5 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1974–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Poteat v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Poteat v. United States, 330 A.2d 229, 231 (D.C. 1974) (stating that “a forfeiture” of constitutional claims “[is] sometimes referred to as a waiver” but that waiver “should be distinguished from the standards applicable to determine whether the right itself has been waived”); United States v. Soto, 794 F.3d 635 , 649 n.7 (6th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “Olano was the first time a majority of the Supreme Court differentiated between ‘waiver’ and ‘forfeiture’” and that “courts and scholars did not use the terms consistently until the Supreme Court clarified the difference in 1993”); 2024See, e.g., Poteat v. United States, 330 A.2d 229, 231 (D.C. 1974) (stating that “a forfeiture” of constitutional claims “[is] sometimes referred to as a waiver” but that waiver “should be distinguished from the standards applicable to determine whether the right itself has been waived”); United States v. Soto, 794 F.3d 635 , 649 n.7 (6th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “Olano was the first time a majority of the Supreme Court differentiated between ‘waiver’ and ‘forfeiture’” and that “courts and scholars did not use the terms consistently until the Supreme Court clarified the difference in 1993”); | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Poteat v. United States, 330 A.2d 229, 231 (D.C. 1974) (stating that “a forfeiture” of constitutional claims “[is] sometimes referred to as a waiver” but that waiver “should be distinguished from the standards applicable to determine whether the right itself has been waived”); United States v. Soto, 794 F.3d 635 , 649 n.7 (6th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “Olano was the first time a majority of the Supreme Court differentiated between ‘waiver’ and ‘forfeiture’” and that “courts and scholars did not use the terms consistently until the Supreme Court clarified the difference in 1993”); 2024See, e.g., Poteat v. United States, 330 A.2d 229, 231 (D.C. 1974) (stating that “a forfeiture” of constitutional claims “[is] sometimes referred to as a waiver” but that waiver “should be distinguished from the standards applicable to determine whether the right itself has been waived”); United States v. Soto, 794 F.3d 635 , 649 n.7 (6th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “Olano was the first time a majority of the Supreme Court differentiated between ‘waiver’ and ‘forfeiture’” and that “courts and scholars did not use the terms consistently until the Supreme Court clarified the difference in 1993”); | 2 | 2 |
Ray Agard v. Leonard Portuondo, Superintendent of Fishkill Correctional Facilitygreen1 sentence2014Heath, 26 A.3d at 281 (emphasis in original to indicate the difference between this rule and the Second Circuit’s rule articulated in Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 705 (2d Cir.1997), rev’d on other grounds, 529 U.S. 61 , 120 S.Ct. 1119 , 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000)). 13 In Heath , we observed that we reach the same result under Kotteakos or Chapman whenever exclusion of evidence reaches reversible error of constitutional magnitude. | 1 | 1 |
Heath v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014Heath, 26 A.3d at 281 (emphasis in original to indicate the difference between this rule and the Second Circuit’s rule articulated in Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 705 (2d Cir.1997), rev’d on other grounds, 529 U.S. 61 , 120 S.Ct. 1119 , 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000)). 13 In Heath , we observed that we reach the same result under Kotteakos or Chapman whenever exclusion of evidence reaches reversible error of constitutional magnitude. 2014Heath, 26 A.3d at 281 . 14 The evidence that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to present is precisely that evidence that, in the context of the entire record, stands a reasonable chance of turning the trial. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Allen v. United States
green
2 sentences2024In Allen, this court, sitting en banc, took deliberate steps to untangle waiver from forfeiture and differentiate the two terms. 495 A.2d at 1151 & n.11. 2024In Allen, this court, sitting en banc, took deliberate steps to untangle waiver from forfeiture and differentiate the two terms. 495 A.2d at 1151 & n.11. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Manuel Soto
green
