14 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1922–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Appeal of Borough of Churchillgreen2 sentences2018See Appeal of Borough of Churchill , 525 Pa. 80 , 88, 575 A.2d 550 , 554 (1990) ("[W]e are not convinced that there is much of a difference between a hearing and a trial[;] [e]vidence is presented in both proceedings and questions of law are determined."). 2018See Appeal of Borough of Churchill , 525 Pa. 80 , 88, 575 A.2d 550 , 554 (1990) ("[W]e are not convinced that there is much of a difference between a hearing and a trial[;] [e]vidence is presented in both proceedings and questions of law are determined."). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Dotygreen2 sentences2015By contrast, forfeiture . . . does not require that the defendant intend to relinquish a right, but rather may be the result of the defendant’s extremely serious misconduct or extremely dilatory conduct.” Doty, supra at 1189 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). -5- J-S70011-15 “extremely serious misconduct during his direct appeal.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 2015By contrast, forfeiture . . . does not require that the defendant intend to relinquish a right, but rather may be the result of the defendant’s extremely serious misconduct or extremely dilatory conduct.” Doty, supra at 1189 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). -5- J-S70011-15 “extremely serious misconduct during his direct appeal.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Grossman v. Barkegreen1 sentence2006See Grossman v. Barke, 868 A.2d 561 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 889 A.2d 89 , 2005 Pa. LEXIS 2333 (Pa. Oct. 25, 2005). ¶ 15 In Grossman , we examined the difference between a claim of ordinary negligence and one of professional medical malpractice in the context of determining whether expert medical testimony was necessary. | 1 | 1 |
Grossman v. Barkegreen1 sentence2006See Grossman v. Barke, 868 A.2d 561 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 889 A.2d 89 , 2005 Pa. LEXIS 2333 (Pa. Oct. 25, 2005). ¶ 15 In Grossman , we examined the difference between a claim of ordinary negligence and one of professional medical malpractice in the context of determining whether expert medical testimony was necessary. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Murraygreen2 sentences1997In so doing, the court explained that the difference between the standard police must employ when stopping a vehicle for a violation of the Vehicle Code as announced in Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 53 , 58- 59, 331 A.2d 414, 416-17 (1975), citing Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 115 , 307 A2d 875, 879 (1973), i.e., “probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation”, and the standard set forth by the legislature in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(a), i.e., “ar-ticulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation”, is purely semantic and a “distinction without a differenc 1997In so doing, the court explained that the difference between the standard police must employ when stopping a vehicle for a violation of the Vehicle Code as announced in Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 53 , 58- 59, 331 A.2d 414, 416-17 (1975), citing Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 115 , 307 A2d 875, 879 (1973), i.e., “probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation”, and the standard set forth by the legislature in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(a), i.e., “ar-ticulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation”, is purely semantic and a “distinction without a differenc | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Swangergreen2 sentences1997In so doing, the court explained that the difference between the standard police must employ when stopping a vehicle for a violation of the Vehicle Code as announced in Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 53 , 58- 59, 331 A.2d 414, 416-17 (1975), citing Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 115 , 307 A2d 875, 879 (1973), i.e., “probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation”, and the standard set forth by the legislature in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(a), i.e., “ar-ticulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation”, is purely semantic and a “distinction without a differenc 1997In so doing, the court explained that the difference between the standard police must employ when stopping a vehicle for a violation of the Vehicle Code as announced in Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 53 , 58- 59, 331 A.2d 414, 416-17 (1975), citing Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 115 , 307 A2d 875, 879 (1973), i.e., “probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation”, and the standard set forth by the legislature in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(a), i.e., “ar-ticulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation”, is purely semantic and a “distinction without a differenc | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. McElroygreen2 sentences1997Whitmyer, 668 A2d at 1116 ; see also, Commonwealth v. McElroy, 428 Pa.Super. 