difference between doctrine in Tennessee

2009The doctrine of direct estoppel “prevents a party from relitigating a fact which was already determined against it in ‘a decision that finally disposes of a part of a claim on the merits but does not preclude all further action on the remainder of the claim; issues common to both parts of the claim are precluded, even though new issues remain to be decided.’” State v. Huskey, 66 S.W.3d 905, 928 (Tenn. Crim.

2009The doctrine of direct estoppel “prevents a party from relitigating a fact which was already determined against it in ‘a decision that finally disposes of a part of a claim on the merits but does not preclude all further action on the remainder of the claim; issues common to both parts of the claim are precluded, even though new issues remain to be decided.’ ” State v. Huskey, 66 S.W.3d 905, 928 (Tenn.Crim.App.2001) (quoting United, States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270, 276 (7th Cir.1992)).

2014But regardless of the label, liability can attach for any injuries arising from a treatment or procedure performed without adequate consent, whether or not those injuries resulted from negligent performance of that procedure.” Hinkle, 2012 WL 3799215 , at *16 (citing Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 732 (Tenn. 1998); Hawk v. Chattanooga Orthopaedic Group, P.C., 45 S.W.3d 24, 32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Church v. Perales, 39 S.W.3d 149, 159 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)).

2005Church went further, however, and stated that a signed consent form raises a presumption that the patient has consented to the procedure -6- “in the absence of proof of misrepresentation, inadequate disclosure, forgery, or lack of capacity.” Church, 39 S.W.3d at 161 .

2018“When the facts concerning a witness’s participation are clear and undisputed, the trial court determines as a matter of law whether the witness is an accomplice.” State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 489 (Tenn. 2004) (citing Ripley v. State, 227 S.W.2d 26, 29 (1950); State v. Perkinson, 867 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tenn. Crim.

2018“When the facts concerning a witness’s participation are clear and undisputed, the trial court determines as a matter of law whether the witness is an accomplice.” State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 489 (Tenn. 2004) (citing Ripley v. State, 227 S.W.2d 26, 29 (1950); State v. Perkinson, 867 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tenn. Crim.

2018“When the facts concerning a witness’s participation are clear and undisputed, the trial court determines as a matter of law whether the witness is an accomplice.” State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 489 (Tenn. 2004) (citing Ripley v. State, 227 S.W.2d 26, 29 (1950); State v. Perkinson, 867 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tenn. Crim.

2015Morgan, 456 S.W.2d at 362-63 ; see also England, 2012 WL 4503434 , at *6 (listing elements of title by prescription without requiring evidence of ouster); Livesay, 611 S.W.2d at 583-84 (same); Patrick, 2001 WL 1683751 , at *3 (“We feel compelled to note at the outset, that actual ‘ouster’ is not one of the requirements that need be proven by the prescriptive holder as [is the case] with the doctrine of adverse possession.”).

2014But regardless of the label, liability can attach for any injuries arising from a treatment or procedure performed without adequate consent, whether or not those injuries resulted from negligent performance of that procedure.” Hinkle, 2012 WL 3799215 , at *16 (citing Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 732 (Tenn. 1998); Hawk v. Chattanooga Orthopaedic Group, P.C., 45 S.W.3d 24, 32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Church v. Perales, 39 S.W.3d 149, 159 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)).

2014But regardless of the label, liability can attach for any injuries arising from a treatment or procedure performed without adequate consent, whether or not those injuries resulted from negligent performance of that procedure.” Hinkle, 2012 WL 3799215 , at *16 (citing Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 732 (Tenn. 1998); Hawk v. Chattanooga Orthopaedic Group, P.C., 45 S.W.3d 24, 32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Church v. Perales, 39 S.W.3d 149, 159 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)).

2011The court opined: The burden to establish demand futility is “more onerous than that required to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).

2011The court opined: The burden to establish demand futility is “more onerous than that required to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).

2009The doctrine of direct estoppel “prevents a party from relitigating a fact which was already determined against it in ‘a decision that finally disposes of a part of a claim on the merits but does not preclude all further action on the remainder of the claim; issues common to both parts of the claim are precluded, even though new issues remain to be decided.’ ” State v. Huskey, 66 S.W.3d 905, 928 (Tenn.Crim.App.2001) (quoting United, States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270, 276 (7th Cir.1992)).

2005Blair, 77 S.W.3d at 146 ; see also Means v. Ashby, 130 S.W.3d 48,57 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (reiterating the difference between the standard applicable to an initial custody determination as opposed to a petition to modify when a non-parent is involved).