2 sentences2024See, e.g., Poteat v. United States, 330 A.2d 229, 231 (D.C. 1974) (stating that “a forfeiture” of constitutional claims “[is] sometimes referred to as a waiver” but that waiver “should be distinguished from the standards applicable to determine whether the right itself has been waived”); United States v. Soto, 794 F.3d 635 , 649 n.7 (6th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “Olano was the first time a majority of the Supreme Court differentiated between ‘waiver’ and ‘forfeiture’” and that “courts and scholars did not use the terms consistently until the Supreme Court clarified the difference in 1993”); 2024See, e.g., Poteat v. United States, 330 A.2d 229, 231 (D.C. 1974) (stating that “a forfeiture” of constitutional claims “[is] sometimes referred to as a waiver” but that waiver “should be distinguished from the standards applicable to determine whether the right itself has been waived”); United States v. Soto, 794 F.3d 635 , 649 n.7 (6th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “Olano was the first time a majority of the Supreme Court differentiated between ‘waiver’ and ‘forfeiture’” and that “courts and scholars did not use the terms consistently until the Supreme Court clarified the difference in 1993”); | 2 | 2024–2024 |
In re Salo
green
1 sentence2016Salo, 48 A.3d at 178 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Portuondo v. Agard
green
2 sentences2014Heath, 26 A.3d at 281 (emphasis in original to indicate the difference between this rule and the Second Circuit’s rule articulated in Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 705 (2d Cir.1997), rev’d on other grounds, 529 U.S. 61 , 120 S.Ct. 1119 , 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000)). 13 In Heath , we observed that we reach the same result under Kotteakos or Chapman whenever exclusion of evidence reaches reversible error of constitutional magnitude. 2014Heath, 26 A.3d at 281 (emphasis in original to indicate the difference between this rule and the Second Circuit’s rule articulated in Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 705 (2d Cir.1997), rev’d on other grounds, 529 U.S. 61 , 120 S.Ct. 1119 , 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000)). 13 In Heath , we observed that we reach the same result under Kotteakos or Chapman whenever exclusion of evidence reaches reversible error of constitutional magnitude. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor v. Baldor Electric Company
green
2 sentences1974In support of this thesis, the opinion quotes at length from an elementary hornbook on administrative law, a decision 6 of the United States Court of Appeals for this circuit made prior to the enactment of the local Administrative Procedure Act, and a citation to another circuit decision affirming an order of the Civil Aeronautics Board. 7 I am quite aware of the difference between rule-making and adjudication, but what the majority overlooks is that the kind of rule-making involved in a minimum wage determination has been specifically held by both our circuit court and this court to require t 1974In support of this thesis, the opinion quotes at length from an elementary hornbook on administrative law, a decision [6] of the United States Court of Appeals for this circuit made prior to the enactment of the local Administrative Procedure Act, and a citation to another circuit decision affirming an order of the Civil Aeronautics Board. [7] I am quite aware of the difference between rule-making and adjudication, but what the majority overlooks is that the kind of rule-making involved in a minimum wage determination has been specifically held by both our circuit court and this court to requi | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Allentuck v. District of Columbia Minimum Wage & Industrial Safety Board
green
2 sentences1974In support of this thesis, the opinion quotes at length from an elementary hornbook on administrative law, a decision 6 of the United States Court of Appeals for this circuit made prior to the enactment of the local Administrative Procedure Act, and a citation to another circuit decision affirming an order of the Civil Aeronautics Board. 7 I am quite aware of the difference between rule-making and adjudication, but what the majority overlooks is that the kind of rule-making involved in a minimum wage determination has been specifically held by both our circuit court and this court to require t 1974In support of this thesis, the opinion quotes at length from an elementary hornbook on administrative law, a decision [6] of the United States Court of Appeals for this circuit made prior to the enactment of the local Administrative Procedure Act, and a citation to another circuit decision affirming an order of the Civil Aeronautics Board. [7] I am quite aware of the difference between rule-making and adjudication, but what the majority overlooks is that the kind of rule-making involved in a minimum wage determination has been specifically held by both our circuit court and this court to requi | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.