69, 75 , 630 A.2d 35, 39 (1993) (En Banc) (Murray standard and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308 standard are interchangeable, but “articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect” is the “preferred ” standard so as to avoid any confusion which may be caused by using the term “probable cause” to describe police encounters with citizens which do not rise to the level of an arrest or a search), allocatur denied, 543 Pa. 729 , 673 A2d 335 (1996). 1997Whitmyer, 668 A2d at 1116 ; see also, Commonwealth v. McElroy, 428 Pa.Super. 69, 75 , 630 A.2d 35, 39 (1993) (En Banc) (Murray standard and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308 standard are interchangeable, but “articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect” is the “preferred ” standard so as to avoid any confusion which may be caused by using the term “probable cause” to describe police encounters with citizens which do not rise to the level of an arrest or a search), allocatur denied, 543 Pa. 729 , 673 A2d 335 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pennsylvania Association of Life Underwriters v. Foster
red
2 sentences2005I write separately to express my own reasons and concerns in reaching the conclusion to affirm the trial court’s sentence. ¶ 2 In Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113 (1995), our Supreme Court addressed the difference between the standard articulated in prior court decisions (probable cause to believe that there has been a violation of the vehicle code) and the language of the applicable statute (articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of the vehicle code), holding that “the two standards amount to nothing more than a distinction without a difference.” The Co 2005I write separately to express my own reasons and concerns in reaching the conclusion to affirm the trial court’s sentence. ¶ 2 In Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113 (1995), our Supreme Court addressed the difference between the standard articulated in prior court decisions (probable cause to believe that there has been a violation of the vehicle code) and the language of the applicable statute (articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of the vehicle code), holding that “the two standards amount to nothing more than a distinction without a difference.” The Co | 2 | 1997–2005 |
Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. McAninley
green
1 sentence2020Commonwealth’s Brief at 25 (citing In re Melograne, 812 A.2d 1164 (Pa. 2002) (explaining the difference between a claim that a court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, which is nonwaivable, and a claim that a court lacked power to take a particular action, which can be waived)). [J-14-2020] - 10 III. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Newton v. First Union National Bank
green
1 sentence2017Bank, 316 F.Supp.2d 225 (E.D.Pa. 2004),2 to explain the difference between a defense and a counterclaim, and it cites the case for support of its position that Appellants failed to establish a meritorious defense. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Whitmyer
green
1 sentence2005I write separately to express my own reasons and concerns in reaching the conclusion to affirm the trial court’s sentence. ¶ 2 In Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113 (1995), our Supreme Court addressed the difference between the standard articulated in prior court decisions (probable cause to believe that there has been a violation of the vehicle code) and the language of the applicable statute (articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of the vehicle code), holding that “the two standards amount to nothing more than a distinction without a difference.” The Co | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Watkins v. Prudential Insurance
green
2 sentences1992Elaborating upon the difference between a presumption of fact and a presumption of law, the trial court quoted our supreme court in Watkins v. Prudential, 315 Pa. 497 , 173 A. 644 . (1934): A presumption is in its characteristic feature a rule of law laid down by a judge, and attaching to one evidentiary fact certain procedural consequences as to the duty of production of other evidence by the opponent. 1992Elaborating upon the difference between a presumption of fact and a presumption of law, the trial court quoted our supreme court in Watkins v. Prudential, 315 Pa. 497 , 173 A. 644 . (1934): A presumption is in its characteristic feature a rule of law laid down by a judge, and attaching to one evidentiary fact certain procedural consequences as to the duty of production of other evidence by the opponent. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath
green
2 sentences1983“It is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice.” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 , 71 S.Ct. 624, 652 , 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951). 1983“It is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice.” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 , 71 S.Ct. 624, 652 , 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Barto v. Felix
