Wn.2d 217, 226 , 802 P.2d 1360 (1991), when we discussed the difference between an inquiry into whether the landowner had notice of criminal activity sufficient to give rise to a duty, and foreseeability of harm as a limitatio 2015In the latter sense, it is a question of fact for the jury. “ ‘Generally, the duty to use ordinary care is bounded by the foreseeable range of danger.’ ” Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wn.2d 381, 395 , 755 P.2d 759 (1988) (quoting Wells v. City of Vancouver, 77 Wn.2d 800, 803 , 467 P.2d 292 (1970)). ¶15 This distinction is clear in Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Avenue Associates, 116 Wn.2d 217, 226 , 802 P.2d 1360 (1991), when we discussed the difference between an inquiry into whether the landowner had notice of criminal activity sufficient to give rise to a duty, and foreseeability of harm as a limitatio | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In the Matter of Marriage of Getz
green
1 sentence1992App. 602, 604, 789 P.2d 331 (1990) explained the difference between error that can be corrected under CR 60(a) and judicial error (here error imputed to the arbitrator) as follows: [I]f the trial judge signs a decree, through misplaced confidence in the attorney who presents it, or otherwise, which does not represent the court's intentions in the premises, an error contained therein may he corrected under Rule 60. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Eternal Truth Spiritualist Church of America v. Stuber
neutral
2 sentences1960Respondent relies on Eternal Truth Spiritualist Church of America v. Stuber, 105 Wash. 154 , 177 Pac. 686 . 1960Respondent relies on Eternal Truth Spiritualist Church of America v. Stuber, 105 Wash. 154 , 177 Pac. 686 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Delano v. Luedinghaus
green
2 sentences1912In the recent case of Delano v. Luedinghaus, 70 Wash. 573 , 127 Pac. 197 , this court said: “Much of the briefs is taken up with the discussion of the difference between an exception and a reservation. 1912In the recent case of Delano v. Luedinghaus, 70 Wash. 573 , 127 Pac. 197 , this court said: “Much of the briefs is taken up with the discussion of the difference between an exception and a reservation. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.