green
2 sentences1980A review of the decision of this Court in Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262 , 378 A.2d 927 (1977) is instructive in its discussion of the difference between the defense of absolute immunity granted to a high public official and the qualified privilege or immunity defense. 2 . 1980A review of the decision of this Court in Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262 , 378 A.2d 927 (1977) is instructive in its discussion of the difference between the defense of absolute immunity granted to a high public official and the qualified privilege or immunity defense. 2 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Commonwealth v. Baylor
neutral
2 sentences1980In Commonwealth v. Baylor, Jr., 279 Pa.Super. 304 , 420 A.2d 1346 , (1980), a panel of this court addressed the difference between the standard for waiver applied when a defendant collaterally attacks his guilty plea by PCHA proceedings and the standard applied when a defendant petitions to withdraw his guilty plea. 1980In Commonwealth v. Baylor, Jr., 279 Pa.Super. 304 , 420 A.2d 1346 , (1980), a panel of this court addressed the difference between the standard for waiver applied when a defendant collaterally attacks his guilty plea by PCHA proceedings and the standard applied when a defendant petitions to withdraw his guilty plea. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Henderson v. Kibbe
green
2 sentences1977As Mr. Justice Stevens, writing for a majority of the United States Supreme Court, recently noted: “An omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 , 97 S.Ct. 1730, 1737 , 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977). 1977As Mr. Justice Stevens, writing for a majority of the United States Supreme Court, recently noted: “An omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 , 97 S.Ct. 1730, 1737 , 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Hiscock v. Varick Bank of New York
green
1 sentence1939If such creditor refuses to have his security valued or surrender the same, he shall be excluded from participation in the fund.” 6 Compare Ivanhoe Building & Loan Assn. v. Orr, 295 U. S. 243 ; Roberts, 3"., said, at p. 247, “A creditor holding security who realizes upon it, does not 'owe’ his debtor the amount realized.” See also Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U. S. 28 . 7 Among them are the cases cited in the briefs: White’s Estate, 322 Pa. 85, 89 , 185 A. 589 ; Beaver Co. B. & L. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Ivanhoe Building & Loan Assn. v. Orr
green
1 sentence1939If such creditor refuses to have his security valued or surrender the same, he shall be excluded from participation in the fund.” 6 Compare Ivanhoe Building & Loan Assn. v. Orr, 295 U. S. 243 ; Roberts, 3"., said, at p. 247, “A creditor holding security who realizes upon it, does not 'owe’ his debtor the amount realized.” See also Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U. S. 28 . 7 Among them are the cases cited in the briefs: White’s Estate, 322 Pa. 85, 89 , 185 A. 589 ; Beaver Co. B. & L. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
White's Estate
green
2 sentences1939If such creditor refuses to have his security valued or surrender the same, he shall be excluded from participation in the fund.” 6 Compare Ivanhoe Building & Loan Assn. v. Orr, 295 U. S. 243 ; Roberts, 3"., said, at p. 247, “A creditor holding security who realizes upon it, does not 'owe’ his debtor the amount realized.” See also Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U. S. 28 . 7 Among them are the cases cited in the briefs: White’s Estate, 322 Pa. 85, 89 , 185 A. 589 ; Beaver Co. B. & L. 1939If such creditor refuses to have his security valued or surrender the same, he shall be excluded from participation in the fund.” 6 Compare Ivanhoe Building & Loan Assn. v. Orr, 295 U. S. 243 ; Roberts, 3"., said, at p. 247, “A creditor holding security who realizes upon it, does not 'owe’ his debtor the amount realized.” See also Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U. S. 28 . 7 Among them are the cases cited in the briefs: White’s Estate, 322 Pa. 85, 89 , 185 A. 589 ; Beaver Co. B. & L. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
National Bank of Commerce v. Mechanics' American National Bank
neutral
1 sentence1922Mechanics’ American National Bank, 148 Mo. App. 1 , enforced a forfeiture under a Clearing House rule, the very words of which are that: “All checks for other items not returned by 2 P. M. on the day of the receipt shall be deemed to have been paid, with like effect as though such check or other item shall have been paid in currency at that hour over the counter, by the bank or trust company on which it was cleared; and, there fore, tlio responsibility of the bank or trust company, through which said item is passed, shall cease as completely as though said check or other item had been in fact | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.